CAMPBELL (RANDY GLEN), ET AL. VS. BINGHAM (BARRY L.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000201-MR
RANDY GLEN CAMPBELL;
ROSE CAMPBELL; GLEN
CAMPBELL; BOBBY J. CAMPBELL;
PAMELA G. HUFFMAN; WILLIAM
WAYNE HUFFMAN; MELISA RICE;
AND RICKEY RICE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00469
BARRY L. BINGHAM; AND
THE ESTATE OF LINDA
HERALD TURNER
AND
NO. 2009-CA-000399-MR
BARRY L. BINGHAM
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00469
RANDY GLEN CAMPBELL;
ROSE CAMPBELL; GLEN
CAMPBELL; BOBBY J. CAMPBELL;
PAMELA G. HUFFMAN; WILLIAM
WAYNE HUFFMAN; MELISA RICE;
AND RICKEY RICE; AND THE ESTATE
OF LINDA HERALD TURNER
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
AND VACATING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, VANMETER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Randy Glen Campbell, et al.1 (hereinafter collectively
referred to as the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices) appeal from an order of the
Grant Circuit Court that awarded Freedis and America Sebastian an easement to
run with the land across four tracts of property owned by the Campbells, Huffmans
and Rices. Barry Bingham cross-appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm in
part and vacate in part.
This appeal arises from an action filed by the Sebastians claiming
damages from interference with an easement over a gravel road that connects their
property to Kentucky State Route 491 and runs across property owned by the
Campbells, Huffmans and Rices. All of the property at issue was once part of a
1
Randy Glen Campbell, Rose Campbell, Glen Campbell, Bobby J. Campbell, Pamela G.
Huffman, William Wayne Huffman, Melisa Rice, and Rickey Rice.
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93.8-acre tract owned by Enoch and Linda Turner. In 1973, the Turners hired a
surveyor to create a plat of their property, and afterwards subdivided their property
into eight tracts in accordance with the plat. The only access to Kentucky State
Route 491 for these eight tracts is via a gravel road across an adjoining property
referred to in this action as “the Joe Reed farm.” Once the gravel road entered the
Turner’s property, it passed through tracts 1, 2, 7, and 8. The gravel road then
went into tract 6, the parcel eventually purchased by the Sebastians, and provided
ingress and egress thereto.
The Campbells, Huffmans and Rices now reside on seven of the eight
tracts. America and Freedis Sebastian owned tract 6 at the time of this action, and
although they never resided there, they often rented the property and allowed their
children to reside there. From 1973 until 2006, the Sebastians claim they never
experienced difficulty using the gravel road, nor knew of any difficulty their
renters experienced. The Campbells, Huffmans and Rices claim during this period
any use of the gravel road was at the request of the residents of tract 6 and with
their permission. At some point in 2006, the Campbells, Huffmans, and Rices
began obstructing use of the road for ingress and egress to tract 6 by standing in
the road to block traffic, placing metal stakes in the road, and eventually sending
the Sebastians a letter advising them they could no longer use the road. As a
result, the Sebastians filed suit seeking an award of an easement and damages for
interference with such easement.
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The trial court denied the Sebastians’ claims of an express or
prescriptive easement, but held the Sebastians had an easement by implication, by
both way of necessity and quasi-easement. Additionally, the trial court denied the
Campbells’, Huffmans’ and Rices’ claim for payment of past upkeep, as well as
payment for the easement. The court also imposed a limitation of one residence
per tract for each of the eight tracts. Finally, the court held the owners of tracts 1
through 8 responsible for one-eighth of the cost of the upkeep of the gravel road
easement to be paid by each owner directly to an independent party. This appeal
and cross-appeal followed.2
I. Issues Raised on Appeal
First, the Campbells, Rices, and Huffmans argue the trial court erred
by finding the Sebastians had a quasi-easement over the gravel road arising by
implication under the law. We disagree.
A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky.App. 2005) (citations
omitted). Such findings are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial
evidence. Id. (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence that “has
sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.”
Id. (citations omitted). The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
Id. (citations omitted).
2
Following entry of the court’s order, the Sebastians sold tract 6 to Barry Bingham by deed
dated February 20, 2009. Thereafter, the trial court granted Bingham’s motion to intervene as
the true party in interest, denied the Campbells’, Huffmans’ and Rices’ motion to set aside the
judgment, and substituted Bingham as the appellee/cross-appellant.
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This court has previously discussed in length the creation of
easements, stating:
Generally, an easement may be created by express
written grant, implication, prescription or estoppel.
Easement by implication includes two legal theories: (1)
quasi-easement and (2) easement or way by necessity. A
quasi-easement arises from a prior existing use of land[.]
A quasi-easement is based on the rule that ‘where
the owner of an entire tract of land or of two or more
adjoining parcels employs one part so that another
derives from it a benefit of continuous, permanent and
apparent nature, and reasonably necessary to the
enjoyment of the quasi-dominant portion, then upon a
severance of the ownership a grant or reservation of the
right to continue such use arises by implication of law.’
Generally, in order to prove a quasi-easement by
implication of law, a party must show: (1) that there was
a separation of title from common ownership; (2) that
before the separation occurred the use which gave rise to
the easement was so long continued, obvious, and
manifest that it must have been intended to be permanent;
and, (3) that the use of the claimed easement was highly
convenient and beneficial to the land conveyed.
Factors relevant to establishing a quasi-easement
include: ‘(1) whether the claimant is the grantor or the
grantee of the dominant tract; (2) the extent of necessity
of the easement to the claimant; (3) whether reciprocal
benefits accrue to both the grantor and grantee; (4) the
manner in which the land was used prior to conveyance;
and (5) whether the prior use was or might have been
known to the parties to the present litigation.’ The courts
imply an easement more readily in favor of a grantee
than a grantor because a grantor has the ability to control
the language in the deed to express the intentions of the
parties. Whether the prior use was known, involves not
absolute direct knowledge, but ‘susceptibility of
ascertainment on careful inspection by persons ordinarily
conversant with the subject.’ Also, the use must be
‘reasonably necessary’ meaning more than merely
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convenient to the dominant owner, but less than a total
inability to enjoy the property absent the use.”
Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489-90 (Ky.App. 2001) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Sebastians demonstrated that the entire 93.8-acre tract
was owned by the Turners from 1958 until at least 1973 when the property was
surveyed and subdivided into eight tracts. But for the gravel road across which the
Sebastians claimed an easement, the entire 93.8 acres as a whole would have been
landlocked without access to Kentucky State Route 491. Evidence was presented
that the Turners used the benefit of the gravel road prior to conveying tract 6 to the
Sebastians. See Hall v. Coffey, 715 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Ky.App. 1986) (“[a]s a
general rule, a landowner who conveys part of his estate ‘impliedly grants all those
apparent or visible easements upon the part retained which were at the time used
by the grantor for the benefit of the part conveyed, and which are reasonably
necessary for the use of that part.’” (citation omitted)). Thus, sufficient evidence
exists to support the trial court’s finding that the Sebastians held a quasi-easement
that runs with the land over the gravel road for ingress and egress.3
Second, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices argue the trial court erred
by finding an easement existed over the gravel road because they lacked notice of
such an easement. We disagree.
3
We decline to review the trial court’s finding that the Sebastians held an easement by way of
necessity. Since the Sebastians no longer own the property, and Bingham owns property
adjoining tract 6 by which he has access to a road, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices argue the
necessity ceases to exist. However, the issue of a way of necessity as it relates to Bingham’s
ownership of tract 6 was not before the trial court, and therefore we are precluded from
addressing the issue. See Abuzant v. Shelter Ins. Co., 977 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Ky.App. 1998)
(Appellate courts are precluded from addressing issues upon which the trial court did not rule).
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The Campbells, Huffmans and Rices fail to direct us to any authority
requiring the burdened property of an appurtenant easement to be put on notice of
the dominant property’s right to an easement. Furthermore, the record reflects that
all parties were aware of the existence of the gravel road by way of the plat
attached to each deed depicting the gravel road, and the Sebastians’ use of the
gravel road for ingress and egress to their property. Accordingly, we find this
argument to be without merit.
Third, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices argue if such an easement
exists, Bingham does not have a right to use it because the Sebastians failed to
contribute to prior upkeep of the gravel road easement. We disagree.
Again, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices do not cite any authority
supporting the notion that the property owner of an otherwise dominant estate
holding a quasi-easement relinquishes ownership of an easement for failure to
contribute to its upkeep. Additionally, the Sebastians offered evidence of their
participation in a road fund, payment for new gravel, and assistance in spreading
gravel on the road for the benefit of the easement. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err by finding the Sebastians held an easement over the gravel road.
Fourth, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices argue the Sebastians’
failure to join the owners of the Joe Reed farm was in error. We disagree.
The Campbells, Huffmans and Rices provide no evidence that the
owners of the Joe Reed farm contested the Sebastians’ use of the portion of the
gravel road over their property. Therefore, the only issue before the trial court was
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the Sebastians’ claim to an easement across property owned by the Campbells,
Huffmans, and Rices. We find no merit to this argument.
Fifth, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices argue the trial court’s
findings are in error because the burden of the easement on their property is
enlarged. We disagree.
The Campbells, Huffmans and Rices argue the trial court’s findings
potentially enlarge the burden on their property because now that Bingham owns
tract 6 and also owns adjoining property he could subdivide tract 6, which would
increase the ingress and egress via the easement. However, the issue of Bingham
potentially subdividing his property was not presented before the trial court, and
therefore, we cannot address that argument here. See Abuzant, 988 S.W.2d at 262.
(holding that appellate courts are precluded from addressing issues upon which the
trial court did not rule).
Sixth, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices argue if an easement across
their property exists, the trial court erred by not awarding them monetary damages
for the value of the easement. We disagree.
The trial court held any claim of payment for the easement would be
offset by the Sebastians claim of damages for interference with the easement and
enjoyment of their property. To support a claim of interference, the Sebastians
presented evidence that the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices prevented access to
tract 6 by standing across the gravel road to block traffic and by placing large
stakes in the road to prevent ingress and egress. Thus, evidence supporting a claim
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of interference was presented to the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court’s
finding that the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices were not entitled to damages was
not in error.
Finally, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices argue the trial court erred
by failing ensure an equitable allocation of the cost of upkeep for the easement.
We disagree.
The trial court ordered each tract owner responsible for one-eighth of
the future cost of the upkeep of the gravel road. We find it reasonable that an
independent party could separately bill each tract owner for an equal proportion of
the cost for upkeep of the gravel road. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by
establishing this payment plan for maintenance of the easement.
II. Issues Raised on Cross-Appeal
Bingham argues the trial court erred by not finding the easement was
created by either express grant or prescription. We disagree.
An express easement is created by a written grant in accordance with
the formalities of a deed. Loid v. Kell, 844 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Ky.App. 1992)
(citations omitted). In this case, the deed from the Turners to the Sebastians did
not specifically designate the right to use the gravel road. The deed did reference
the plat, which depicted the gravel road; however, the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate an express grant of an easement.
The theory behind prescriptive easements derives from the same
principles underlying adverse possession of property. Cole v. Gilvin, 59 S.W.3d
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468, 475 (Ky.App. 2001). Generally, “to obtain a right to a prescriptive easement,
a claimant’s adverse use must be ‘actual, open, notorious, forcible, exclusive, and
hostile, and must continue in full force . . . for at least fifteen years.’” Id. (citation
omitted).
In this case, the Campbells, Huffmans and Rices, as well as the
Turners, acquiesced in the Sebastians’ use of the gravel road from 1973 until 2006.
Accordingly, since the Sebastians’ use of the gravel road was not hostile during
that period, the trial court did not err by finding the Sebastians did not acquire a
prescriptive easement.
III. Issue Raised by Both Parties
Both parties allege the trial court erred by limiting tracts 1 through 8
to one residence per tract. We agree.
It appears from the record that both parties oppose the court’s
limitation on the number of residences per tract and that this issue was not actively
litigated. The limitation was imposed by the court sua sponte and appears to be an
unnecessary restriction at this time. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred by
restricting one residence per tract, and thus this portion of the court’s order is
vacated.
The order of the Grant Circuit Court is affirmed in part and vacated in
part.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS/
CROSS- APPELLEES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Rita Ferguson
Williamstown, Kentucky
Pete W. Whaley
Williamstown, Kentucky
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