MILLER (ELMER DAVID) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000296-MR
ELMER DAVID MILLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00100
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Elmer David Miller appeals an order of the Lincoln
Circuit Court extending his probation beyond the maximum statutory two-year
period for a misdemeanor conviction. For the reasons stated, we reverse and
remand.
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
On October 10, 2005, Miller was charged with unlawful transaction
with a minor in the first degree, sodomy in the third degree, and for promoting
prostitution in the first degree for allegedly attempting to convince a child younger
than sixteen years of age to engage in sexual activities. Subsequently, Miller was
indicted for criminal attempt to commit an unlawful transaction with a minor in the
first degree, a misdemeanor offense.
On October 27, 2006, Miller entered a guilty plea to the charged
offense and was sentenced to twelve months in jail, probated for two years. Miller
was ordered to submit to an evaluation and attend counseling as requested by
probation and parole. On October 14, 2008, Miller was summonsed by the trial
court for failing to complete the sex offender treatment program (SOTP). At the
time, Miller was participating in the program but his probation was set to expire
before it was completed. The Commonwealth requested that the trial court extend
Miller’s probation until he completed the sex offender treatment program.
On October 24, 2008, the trial court found that Miller’s probation was
set to expire on October 27, 2008, and issued an oral ruling continuing Miller’s
probation status quo until the probation extension issue could be resolved.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order extending Miller’s probation “until such
time as the community based SOTP is completed.” This appeal followed.
Miller argues that the trial court erred by extending his misdemeanor
probation beyond the maximum statutory period of two years. We agree.
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Probation is a creation of the legislature which possesses the inherent
power to change the parameters of a defendant’s probation by statutory enactment.
Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Ky.App. 1997) (abrogated on
other grounds by Commonwealth v. Merriman, 265 S.W.3d 196 (Ky. 2008)). In
KRS 533.020(4), the legislature provided the following:
The period of probation, probation with an alternative
sentence, or conditional discharge shall be fixed by the
court and at any time may be extended or shortened by
duly entered court order. Such period, with extensions
thereof, shall not exceed . . . two (2) years, or the time
necessary to complete restitution, whichever is longer,
upon conviction of a misdemeanor. Upon completion of
the probationary period, probation with an alternative
sentence, or the period of conditional discharge, the
defendant shall be deemed finally discharged, provided
no warrant issued by the court is pending against him,
and probation, probation with an alternative sentence, or
conditional discharge has not been revoked.
Thus, misdemeanor convictions are subject to a maximum two-year probationary
period, excluding when restitution is ordered as a probationary condition. Id.
The trial court found that it was authorized to extend probation
because Miller failed to complete a condition of his agreed upon probation. The
trial court then wrote the following:
This leaves the Court with [two] options under the law.
The first is to revoke Defendant’s probation for noncompliance with the conditions of probation, and the
second is to extend the probation based on either a
waiver implied from Defendant’s plea agreement
(entered into knowingly and voluntarily), or under the
authority of Griffin and KRS 532.045(4). Both bases are
sufficient for the Court to extend Defendant’s probation.
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While Griffin does permit the extension of probationary terms after the expiration
of the normal probationary period, this authority is inapplicable under the facts of
this case and, thus, was improperly applied to Miller.
In Commonwealth v. Griffin, 942 S.W.2d 289 (Ky. 1997), the court
observed that the purpose of a strict probationary period is to protect a defendant
from being subjected to a probationary status of indefinite duration. Id. at 291.
However, when the period of probation is extended beyond the statutory period at
the request of the defendant in order to avoid a more severe sanction for violating
the original terms of probation, the court concluded that such an extension is “in
harmony with the underlying purpose of the statute[.]” Id.
At his hearing, Miller specifically did not agree to the probation
extension beyond the two-year statutory period. While the trial court ruled that
Griffin supported extending probation, the court’s decision in Griffin only supports
extending probation when the defendant requests the probation extension. Thus,
the trial court, even with its good intentions, was not authorized under Griffin to
extend Miller’s probation. He did not request it and specifically resisted the
extension of his probationary period.
Regarding the trial court’s second basis for extending Miller’s
probation, KRS 532.045(4) provides the following:
If the court grants probation or conditional discharge, the
offender shall be required, as a condition of probation or
conditional discharge, to successfully complete a
community-based sexual offender treatment program
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operated or approved by the Department of Corrections
or the Sex Offender Risk Assessment Advisory Board.
Further, KRS 532.045, which generally deals with sex offenders, contains a
provision, Subsection Nine, that its provisions take precedence over provisions to
KRS 533.010, which contains our foundational probationary conditions.
While Miller points out that KRS 532.045 was not referenced by the
trial court when he was sentenced and given probation, the trial court’s sentencing
order required Miller to complete any counseling recommended by probation and
parole. Therefore, when probation and parole recommended that he complete a
SOTP, he was obligated to comply as a condition of his probation.
When Miller failed to comply with his probation, KRS 532.045 did
not authorize the trial court to unilaterally extend his probationary period. As
stated in KRS 532.045(6), the failure to complete a required sexual offender
treatment program constitutes grounds for the revocation of probation. Therefore,
the trial court could only revoke Miller’s probation or permit his probation to
continue until expiration. Accordingly, the trial court erred by unilaterally
extending Miller’s probation.
We further note that the trial court’s last-minute citation to KRS
532.045 to extend Miller’s probation is problematic for another reason. KRS
532.045(8) provides the following:
Before imposing sentence, the court shall advise the
defendant or his counsel of the contents and conclusions
of any comprehensive sex offender presentence
evaluation performed pursuant to this section and afford
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a fair opportunity and a reasonable period of time, if the
defendant so requests, to controvert them. The court
shall provide the defendant's counsel and the
Commonwealth's attorney a copy of the comprehensive
sex offender presentence evaluation. It shall not be
necessary to disclose the sources of confidential
information.
Miller was not subjected to a comprehensive sex offender presentence evaluation
and an opportunity to confront the contents of the evaluation as required by statute.
Thus, we fail to see how KRS 532.045 would have any application on this case.2
Having reversed the trial court’s order, we are left with deciding how
the proceedings are to be conducted on remand. Miller contends that the trial court
is without jurisdiction over his case because his probation expired on October 27,
2008. The Commonwealth contends that we should remand the matter back to the
trial court for revocation of Miller’s probation. Having reviewed the applicable
law, we remand this case to the trial court for further probation proceedings where
the trial court can determine Miller’s probation in light of our reading of Griffin.
While we understand that Miller’s case has proceeded for over four
years, the Commonwealth initiated probation revocation proceedings against him
prior to the expiration of his two-year probationary period. Miller was in court to
answer for the alleged probation violation before October 27, 2008. Thus, Miller
was on notice and litigating his probation revocation proceeding and, thus,
2
We note that some statutes are mandatory in nature and would be applicable to a defendant’s
case even when the matter was not orally discussed or mentioned in a court’s written judgment.
See Jones v. Commonwealth, 200 S.W.3d 495 (Ky.App. 2006).
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jurisdiction was not lost over his case pursuant to KRS 533.020(4). Gossett v.
Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Ky. 1964).
For the foregoing reasons, the Lincoln Circuit Court’s order is
reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Clay
Danville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Julie Scott Jernigan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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