THE ESTATE OF JENNIFER GAYLE TRIPLETT, ET AL. VS. JAMISON (CHRIS), ET AL
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RENDERED: MAY 7, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000257-MR
THE ESTATE OF JENNIFER GAYLE
TRIPLETT; GINA LYNNETT TRIPLETT,
ADMINISTRATRIX; GINA LYNNETT
TRIPLETT; AND TIMOTHY ALAN TRIPLETT
v.
APPEAL FROM BATH CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-90187
CHRIS JAMISON
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2009-CA-000283-MR
THE ESTATE OF TUESDAY NICOLE
HELTON; AND MARSHA HELTON,
ADMINISTRATRIX
v.
APPELLANTS
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BATH CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-90187
CHRIS JAMISON
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Appellants, as the estates, administratrixes of the estates,
and family members of Jennifer Gayle Triplett and Tuesday Nicole Helton, appeal
from a Bath Circuit Court order granting Chris Jamison’s motion for summary
judgment. For the following reasons, we vacate the order and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Factual Background.
In the early 1990’s, Johnnie Maze and some of his friends constructed
a garage on Maze’s property. Maze and his friend, Johnny McCarty, performed
the electrical work on the garage, which satisfied an electrical inspection in 1993.
The garage initially contained a 100 amphere breaker panel. At some point, Maze
replaced that breaker panel with a 200 amphere one, and added an upstairs
apartment to the garage. Maze’s son, Jared, occupied the apartment from 2000
until the structure burned in 2006.
The source of the fire initially was classified as electrical, but it later
was changed to “undetermined due to not being able to determine the point of
origin nor the cause of the fire.” Several months before the fire, Chris Jamison, a
licensed electrician, performed some electrical work on the structure at Maze’s
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request. Thereafter, other people performed additional electrical work, including
the installation of a central heating and air unit, washer, and dryer.
At the time of the fire, Jared, Tuesday Helton and Jennifer Triplett
were in the apartment. Only Jared survived. Thereafter, appellants filed suit
seeking damages for wrongful death and personal injury. The named defendants
included, among others, Maze, Jamison, the electrical inspector, and persons
involved with the installation of the central heating and air unit, washer, and dryer.1
Jamison filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that
Darvin Spencer, appellants’ expert witness, had not attributed any fault to
Jamison’s limited work of installing light switches or installing outside lights. As
noted, the trial court granted Jamison’s motion for summary judgment.
II. Standard of Review.
In reviewing summary judgments, we note that
[w]hile it has been recognized that summary
judgment is designed to expedite the disposition of cases
and avoid unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of
material fact are raised . . . the rule is to be cautiously
applied. The record must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.
Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing
the motion may not succeed at trial, it should not render a
summary judgment if there is any issue of material fact.
The trial judge must examine the evidence, not to decide
any issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It
clearly is not the purpose of the summary judgment rule,
as we have often declared, to cut litigants off from their
right of trial if they have issues to try.
1
At the time the trial court granted Jamison’s motion for summary judgment, some but not all of
the other claims had been resolved.
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Steelvest Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr. Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991)
(citations omitted).
On appeal from a granting of a motion for summary judgment, our
standard of review is “‘whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436
(Ky.App. 2001) (quoting Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996)).
Because no factual issues are involved and only legal issues are before the court on
a motion for summary judgment, we do not defer to the trial court and our review
is de novo. Hallahan v. Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Ky.App. 2004).
III. Issues on Appeal.
On appeal, appellants raise two arguments. First, they contend the
trial court erred by granting Jamison’s motion for summary judgment, since a
factual dispute exists regarding the extent of electrical work performed by Jamison
in or on the structure. Second, appellants assert the trial court erred by failing to
recognize Jamison’s duty to obtain inspections and certificates of compliance for
the work he performed.
In any negligence action brought under Kentucky law, a plaintiff must
prove the existence of a duty, breach thereof, and consequent injury. Mullins v.
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Ky. 1992) (citing Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Vincent, 412 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1967)). The existence of a duty is
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a question of law for the court, while breach and injury are questions of fact for the
jury. Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Ky. 2003). Causation
presents a mixed question of law and fact. Id. Therefore, we review de novo
appellants’ allegation that the trial court erred by finding they had failed to prove
Jamison owed them a duty, since it presents a question of law.
Duty may be established in several ways, but ultimately, “[t]he most
important factor in determining whether a duty exists is foreseeability.” David J.
Leibson, 13 Kentucky Practice: Tort Law § 10:3, at 166 (2008). Although
foreseeability tends to be elusive in definition, perhaps most famously, Judge
Cardozo stated on the subject of duty that “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed[.]” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344,
162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). Generally, each person “‘owes a duty to every other
person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to prevent foreseeable injury.’”
Isaacs v. Smith, 5 S.W.3d 500, 502 (Ky. 1999) (citation omitted). Ordinary care is
defined as the degree of care which a prudent person would exercise under the
same or similar circumstances. T & M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks ex rel. Hicks, 189
S.W.3d 526, 530 (Ky. 2006). However, in cases involving professionals or
professions requiring special skill and expertise, the standard is typically measured
by the standard of conduct customary in the profession under the circumstances.
See, e.g., Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 113 (Ky.
2008); Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky.App. 1978). In such cases,
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expert testimony is typically required to establish the standard of care. Greer's
Adm'r v. Harrell's Adm'r, 306 Ky. 209, 213, 206 S.W.2d 943, 946 (1947).
However, expert testimony is not always required in cases involving
professional negligence. Rather, our courts have long recognized an exception in
cases where the negligence of the professional is so apparent that even a layperson
could recognize it. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 681
(Ky. 2005). Restated, an expert witness is required to establish the standard of care
in professional negligence cases in Kentucky, unless the standard is within the
general or common knowledge of laypersons. Id.
In this case, the standard of care is not within the general or common
knowledge of laypersons. Thus, expert witness testimony is required to establish
that Jamison failed to comply with that standard. The difficulty is that appellants’
sole expert witness, an electrical engineer, testified that he did not know of a
specific code or regulation requiring an electrical inspection in this instance. On
the other hand, the certified electrical inspector who initially inspected the property
in 1993 testified that in Kentucky, “all electrical alterations and inspections made
by a homeowner or an electric contractor need to be inspected and approved by a
certified electrical inspector before use.” In his opinion, “running wire” triggers an
inspection, while installing three-way switches does not.
While Jamison denied running any wires in the structure, the
testimony of Johnnie Maze and Jared Maze suggested that Jamison did run wires.
As such, factual issues existed as to the extent of Jamison’s work and as to whether
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Jamison failed to comply with the applicable standard of care by failing to obtain
an inspection.
Because we hold that summary judgment was improperly granted and
this matter must be remanded for further proceedings, we deem it unnecessary to
address appellants’ claim regarding Jamison’s alleged violation of administrative
regulations pertaining to inspections and certificates of compliance. See 815 KAR2
35:080 § 1.
IV. Conclusion.
The order of the Bath Circuit Court is vacated and this case is hereby
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
2
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANTS THE ESTATE
OF JENNIFER GAYLE TRIPLETT;
GINA LYNNETT TRIPLETT,
ADMINISTRATRIX; GINA
LYNNETT TRIPLETT; AND
TIMOTHY ALAN TRIPLETT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Farrah W. Ingram
Mount Sterling, Kentucky
Todd Trautwein
Morehead, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS THE
ESTATE OF TUESDAY NICOLE
HELTON; AND MARSHA HELTON,
ADMINISTRATRIX:
Paula Richardson
Owingsville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE
ESTATE OF TUESDAY NICOLE
HELTON:
David A. Barber
Owingsville, Kentucky
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