COLLINS (JOSEPH) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000252-MR
JOSEPH COLLINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-000989
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON; JUDGE; WHITE,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Joseph Collins appeals the denial by the Jefferson
Circuit Court of his motion (filed pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42) which alleged that he had received ineffective assistance
of counsel. After careful review, we remand.
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
On August 8, 2006, Collins pled guilty to complicity to second-degree
burglary and to being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I). The
plea agreement included a “hammer clause,” which provided that the
Commonwealth would drop the PFO I charge and recommend a ten-year sentence
contingent upon the conditions that Collins would: appear at sentencing, not
obtain new charges, avoid contact with his co-defendant and with his victim, and
cooperate with his pre-sentencing investigation.
Collins complied with all conditions of the hammer clause except one.
He did not appear at his sentencing on September 26, 2006. Collins’s counsel
appeared and told the court that he had not heard from Collins since he pled guilty.
The court issued a bench warrant for Collins, and he was arrested in December
2006.
Collins’s sentencing was held on February 19, 2007. He testified that
his stepmother had passed away and that her funeral was held on September 25,
2006 – the day before the sentencing date. Following her funeral, Collins and his
father went to his attorney’s office. He said that they gave his attorney one
thousand dollars (and two ounces of marijuana) in payment and asked him to
request a continuance at the sentencing hearing the next morning. Collins said that
he found out about the bench warrant a few days later but that he was afraid to turn
himself in. The court applied the hammer clause and sentenced Collins to twentyyears’ incarceration.
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In April 2008, Collins filed a motion under RCr 11.42 seeking to
vacate his sentence because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Court-appointed counsel supplemented his motion and requested an evidentiary
hearing in August 2008. The court denied the motions in December 2008. This
appeal follows.
The Commonwealth first argues that Collins’s original RCr 11.42 has
not been preserved for appeal because it was not properly verified. However, the
trial court disposed of the motion based on the merits; additionally, this issue was
not raised before the trial court. Therefore, we will not address the alleged defect
of lack of preservation. Kentucky Rule[s] of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c).
Our standard of review of an RCr 11.42 motion is governed by rules
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States. It has prescribed a twopronged test that a defendant must satisfy in order to sustain his burden of proof in
these cases:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), adopted in Kentucky by Gall
v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Ky. 1985). Both criteria must be
demonstrated in order for the test to be met. The Strickland Court emphasized that
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reviewing courts should assess the effectiveness of counsel in the light of the
totality of the evidence presented at trial and the fundamental fairness of the
challenged proceeding. Id. at 695-96.
The Supreme Court refined the Strickland test in the context of guilty
pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), in which it held that “in order to
satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.
Collins argued that the trial court erred when it did not grant his
motion for an evidentiary hearing to prove that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. We agree.
After an RCr 11.42 motion and the answer to it have both been filed, a
trial court must determine if there are any “material issue[s] of fact that cannot be
conclusively resolved . . . by an examination of the record.” Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001). (Emphasis added). See also RCr
11.42(5).
Collins first contends that the face of the record does not resolve his
argument that his counsel should have requested a continuance as he allegedly
agreed to do. Therefore, he believes that a hearing is required.
Collins claims that he contacted his counsel the day before his
sentencing; but his counsel has denied speaking to him. He believes that this
discrepancy in their version of the facts is a material fact meriting a hearing. He
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believes that if his lawyer had appeared to request a continuance in light of a death
in his immediate family, he would have been spared the application of the hammer
clause.
On August 8, 2006, when Collins entered his guilty plea, the trial
court patiently explained to him that he must comply with all the conditions of the
hammer clause in order to receive the benefits of the plea agreement. Collins
clearly indicated that he understood. At his next court appearing in February 2007,
Collins admitted to the court that he had become aware of the bench warrant for his
arrest within days of its issuance. However, he told the court that he had been too
scared to turn himself in. The court told Collins that if he had come in within a
week, “it would have made all the difference in the world.” Thus, Collins reasons
that the timely explanation of his absence by his counsel would have made “all the
difference.”
We note that the court had already accepted Collins’s guilty plea in
September of 2006. Thus, pursuant to Hill, requesting the continuance was
immaterial to the issue of whether Collins had received effective assistance of
counsel prior to the plea, which preceded the need or request for a continuance in
sentencing. However, the issue remains whether counsel was ineffective in failing
to request a continuance if Collins indeed had so requested and whether Collins
was entitled to rely on counsel at this juncture. Collins’s failure to appear at
sentencing undoubtedly was a material issue according to the literal terms of the
plea and the applicability of the hammer clause.
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We are persuaded that the court should have held an evidentiary
hearing to attempt to ferret out the truth in this case. The face of the record cannot
resolve the contradiction in the versions of the story presented by Collins in his
brief and the representations by counsel in open court that he had not seen Collins
since his release.
Again, appearance by Collins at his sentencing was one of four
material criteria upon which the plea and invocation of the hammer clause
depended. If, after a hearing, the court is satisfied that Collins did not contact
counsel to ask for a continuance, there will be no doubt that the sentence should
stand. If, on the other hand, the court believes that counsel was indeed contacted
and compensated and that he failed to ask for a continuance as agreed, Collins will
be entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
We note that if counsel requested partial payment of marijuana for his
services and/or that he lied in court in representing that he had not seen Collins, the
court shall refer trial counsel to the Kentucky Bar Association for disciplinary
proceedings. KRS. 26A.080.
In light of our decision at this juncture, we need not -- and shall not -address Collins’s argument as to failure of his attorney to advise him about parole
eligibility.
Accordingly, we vacate the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
denying the motion for RCr 11.42 relief and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kate Dittmeier Holm
Assistant Public Advocate
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shakelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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