BECK (MICHAEL D.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000231-MR
MICHAEL D. BECK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00113
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
NO. 2009-CA-000232-MR
MICHAEL D. BECK
v.
APPELLEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00042
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON, JUDGE; WHITE,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Michael Beck, directly appeals from a
January 12, 2009, order of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court revoking his probation in
two separate indictments and reinstating his sentences.2 On appeal, Beck argues
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation and that doing
so violated his state and federal due process rights because he did not knowingly
and voluntarily waive the statutory maximum five-year probation term imposable
in felony cases. After a thorough review of the record, the arguments of the
parties, and the applicable law, we vacate the portion of the order pertaining to the
2002 case and remand for entry of a new order consistent with this opinion.
On March 8, 2002, the Muhlenberg Grand Jury, in indictment number
02-CR-00113, charged Beck with one count of operating a motor vehicle under the
influence, fourth or subsequent offense, in violation of KRS 189A.010, one count
of operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license, third or subsequent offense,
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
These were identified as cases 02-CR-00113, and 07-CR-00042. Beck was sentenced to serve
his three-year sentence in case number 02-CR-00113 consecutively to his nine-year sentence in
case number 07-CR-00042, for a total of twelve-years imprisonment. Beck filed a notice of
appeal for both case numbers appealing the identical revocation order entered in each case, and
the appeals were consolidated upon Beck’s motion.
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and one count of third-degree possession of a controlled substance (Schedule IV or
Schedule V). On June 25, 2002, Beck entered into a plea agreement under which
he pled guilty to one count of operating a motor vehicle under the influence, fourth
or subsequent offense, and violation of operating a motor vehicle with a license
which has been revoked or suspended for driving under the influence, third or
subsequent offense. Final judgment was entered on July 23, 2002, and Beck was
sentenced to three years on both counts, to run concurrently.
As part of the plea agreement, the Commonwealth did not oppose the
trial court’s granting shock probation after Beck served 150 days in jail.
Accordingly, on December 6, 2002, Beck was granted shock probation, and his
sentence was suspended for five years. Thereafter, on February 23, 2007, Beck
was indicted, in case number 07-CR-00042, on two counts of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine and methamphetamine), one count of
trafficking in a controlled substance in the second degree (Lortab), one count for
being a persistent felony offender, one count of possession of marijuana (less than
eight ounces), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia on or about
January 22, 2007.
On March 26, 2007, the Commonwealth moved the trial court to
revoke Beck’s probation in case number 02-CR-00113. Following a hearing on
April 30, 2007, the trial court found that Beck had violated the terms of his
probation by possessing methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. Accordingly,
Beck’s probation was revoked by an order entered on May 4, 2007.
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On May 21, 2007, Beck entered into a plea agreement in case number
07-CR-00042 under which he pled guilty to the amended charges of two counts of
second-degree possession of a controlled substance, one count of persistent felony
offender, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of possession of
drug paraphernalia. Final judgment was entered on June 6, 2007, and Beck was
sentenced to five years on both counts of possession of a controlled substance,
enhanced to nine years by the count of being a second-degree persistent felony
offender, and was sentenced to twelve months on the counts of possession of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Specifically, the agreement
provided that the sentences from the 2007 indictment were to be run concurrently
but were to be, “consecutive with 02-CR-00113, to be probated following service
of six (6) months in 02-CR-00113 from date of revocation of probation, being
April 30, 2007.”
Thereafter, on October 26, 2007, Beck was granted shock probation in
case numbers 02-CR-00113 and 07-CR-00042 for a period of five years.
Nevertheless, on December 22, 2008, the trial court entered an order finding that
Beck had violated the terms and conditions of drug court and had, therefore, been
terminated from the drug court program. As a result, Beck’s case was scheduled
for a probation revocation hearing. Shortly thereafter, on January 8, 2009, the
Commonwealth moved the trial court to revoke Beck’s probation in case numbers
02-CR-00113 and 07-CR-00042.
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A probation revocation hearing was held on January 12, 2009. During
the course of that hearing, testimony was offered by Beck’s probation and parole
officer, who testified that Beck tested positive for drugs three times while on
probation and in drug court, and that a search of his home on December 12, 2008,
revealed drug paraphernalia, pills, and an empty bottle of liquid used for passing a
drug screen. Accordingly, Beck was terminated from drug court on December 22,
2008, and was subsequently charged in case number 08-M-01482 for possession of
a Schedule II controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Following the hearing, the trial court found that Beck had violated the
conditions of probation and granted the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke Beck’s
probation in both the 2002 and the 2007 indictments. Beck was ordered to serve
his three-year sentence in case number 02-CR-00113 consecutively to his nineyear sentence in case number 07-CR-00042, for a total of twelve years’
imprisonment. It is from that order that Beck now appeals.
On appeal, Beck makes one argument, that the court was without
jurisdiction to revoke his probation in case number 02-CR-00113. Beck concedes
that this issue was not raised below. Nevertheless, as this issue is jurisdictional,
the ability to raise it cannot be waived or forfeited by a failure to object. See
Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1985), and Singleton v.
Commonwealth, 208 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. 1948). Further, we note that when the
lower court is alleged to be acting outside of its jurisdiction, the proper standard of
review is de novo because jurisdiction is generally only a question of law. See
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Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 810 (Ky. 2004).
Specifically, Beck argues that his period of probation on case
number 02-CR-00113 expired as a matter of law on September 9, 2008. To briefly
review the timeline of pertinent events, we note that, (1) Beck was granted shock
probation in 02-CR-00113 on December 6, 2002, for a period of five years (a
period initially set to expire on December 6, 2007); (2) Beck violated his probation
on January 22, 2007, and was indicted thereon in case number 07-CR-00042 on
February 23, 2007;3 (3) On October 26, 2007, Beck was again granted probation
for a period of five years.4
Beck argues that as of January 22, 2007, the date that his parole
violation occurred in 02-CR-00113, he had 318 days left to serve on his probation
since the initial expiration date would have been December 6, 2007. Therefore,
when probation was reinstated on October 26, 2007, he should have had 318 days
remaining, making the new expiration date September 9, 2008. Accordingly, Beck
argues that when the court revoked his probation in case number 02-CR-00113 on
January 12, 2009, it was without jurisdiction to do so because the probation period
had expired.
In support of his arguments in this regard, Beck directs this Court to
KRS 533.020(4), which provides that:
3
Indictment 07-CR-00042 provided the grounds for revocation of his probation on April 30,
2007, in case number 02-CR-00113.
4
A review of the court’s October 26, 2007 order reveals that it is styled with both case numbers
02-CR-00113 and 07-CR-00042. Beyond the styling of the order, the order itself does not
specifically reference one case number or the other in granting the five year period of probation.
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The period of probation . . . shall be fixed by the court
and at any time may be extended or shortened by duly
entered court order. Such period, with extensions
thereof, shall not exceed five (5) years . . . upon
conviction of a felony . . . . Upon completion of the
probationary period . . . the defendant shall be deemed
finally discharged, provided no warrant issued by the
court is pending against him, and probation . . . has not
been revoked.
See also Curtsinger v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky. 1977). Thus,
while Beck concedes that the court retained jurisdiction over case number 07-CR00042, it had lost jurisdiction over case number 02-CR-00113, thereby voiding any
order entered with regard thereto. Further, Beck argues that the order is void under
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.5
In response, the Commonwealth concedes that pursuant to KRS
533.020(4), the period of probation for a felony shall not exceed five years even
with extensions. It nevertheless argues that the October 26, 2007, order of the
court granting shock probation for the 2002 and 2007 indictments was not a
reinstatement of Beck’s 2002 probation, but instead, was a decision imposing a
new five-year probation sentence on both indictments. The Commonwealth argues
that this new sentence was given in exchange for Beck’s guilty plea in the 2007
indictment and that by knowingly and voluntarily requesting shock probation on
both indictments, Beck made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the statutory fiveyear maximum probation period.
5
See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990),
citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 718, 732 (1876), in holding that a judgment of a court lacking
personal jurisdiction is void and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
-7-
In support of its arguments in this regard, the Commonwealth directs
this Court to Commonwealth v. Griffin, 942 S.W.2d 289 (Ky. 1997). In Griffin,
our Kentucky Supreme Court departed from the statutory language concerning the
five-year maximum probation period and held that in that case, the trial court
retained jurisdiction over the defendant past the five-year period because the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily requested that the period be extended in
exchange for avoiding imminent revocation of probation and imprisonment.
The Commonwealth, relying on Griffin, asserts that Beck knowingly
and voluntarily extended the probationary period on the 2002 sentence by pleading
guilty to the 2007 indictment under the terms of the Commonwealth’s offer
because Beck received the benefit of a bargain by agreeing to an extension of the
probationary benefit in exchange for being released from jail and placed on
probation again. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we cannot
agree.
Having reviewed Griffin, we find it to be distinguishable from the
matter sub judice. In Griffin, the defendant expressly, knowingly, and voluntarily
agreed that his probationary period would be extended for an additional five years.
In this case, having reviewed the record, we cannot determine that Beck even
understood that his probation would be extended for an additional five years on the
2002 charge or that he expressly agreed for the court to do so. Thus, we cannot
find a knowing and voluntary waiver.
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Beyond that, however, in Griffin, the defendant agreed for the
probationary period to be extended prior to the time that the five-year period had
expired on the initial charge. In the matter sub judice, however, Beck’s period of
probation on the 2002 case expired as a matter of law on September 8, 2008. Beck
was not terminated from drug court until December 22, 2008, and it was not until
January 12, 2009, that the trial court revoked his probation. Accordingly, the court
had already lost jurisdiction over the 2002 case. Thus, any order entered by the
court with regard to the probationary period in that case was void.
Having so found, we are compelled to vacate that portion of the
Muhlenberg Circuit Court’s January 12, 2009, order revoking Beck’s probation on
case number 02-CR-00113 and sentencing him to a corresponding three-year
imprisonment. We hereby remand this matter to the Muhlenberg Circuit Court for
entry of an order that shall reflect these changes to be sent to the Department of
Corrections.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K. R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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