NUCKOLS (CHRISTOPHER A.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 2, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000152-MR
CHRISTOPHER A. NUCKOLS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHIL PATTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00482
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Christopher A. Nuckols appeals from an order entered by the
Barren Circuit Court denying his motion for relief pursuant to RCr2 11.42 and CR3
60.02. Nuckols claimed his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
not advising the Commonwealth he wanted to plead guilty before the
Commonwealth’s offer on a guilty plea expired. The trial court denied relief upon
finding that Nuckols, with full knowledge that the Commonwealth’s offer would
expire forty-eight hours before trial, did not communicate to his attorney his desire
to take the deal until after it had been withdrawn. Upon review of the briefs, the
record, and the law, we affirm.
We quote the facts as they appeared in the Supreme Court’s direct
appeal opinion: 4
The underlying facts in this case are largely
undisputed by the parties. On September 6, 2003, the
victim returned home from work between 10:00 and
10:30 p.m. She was 6 1/2 months pregnant. After a short
visit from friends, the woman heard someone enter her
home and shortly thereafter was confronted by a large
African-American man with a stocking covering his face,
later identified as [Nuckols]. He appeared to be carrying
a small paddle in the back of his shorts.
Immediately, [Nuckols] grabbed the victim's cell
phone and shut and locked the door to her home. He
threatened the woman, grabbed her breast, and instructed
her to perform oral sex on him. When she refused,
[Nuckols] threw her over the side of a recliner, pulled her
pants off, ripping her underwear, and attempted to have
anal intercourse with her. At some point, [Nuckols]
struck the victim in the face. Next, [Nuckols] threw the
victim to the floor and, after repeated failed attempts at
anal intercourse, forced her to engage in vaginal
intercourse. After ejaculating, [Nuckols] left the victim's
home. During the course of the attack, [Nuckols]
4
Nuckols v. Commonwealth, 2006 WL 1650970, No. 2004-SC-000886-MR, 6/15/2006,
unpublished). The Supreme Court reversed the kidnapping conviction but left the remaining
convictions intact. Because many of the sentences were ordered to run concurrently, the total
length of Nuckols’s sentence was unchanged.
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repeatedly told the victim to “shut up,” threatened to
harm her baby, and referred to her by name. The victim
testified that she recognized [Nuckols] as a neighbor, but
did not know his name. She stated that she remembered
having spoken with him briefly on the day she moved
into her house.
After waiting a short time, the victim, whose cell
phone had been stolen by [Nuckols], left her home and
went to a local convenience store to call the police. A
Glasgow police dispatcher received her telephone call
early in the morning of September 7, 2003. The
dispatcher testified at trial that the victim was distraught
and claimed to have been raped. Officers responded to
the call, and the woman gave a description of her
assailant before being taken to a local emergency room
for examination and treatment of minor injuries. While
at the hospital, the victim was questioned by officers and
identified [Nuckols] in a photo lineup. At least one
officer also went to the victim's residence, the site of the
incident, where he observed signs of a struggle and a
plastic lawn chair placed under one of the windows of the
victim's house.
After [Nuckols] was identified, officers went to his
house, which was located just down the street from that
of the victim. [Nuckols] was apprehended at the rear of
the residence and officers obtained consent from his
mother to search the home. During the search, police
found: a fan blade that had been removed from a ceiling
fan, used condoms, and wadded panty hose. Officers
also observed two plastic lawn chairs, which were similar
to the one found under the window at the victim's
residence. [Nuckols] and his mother were transported to
the police station for questioning. [Nuckols] initially
denied any involvement with the attack. As the
questioning progressed, [Nuckols] made admissions
indicating his involvement in the attack. [Nuckols] then
confessed to police that he had taken the victim's cell
phone and had thrown it out in a park after the assault.
Later that night, [Nuckols] led police to the phone.
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Because he was 17 at the time of the incident, [Nuckols]
was initially charged in juvenile court. Shortly
thereafter, the Commonwealth moved to transfer the case
to circuit court and to proceed against [Nuckols] as a
youthful offender in accordance with KRS 640.010. The
district court granted that motion on September 25, 2003.
Trial began on July 1, 2004 and lasted just two days.
After trial, but before sentencing, [Nuckols] filed a pro
se motion asking for post-trial DNA testing. The court
granted the motion. Testing was completed prior to final
sentencing and showed that DNA samples from bodily
fluids recovered from the victim's body matched samples
provided by [Nuckols]. The report concluded that “[t]he
estimated frequency of this profile is one person in six
quadrillion based on the United States African American
or Caucasian populations.” On September 27, 2004,
[Nuckols] was sentenced to twenty years in prison as
recommended by the jury.
The facts pertinent to this particular appeal are that as early as
November of 2003, the Commonwealth was willing to recommend a sentence of
fifteen years in exchange for Nuckols’s guilty plea to all offenses. In February of
2004, the parties had not reached an agreement and trial was set for July 1, 2004.
On June 4, 2004, the Commonwealth received a letter from Nuckols’s sister urging
the Commonwealth to recommend a sentence of less than fifteen years. On June 8,
2004, the Commonwealth reiterated its offer of fifteen years and again indicated
the offer would expire forty-eight hours before trial. On June 9, 2004, the court
notified defense counsel and the prosecution that it had received a letter from
Nuckols’s sister seeking leniency and a sentence of less than fifteen years. On
June 10, 2004, the Commonwealth advised defense counsel by letter that its best
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offer remained fifteen years. As of the pretrial conference on June 14, 2004,
Nuckols was still intent on going to trial.
Then, on or about June 30, 2004, defense counsel advised the
Commonwealth that Nuckols had changed his mind and wanted to plead guilty in
exchange for the recommendation of a sentence of fifteen years. The sticking
point for Nuckols was the requirement that he would have to serve 85 percent of
the sentence before becoming parole eligible as a violent offender under KRS
439.3401. Counsel testified he conveyed Nuckols’s desire to accept the offer to
the prosecutor on the same day he learned from Nuckols that he wanted to plead
guilty. Four years had passed between trial and the post-conviction hearing and
counsel did not recall if Nuckols had told him he wanted to plead guilty one day or
two days before trial. Either date was within forty-eight hours of the scheduled
beginning of trial and the Commonwealth had withdrawn its offer as it said it
would.
Nuckols filed, pro se, a joint RCr 11.42/CR 60.02 motion claiming
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress a statement he
maintained police had coerced him to give. Pursuant to Nuckols’s request, counsel
was appointed and filed a supplemented motion claiming trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to timely communicate Nuckols’s desire to plead guilty to the
Commonwealth. Following a hearing at which Nuckols, his mother and his trial
attorney testified, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying
relief because: 1) Nuckols’s statement was not coerced; and 2) Nuckols did not
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tell counsel he wanted to plead guilty until after the Commonwealth’s offer had
been withdrawn. This appeal followed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, Nuckols argues only that counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to timely accept the Commonwealth’s offer. He
has abandoned any claim that counsel should have moved to suppress his allegedly
coerced statement.
“The standard of review of an appeal involving a CR 60.02 motion is
whether the trial court abused its discretion.” White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d
83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000). To amount to an abuse of discretion, the trial court's
decision must be “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principals.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Absent
a “flagrant miscarriage of justice,” the trial court will be affirmed. Gross v.
Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983).
The standard of review for denial of an RCr 11.42 motion is wellsettled. To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
prove: 1) deficient performance by counsel that 2) prejudiced the defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);
accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986). Pursuant to Strickland, the standard
of attorney performance is not perfection, but reasonable, effective assistance. The
defendant bears the burden of proof in showing counsel's representation fell below
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an objective standard of reasonableness and he must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel's performance was adequate. Jordan v. Commonwealth,
445 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1969); McKinney v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 874 (Ky.
1969). The defendant also bears the burden of overcoming “the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Since an evidentiary hearing was held, we must
determine whether the trial court erroneously found Nuckols received effective
assistance of counsel. Ivey v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. App. 1983).
In doing so we will “defer to the determination of the facts and witness credibility
made by the trial judge. (citations omitted).” Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d
436, 442 (Ky. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth,
279 S.W.3d 151, 158-59 (Ky. 2009).
Nuckols argues he is serving twenty years, instead of just fifteen, as a
direct result of counsel’s ineffectiveness. He claims the two-prong Strickland
standard was satisfied because the additional five years he will serve is proof of
prejudice and incompetent professional advice. Further, he contends the outcome
would have been different because he would have entered a guilty plea rather than
standing trial.
Nuckols lays blame for the late attempt to accept the
Commonwealth’s offer at his attorney’s feet. According to Nuckols’s testimony,
when his attorney learned of his desire to plead guilty, his attorney promised to
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return with the necessary paperwork (guilty plea form) but failed to do so in a
timely manner and by the time counsel told the Commonwealth that Nuckols
wanted to plead guilty, the offer had been withdrawn.
Curiously, defense counsel was not asked about the timing of the
paperwork during the hearing on the post-conviction motion. Instead, defense
counsel painted a picture of a recalcitrant client who did not want to serve eightyfive percent of a fifteen-year sentence before becoming parole eligible. Trial
counsel testified he had given up on the case ending in a plea bargain because of
the eighty-five percent rule.
Nuckols testified he learned of the Commonwealth’s offer one to two
months before trial, but he understood the offer to be twenty years and he refused
to take it. Then, about a month before trial he learned from his attorney that the
Commonwealth was willing to recommend a sentence of just fifteen years.
Nuckols said he wanted to discuss the offer with his family, which he did, and then
he accepted it. His attorney then informed him that the Commonwealth had
withdrawn the offer. Nuckols acknowledged that he never personally contacted
the judge or prosecutor to request a better deal and during court proceedings he
never indicated he wanted to accept the Commonwealth’s offer.
The evidentiary hearing brought forth two lines of conflicting
testimony. Nuckols testified he decided to accept the Commonwealth’s offer well
in advance of trial and communicated his decision to his trial attorney. In contrast,
the trial attorney testified Nuckols told him a day or two, within forty-eight hours
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of the beginning of trial, that he wanted to enter a guilty plea and counsel conveyed
that fact to the Commonwealth that same day. However, because the decision was
made within forty-eight hours of trial, the Commonwealth had withdrawn its offer
as it had said it would. Haight requires us to give great deference to the trial
court’s view of the facts and witness credibility. In the context of this case, we see
no reason to disagree with the trial court’s assessment of the case.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Barren Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Heather McGregor
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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