COURTNEY (JUANA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 4, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000254-MR
JUANA COURTNEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00035
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND CLAYTON, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR
JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Juana Courtney appeals from a conviction, entered upon a
jury verdict, for second-degree manslaughter and tampering with physical
evidence. Courtney asserts that the trial court erred by not allowing relevant
evidence about James L. Courtney, the victim, into evidence and that the
Commonwealth violated Batson v. Kentucky in its exercise of peremptory
challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69
(1986). After our review, we affirm.
James Courtney was shot and killed in Fulton County, Kentucky, on
November 10, 2007. On June 12, 2008, the Fulton County Grand Jury indicted
Juana Courtney for murder under KRS 507.020 and tampering with physical
evidence under KRS 524.100. The indictment charged that Juana shot and killed
James.
The jury trial began on December 8, 2008, and concluded three days
later. On the morning of the trial, the trial court addressed several motions in
limine. The motion relevant to this appeal was made by the Commonwealth. It
moved to exclude any mention at trial of James’s purported involvement with the
Hell’s Angels. The Commonwealth argued that this information was not relevant
to whether Juana shot and killed James and that any mention of this information
might unduly prejudice the jury. Juana countered that an inability to present this
evidence would harm her defense.
After arguments, the trial court held that Juana had not provided any
proof that James was actually a member of the Hell’s Angels and that a stigma was
associated with the Hell’s Angels. Thus, the trial court granted the
Commonwealth’s motion and ruled that James’s association with the Hell’s Angels
was not relevant to the issue at hand and would be extremely prejudicial to the
Commonwealth’s case.
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Next, the parties conducted jury selection. Following voir dire, Juana
raised a Batson challenge based on the Commonwealth’s use of its peremptory
challenges to exclude three African-American jurors. The Commonwealth then
articulated its reasons for striking these three jurors. First, the Commonwealth
explained that two of the three potential jurors had not been paying attention
during voir dire and refused to look at its attorney. As to the third juror, the
Commonwealth said that it had prosecuted two of his family members. It provided
the names of the two family members and their relationship to the potential juror.
At this point, the trial court overruled Juana’s Batson objection and stated that the
Commonwealth had given race-neutral reasons for the use of its peremptory
challenges.
Subsequently, the Commonwealth raised a Batson objection to
Juana’s use of peremptory challenges because she used peremptory challenges to
exclude six white males from the jury. Juana’s attorney explained in reference to
one potential juror that he had a bad feeling about the guy. He used his peremptory
challenge for that reason. After observing the similarity between the two parties’
Batson objections, the trial court overruled all the Batson objections.
At the conclusion of the guilt phase, Juana was convicted of the lesser
included charge of second-degree manslaughter and tampering with physical
evidence. During the penalty phase, Juana was able to testify about James’s
alleged membership in the Hell’s Angels. Thereafter, the jury recommended a
sentence of ten years on the manslaughter charge and five years on the tampering
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with physical evidence charge. The sentences were to run consecutively for a total
of fifteen years in prison. This appeal follows.
The basis for Juana’s appeal is twofold. First, Juana maintains that
the trial court erred by excluding evidence to support her defense. She maintains
that telling the jury about James’s membership in the Hell’s Angels was crucial to
her defense. Second, Juana contends that the trial court erred in overruling her
Batson objections because the Commonwealth did not provide an adequate raceneutral explanation for its peremptory challenges.
We will first address whether the trial court erred by excluding
evidence during the guilt phase of the trial about James’s alleged membership in
the Hell’s Angels. It is a well-settled principle of Kentucky law that a trial court
ruling with respect to the admission of evidence will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion. Simpson v. Com., 889 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1994). Consequently,
this Court's standard of review for the admission of evidence is whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Com. v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. This error
was preserved by defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's motion in limine
to exclude evidence about James’s alleged membership in the Hell’s Angels.
The “accused in a criminal trial [is entitled] to due process [which] is,
in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.”
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed 2d 297
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(1973). This right, often referred to as the “right to present a defense,” is firmly
ingrained in Kentucky law. Rogers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29, 39-40 (Ky.
2002). Moreover, “[a]n exclusion of evidence will almost invariably be declared
unconstitutional when it ‘significantly undermine[s] the fundamental elements of
[a] defendant’s defense.’” Beaty v. Com., 125 S.W.3d 196, 206-07 (Ky. 2003),
citing U. S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1267-68, 140 L.Ed.2d
413 (1998). Furthermore, case law instructs that “[i]t is crucial to a defendant's
fundamental right to due process that he be allowed to develop and present any
exculpatory evidence in his own defense, and we reject any alternative that would
imperil that right.” McGregor v. Hines, 995 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Ky. 1999). And
“[a] trial court may only infringe upon this right when the defense theory is
‘unsupported,’ ‘speculat[ive],’ and ‘far-fetched’ and could thereby confuse or
mislead the jury.” Beaty, 125 S.W.3d at 207 (internal citation and quotation
omitted).
Here, Juana’s argument, that the trial court’s refusal to allow her to
discuss her late husband’s association with the Hells’ Angels seriously undermined
her defense and denied her constitutional right to a proper defense, is
“unsupported, speculative, and far-fetched.” Id. Juana was on trial for shooting
her husband. Juana maintains that she fled and hid because of fear concerning her
husband’s associates in the Hell’s Angels. She does not demonstrate, however,
that this fear of her husband’s associates has any relevance to the shooting.
Without providing this nexus, Juana cannot demonstrate the crucial nature of this
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evidence to her defense. While it may be conceded that it has some significance to
the reason that Juana left the scene of the crime or was segregated in prison, Juana
still provides no direct connection between James’s alleged Hell’s Angels
membership and her defense.
Furthermore, Juana was permitted during the trial to present evidence
of James’s prior bad acts. For example, Juana presented witnesses who described
violent acts by James. Moreover, when Juana introduced to the jury pictures of
James at the time of his death, he was wearing clothing bearing the Hell’s Angels
logos. According to her counsel, this insignia is extremely common, and thus, the
jury did have some awareness of a possible connection between James and the
Hell’s Angels. In fact, the only thing that the trial court excluded was mention that
James was a member of the Hell’s Angels. In sum, a review of the record shows
that Juana was able to present thorough and substantial evidence that James was a
violent, intimidating person and that she feared for her life. But Juana did not
provide any essential nexus between James’s alleged Hell’s Angels membership
and her defense.
Notably, a criminal defendants' due process rights are not violated by
every limitation placed on the admissibility of evidence. Id. at 208. In these
circumstances, we cannot presume that the exclusion of this particular evidence
“significantly undermine[d] fundamental elements of the defendant's defense” so
as to merit a reversal here. Id. at 207. Hence, we hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence.
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We will next address Juana’s claim that the trial court erred when it
overruled her Batson objections because she maintains that the Commonwealth did
not provide an adequate race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenges.
After selection of the jury, Juana properly raised Batson objections. She noted that
the jury venire had three African-American members and the prosecution struck all
three members.
On appellate review, a trial court's denial of “a Batson challenge will
not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.” Washington v. Com., 34 S.W.3d 376,
379-380 (Ky. 2000). Moreover, Kentucky jurisprudence informs that “[b]ecause
the trial court is the best ‘judge’ of the Commonwealth's motives in exercising its
peremptory strikes, great deference is given to the court's ruling.” Gray v. Com.,
203 S.W.3d 679, 691 (Ky. 2006) (citing Wells v. Com., 892 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Ky.
1995)). So that, in essence, a trial court's Batson finding is akin to a finding of
fact, and is granted appropriate deference. Rodgers v. Com., 285 S.W.3d 740, 757
(Ky. 2009).
In Batson, the U.S. Supreme Court outlined a three-step process for
evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner
violating the Equal Protection Clause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. First, the
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Id. at 96-97. Second, if the requisite
showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a raceneutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Id. Finally, the trial court
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must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 98. To summarize, a trial court’s finding will not be found
clearly erroneous if the court properly determined that the striking party articulated
a race-neutral explanation for the exercising the strike.
So turning to the three-step process, the preliminary issue of whether
Juana established a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson is moot since
the Commonwealth responded to her Batson challenge and offered race-neutral
explanations for its peremptory challenges, which the trial judge accepted. Thus,
the question for this Court is whether the trial judge correctly ascertained that the
Commonwealth’s explanation for the peremptory strikes of three AfricanAmerican jurors was race-neutral or whether it was clear error for the trial court to
accept the Commonwealth’s reasons for the peremptory strikes as race-neutral.
For one juror, the Commonwealth stated that it had previously
prosecuted two of that juror’s relatives. After inquiry by the court, the
Commonwealth further provided that it had prosecuted two brothers of the
potential juror. The trial court accepted this answer as a race-neutral one. In
Saylor v. Com., 144 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky Supreme Court
said that it was not clear error for the trial judge to accept the previous prosecution
of relatives as a race-neutral reason for peremptory strikes. Thus, bolstered by this
holding and its commonsense implication, we do not find that the trial court
committed error in accepting the Commonwealth’s explanation as a race-neutral
for this juror.
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For Juana’s Batson challenge for the remaining two jurors, we turn to
the second step of the Batson analysis wherein the burden shifts to the prosecutor
to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. The
Commonwealth submitted that its race-neutral reason for using the peremptory
challenges was based on the fact that the potential jurors had not been paying
attention during voir dire and refused to look at its attorney. The third and final
step in the analysis is for the trial court to assess the plausibility of the prosecutor's
explanations in light of all relevant evidence and determine whether the proffered
reasons are legitimate or simply pretextual for discrimination against the targeted
class. In light of all relevant evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the
Commonwealth did in fact strike these two jurors due to their inattentiveness. In
addition, these two jurors were struck along with, and for the same reason as, a
white juror. And the trial court carefully considered the explanation noting that it
had no reason to disbelieve the Commonwealth Attorney’s explanation. In
Snodgrass, the Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly held:
The trial court may accept at face value the explanation
given by the prosecutor depending upon the demeanor
and credibility of the prosecutor.
Com. v. Snodgrass, 831 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Ky. 1992), citing Stanford v. Com., 793
S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1990). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the Commonwealth's proffered reasons were
legitimate.
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While the rationale behind Batson was to eliminate the repulsive
practice of eliminating potential jurors simply because of race, Batson did not
“remove all prosecutorial discretion in peremptory strikes.” Washington, 34
S.W.3d at 379. Accordingly, in the situation herein, we find that the
Commonwealth's reasons for striking the three jurors were race-neutral reasons and
resulted from the prosecutorial discretion underlying peremptory challenges.
Further, we note that a trial judge's findings in this context largely turn on an
evaluation of credibility and are given great deference by a reviewing court.
Stanford, 793 S.W.2d at 114. Hence, we do not find that the trial court erred in its
determination that the Commonwealth’s proffered reasons for the peremptory
strikes were race-neutral, and therefore, affirm its ruling.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Fulton Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Emil Samson
Mayfield, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
M. Brandon Roberts
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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