ALLRED (WALTER), ET AL. VS. DIETRICH (JOHN J.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2010: 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000216-MR
WALTER ALLRED, individually;
and IRVIN COBB MARINA, INC.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00474
JOHN J. DIETRICH,
SUSAN DIETRICH and
IRVIN COBB RESORT, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND ACREE, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Walter Allred and Irvin Cobb Marina, Inc. (“Appellants”)
have appealed from the Calloway Circuit Court’s order awarding summary
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
judgment to John and Susan Dietrich and Irvin Cobb Resort, Inc. (“Appellees”)
and finding that Appellants must abide by an agreement concerning certain uses of
both Appellants’ and Appellees’ properties. Because the trial court properly
concluded that the agreement was a covenant, easement, and restriction running
with the land, we affirm.
Clifton and Patricia Roberson and Irvin Cobb Resort, Inc. (the
“Resort”) initially owned a tract of land adjacent to Kentucky Lake (the “Original
Tract”). In October 1995, the Robersons and the Resort conveyed to Irvin Cobb
Marina, Inc. (the “Marina”) and Paul Krueger, its president, a portion of the
Original Tract directly adjacent to Kentucky Lake which included a boat launch
ramp (the “Conveyed Tract”). As part of this conveyance the parties executed an
Agreement to Agree dated October 12, 1995 (the “Agreement”), which was
recorded with the clerk’s office in Calloway County. The Agreement stated that
the patrons of the Resort had the right to use the boat launch ramp located on the
Conveyed Tract, and that the patrons of the Marina had the right to use a parking
lot located on the remaining portion of the Original Tract. The boat launch ramp in
question provided the only access to Kentucky Lake for Appellees and their
patrons.
Subsequently, Walter Allred purchased the Conveyed Tract from the
Marina and Krueger in June 2001. In addition to a deed to convey the property,
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the parties entered into an Assignment of the Agreement to Agree (the
“Assignment”). The Assignment assigned the rights and obligations of the Marina
and Krueger under the Agreement to Allred. The remaining portion of the Original
Tract was ultimately conveyed to John and Susan Dietrich, with the land contract
incorporating the terms of the Agreement and the Assignment.
Although Allred adhered to the provisions of the Agreement and
Assignment for a period of approximately six years after he purchased the
Conveyed Tract, beginning in September 2007, Allred began refusing to permit
Appellees’ patrons to use the boat ramp without paying a fee. In October 2007,
Appellees filed suit against Appellants alleging that Appellants had violated the
Agreement and sought enforcement through an injunction. The trial court entered
a temporary injunction ordering Appellants to abide by the Agreement. Both
parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Appellees, determining that the Agreement constituted a
covenant, restriction, and easement that ran with the title of the land, and therefore
that Appellant was required to abide by its terms. Appellants subsequently filed a
motion to reconsider, which was denied by the trial court. This appeal followed.
When a trial court grants a motion for summary judgment, the
relevant standard of review is “whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432,
436 (Ky. App. 2001) (quoting Scrifes v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
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1996)). The party opposing summary judgment must present “at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.” Lewis, 56 S.W.3d at 436 (quoting Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991)). The trial court must “view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party[.]” Id. (citing
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480-82). Because summary judgment involves only legal
issues, “an appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and will
review the issue de novo.” Lewis, 56 S.W.3d at 436.
With these standards in mind, we will examine Appellants’ claims of
error. Appellants first claim that the trial court erred in finding that the Agreement
was a covenant, restriction, and easement that runs with the title to the land.2 The
Supreme Court of Kentucky has found that a contract between a grantor and a
grantee can create a covenant or restriction upon the use of land. Oliver v. Schultz,
885 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Ky. 1994). Under Kentucky law:
[t]he criteria for determining whether a covenant runs
with the land or is merely personal between the grantor
and the grantee include the intent of the parties, whether
the covenant must affect or concern the land with which
it runs, and whether privity of estate exists between the
party claiming the benefit and the party who rests under
the burden.
2
Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court found that the Agreement was a reciprocal
negative easement. However, we do not believe this doctrine is applicable, as it is generally
applied in situations where a party wishes to place a restriction on the use of a parcel of land in
order to preserve the physical integrity of a larger development, such as a residential subdivision.
See Reiger v. Wessel, 319 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1958); Galbreath v. Miller, 426 S.W.2d 126 (Ky.
1968); and First Security National Bank & Trust v. Peter, 456 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1970).
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Oliver, 885 S.W.2d at 700 (quoting Bishop v. Rueff, 619 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Ky.
App. 1981)). Additionally, a restriction cannot create a burden running with the
land unless it is recorded in an instrument of record “that would place an ordinary
and reasonably prudent attorney performing a title search on notice of the
restrictions in question.” Oliver, 885 S.W.2d at 701.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has stated that the applicable intent
when determining whether a covenant runs with the land is that of the original
promisor and promisee, and whether those parties intended the burden to run with
the land. Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Ky. App.
1987) (overruled on another point by Oliver, 885 S.W.2d at 702). The Court in
Paine additionally held that the burden of a covenant touched and concerned the
land because the parcels were adjacent, and because limiting the use of the
grantor’s land would enhance the value of the grantee’s land. Finally, Kentucky
courts have held that the requisite privity of estate is met when a grantor-grantee
relationship exists at the time the restriction is created. Fishback v. Dozier, 362
S.W.2d 490, 491 (Ky. 1962).
In this case, we agree with the trial court that the Agreement created a
covenant that runs with the land. It is evident from the language in the Agreement
and the conduct of the parties that they intended subsequent purchasers of the
adjacent property to be bound. Further, both the original grantor and the original
grantee provided affidavits that it was their intention that subsequent purchasers
would be bound, as the need to have access to the lake would always be an
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essential part of any business operating on the property. As in Paine, the
restriction relates to the land sold to Appellees in that both parcels are adjacent,
and allowing Appellees patrons free access and use of the boat ramp and the
patrons of Appellants free use of the parking lot enhances the value of both tracts.
Additionally, the privity of estate required under Bishop and Oliver is present, as a
grantor-grantee relationship existed between the original promisor and promisee at
the time of the creation of the restriction. Finally, the Agreement was recorded
within the chain of title.
Because we have determined that the Agreement created a covenant
that runs with the land, we need not address Appellants’ arguments that the
Agreement or Assignment could be terminated at will by the parties.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Dennis L. Null, Jr.
Mayfield, Kentucky
Trevor H. Coleman
Murray, Kentucky
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