HOLLEN (FREDA) VS. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
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RENDERED: MARCH 5, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000119-MR
FREDA HOLLEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01287
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Freda Hollen appeals from an opinion and order of the
Franklin Circuit Court entered on December 17, 2008, affirming a denial of
Hollen’s application for disability retirement benefits by the Board of Trustees of
the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KRS). Hollen argues that the trial court erred
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
by affirming the decision of the Board because the Board’s decision was arbitrary
and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. After our review, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As an initial matter, we note that Hollen’s briefs fail to include
specific references and citations to the record as required by Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v). This failure is particularly notable in
this case because the administrative record is nearly 700 pages in length and has
made verification of Hollen’s factual assertions exceedingly difficult. Although
noncompliance with the provisions of CR 76.12 is not automatically fatal to a
party’s appeal, this Court would be well within its discretion to strike Hollen’s
briefs for these omissions. See CR 76.12(8)(a). We decline to do so, however, and
choose to address Hollen’s appeal on the merits.
Hollen was formerly employed by the Clay County Board of
Education as a cook/baker at Hacker Elementary School. Her membership date in
the County Employees Retirement System was November 2, 1989, and her last
date of paid employment in a full-time position with the System was January 1,
2002. Accordingly, she had 131 months of total service credit. Hollen’s duties as
a cook/baker were classified as “medium” in nature and included preparing and
serving food, stocking frozen food and other grocery items, and cleaning the
kitchen area. According to Hollen, her job required her to be on her feet for seven
hours a day and involved such physical activities as kneeling, crawling, reaching,
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pushing, pulling, bending, and lifting and carrying weights of up to fifty pounds.
KRS notes, however, that handcarts were made available for transporting food and
stock and that Hollen could ask coworkers for help with any heavy lifting.
Hollen first filed an application for disability retirement benefits on
February 18, 2002. Hollen submitted a number of medical records from her
treating physicians to support her position that she was disabled because of “severe
pain and weakness in her neck, back, and right arm” that she had begun
experiencing while employed with the Board of Education. Hollen alleged that
this pain was debilitating to the point that it rendered her unable to perform her job
duties.
The medical records reflect that Hollen first saw Dr. Suzanne
Dansereau of the Parkway Medical Clinic in Manchester, Kentucky, in October
1999 and told her that she had begun having pain in her back after trying to lift a
box of cheese at work.2 Dr. Dansereau ultimately diagnosed Hollen with such
ailments as cervical disc spurs, chronic lower-back and neck pain, fibromyalgia,
right-arm pain, mild right-sided carpal tunnel syndrome, and depression.
However, Dr. Dansereau noted on at least one occasion that previous MRI scans of
Hollen’s spine were “unremarkable.” In a form submitted to KRS in July 2002,
Dr. Dansereau indicated that Hollen’s ailments were such that she would be unable
to perform her job duties.
2
The record does not reflect that Hollen ever filed a workers’ compensation claim.
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Hollen also submitted medical records from Dr. William Brooks, a
neurologist in Lexington, Kentucky. Those records reflect that Hollen suffered
from a mild-to-moderate case of carpal tunnel syndrome on her right side and a
mild case on her left side. However, a bone scan of Hollen conducted in January
2002 was normal, as were an MRI taken of her lumbar spine in April 1999 and a
CT scan of her pelvis conducted in March 1999. In a letter dated January 10, 2002,
Dr. Brooks acknowledged Hollen’s complaints of neck, back, and right-arm pain
but then noted:
After reviewing her cervical and lumbar MRI films, she
does indeed have some arthritis and stenosis in her low
back, but there is no nerve root impingement. The
cervical MRI is fairly unremarkable and also shows no
evidence of nerve root impingement, stenosis, or a
bulging disc. At this point I am really not sure what is
causing Ms. Hollen’s particular symptoms, especially the
right arm pain. I find it unusual that the right arm began
sometime before the neck pain and does not seem to
radiate down the arm as one would expect it to do with
some type of nerve root impingement either from
stenosis or herniated disc.
Dr. Brooks also identified degenerative osteoarthritis as a possible cause for some
of Hollen’s complaints. He further noted that physical therapy had helped Hollen’s
neck pain and increased her range of motion, but it had done nothing for her arm
pain and numbness.
Records from Dr. Rahul Dixit reiterated Hollen’s diagnoses of
fibromyalgia, mild right-sided carpal tunnel syndrome, DDD of the cervical spine
without neurological impingement, and a small posterior spur on her spine. Dr.
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Dixit also concluded that Hollen was suffering from depression with secondary
anxiety. Following an examination conducted on May 14, 2002, Dr. Dixit noted
that Hollen’s cervical spine range of motion was decreased in all directions by 20
percent and that she also suffered from decreased range of motion and tenderness
in her lumbar spine.
Hollen’s application for disability retirement benefits was denied on
September 10, 2002, after her medical records were reviewed – and denial of her
claim recommended – by both the primary and secondary Medical Review Board
physicians. Those doctors found that the records presented by Hollen did not
reflect a “permanently disabling process” and that her claims of being permanently
disabled were not explained or justified by objective medical evidence. Hollen did
not file any further appeals from this decision.
Instead, Hollen subsequently filed a second application for disability
retirement benefits on January 14, 2003. Hollen identified degenerative spine
disease, depression, fibromyalgia, osteoarthritis, and heavy lifting as the causes of
her disability. She further noted that she was no longer able to lift anything, bend
over, reach, climb, concentrate, or sit for more than twenty minutes because of her
ailments. Hollen’s application further provided that she injured her back for the
first time when she attempted to remove a box of cheese from a freezer at work
and that she twisted it again at work while serving food. Hollen also claimed that
her depression had increased as a result of her physical issues.
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Hollen’s second application was accompanied by many of the same
medical records submitted originally along with some new information. A report
dated March 14, 2002, from Dr. Brooks reflected his belief that Hollen suffered
from fibromyalgia. However, he could not find “an isolated abnormality that
would lend itself to surgical correction” and noted that Hollen did not suffer from
any mental or emotional instability. Dr. Brooks further recommended that Hollen
be limited to lifting ten to twenty pounds, but he offered no comments on the
question of whether she could return to her former work. Another report submitted
by Dr. Cary L. Twyman recognized that Hollen suffered from dual-sided carpal
tunnel syndrome.
Hollen also submitted new (and largely illegible) medical records
from her psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia A. Carpio-Carigaba, who diagnosed her with
major depressive disorder (chronic, recurrent, moderate) and gave her a poor
prognosis. Dr. Carpio-Carigaba opined that because of her depression, Hollen was
unable to engage in any gainful employment, but she failed to elaborate on this
conclusion. Hollen also submitted records from Dr. Elmer C. Maggard which
contained extensive discussion about her depression. Notably, an intake note from
July 3, 2003, indicated that Hollen had attempted suicide on two occasions prior to
her employment with the Clay County Board of Education. The first occurred
when she was in high school and felt “worthless” and “embarrassed by her
stuttering.” The second attempt occurred after the birth of her youngest child.
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Hollen also submitted a number of other X-rays and MRIs taken at the
Parkway Medical Clinic. An X-ray report from January 25, 1999, showed “mild
osteopenia” but “no significant bony or joint abnormality[.]” Subsequent X-ray
reports from October 13, 1999, and March 15, 2000, reflected “very mild
positional scoliosis” but were otherwise unremarkable. An MRI of Hollen’s
cervical spine conducted on September 21, 2000, revealed a straightening of the
spine and resulting muscle spasms along with some disc bulging and marginal spur
formation. Another MRI of Hollen’s lumbar spine performed on November 26,
2001, produced an “essentially normal” impression. An MRI of her cervical spine
performed that same day showed some “mild posterior spurring” but no significant
narrowing of the spinal canal or cord. Hollen also submitted a number of other
medical records that are essentially repetitive of what has been said above or
involve unrelated medical issues.
Hollen’s second application for disability retirement benefits was
denied on May 5, 2003, upon the recommendations of the Medical Review Board,
who again found no “objective evidence of a permanently disabling problem.” The
doctors specifically dismissed the idea of fibromyalgia being an objectively
disabling condition. Hollen’s subsequent appeals to the Board were also denied
despite the submission of additional information. On July 26, 2004, Hollen
requested a full administrative hearing before a hearing officer in order to contest
the denial of her application. A hearing was held on December 9, 2004.
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At the hearing, Hollen testified on her own behalf and described in
detail the nature of her former job duties. She also discussed her physical and
mental ailments, noting that she was never completely pain-free, that she had
trouble sitting, and that she often had to rest and change places when she was lying
down. Hollen further testified that she was unable to do much housework anymore
because of the pain that she continued to experience in her neck, back, knees, and
arm. She also indicated that she often could not sleep or eat and felt worthless
because she was unable to do anything. She further noted that she wore a cervical
collar and used a cane to walk while at home and that she had difficulty using her
hands. Hollen presented no other testimony at the hearing, but she did provide the
hearing officer with all of the medical records discussed above.
On April 8, 2005, the hearing officer submitted his “Report and
Recommended Order” concluding that Hollen’s claim for disability retirement
benefits should be denied. The hearing officer classified Hollen’s occupation as
“medium” work3 and noted that her application was based on claims of
degenerative spine issues, depression, fibromyalgia, and osteoarthritis. After
setting forth in extensive detail the substance of the testimony and medical records
presented as evidence, the hearing officer ultimately recommended denial of
Hollen’s application on the following grounds:
5) The Claimant claims that she has various conditions
which prevent her from performing the duties of a
3
KRS 61.600 defines “medium” work as “work that involves lifting no more than fifty (50)
pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to twenty-five (25)
pounds.” KRS 61.600(5)(c)(3).
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Cook/Baker. However, the objective medical evidence
of record does not support her claim for disability. She
has mild to moderate carpal tunnel syndrome. No
evidence of disc herniation or internal disc disruption of
the cervical spine based on the MRI. While she has some
small posterior spurs, there is no neurological
impingement. She had a normal bone scan. (See Dr.
Dixit’s May 2002 report, Exhibit 20, p. 103)
6) The Claimant has been diagnosed with major
depression. As the Systems points out, however, she had
episodes of attempted suicide prior to her initial
membership date.
7) While the Claimant has pain and has complained of
problems with lifting and carrying, the objective
evidence does not support this complaint.
8) As to her depression, it has not been shown that the
depression would prevent her from performing her duties
but, because of the suicide attempts prior to her initial
membership date, it is found that her emotional condition
is a pre-existing condition.
9) As to the Claimant’s mild to moderate carpal tunnel
syndrome, no surgery has been recommended.
10) The Claimant has failed to set forth objective medical
evidence to show that she would be unable to perform
her duties as a Cook/Baker for the Clay County Board of
Education.
11) The Claimant does not have sixteen years of service,
nor has there been a showing of an accident or injury in
the course of employment that has aggravated her
condition.
The Disability Appeals Committee of the KRS Board of Trustees adopted the
Hearing Officer’s “Report and Recommended Order” and denied Hollen’s
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application for disability retirement benefits in a “Final Order” entered on August
25, 2005.
Hollen subsequently filed a petition for review in the Franklin Circuit
Court pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.665(5) and KRS 13B.140.
She specifically disagreed with the Retirement Systems’ conclusion that she had
failed to provide objective evidence to show that she was unable to perform her job
duties as a cook/baker. On December 17, 2008, the circuit court entered an
“Opinion and Order” in which it affirmed the denial of Hollen’s application for
disability retirement benefits. As to Hollen’s claimed physical ailments, the court
justified its decision as follows:
Ultimately, the Board based its rejection of Plaintiff’s
appeal upon a lack of objective medical evidence of
disabling injury. Plaintiff did present objective medical
evidence that she experienced some degenerative disc
disease and osteoarthritis; however, treating physicians
consistently referred to these conditions as substantially
normal. There was no indication that those slight spinal
abnormalities were disabling. Further, although the
Board recognized that Plaintiff did, in fact, have
fibromyalgia, there was very little supplemental or
objective information about the extent to which that
should have disabled Plaintiff. Given the whole record,
the Board’s decision as to Plaintiff’s physical condition
was based upon substantial evidence.
As to Hollen’s claim of disabling depression, the court found no error with the
Board’s conclusion that her depression was a condition that predated her
employment with the Clay County Board of Education:
Plaintiff also submitted medical records from doctors
who treated her depression. These records include
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doctors’ observations of her emotional state, the stressors
Plaintiff encountered, Plaintiff’s reports of hopelessness
and crying spells, medications Plaintiff took to regulate
her mental state, and some largely illegible records
provided by one mental health professional. Also
included in these records are intake forms and
preliminary interviews with Plaintiff, which document
two suicide attempts that occurred before Plaintiff began
working for the Clay County Board of Education. Based
upon those two incidents, it was certainly permissible for
the Board to conclude that Plaintiff’s depression predated
her membership in CERS, which made her ineligible for
disability retirement benefits.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hollen argues that the circuit court erred in affirming the
administrative decision denying her application for disability retirement benefits
and claims that that decision went against the evidence. Pursuant to KRS
13B.090(7), the burden of proof rests on the party who is seeking benefits from the
agency. McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d 454, 457-58 (Ky.
App. 2003). In cases where a party seeking disability retirement benefits was
denied such, “the issue on appeal is whether the evidence in that party’s favor is so
compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded by it.” Id.
at 458. “In its role as a finder of fact, an administrative agency is afforded great
latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility of witnesses,
including its findings and conclusions of fact.” Aubrey v. Office of Attorney
General, 994 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Ky. App. 1998). Accordingly, “[a] reviewing
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court is not free to substitute its judgment for that of an agency on a factual issue
unless the agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious.” McManus, 124 S.W.3d
at 458. Ultimately, this court’s role “is to review the administrative decision, not
to reinterpret or reconsider the merits of the claim.” Lindall v. Kentucky
Retirement Systems, 112 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Ky. App. 2003).
KRS 61.600 provides members of the County Employees Retirement
System with disability retirement benefits when certain conditions are met. That
statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) Any person may qualify to retire on disability, subject
to the following conditions:
....
(3) Upon the examination of the objective medical
evidence by licensed physicians pursuant to KRS 61.665,
it shall be determined that:
(a) The person, since his last day of paid
employment, has been mentally or physically
incapacitated to perform the job, or jobs of like
duties, from which he received his last paid
employment. In determining whether the person
may return to a job of like duties, any reasonable
accommodation by the employer as provided in 42
U.S.C. sec. 12111(9) and 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 shall
be considered;
(b) The incapacity is a result of bodily injury,
mental illness, or disease. For purposes of this
section, “injury” means any physical harm or
damage to the human organism other than disease
or mental illness;
(c) The incapacity is deemed to be permanent; and
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(d) The incapacity does not result directly or
indirectly from bodily injury, mental illness,
disease, or condition which pre-existed
membership in the system or reemployment,
whichever is most recent. For purposes of this
subsection, reemployment shall not mean a change
of employment between employers participating in
the retirement systems administered by the
Kentucky Retirement Systems with no loss of
service credit.
(4) Paragraph (d) of subsection (3) of this section shall
not apply if:
(a) The incapacity is a result of bodily injury,
mental illness, disease, or condition which has
been substantially aggravated by an injury or
accident arising out of or in the course of
employment; or
(b) The person has at least sixteen (16) years'
current or prior service for employment with
employers participating in the retirement systems
administered by the Kentucky Retirement
Systems.4
Essentially, then, a person seeking benefits is required to show, via “objective
medical evidence,” a permanent5 inability – because of bodily injury, mental
illness, or disease – to perform her old job duties. Moreover, these incapacitating
conditions cannot have existed prior to the applicant’s membership in the system.
4
KRS 61.600 also requires preliminary qualifications such as length of service and timely
filings, but these appear to have been satisfied.
5
Under KRS 61.600, “[a]n incapacity shall be deemed to be permanent if it is expected to result
in death or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months
from the person's last day of paid employment in a regular full-time position.” KRS
61.600(5)(a)(1).
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After reviewing the administrative record and the parties’ arguments,
we cannot say that they compel reversal of the administrative decision since “[t]he
evidence is not so overwhelming that the hearing officer’s decision was
unreasonable.” McManus, 124 S.W.3d at 459. The fact that we might disagree
with the administrative decision is of no consequence. As noted by the hearing
officer and the circuit court, Hollen was found by her treating physicians to suffer
only from mild to moderate carpal tunnel syndrome in her left hand and did not
recommend any sort of surgery. Moreover, bone scans, MRI scans, and CT scans
of Hollen’s spine and pelvic regions produced generally normal results and no
neurological impingement was found. There was certainly evidence in the record
indicating that Hollen suffered from pain, but the hearing officer concluded that it
failed to adequately explain and justify how and why such pain was disabling in
this case. Indeed, Hollen’s physicians often appeared to be at a loss to explain her
ailments. In light of our limited role as a reviewing court in such matters, we
cannot say that this conclusion was entirely unreasonable. Hollen also notes that
she received a favorable Social Security decision in which she was found to be
disabled, but this determination does not compel a similar result in a case such as
this one.
As to the matter of Hollen’s depression, the hearing officer concluded
that such was a condition that pre-existed her employment with the Clay County
Board of Education because of her documented suicide attempts. Thus, it could
not be considered as a basis for Hollen’s application for disability retirement
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benefits under KRS 61.600(3)(d). Under McManus, supra, Hollen had the ultimate
burden of proof as to the question of whether her depression was a condition that
preceded her employment with the Board. See McManus, 124 S.W.3d at 458. Her
brief provides nothing of substance to refute the hearing officer’s conclusion and
no medical records were produced prior to her employment with the Board that
might have served to challenge this determination. Therefore, we once again
cannot conclude that the evidence in Hollen’s favor was overwhelming to such a
degree that reversal is merited.
Hollen next argues that the hearing officer, the KRS Board of
Trustees, and the circuit court failed to consider the “cumulative effect” of her
impairments in denying her disability benefits application. In Kentucky Retirement
Systems v. Bowens, 281 S.W.3d 776 (Ky. 2009), our Supreme Court held that KRS
is required to consider the “cumulative effect” of all of an applicant’s medical
problems in making its disability determination. Id. at 783. Hollen argues that
such has not occurred here.
Bowens was not rendered until April 23, 2009 – after the circuit court
entered its decision – which raises the question of whether that decision should
apply here. However, a new precedent cannot be applied retroactively unless the
subject issue was preserved for review. Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky.
1997). Our review of the record fails to show that the issue was ever raised below,
and Hollen has provided us with no statement of preservation on the matter, as
required by CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). Therefore, we decline to consider her argument.
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Citing to Jones v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems,
910 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1995), Hollen finally offers a somewhat confusing
contention that the Board’s decision denying her application for benefits was a
“retroactive amendment that impairs the obligations of the inviolable contract of
the Commonwealth created by KRS 60.510 to 61.705.” While our Supreme Court
recognized in Jones that “the retirement savings system has created an inviolable
contract between KERS members and the Commonwealth,” and that consequently
“the General Assembly can take no action to reduce the benefits promised to
participants,” id. at 713, nothing within that decision purports to limit the Board’s
authority to deny disability retirement benefits where merited. We suspect that
Hollen attempts to raise a contention that the pre-existing condition provisions of
KRS 61.600 do not apply in her case, but she provides nothing of substance to
support this position. Thus, this argument must also be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Phyllis L. Robinson
Manchester, Kentucky
Jennifer A. Jones
Frankfort, Kentucky
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