YOUNG (GEOFFREY M.) VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY , ET AL.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 24, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000292-MR
GEOFFREY M. YOUNG
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01812
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY,
KENTUCKY UTILITIES COMPANY, LOUISVILLE
GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL
UTILITIES CUSTOMERS, THE KROGER COMPANY,
THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY
GOVERNMENT, COMMUNITY ACTION KENTUCKY,
INC./COMMUNITY ACTION COUNCIL FOR
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE, BOURBON, HARRISON
AND NICHOLAS COUNTIES, INC., ASSOCIATION
OF COMMUNITY MINISTRIES/PEOPLE ORGANIZED
AND WORKING FOR ENERGY REFORM,
THE KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY, DUKE
ENERGY KENTUCKY, INC., AND EAST KENTUCKY
POWER COOPERATIVE, INC.
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal of a decision of the Franklin Circuit Court
which held that the appellant, Geoffrey M. Young’s, denial of his request for
intervention was interlocutory and, therefore, not ripe for appeal. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the decision of the Franklin Circuit Court.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Appellee Kentucky Utilities (“KU”) filed a notice of intent to file
Public Service Commission (“PSC”) Case NO. 2008-33251 on July 1, 2008. It
later filed that case on July 29, 2008. Young filed a petition for full intervention
pursuant to KRS 278.310 and 807 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR)
5:001 Section 3(8). Young was informed by letter, that due to ethical obligations
of the PSC’s Chairman and Vice-Chairman, the agency could not rule upon the
petition until after December 1, 2008. On December 5, 2008, in dismissing
Young’s action, the PSC denied Young’s motion for intervention in the KU case.
Appellee, Louisville Gas & Electric (“L G & E”) filed an application
for an adjustment of its rates on July 29, 2008. Young also moved to intervene in
this action. On October 10, 2008, Young’s motion to intervene in LG & E’s case
was denied by the PSC.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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On October 31, 2008, Young filed a “Complaint for Review of
Determinations of the Kentucky Public Service Commission and for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief” with the Franklin Circuit Court. The circuit court found as
follows:
. . . Mr. Young’s appeal of the PSC’s ruling on his
petition for intervention is not ripe for adjudication
because it is interlocutory. Though appeals of PSC
decisions are not governed by the Civil Rules until the
appeal is perfected [See Board of Adjustments of City of
Richmond v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1978)], the
interests at stake here are identical to those contemplated
by the drafters of CR 24.02. Allowing every party who
desires permissive intervention in a PSC rate case to file
an interlocutory appeal to the Franklin County Circuit
Court is unworkable. Halting adjudication of every case
before the PSC to await a ruling as to the propriety of
each denial of permissive intervention would render most
rate cases interminable. The overwhelming time and
expense such a ruling would incur are unjustifiable,
especially given the right to appeal a denial of permissive
intervention upon a final ruling of the PSC. Furthermore,
no statute or regulation provides for such appeal.
Young now appeals the dismissal of his case by the circuit court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the granting of a motion to dismiss, we must determine
whether it appeared that the pleading party would be entitled to relief under any set
of facts that could be proven in support of his claim. Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union of
Kentucky, Local 541, SEIU, AFL-CIO v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801,
803 (Ky. 1977). With this standard in mind, we examine the circuit court’s ruling.
DISCUSSION
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Young first asserts that “[t]he Trial Court committed reversible error by
unilaterally redefining [his] complaint and memorandum nearly out of existence,
by addressing only one claim, and by completely ignoring all of [his] most serious
claims.” Appellant’s Brief at p. 4. Young filed his complaint in Franklin Circuit
Court and, thereafter, amended it. Young attempted to file a second amended
complaint; however, the circuit court never granted him leave to do so. Young
filed yet another “amended” complaint after the hearing on the motion to dismiss
by the court. Again, there was no notice of the motion to amend and such was not
granted by the circuit court. We have, therefore, the original and amended
complaints which were appropriately filed with the court.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 6.04 (1) provides that “[a] written
motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served a reasonable time before the time specified for the
hearing[.]” The amended complaint filed with the circuit court sought relief
regarding KU and LG&E rate cases. As set forth above, the trial court first had to
determine whether Young’s appeal was interlocutory.
In Ashland Public Library Bd. Of Trustees v. Scott, 610 S.W.2d 895,
896 (Ky. 1981), the Court held:
The provisions of CR 54.02(1) do not encompass
orders denying intervention. Applicants for intervention
are not parties to an action and do not present claims for
relief in an action unless and until they are permitted to
intervene. Rather, they seek to become parties so that
they may then assert a claim or defense in the action. CR
24.03. Consequently, recitation of a determination that
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there is no just reason for delay and that the order is final
is neither a condition precedent to appellate review of a
denial of intervention sought as a matter of right, nor a
vehicle to authorize appellate review of a denial of
permissive intervention prior to judgment disposing of
the whole case.
Clearly precedent supports the trial court’s conclusion that the denial of
Young’s motion to intervene was interlocutory and that any appeal of the denial
must occur after final adjudication in the underlying case. In Inter-County Rural
Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 407 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Ky.
1966), the Court held that 807 KAR 5:001 Section 3(8) “reposes in the
Commission the responsibility for the exercise of a sound discretion in the matter
of affording permission to intervene. Intervention as a matter of right is not
specifically defined in the regulation.”
The PSC had denied Young’s motion to intervene in the KU and LG&E
cases. Having determined that the appeals were interlocutory, the court then
properly found it had no jurisdiction over them. We find the circuit court did not
err in making this determination.
Young also contends that the trial court failed or refused to rule on any of his
motions to amend his complaint and memoranda, thereby negating the intent of CR
15.01 and CR 15.04. CR 15.01 provides that “[a] party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served[.]” In
this case, the trial court did just that. CR 15.01 goes on to provide that
“[o]therwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of the court or by
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written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice
so requires.”
Young argues that because Complaint 4 was submitted for the purpose of
making several claims for relief within the time frame specified by the governing
statute, justice required the trial court to allow him to amend his pleading. In any
event, he contends, the trial court addressed only Complaint 4 in its opinions and
orders. Specifically, Young states that while the trial court did not set forth which
version of the complaint was addressed in its opinion and order, it was clear that
Complaint 4 was the one since it referred to a December 2008 decision of the PSC
which was after the date of the filing of the first three complaints. Complaint 4, he
asserts, included the claims arising in part from the denial of that order.
As set forth above, CR 15.01 clearly provides that it is within a court’s
discretion as to whether a second amended complaint may be filed. We find no
reason to hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in this instance.
Finally, Young contends that the jurisdiction of the Franklin Circuit Court
over his complaint had attached. He argues that the trial court’s opinion and order
in this civil action did not include any language that would indicate that subject
matter jurisdiction had not attached. Language in the court’s opinion is not
important in determining whether or not the court had jurisdiction. The Franklin
Circuit court correctly held that it did not have jurisdiction over an interlocutory
order.
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Thus, the trial court was correct in holding that the denial of Young’s
motion to intervene was interlocutory and, consequently, not subject to appellate
review. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision dismissing the action.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Geoffrey M. Young
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION:
David S. Samford
Helen C. Helton
Richard W. Bertelson, III
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
KENTUCKY UTILITIES
COMPANY AND LOUISVILLE
GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY:
Robert M. Watt, III
David T. Royse
Lynn Sowards Zellen
Lexington, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEES
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
KENTUCKY, KENTUCKY
INDUSTRIALUTILITIES
CUSTOMERS, THE KROGER
COMPANY,THE LEXINGTONFAYETTE URBAN COUNTY
GOVERNMENT, COMMUNITY
ACTION KENTUCKY,
INC./COMMUNITY ACTION
COUNCIL FOR LEXINGTONFAYETTE, BOURBON, HARRISON
AND NICHOLAS COUNTIES, INC.,
ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY
MINISTRIES/PEOPLE ORGANIZED
AND WORKING FOR ENERGY
REFORM, THE KENTUCKY
POWER COMPANY, DUKE
ENERGY KENTUCKY, INC., AND
EAST KENTUCKY POWER
COOPERATIVE, INC.
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