WILLIAMS (JEREMY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JANUARY 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000163-MR
JEREMY WILLIAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00458
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, TAYLOR AND WINE, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Jeremy Williams appeals from the Hardin Circuit Court’s
order denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. Finding no error, we affirm.
While on probation for felonies committed in 1999, Williams knocked
on a woman’s door in Hardin County and asked to come into her home. When she
said no, Williams reached inside and grabbed her breast. Williams continued in his
attempts by approaching the door again and pounding on the door. As a result, a
Hardin County grand jury indicted Williams for Sexual Abuse in the First Degree
and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (“PFO II”). With the
assistance of counsel, Williams entered a guilty plea.
Before his sentencing hearing, however, Williams wrote a letter to the
judge requesting to withdraw his guilty plea. He alleged that “[a]t the time my
attorney Nancy Bowman-Denton told me I really don’t have a choice but to take
the plea agreement because I wasn’t going to win the case if I took it to trial.” He
stated that he felt “misled” and “tricked into taking the plea agreement,” and
alleged that he did not fully understand what to do when he was being questioned
by the trial court regarding his guilty plea. The trial court denied his request, and
Williams was subsequently sentenced to five years in prison in accordance with his
plea agreement.
Williams brought a direct appeal, arguing that he had not voluntarily
pled guilty and that the trial court acted improperly in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Although this Court affirmed the trial court, the opinion
contained the following footnote:
(3) Although not mentioned by either party, the
indictment lists the substantive charge as “FirstDegree Sexual Abuse; a Class ‘D’ Felony” and
cites the relevant statutory authority as KRS
510.110. The description of this count reads in
full: “That on or about the 31st day of May, 2004,
in Hardin County, Kentucky, the above named
Defendant committed the offense of First-Degree
Sexual Abuse when he subjected ‘T.M.’, to sexual
-2-
contact.” We mention this because the description
appears more consistent with sexual abuse in the
third degree, a Class B misdemeanor defined in
KRS 510.130 and requiring proof that another
person was subjected “to sexual contact without
the latter’s consent,” than it is with sexual abuse in
the first degree which requires proof of “sexual
contact by forcible compulsion[.]” Nevertheless,
an indictment must be read as a whole so as to
fairly apprise the accused of the crime against
which he is defending. Cavitt v. Commonwealth,
397 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1965). Here, any potential for
confusion over the crime charged was erased by
including the name of the crime, its classification
as Class D felony, and the statutory reference in
the indictment. Furthermore, any defect in the
indictment, other than a claim that “it fails to show
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense,” is
waived if not raised by pretrial motion. Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.18. No
motion was made here so we will not address it
further.
Thereafter, Williams filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 to set aside
his conviction on the basis that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his counsel had failed to address the alleged defect in the indictment. The
trial court granted Williams an evidentiary hearing to address his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying Williams relief
pursuant to RCr 11.42. Williams filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s order, in which Williams did not dispute the findings of fact, but rather the
legal conclusions drawn by the trial court. The motion for reconsideration was
denied, and this appeal followed.
-3-
Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because she
failed to file a motion to dismiss the indictment based on the lack of “forcible
compulsion” in the commission of the charged offense. Williams argues that his
conduct did not conform to the elements of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
510.110, which states in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree
when:
(a) He or she subjects another person to sexual
contact by forcible compulsion.
The indictment listed Williams’ conduct as follows: “That on or about the 31st day
of May, 2004, in Hardin County, Kentucky, the above named Defendant
committed the offense of First-Degree Sexual Abuse when he subjected ‘T.M.’ to
sexual contact.”
When reviewing an RCr 11.42 motion taken from a guilty plea, this
Court has stated that:
[a] showing that counsel’s assistance was ineffective in
enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal
alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two
components: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the
deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome
of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would
not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going
to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366,
370, 80 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Cf., Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90
S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).
-4-
Sparks v. Com., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky. App. 1986). “When the trial court
conducts an evidentiary hearing, a reviewing court must defer to the
determinations of fact and witness credibility made by the trial judge.” Sanborn v.
Com., 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by Leonard v.
Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009)).
Here, any error by counsel in failing to file a motion to dismiss the
indictment did not lead to a reasonable probability that Williams would not have
pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Kentucky courts have held
that an indictment is sufficient if it informs the accused of the specific offense with
which he is charged and does not mislead him. Wylie v. Com., 556 S.W.2d 1, 2
(Ky. 1977). The indictment need not detail the essential elements of the charged
crime, so long as it “fairly informs the accused of the nature of the charged
crime[.]” Thomas v. Com., 931 S.W.2d 446, 449 (Ky. 1996).
In this case, Williams had sufficient notice of the charge against him
because of the statutory reference and the indication that a felony-level offense was
alleged in the indictment. Williams admitted that he read the statute defining FirstDegree Sexual Abuse. Further, the trial court found, and Williams did not dispute,
that counsel had met with Williams on several occasions and that she went over the
discovery with him, which included a description of Williams’ alleged conduct.
Williams also conceded that his counsel advised him that Third-Degree Sexual
Abuse would be a lesser included offense if the case went to trial. The trial court
found, and Williams did not dispute, that his attorney specifically explained that
-5-
the issue of whether force was used would be a factor in the proceedings. As the
trial court found, at the time that Williams pled guilty, it appears that he knew that
he may have been able to establish a misdemeanor level offense rather than the
felony to which he pled. Therefore, counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss the
indictment, while perhaps unwise, did not necessarily influence Williams’ decision
to plead guilty. Because of his failure to meet both of the elements of the modified
Strickland test in these circumstances, Williams has failed to carry the considerable
burden he has to show that his counsel was ineffective.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rachelle N. Howell
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.