REYNOLDS (TODD) VS. SONITROL OF LEXINGTON, INC
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RENDERED: APRIL 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000106-MR
TODD REYNOLDS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-04813
SONITROL OF LEXINGTON, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Todd Reynolds appeals from a judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court dismissing his claim against Sonitrol of Lexington, Inc.,
for tortious interference with contractual relations and awarding liquidated
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Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
damages and attorney’s fees to Sonitrol on its counterclaim. Reynolds argues that:
(1) there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded dismissal of his
complaint; (2) he was denied his right to discovery; (3) the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding Sonitrol costs; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by
granting a temporary injunction; (5) the trial court erroneously awarded Sonitrol
liquidated damages; and (6) the award of attorney’s fees was contrary to law. We
affirm.
Sonitrol provides home and business security services as an alarm
system installer and is located in Lexington, Kentucky. Reynolds began working
for Sonitrol in 2003. On May 14, 2003, Reynolds and Sonitrol entered into a noncompete agreement. The agreement states in pertinent part:
Employee hereby expressly covenants and agrees, which
convenant and agreement is the essence of the
Employer/Employee relationship, that at no time during
the term of his/her employment or for a period of three
(3) years immediately following the termination thereof,
whether said termination is occasioned by the Employer,
the Employee, the mutual agreement of said parties or
otherwise, will be (sic) for himself/herself, or on the
behalf of any other person, persons, firm, partnership,
corporation or company, directly or indirectly:
(c) Engage in, directly or indirectly, the Employer’s
business or any other business in competition with the
active business activities of the Employer within a radius
of one hundred (100) miles from Lexington, Kentucky.
The agreement further provided remedies for its breach:
The Employee agrees that upon breach of the provisions
of this agreement set forth above, he/she will pay
Employer the sum of Ten Thousand and No/100 dollars
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($10,000). It is further agreed that the Employer will be
irreparably damaged in the event of breach by Employee
and that the payment of Ten Thousand and No/100
dollars ($10,000) as aforesaid will not fully nor
adequately compensate the Employer for damage . . .
In the event of action brought by Employer by the terms
of this Agreement, Employer shall be entitled to receive
from Employee reasonable attorney’s fee including
attorney’s fees through the appellate level and costs of
the action.
Although Reynolds stated that he had no recollection of the agreement, he did
acknowledge that the signature on it “appears to be mine.”
In 2006, Reynolds’s job duties with Sonitrol changed from alarm
system installation to maintenance and repair. In August 2006, Reynolds
voluntarily resigned from Sonitrol and took a job with ADT Security Services, Inc.
Upon learning that Reynolds was employed by ADT, Sonitrol sent Reynolds a
letter stating that his employment with ADT violated the non-compete agreement.
ADT terminated Reynolds’s employment after learning of the existence of the
agreement.
Subsequently, Reynolds filed a complaint against Sonitrol for tortious
interference with contractual relations and simultaneously pursued a grievance
before an arbitrator under his union’s collective bargaining agreement. The sole
issue before the arbitrator was whether ADT had terminated Reynolds for cause.
The arbitrator found that Reynolds’s statements regarding the existence of the noncompete agreement on his application to ADT was not an intentional
misrepresentation, that Reynolds was not contractually barred from working for
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ADT, and that his termination was without cause. Reynolds was then temporarily
reinstated by ADT. Sonitrol was not a party to the arbitration proceedings. The
arbitrator’s decision was placed into the record before the trial court.
Meanwhile, Sonitrol filed a motion to dismiss Reynolds’s complaint
based on the existence and enforceability of the non-compete agreement.
Reynolds then filed an amended complaint which referenced the arbitration
decision and asked the court to declare the non-compete agreement unenforceable.
Upon learning that Reynolds was reinstated by ADT, Sonitrol joined ADT as a
third-party defendant and filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint asserting
claims against Reynolds and ADT.
Following a hearing on November 9, 2007, the court dismissed
Reynolds claims against Sonitrol and ruled that Sonitrol’s claims against Reynolds
and ADT would remain on the docket. At the hearing Reynolds admitted that he
was still working for ADT and that ADT and Sonitrol were competitors. Sonitrol
then filed a motion for a temporary injunction and a judgment on its claim for
liquidated damages under the non-compete agreement.
Following a second hearing, the trial court granted Sonitrol’s motion
for a temporary injunction and required a $5,000 bond, which was to be paid by
Sonitrol. The court also awarded costs to Sonitrol. Subsequently, Sonitrol filed an
affidavit with the court delineating the costs it had incurred, and the trial court
award Sonitrol $1,000 in costs.
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Reynolds then filed motions in this Court for emergency relief and
interlocutory relief. This Court found that Reynolds failed to demonstrate
irreparable injury and denied his motion for emergency relief. This Court also
denied Reynolds’s motion for interlocutory relief because the bond was not yet
posted by Sonitrol and because the absence of the bond meant that there was no
injunction in place. Sonitrol had not posted the bond because ADT had terminated
Reynolds employment for the second and final time after the entry of the order
granting the motion for temporary injunction.
On October 28, 2008, Sonitrol filed a motion for summary judgment
on its claims against Reynolds. The court granted summary judgment and awarded
Sonitrol $10,000 in liquidated damages pursuant to the terms of the non-compete
agreement. The court later awarded Sonitrol $9,680.50 for attorney’s fees pursuant
to the agreement. Reynolds filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction,
which the court granted. This appeal by Reynolds followed.
Reynolds argues that he raised several issues of material fact
sufficient to overcome summary judgment and that the trial court assumed facts
not in the record.
“The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material
fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). “The record must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
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judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). “Even though a trial court
may believe the party opposing the motion may not succeed at trial, it should not
render a summary judgment if there is any issue of material fact.” Id. Further,
“the movant must convince the court, by the evidence of record, of the
nonexistence of an issue of material fact.” Id. at 482. “The standard of review on
appeal of a summary judgment is whether the circuit judge correctly found that
there were no issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys.,
Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002).
Reynolds states that an issue of material fact was raised because he
stated that he did not recall signing the non-compete agreement. Whether or not
Reynolds remembers signing the document is immaterial because he admitted that
the signature “appears to be mine.” When a party admits that their signature
appears on a document, lack of recollection of signing is not sufficient to raise an
issue of fact. Payne v. Terry, 367 S.W.2d. 277, 279 (Ky. 1963).
Reynolds also argues that there is an issue of fact regarding whether
Regina Hoover, whose signature appears on the non-compete agreement, had the
authority to bind Sonitrol to the agreement. We disagree. Even if Hoover was
unauthorized to bind Sonitrol, Sonitrol had ratified the agreement. In Capurso v.
Johnson, 248 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1952), the former Court of Appeals stated:
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It is a well-established rule of law that if one, not
assuming to act for himself, does an act for or in the
name of another upon an assumption of authority to act
as the agent of the latter, even though without any
precedent authority whatever, if the person in whose
name the act was performed subsequently ratifies or
adopts what has been so done, the ratification relates
back and supplies original authority to do the act. In
such cases, the principal, whether a corporation or an
individual, is bound to the same extent as if the act had
been done in the first instance by his previous authority;
this is true whether the act is detrimental to the principal
or to his advantage, whether it sounds in contract or tort,
or whether the ratification is express or implied.
Id. at 910 (quoting 2 Am.Jur., Agency, § 209, p. 166). There is no question that
Sonitrol ratified the agreement.
Reynolds argues that there are issues of fact regarding Sonitrol’s
justifications and motivations behind the non-compete agreement. This Court
recently held, in the context of non-compete agreements, that resort to parol
evidence is inappropriate when the terms of the agreement are clear and
unambiguous on their face. New Life Cleaners v. Tuttle, 292 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Ky.
App. 2009). In the present case, we conclude that the terms of the non-compete
agreement are clear and unambiguous. We also conclude that the terms are not
unconscionable. See Lareau v. O’Nan, 355 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1962) (upholding a
non-compete agreement with a restriction of five years and a geographic restriction
of one county).
Reynolds next argues that the trial court erred by denying his right to
discovery. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.06 states:
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Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may
make such other order as is just.
The decision to allow or deny additional discovery is committed to the discretion
of the trial court. Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 557
(Ky. App. 1982).
The trial court had sufficient evidence in the record before it to
dismiss Reynolds’s claims as a matter of law. The agreement was in the record,
and Reynolds admitted in his affidavit that the signature on the agreement
appeared to be his. Investigations into Sonitrol’s motivations behind entering into
the agreement would have been irrelevant. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
Reynolds next argues that the trial court committed various errors in
granting Sonitrol’s motion for a temporary injunction. The temporary injunction
was never actually in effect, and the trial court dissolved the injunction in an order
entered on January 5, 2009. Thus, we conclude that any argument in this regard is
moot.
Reynolds also argues that the trial court erred in awarding Sonitrol its
costs incurred in bringing the motion for temporary injunction. The court granted
Sonitrol its costs without explanation.
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Reynolds argues that he never violated any orders of the court and that
sanctions were inappropriate. However, the non-compete agreement states:
In the event of action brought by Employer by the terms
of this Agreement, Employer shall be entitled to receive
from Employee reasonable attorney’s fees including
attorney’s fees though the appellate level and costs of the
action.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Sonitrol its
costs incurred by bringing the motion for temporary injunction because Reynolds
had clearly violated the agreement and the agreement provided for such costs.
Reynolds next argues that the trial court erred by awarding Sonitrol
liquidated damages pursuant to the agreement without discovery or an evidentiary
hearing. The Kentucky Supreme Court has explained the rule on liquidated
damages as follows:
Historically contract provisions specifying liquidated
damages were viewed with disfavor, as devices to extract
penalties and forfeitures and against public policy. In
time the rule evolved that such devices would be
recognized as a useful commercial tool to avoid litigation
to determine actual damages. But two restrictions
remain: they should be used only (1) where the actual
damages sustained from a breach of contract would be
very difficult to ascertain and (2) where, after the breach
occurs, it appears that the amount fixed as liquidated
damages is not grossly disproportionate to the damages
actually sustained.
Mattingly Bridge Co., Inc. v. Holloway & Son Const. Co., 694 S.W.2d 702, 705
(Ky. 1985) (emphasis in original, internal citations omitted). This Court has also
found that the enforcement of liquidated damage provisions is particularly
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appropriate in the context of non-compete agreements. Daniel Boone Clinic,
P.S.C. v. Dahhan, 734 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Ky. App. 1987).
We conclude that actual damages would be difficult to ascertain under
the circumstances of this case. Reynolds possessed, by his own admission, unique
skills related to the installation and maintenance of security systems. We cannot
conclude that the $10,000 damage award is so disproportionate as to constitute a
penalty. Id. (upholding the enforcement of a $75,000 liquidated damages
provision).
Reynolds next argues that the trial court erred by awarding Sonitrol its
attorney’s fees.
Attorney’s fees are allowable when expressly provided for by contract
or statute. Batson v. Clark, 980 S.W.2d 566, 577 (Ky. App. 1998). The agreement
clearly provided for Sonitrol’s attorney’s fees. However, Reynolds also argues that
a portion of the award of attorney’s fees relating to Sonitrol’s defense of his tort
claims and its pursuit of claims against ADT were not contemplated by the express
language of the agreement.
In Young v. Vista Homes, Inc., 243 S.W.3d 352, 368 (Ky. App. 2007),
this Court held:
Generally, attorney fees must be apportioned between
claims for which there is statutory authority for an award
of attorney fees and those for which there is not. But
where all of plaintiff’s claims arise from the same
nucleus of operative facts and each claim was
“inextricably interwoven” with the other claims,
apportionment of fees is unnecessary.
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(Citations omitted).
While Young dealt with the issue in the context of statutorily
authorized attorney’s fees, we find that the same reasoning applies to the present
case. We conclude that the fees claimed by Sonitrol arose from the same nucleus
of operative facts and were inextricably intertwined with the other claims. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to apportion the award of
attorney’s fees.
Finally, Reynolds argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to compel discovery and by denying his motion for a pretrial conference
and trial relating to the award of liquidated damages. We are cited to no authority
in support of this argument. Based on our review of the record and given our
conclusions above, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Leightty
Louisville, Kentucky
Don A. Pisacano
Lexington, Kentucky
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