STUDER (SEAN), ET AL. VS. JACKSON (WALTER), ET AL.
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RENDERED: APRIL 23, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000267-MR
SEAN STUDER AND CATHLEEN D. STUDER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT W. MCGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00278
WALTER JACKSON
AND PATRICIA JACKSON
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Sean and Cathleen Studer appeal the February 6, 2009,
order of the Harrison Circuit Court denying their motion to alter, amend or vacate
the trial court’s November 10, 2008, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
judgment. That judgment found in favor of Walter and Patricia Jackson with
regards to a property dispute between the parties. In short, the judgment gave the
Jacksons unrestricted access to an easement and enjoined the Studers from
interfering with said access. We find no error with the trial court’s judgment and
thereby affirm.
The parties are the owners of three parcels of land which were
previously owned by Ralph Hopkins as one parcel. The Jacksons acquired their
two parcels, by separate deed, in August of 2002 and August of 2003. The Studers
acquired their parcel in October of 2005. The Studers’ parcel is subject to an
easement running from US 62 to their property. The easement is fifty feet wide
and runs between the two lots owned by the Jacksons. The easement is recorded
on two plats that have been recorded in the Harrison County Clerk’s office. The
plats indicate that the easement is to be used for ingress, egress, and utility
services. All deeds conveying the parcels to their respective owners reference and
incorporate the plats. At the time the Studers acquired their parcel, the easement
contained a gravel driveway, located in the center, and there were five access
points from the driveway to the Jacksons’ parcels.
In August of 2008, the Studers installed fence posts and fencing
across some of the access points to the Jacksons’ property. The Jacksons then filed
a complaint with the Harrison Circuit Court seeking injunctive relief, a declaration
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of rights, and monetary damages. The Jacksons sought a temporary, and
permanent, injunction requiring the Studers to remove the barriers and to
discontinue any future interference with the Jacksons’ use of the easement. The
Studers filed an answer and counterclaim, in which they denied limiting the
Jacksons’ property access and alleged that the Jacksons had trespassed and caused
damage to the Studers’ property. The trial court heard the case on October 7,
2008. On November 10, 2008, the trial court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and judgment were entered. In that judgment, the trial court ordered that the
Studers immediately remove the barriers that were placed across the access points
to the Jacksons’ property and enjoined them from further blocking or interfering
with the Jacksons’ use of their property. It was also ordered that no additional
blacktop be placed on the driveway. The Studers filed a motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the trial court’s judgment, which the court subsequently denied. This
appeal followed.2
The Studers make the following arguments on appeal: 1) the division
of the property by Hopkins was illegal, pursuant to KRS 100.277, and therefore
must be replatted; 2) the easement fails to meet all requirements to make it valid;
3) the trial court’s finding of unlimited scope of use is too broad; 4) the Jacksons’
2
The Studers have previously filed with this Court a motion to hold this appeal in abeyance. In
said motion, the Studers referenced another civil action, currently before the Harrison Circuit
Court, between themselves and the Harrison County Planning Commission. That action
addresses the validity of the plat maps which display the easement, an issue that was not
addressed by the trial court in its November 10, 2008, judgment. Accordingly, the Studers’
motion to hold the appeal in abeyance was denied by an order of this Court, on February 26,
2009.
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concrete and asphalt upon the Studers’ land constitutes an absolute trespass; and 5)
the trial court failed to allocate maintenance costs for the easement among the
parties. We will address each argument in turn.
We address the Studers’ first two arguments together: that the division
of the property was illegal and that the easement fails to meet the requirements that
would make it valid. These arguments are without merit for several reasons. First,
the Studers failed to make this argument to the trial court. It cannot be found in
their answer and counter-claim, and they have failed to otherwise identify where it
may be located within the record. It is therefore improperly preserved for our
review. See CR3 76.12(4)(c)(v). Secondly, we note that the Studers failed to join
the planning commission in the original action. See CR 19.01. The Studers argue
that Hopkins obtained an improper signature from the planning commission
personnel in order to subdivide his property. Any action which challenges a final
action of the planning commission must also include the planning commission as a
party. KRS 100.347(2). Third, we note that this issue, as pointed out by the
Studers to this Court, is currently being pursued in another circuit court action and
is therefore not ripe for our review. Lastly, we note that the Studers failed to
motion the trial court for specific findings regarding this issue, as required by CR
52.04. Accordingly, both of these arguments fail.
We next address the Studers’ argument that the trial court’s finding,
that the Jackson’s use of the easement is unlimited, is too broad. This court will
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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uphold a trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. CR 52.04.
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by substantial
evidence. Black Motor Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Ky. 1965).
Substantial evidence is defined as “that which, when taken alone or in light of all
the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a
reasonable person.” Bowling v. Natural Res. & Envtl. Prot. Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d
406, 409 (Ky. App. 1994). When determining whether the findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence, we will not substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court. Bickel v. Bickel, 95 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Ky. App. 2002).
After a thorough review of the trial court’s judgment, we find no
finding of fact which delegates unlimited use of the easement to the Jacksons.
However, the judgment does contain several legal conclusions which address this
issue. We assume that it is these conclusions which the Studers are in fact
challenging. Those conclusions state that the easement is for the use and benefit of
the Jacksons’ property; that the Jacksons are entitled to use the easement for the
purposes set out in the plats; and that there are no restrictions on the number of
access points allowed by the Jacksons.
The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Gosney v.
Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky. App. 2005). An easement may be established by
express written grant, implication, prescription, or estoppel. Loid v. Kell, 844
S.W.2d 428, 429 (Ky. App. 1992). In the case at hand, there are plats recording
the existence of the easement, and it is therefore established by express written
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grant. Because the validity of the plats containing the easement was not addressed
by the trial court, we must assume that they are valid. The plats are referenced by,
and incorporated into, the deeds which convey the Jacksons’ property and the
Studers’ property to their respective owners. The trial court specifically limits the
Jacksons’ use of the easement to those purposes stated in the plat: ingress, egress,
and utility service. Neither the plats, nor the deeds, limits the number of entrances
that the Jacksons may create in order to fulfill their usage of ingress and egress.
Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court’s conclusions of law regarding
the Jacksons’ use of the easement.
Lastly, we address the Studers’ arguments that the Jacksons’ concrete
and asphalt upon the Studers’ land constitutes an absolute trespass and that the trial
court failed to allocate maintenance costs for the easement among the parties. The
Studers failed to request findings from the trial court as to these issues. As we
have previously noted, a parties’ failure to request a finding on a specific issue
makes it inappropriate for our review. CR 52.04.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Studers have failed to
show error with the trial court’s November 10, 2008, findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and judgment, and it is hereby affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Brennen C. Ragone
Lexington, Kentucky
John P. Brice
Lexington, Kentucky
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