LEXINGTON - FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT VS. L.L. HANKS, JR. & SONS
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RENDERED: JULY 2, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000209-DG
&
NO. 2009-CA-000926-DG
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNESTO M. SCORSONE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-XX-00037
L.L. HANKS, JR. & SONS
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, VANMETER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (“LFUCG”)
seeks discretionary review from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court which
affirmed an order of the Fayette District Court awarding attorney fees after a
dismissal of a code-enforcement violation citation against L.L. Hanks, Jr. & Sons
(“Hanks”). LFUCG contends that there was no basis for an equitable award of
attorney fees. In its cross-petition, Hanks contends that the award was inadequate.
On or about September 12, 2007, an LFUCG code enforcement
officer inspected a horse barn located at 4601 Athens-Boonesboro Road. This
inspection was apparently done upon a “drive-by” observance of the barn, while
the code enforcement officer was traveling down a main thoroughfare in
Lexington, Kentucky. The code enforcement officer took photographs of the barn
at that time, apparently while stopped on the roadside, which showed that the barn
had holes in the roof and walls. On September 17, 2007, the code enforcement
officer issued a repair notice to Hanks with the directive that the barn either be
repaired and repainted or demolished.
Hanks appealed the repair notice. Hanks’ appeal was heard on
November 20, 2007, by Hearing Officer Beth Rosdatter. At the hearing, the code
enforcement officer presented photographs of the barn. The code enforcement
officer also testified to her personal observation of the condition of the barn. In
addition, pictures were introduced showing that several sections of the barn had
been demolished prior to the hearing.1
1
Apparently there were four separate “wings” to the barn and an open center area, much like
one of the stallion barns at the Kentucky Horsepark. It appears from the photo that only one of
these “wings” remains. We do not agree with LFUCG that this renders the issue moot, however,
as there was still an outstanding code enforcement violation against Hanks which LFUCG
refused to dismiss. The fact that a penalty or fee was not associated with the citation is
irrelevant. As Hanks had suffered adverse legal action, he was entitled to appeal.
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It was noted at the hearing that Hanks was cited for code deficiencies
under Chapter 12 of the LFUCG Code of Ordinances (“the Code”), the chapter
entitled “Housing.” LFUCG testified that Chapter 12 of the Code includes both
residential and non-residential structures. Hanks testified, however, that the barn
was used as part of an agricultural operation and had housed horses as recently as
two months prior to the hearing. Hanks noted that it had contacted LFUCG prior
to the hearing and presented the applicability of the “agricultural supremacy
clause” found in Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 413.072 which exempted his
property from the application of LFUCG’s local ordinances. KRS 413.072
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) It is the declared policy of the Commonwealth to
conserve, protect, and encourage the development and
improvement of its agricultural land and silvicultural land
for the production of food, timber, and other agricultural
and silvicultural products. When nonagricultural land
uses extend into agricultural and silvicultural areas,
agricultural and silvicultural operations often become the
subject of nuisance suits or legal actions restricting
agricultural or silvicultural operations. As a result,
agricultural and silvicultural operations are sometimes
either curtailed or forced to cease operations.
Investments in farm and timber improvements may be
discouraged. It is the purpose of this section to reduce
the loss to the state of its agricultural and silvicultural
resources by clarifying the circumstances under which
agricultural and silvicultural operations may be deemed
to be a nuisance or interfered with by local ordinances or
legal actions.
(2) No agricultural or silvicultural operation or any of its
appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance or trespass,
private or public, or be in violation of any zoning
ordinance, or be subject to any ordinance that would
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restrict the right of the operator of the agricultural or
silvicultural operation to utilize normal and accepted
practices, by any changed conditions in or about the
locality thereof after the same has been in operation for
more than one (1) year, when the operation was not a
nuisance at the time the operation began. The provisions
of this subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance,
trespass, or zoning violation results from the negligent
operation of an agricultural or silvicultural operation or
its appurtenances.
...
(7) Any and all ordinances of any unit of local
government now in effect or hereafter adopted that would
make an agricultural or silvicultural operation or its
appurtenances a nuisance per se, or providing for
abatement thereof as a nuisance, a trespass, or a zoning
violation in the circumstance set forth in this section shall
be void. However, the provisions of this subsection shall
not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent
operation of any such agricultural operation or any of its
appurtenances.
Based on this statute, Hanks requested, via a letter from counsel, that the
Department of Code Enforcement voluntarily dismiss or withdraw the citation.
After the hearing, Hanks made a motion to dismiss the repair notice
and a motion requesting an award of attorney fees and costs. The hearing officer
ultimately issued an order upholding the repair notice, noting that, although KRS
413.072 was applicable, the barn fell within the exception set forth in KRS
413.072(7) because the barn was a nuisance resulting from the negligent operation
of an agricultural operation.2
Hanks appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Fayette District
Court. In the hearing before the district court, the district judge expressed her
2
Interestingly, no evidence of negligence, much less expert testimony regarding the negligent
operation of an agricultural operation, was presented before the hearing officer.
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displeasure with LFUCG’s actions, noting that the code enforcement officer never
actually went onto the property to inspect the barn before citing it, and therefore,
that LFUCG could not have actually known whether the barn was structurally
unsound. In response, LFUCG’s attorney stated: “I can’t speak to the policy of
what the government is doing. I believe that they’re trying to clean up the main
arteries into town for the [World Equestrian] Games that are coming here in 2010.”
The district court reversed the administrative decision, agreeing with
the hearing officer that KRS 413.072 was applicable, but noting that that there was
no proof of negligent operation, and thus, that the barn could not be found to fall
within the exception set forth in KRS 413.072(7). The district court did not
immediately rule on the issue of attorney fees, but instead ordered the parties to
mediate the matter. The parties scheduled mediation, but LFUCG cancelled the
mediation a few days before it was to occur. The district court later noted its
displeasure with LFUCG’s disregard of the clear court order to mediate.
Thereafter, the district court entered an opinion and order awarding Hanks
$6,000.00 in attorney fees based upon the circumstances of the case.
The district court’s ordered stated as follows:
Based upon this Court’s thorough review and
consideration of the record in this case, and the
circumstances presented in this particular case, to-wit;
that a citizen of the Lexington Fayette Urban County
Government has made a valid objection to an action
taken by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government’s Division of Code Enforcement, and
followed it through, and was required to expend an
extreme amount of money to try to address the issue.
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LFUCG appealed the entire matter (both the substantive ruling and the
award of attorneys’ fees) to the Fayette Circuit Court. The Fayette Circuit Court
affirmed the district court. LFUCG now petitions this Court for discretionary
review on the sole issue of the award of attorney fees. LFUCG no longer
challenges the underlying issue concerning the propriety of the citation. Hanks
filed a cross-petition, arguing that the award of attorney fees was inadequate to
cover his actual costs.
The question on review then is whether the equitable award of
attorney fees was properly granted. We also consider the issue raised in Hanks’
cross-petition –whether the award of attorney fees was adequate.
To begin, LFUCG argues that we should reverse the opinion of the
Fayette Circuit Court on the grounds that there is no contract between the parties
nor any applicable statute which would allow Hanks to recover attorney fees.
LFUCG concedes that the district court had the authority to make an award of
attorney fees on equitable grounds. However, LFUCG argues that the record does
not support an equitable basis for the award of attorney fees because there was no
finding of bad faith.
When reviewing the equitable award of attorney fees, this Court gives
deference to the district court because the award of costs and attorney fees is
within the discretion of the trial court. Kentucky State Bank v. AG Services, Inc.
663 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. App. 1984); Dorman v. Baumlisberger, 271 Ky. 806, 113
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S.W.2d 432, 433 (1938). As an award of attorney fees is an exercise of the court’s
discretion, rather than an application of the law, we will not reverse absent an
abuse of that discretion. The test for abuse of discretion is whether “the trial
judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
In Kentucky, we follow the “American Rule,” which precludes the
recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party unless there is a specific
contractual provision or fee-shifting statute which allows recovery. Kentucky State
Bank v. AG Services, Inc., 663 S.W.2d at 755. However, this long-standing rule
does not abolish the equitable principle that a trial court can rely upon its powers in
equity to make an award of attorney fees. Batson v. Clark, 980 S.W.2d 566, 577
(Ky. App. 1998). Indeed, whether to make an equitable award of attorney fees “is
within the discretion of the court depending on the circumstances of each particular
case.” Id. at 577, quoting Kentucky State Bank v. AG Services.
While LFUCG argues that a trial court may not award attorney fees on
an equitable basis unless there is a finding of bad faith, we do not agree. See, e.g.,
Cummings v. Covey, 229 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Ky. App. 2007) (circumstances justifying
equitable award of attorney fees “have never been spelled out.”); Batson v. Clark,
980 S.W.2d at 577 (whether an equitable award of attorneys fees should be made
turns on the particular circumstances of each case). Rather, a trial court may
consider bad faith in determining whether it should award attorney fees, just as it
may consider other factors such as whether a suit is frivolous or whether, as here, a
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city purportedly cites an individual for violation of an ordinance which is
inapplicable and which is unsupported by proper inspection and/or investigation.
While LFUCG cites Lake Village Water Association, Inc. v. Sorrell,
815 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Ky. App. 1991) in support of its argument, this case merely
notes that the Supreme Court has recognized the power of federal courts to award
attorney fees in equity as a sanction for bad faith conduct, and noted the similar
authority of our state courts. However, the tests set forth in the case Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991), which was
cited by Lake Village, are applicable to the federal courts and do not restrict the
ability of the courts of the many states to award fees in equity.
Regardless, the fact that a court may choose to award attorney fees as
a sanction for bad faith conduct does not exclude the myriad other reasons upon
which one of our courts may choose to award fees for counsel in equity.
Moreover, as we have previously stated, such an award is always discretionary,
and even upon a finding of bad faith, the trial court may elect not to make an
equitable award of attorney fees. Golden Foods, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Metropolitan Sewer District, 240 S.W.3d 679, 683 (Ky. App. 2007).
Another case cited by LFUCG, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Dep’t. of
Transp., Bureau of Highways v. Knieriem, 707 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1986), is also
distinguishable from the present case, as it deals with the appellate courts’
authority to award attorney fees where the trial court has elected not to make such
an award. Although the Knieriem case mentions “bad faith,” it is discussing the
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concept from the stance of when an appellate court may award fees where the trial
court has elected not to award them. As previously noted, “trial courts are granted
broad discretion in awarding attorney fees based on their analysis of the unique
facts of each case.” Golden Foods, 240 S.W.3d at 684. It is not the place of the
appellate courts to disturb such discretion absent a finding of abuse.
Here, the district court noted that it was awarding Hanks attorney fees
based upon “the circumstances presented in this particular case.” The District
Court did not go into specifics of all the circumstances which warranted an award
of attorney fees, but noted in its August 19, 2008 order that Hanks had “made a
valid objection to an action taken by the [LFUCG]’s Division of Code
Enforcement, and followed it through, and was required to expend an extreme
amount of money to try to address the issue.” While the district court’s July 25,
2008 opinion and order in favor of Hanks makes clear that it found that no formal
complaint had been filed about the barn prior to the citation and that the code
enforcement officer did not actually inspect the barn in any formal sense, the
district court failed to cite specific reasons in its order for the award of attorney
fees.
This Court is not adequately equipped with information from the
record and the standard language of the order to make a determination as to
whether an award of attorney fees was appropriate in this case. While the trial
courts certainly have the discretion to award attorney fees in equity when they
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deem such an award proper and the circumstances so warrant, an order granting
attorney fees must set out at least some specific reason therefore.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for specific
findings to support its award of attorney fees. While there do appear to be some
grounds which would support such an award, we cannot speculate as to why the
trial court entered its order and award.
As we are remanding on the issue of attorney fees for specific findings
to be made, we cannot now address Hanks’s claim that the award of attorney fees
was inadequate. On remand, the district court shall consider Hanks’s claim that
attorney fees were inadequate and make any award it deems appropriate. We note
that the determination of the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees, much
like that determination of whether equitable attorney fees should be awarded in the
first place, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. C.A. Woodall, III v.
Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 648 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Ky. 1983).
Accordingly, we vacate the award of attorney fees and remand to the
Fayette District Court for specific findings to be made supporting the award of
attorney fees. The trial court shall consider Hanks’ argument that the award was
inadequate before awarding any attorney fees.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Michael R. Sanner
Lexington, Kentucky
Carroll M. Redford, III
Lexington, Kentucky
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