PARDUE (DANTE RHONJIA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 2, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000214-MR
DANTE RHONJIA PARDUE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-002771
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Dante Rhonjia Pardue appeals from a Judgment of
Conviction of the Jefferson Circuit Court reflecting a conditional plea of guilty on
one count each of reckless homicide, complicity to commit robbery in the first
degree and complicity to commit burglary in the first degree. Pardue argues that
the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the murder charge (later
pled to reckless homicide) because no probable cause was tendered on that charge
when the Commonwealth successfully moved to transfer the proceeding from
district court to circuit court. We conclude that the circuit court properly
determined that a murder charge arose out of the same course of conduct as the
robbery charge, and accordingly affirm.
On July 1, 2007, Pardue and Jordan Adams went to the residence of a
drug dealer, Troy Cole, for the purpose of robbing Cole. Pardue and Adams were
each 15 years old at the time. Pardue allegedly asked Adams to participate in the
crime because Adams had possession of a firearm. Upon arriving at Cole’s
apartment, Pardue and Adams rushed in when Cole answered the door. Adams
pointed the gun at Cole’s head and demanded money. The record indicates that
Cole initially appeared to comply, but after a brief struggle, Cole produced a
handgun and shot Adams. Adams subsequently died. Cole was later found to have
acted in self defense, though he was charged with various drug offenses.
Pardue was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of firstdegree robbery. Because of Pardue’s age, the matter proceeded in district court.1
During the pendency of the proceeding, the Commonwealth filed a motion to
transfer the matter to Jefferson Circuit Court pursuant to Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 635.020(4). In support of the motion, the Commonwealth relied on
the fact that Pardue’s accomplice, Adams, was armed with a gun at the time of the
robbery.
1
Consistent with local practice, Pardue uses the term “district court” rather than juvenile or
family court.
2
A hearing on the motion was conducted on July 17, 2007, in district
court. The court determined that Pardue was over the age of fourteen at the time of
the offense and that probable cause existed that a handgun was used in the
commission of the offense. At the conclusion of the hearing, jurisdiction over the
action was transferred to Jefferson Circuit Court.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth went before the Jefferson Grand Jury
and obtained an indictment against Pardue on one count each of first-degree
robbery, first-degree burglary and wanton murder. Pardue subsequently moved to
dismiss the murder charge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support of the
motion, Pardue argued that he was not charged with murder in district court, that
the district court made no probable cause finding as to the then nonexistent murder
charge, and that as such there was no statutory basis for the circuit court to
adjudicate a murder charge against a juvenile. Hearings on the motion were
conducted on September 19, 2008, and November 5, 2008, resulting in an Order
denying the motion to dismiss the murder charge.
The Commonwealth subsequently offered Pardue a plea agreement
providing that, in exchange for a guilty plea, the charges would be reduced to
complicity to commit first-degree robbery, complicity to commit first-degree
burglary and reckless homicide. Pardue accepted the plea, subject to the
reservation of his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the murder
charge. The plea was entered on December 9, 2007, and a Judgment of Conviction
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reflecting the plea was rendered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on January 7, 2009.
This appeal followed.
Pardue now argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court committed
reversible error in denying his motion to dismiss the murder charge for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Pardue contends that the circuit court never gained
jurisdiction over the murder charge since that charge was not before the district
court during the transfer hearing and it is not an offense that falls under KRS
635.020(4), which Pardue refers to as the automatic gun transfer statute. The focus
of Pardue’s claim of error is that only those charges which were before the district
court and raised at the transfer hearing, or charges which arose from the same
course of conduct, may properly be transferred to the circuit court pursuant to KRS
635.020(4). Pardue contends that testimony at the transfer hearing created
probable cause to believe that he committed robbery and burglary. However, he
maintains that no probable cause existed for the later allegation that he engaged in
wanton murder. In sum, Pardue argues that Adams’ use of a firearm and his
subsequent death did not arise out of the same course of conduct as the burglary
and robbery, and that as such, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the murder charge.
KRS 635.020(4) provides that a juvenile over the age of fourteen
years who is charged with a felony in which a firearm was used, shall be
transferred to the circuit court. It states that,
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Any other provision of KRS Chapters 610 to 645 to the
contrary notwithstanding, if a child charged with a felony
in which a firearm, whether functional or not, was used
in the commission of the offense had attained the age of
fourteen (14) years at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense, he shall be transferred to the Circuit
Court for trial as an adult if, following a preliminary
hearing, the District Court finds probable cause to believe
that the child committed a felony, that a firearm was used
in the commission of that felony, and that the child was
fourteen (14) years of age or older at the time of the
commission of the alleged felony. If convicted in the
Circuit Court, he shall be subject to the same penalties as
an adult offender, except that until he reaches the age of
eighteen (18) years, he shall be confined in a facility or
program for juveniles or for youthful offenders, unless
the provisions of KRS 635.025 apply or unless he is
released pursuant to expiration of sentence or parole, and
at age eighteen (18) he shall be returned to the sentencing
Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with KRS
640.030(2).
In accordance with this statute, a transfer hearing was conducted on
July 17, 2007, in Jefferson District Court. The district court determined that
probable cause existed to believe that Pardue committed the felony of robbery, that
a firearm was used in the commission of the robbery, and that Pardue was over the
age of fourteen years. Pardue contends that because he was not charged with
murder at the time of the hearing, no probable cause could have existed to support
the then nonexistent murder charge, resulting in no charge to transfer to the circuit
court.
We do not find this argument persuasive. Both Pardue and the
Commonwealth direct our attention to Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234
(Ky. 2001), and Pollini v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. 2005), in support
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of their respective arguments. We find these cases to be directly on point and
dispositive of Pardue’s claim of error. The Kentucky Supreme Court stated in
Pollini at 425 that,
In Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Ky.
2001), this Court stated that “it is the offender that is
transferred to circuit court, not the offense.” Accordingly,
subsequent charges against a youthful offender may be
brought directly in circuit court without conducting a
second set of transfer proceedings if (1) proper District
transfer proceedings have previously been held and a
valid transfer order from those proceedings has been
entered; and (2) the subsequent charges “aris[e] out of the
same course of conduct that gave rise to the offense that
caused the child to be transferred to circuit court.” Id.
The question then is whether Pardue’s subsequent charge, i.e., the
count of wanton murder handed down by the grand jury, arose out of the same
course of conduct which gave rise to the robbery charge. If so, then it was
properly before the circuit court pursuant to KRS 635.020(4). We must answer
that question in the affirmative. The facts giving rise to the burglary of Cole’s
apartment, the robbery of Cole and the death of Jordan Adams are so co-mingled
as to be inseparable. It is uncontroverted that Adams’ death occurred during the
course of the burglary and robbery. The record indicates that Pardue and Adams
pushed their way into Cole’s apartment when Cole answered the door, and that
Adams immediately produced a firearm for the purpose of robbing Cole. Adams
pointed the gun at Cole, resulting in a struggle terminated by Cole’s shooting and
killing Adams. According to Cole, Adams fired a shot during the struggle which
grazed Cole. It cannot reasonably be said that Adams’ death did not, in the
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language of Osborne and Pollini, arise out of the same course of conduct that gave
rise to the robbery. The circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the murder
charge comported with KRS 635.020(4) as well as Osborne and Pollini. As such,
we find no error in the circuit court’s December 1, 2008 Order denying Pardue’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Judgment of Conviction of
the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce P. Hackett
Chief Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro
Public Defender
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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