ROBLERO (RENE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000127-MR
RENE ROBLERO
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHIL PATTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00034
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Rene Roblero, appeals pro se from an order of the
Barren Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
RCr 11.42. Finding no error, we affirm.
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.580.
Appellant was convicted in the Barren Circuit Court of wanton
murder and tampering with physical evidence in the December 2003 shooting
death of Jose Juan Carillo Blanco. He was sentenced to twenty years’
imprisonment. Appellant’s convictions and sentence were affirmed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court on direct appeal. Roblero v. Commonwealth, 2005-SC000301-MR (October 19, 2006).
On March 28, 2007, Appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate his
sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42. Therein, he alleged that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to ensure that he was provided with adequate interpreters and
for failing to investigate the existence of an individual named “Pedro” or “Pepe.”
The trial court thereafter granted Appellant’s motion for the appointment of
counsel. However, on November 20, 2008, Appellant moved to forgo an
evidentiary hearing and submit the matter on the pleadings. On December 17,
2008, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion.
Thereafter, in response to a motion from Appellant, the trial court rendered specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal ensued.
In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right that would justify the
extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. Dorton v.
Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). An evidentiary hearing is
warranted only “if there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face
of the record.” Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993),
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cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 (1994); RCr 11.42(5). See also Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981
S.W.2d 545, 549 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026 (1999). “Conclusionary
allegations which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary
hearing because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a
discovery deposition.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky.
2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 838 (2003), overruled on other grounds in Leonard
v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). However, when the trial court
conducts an evidentiary hearing, the reviewing court must defer to the
determinations of fact and witness credibility made by the trial judge. McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1986); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934
S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1996); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), sets forth the standards which measure ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. In order to be ineffective, performance of counsel must fall below
the objective standard of reasonableness and be so prejudicial as to deprive a
defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable result. Id. “Counsel is constitutionally
ineffective only if performance below professional standards caused the defendant
to lose what he otherwise would probably have won.” United States v. Morrow,
977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 975 (1993). Thus, the
critical issue is not whether counsel made errors, but whether counsel was so
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“manifestly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable
victory.” Id.
In considering ineffective assistance, the reviewing court must focus
on the totality of evidence before the trial court or jury and assess the overall
performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the
alleged acts or omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered
reasonable professional assistance. Strickland; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986). A defendant is not
guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but
counsel likely to render reasonably effective assistance. McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1130 (1997).
The Supreme Court in Strickland noted that a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Appellant first argues that trial counsel provided ineffective
representation with respect to the court-appointed interpreters. Although Appellant
concedes there are no Kentucky cases on point, he cites to an Iowa decision,
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 2001), wherein the court held that any
deficient conduct on the part of the interpreter can be imputed to the attorney as
ineffective representation. We find no merit to this argument.
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On direct appeal, our Supreme Court addressed Appellant’s argument
that his interpreters were so deficient that he was effectively not present at trial as
provided for in RCr 8.28(1):
[W]e note that the interpreters provided by the Court
were Qualified Level 1 interpreters pursuant to Rule of
Administrative Procedure, Part IX, Section 8. The trial
court was well within its discretion in selecting these
interpreters to assist Appellant during the course of the
trial, including arraignment and all other critical stages of
the trial where Appellant’s presence is mandated by RCr
8.28(1).
Roblero v. Commonwealth, Slip Opinion 8-9. Although the issue was unpreserved
on direct appeal and thus analyzed under the palpable error standard, the Court
noted that there was no evidence that Appellant was dissatisfied with his
interpreters, as he did not bring it to the attention of either the trial court or trial
counsel.
The law regarding the removal of an interpreter is contained in KRS
30A.410(2), which provides:
(2) Upon request of the person for whom the interpreter
is appointed, or on the court’s own motion, an interpreter
may be removed for inability to communicate with the
person, or if for reasonable cause another interpreter is so
desired by the person for whom the interpreter is
appointed, or because the services of an interpreter are
not desired by the person.
Clearly, the burden was on Appellant to bring any complaints he had to the
attention of the trial court or his trial counsel. Appellant was capable of
communicating, as evidenced by a conversation with one of the police detectives
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during which Appellant spoke only English, and as such, he certainly could have
communicated any issues to his counsel.
Appellant has offered no evidence or particular instance where his
court-appointed interpreters failed to adequately perform their duties. Nor has he
described how he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. Moreover,
the trial court in its findings of fact specifically found that Appellant made no
claim that he informed trial counsel that he desired new interpreters. Therefore, if
counsel was unaware of Appellant’s complaint, we clearly cannot conclude that his
performance fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Appellant next argues that counsel provided ineffective representation
by failing to investigate the existence of another perpetrator. Specifically, upon his
arrest, Appellant told police he was forced to shoot the victim by an individual
named “Pepe.” Later, in a second statement, he claimed the individual was named
“Pedro.” Appellant claims that this was exculpatory evidence that someone else
committed the crime and thus, counsel had a duty to investigate and locate this
individual. Again, we disagree.
In Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Ky. 2001),
overruled on other grounds in Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.
2009), the Kentucky Supreme Court held:
This Court has recognized the necessity for complete
investigation by defense counsel. We must agree with
the view expressed by the United States Supreme Court
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in Strickland, supra, to the effect that counsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigation unnecessary
under all the circumstances and applying a heavy
measure of deference to the judgment of counsel. A
reasonable investigation is not an investigation that the
best criminal defense lawyer in the world, blessed not
only with unlimited time and resources, but also with the
benefit of hindsight, would conduct. Thomas v. Gilmore,
144 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 1998). The investigation must be
reasonable under all the circumstances. Stevens v. Zant,
968 F.2d 1076 (11th Cir. 1992).
The record establishes that other than a first name, which Appellant
could not even confirm whether it was “Pepe” or “Pedro,” he provided no
information other than his opinion that this person probably fled to Mexico. The
trial court noted that investigating officers were unable to discover any additional
information about the existence of “Pepe/Pedro.” Further, the two other
individuals who were present at the time of the shooting testified that Appellant
arrived at the murder scene by himself. Thus, under the circumstances, it was not
reasonable for trial counsel to engage in a search spanning the United States and
Mexico for the existence of this unknown individual. Accordingly, counsel’s
performance in this respect cannot be deemed ineffective. Strickland.
Finally, Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of his trial
counsel’s errors warrants relief pursuant to RCR 11.42. However, this claim is
without merit as we have determined that the individual claims of error are
unsubstantiated. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 913, (Ky. 1998),
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overruled on other grounds in Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.
2009).
The order of the Barren Circuit Court denying Appellant’s motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rene Roblero, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
M. Brandon Roberts
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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