STANFORD HEALTH & REHABILITATION CENTER, ET AL. VS. BROCK (LUCILLE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2010: 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000160-MR
STANFORD HEALTH & REHABILITATION
CENTER; BEVERLY HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC.;
BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, INC.;
BEVERLY CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
A/K/A BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, INC.
D/B/A BEVERLY HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC.;
GOLDEN LIVING CENTER - STANFORD;
AND GGNSC STANFORD LLC
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00206
LUCILLE BROCK, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF GLEN WILLIAMS,
DECEASED, AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL WRONGFUL DEATH
BENEFICIARIES OF THE ESTATE OF
GLEN WILLIAMS, DECEASED
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Appellants (collectively “Stanford”) appeal the
January 5, 2009, order of the Lincoln Circuit Court. That order found that an
arbitration agreement was unenforceable in a lawsuit initiated against Stanford by
Lucille Brock, on behalf of Glen Williams, now deceased. Because we hold that
the trial court’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
Williams was admitted to Stanford, a nursing home facility, on June
11, 2004. At that time, he was presented with approximately 15-20 documents for
review and signature, including an arbitration agreement. Jacquie Smith, the
admission coordinator for Stanford, was present during the admission process and
presented the documents to Williams. It is undisputed that Williams did not sign
the arbitration agreement and that his sister, Brock, signed his name on the
document. Williams died on April 1, 2006, and Brock was appointed
administratrix of his estate. Brock subsequently filed suit against Stanford,
alleging negligence, violation of statutory duties, breach of contract, and breach of
fiduciary duty. Brock also sought punitive damages.
Stanford filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing to the arbitration
agreement signed by Brock. That motion was denied in an order that did not
contain either findings of fact or conclusions of law. Stanford appealed that order
and a panel of this Court subsequently vacated and remanded it, with instructions
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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to reconsider Stanford’s motion and render an order setting forth specific findings
of fact and conclusions of law.2
After remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing as to the
validity of the arbitration agreement. An order was then entered, on January 5,
2009, denying Stanford’s motion to compel arbitration. In support of its decision,
the trial court found that neither Williams, nor anyone authorized to sign on his
behalf, actually executed the agreement and that that agreement was
unconscionable. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Stanford makes three arguments. They are: 1) the trial
court erred as a matter of law when it determined that Smith had a duty to insure
that Williams understood the arbitration agreement; 2) the trial court’s finding that
Williams did not authorize Brock to sign for him is clearly erroneous and not
supported by substantial evidence; and 3) the arbitration agreement conforms to all
common law and statutory requirements and is not unconscionable.
A trial court’s findings of fact will “not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.” CR3 52.01. A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when it is not supported by substantial evidence. Eagle Cliff Resort,
LLC v. KHBBJB, LLC, 295 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Ky. App. 2009). Substantial
evidence has been defined as that which, when taken alone or in light of all the
2
See Stanford Health & Rehabilitation Center v. Brock, 2008 WL 2312775 (Ky. App. 2008)
(2007-CA-001703-MR).
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a
reasonable person. Secretary, Labor Cabinet v. Boston Gear, Inc., 25 S.W.3d 130,
134 (Ky. 2000). Legal issues will be reviewed de novo. Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74
S.W.3d 777 (Ky. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Benet v.
Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008).
The trial court concluded that the arbitration agreement is
unenforceable for two separate reasons. These are: 1) neither Williams nor anyone
authorized to sign on his behalf actually executed the agreement, and 2) the
agreement is unconscionable. In support of its conclusion that the agreement was
not properly executed, the trial court made numerous findings. Specifically, it
found that Williams was mentally competent at the time of the admission process,
that he had no legal representative, that he had not executed a power of attorney,
that he informed Smith that no one had the authority to act on his behalf, and that
he did not authorize Brock to sign his name to the arbitration agreement. The trial
court further found that Brock had made it clear to Smith that she did not have the
authority to act on behalf of Williams.
After reviewing the testimony of the parties, we hold that the trial
court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. The trial court concluded
that the agreement is unenforceable because it was not signed by Williams nor an
agent thereof, and such a conclusion is legally sound. See Bottoms v. Bottom, 880
S.W.2d 559, 561 (Ky. App. 1994). As our decision on this issue is determinative
of the case as a whole, we need not address Stanford’s remaining arguments.
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For the foregoing reasons, the January 5, 2009, order of the Lincoln
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
A. Courtney Guild, Jr.
Edward L. Schoenbaechler
Hall, Render, Killian, Health &
Lyman, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Jacques G. Balette
Markes Balette & Giessel, P.C.
Houston, Texas
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Edward L. Schoenbaechler
Jacques G. Balette
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