DOSTER (JERREL) VS. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD
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RENDERED: APRIL 2, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000168-MR
JERREL DOSTER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-02035
KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD,
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
CABINET
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Jerrel Doster appeals pro se from an order of the Franklin
Circuit Court, entered December 18, 2008, sua sponte dismissing his petition for a
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
writ of mandamus. For the following reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order and
remand to that court for further proceedings.
Doster is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence for trafficking in
a controlled substance in the first degree (two counts), theft by deception over
$300, forgery in the second degree, unlawful possession of a methamphetamine
precursor, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree. When Doster became eligible for parole
after serving three years, the Kentucky Parole Board reviewed his file pursuant to
KRS 439.340(2) and deferred his case for thirty months.
Subsequent to the Board’s deferment of his case, Doster sought
reconsideration of the denial of parole, asserting that the Board had relied on his
resident record card which contained a clerical error. Apparently Doster’s card
stated erroneously that he was serving a 55-year sentence, rather than a 15-year
sentence. The record indicates the card was corrected to reflect the accurate term
of imprisonment by the time the Board denied Doster’s request for reconsideration.
Following the Board’s denial of his request for reconsideration,
Doster petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to
reconsider or review his case, stating that he had “more than clarified to [the
Board] that their decision was based on a clerical error[.]” The court sua sponte
dismissed the petition pursuant to CR2 12.02(f), on the basis that it failed to state a
claim for which relief could be granted. Specifically, the court noted: “Decisions
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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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of the Kentucky Parole Board are not reviewable absent extraordinary legal
circumstances, which do not exist in this situation.” This appeal followed.
On appeal, Doster contends that the court abused its discretion in sua
sponte dismissing his petition. He asserts that the Board’s decision was based on
incorrect information and as a result, his procedural due process right to a fair
parole hearing under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution was violated. He further asserts
that the court’s sua sponte dismissal of the petition failed to comport with minimal
due process requirements, including the provision of notice and a hearing. With
regard to Doster’s latter contention, we agree.
Generally speaking, Kentucky law strongly discourages sua sponte
dismissals under CR 12.02. See Storer Commc’ns of Jefferson County, Inc. v.
Oldham County Bd. of Educ., 850 S.W.2d 340 (Ky.App. 1993); Gall v. Scroggy,
725 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.App. 1987). Cf. Fourroux v. City of Shepherdsville, 148
S.W.3d 303 (Ky.App. 2004) (holding that a trial court’s sua sponte grant of
summary judgment, on the basis that the appellants lacked standing, was proper
where the issue of standing had been extensively briefed and argued by the
parties).
In Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App. 1987), a panel of
this court held that the trial court improperly sua sponte dismissed a complaint
filed by prison inmates for failure to state a claim, pursuant to CR 12.02(f), when
no answers had been filed, no motion for dismissal had been made, and neither
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notice nor a hearing had been provided to the parties. In particular, the court noted
that CR 12.02
clearly contemplates that these defenses will be raised in
the form of a motion by a party defendant, not by the
court. There is no authority in Kentucky that we are
aware of which would allow a circuit court to dismiss a
complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim with or
without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
....
We think it better that a trial court refrain from
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim unless
it is brought to its attention by way of pleading or motion
to dismiss as set forth in CR 12.02. If, however, a trial
court is so inclined to dismiss sua sponte, we believe it
must afford the plaintiff certain minimal procedures as
established by the Court in Tingler [v. Marshall, 716
F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983)] as follows:
(1) allow service of the complaint upon the defendant; (2)
notify all parties of its intent to dismiss the complaint; (3)
give the plaintiff a chance to either amend his complaint
or respond to the reasons stated by the district court in its
notice of intended sua sponte dismissal; (4) give the
defendant a chance to respond or file an answer or
motions; and (5) if the claim is dismissed, state its
reasons for the dismissal. Id. pp. 1111-1112.
Gall, 725 S.W.2d at 869.
The holding in Gall, with respect to minimal due process
requirements, was reaffirmed in Storer. In Storer, the court noted: “In Gall v.
Scroggy, supra, we discussed the policy reasons which dictate against a court
dismissing a complaint without a motion or notice of such intent. Most significant
to us was the loss, or the appearance thereof, of the court’s detachment and its
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assumption of an adversarial role.” Storer, 850 S.W.2d at 341. The court
emphasized that it “clearly attempted to discourage sua sponte dismissals under
CR 12.02 in Gall, and provided a list of ‘minimal procedures’ ‘in order to ensure
due process . . . .’” Id. (quoting Gall, 725 S.W.2d at 869). Although answers had
been filed in Storer, whereas none had been filed in Gall, the court nevertheless
found this distinction immaterial and held that the trial court’s sua sponte grant of
judgment for the appellees on the merits, without a motion for dismissal by any
party, or briefs or arguments on the issues, violated the plaintiff’s due process
rights. Id. at 341-42.
More recently, a trial court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment,
on the basis that the appellants lacked standing, was held to be proper where the
issue of standing had been extensively briefed and argued by all parties. See
Fourroux, 148 S.W.3d at 305. In Fourroux, the court distinguished the situation
therein from that of Storer Communications, on the basis that the parties in
Fourroux had an opportunity to present their arguments to the trial court. See id.
In the present case, the trial court sua sponte dismissed Doster’s
complaint, without a motion for dismissal or summary judgment by any party, and
without providing notice of its intent to dismiss and affording the parties an
opportunity to respond. Irrespective of the merits of Doster’s due process claim
relating to his resident record card, as to which we express no opinion, we find that
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the court improperly sua sponte dismissed his complaint without following the
minimal due process procedures set forth in Gall.3
The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is vacated and this case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jerrel Doster, Pro se
Fredonia, Kentucky
J. Todd Henning
Justice & Public Safety Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
3
Arguably, this issue might be subject to harmless error analysis under CR 61.01. However, no
case has been cited in which the harmless error doctrine has been applied to circumstances such
as those presently before us.
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