THORNTON (JAMES) VS. CARMEUSE LIME SALES CORPORATION , ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000090-MR
JAMES THORNTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT W. MCGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00286
CARMEUSE LIME SALES CORPORATION;
CARMEUSE LIME AND STONE, INC.; AND
BULK TRANSIT CORPORATION
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.580.
ACREE, JUDGE: The Appellant, James Thornton, asks this court to reverse the
Pendleton Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the
appellee, Carmeuse Lime Sales, Inc.2 Because Carmeuse falls within the statutory
definition of a contractor under KRS 342.610(2), its liability is limited pursuant to
KRS 342.690. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s order.
Thornton was employed by a trucking company, Bulk Transit
Corporation (Bulk Transit). Bulk Transit entered into a motor-carrier agreement
with Carmeuse whereby Bulk Transit would transport lime from Carmeuse’s
facility to Carmeuse’s customers. Thornton, under the direction of his supervisor
at Bulk Transit, made approximately nine to ten trips to and from the Carmeuse
facility each week.
On October 27, 2007, Thornton suffered injuries while attempting to
load his truck at the Carmeuse facility. He pursued and received workers’
compensation benefits from Bulk Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier.
Thornton also brought suit against Carmeuse for negligence based on
the same operative facts that supported his workers’ compensation claim.
Carmeuse answered and subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Bulk
Transit which Bulk Transit answered. Carmeuse then filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that, in accordance with the terms of the motor-carrier agreement
and pursuant to KRS 342.610, Carmeuse is a contractor, Bulk Transit is a
subcontractor and Thornton is an employee for purposes of the statute;
2
Appellees include Carmeuse Lime Sales Corporation and Carmeuse Lime and Stone, Inc. and
will hereinafter be referred to collectively as Carmeuse.
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consequently, Carmeuse is entitled to the “exclusive remedy” defense provision of
KRS 342.690. The Pendleton Circuit Court granted summary judgment on that
basis and in doing so also dismissed Carmeuse’s third-party complaint against
Bulk Transit.
On appeal, Thornton argues that Carmeuse was not entitled to
summary judgment because it does not fit within the statutory definition of a
“contractor.” Therefore, Carmeuse is not entitled to “up-the-ladder immunity.”
Further, Thornton argues that even if Carmeuse fits within the definition, it is not
entitled to protection because Carmeuse’s status as a contractor was altered by the
motor-carrier agreement. Carmeuse maintains that it is a “contractor” as defined in
KRS 342.610(2).
In addition to the arguments proffered by Thornton and Carmeuse,
Bulk Transit submits that even if this Court reverses the decision of the circuit
court as to Carmeuse, we should affirm the dismissal of the third-party complaint.
The circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).
KRS 342.690 states:
If an employer secures payment of compensation as
required by this chapter, the liability of such employer
under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal
representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents,
next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on
account of such injury or death. For purposes of this
section, the term “employer” shall include a
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“contractor” covered by subsection (2) of KRS 342.610,
whether or not the subcontractor has in fact, secured the
payment of compensation. The liability of an employer
to another person who may be liable for or who has paid
damages on account of injury or death of an employee of
such employer arising out of and in the course of
employment and caused by a breach of any duty or
obligation owed by such employer to such other shall be
limited to the amount of compensation and other benefits
for which such employer is liable under this chapter on
account of such injury or death, unless such other and the
employer by written contract have agreed to share
liability in a different manner.
KRS 342.690 (emphasis added). Therefore, the central issue here is whether
Carmeuse is a “contractor” as defined in KRS 342.610(2). That statute says,
A person who contracts with another . . . . To have work
performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part
of the work of the trade, business, occupation, or
profession of such person shall for the purposes of this
section be deemed a contractor, and such other person a
subcontractor.
KRS 342.610(2)(b).
In Tom Ballard Co. v. Blevins, 614 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. App. 1980), this
Court found that a coal mine operator that hired a transportation company to
deliver coal to its customers was a “contractor” under KRS 342.610(2). Id. at 249.
The Court reasoned that the mine sold coal at a price that included delivery and it
was the mine’s responsibility to ensure that the shipment was received. Id. The
court noted that under KRS 342.610(2) certain persons who would not otherwise
be contractors are deemed such for purposes of the act. Id.
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The Supreme Court discussed the Blevins holding and affirmed its
reasoning in General Electric Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007). On the
basis of a contract between the parties, the Court determined the delivery work
performed by the transportation company was a part of the mining company’s
business. Id. at 586. Specifically, delivering coal to its customer was a “regular or
recurrent part of the business of the mining company under its contracts to both
mine and deliver.” Id.
Likewise, the delivery of lime to Carmeuse’s customers was a regular
and recurrent part of its business to mine and deliver lime to its customers. In
accordance with the motor-carrier agreement, Carmeuse contacts Bulk Transit and
states how many loads need to be picked up each day from the Carmeuse facility
and delivered to Carmeuse customers. Bulk Transit then picks up the load and
delivers it in accordance with the delivery deadlines provided by Carmeuse.
Carmeuse customers pay Carmeuse for the product and the delivery. In turn,
Carmeuse pays Bulk Transit per load – receiving payment for approximately forty
loads per day.
The relationship between Carmeuse and Bulk Transit is nearly
identical to that discussed Blevins. Accordingly, this relationship also amounts to a
contractor-subcontractor relationship as defined by KRS 342.610(2).
Thornton argues that even if Carmeuse Lime is a contractor under the
statute, the motor-carrier agreement changes that relationship. In support of this
argument he relies on an unpublished decision of the United States Court of
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Morlan v. Green River Steel Corp., 35 F.3d 566
(Table), 1994 WL 502655 (6th Cir. (Ky.), Sept. 14, 1994).3 In Morlan, after
determining that Green River Steel was not a statutory contractor, the Sixth Circuit
considered whether it was a “statutory employer.” 1994 WL 502655 *5-6. In
making this determination the Sixth Circuit relied on a decision of the Kentucky
Supreme Court, M.J. Daly Co. v. Varney, 695 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1985). Thornton’s
reliance on the reasoning of these cases is flawed.
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Technical Minerals, Inc.,
934 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1996), our Supreme Court said M.J. Daly Co. v. Varney was
wrongly decided. The error was that “M.J. Daly Co. v. Varney . . . interprets the
language . . . of a repealed statute.” U.S. Fidelity, 934 S.W.2d at 269. Based on
this error, the Court in M.J. Daly Co. v. Varney in cursory fashion determined that
a contractor-subcontractor relationship did not exist. M.J. Daly Co. v. Varney at
401 (“[T]here is no contractor/subcontractor question here.”). In U.S. Fidelity, the
Supreme Court admitted and corrected its error stating, “To conclude that the M.J.
Daly Company was not a contractor is erroneous[.]” U.S. Fidelity, 934 S.W.2d at
268. If the correct determination of contractor status had been made in M.J. Daly
Co. v. Varney, examination in that case of the parties’ contract in order to
3
In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 32.1, “A court may not
prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written
dispositions that have been: (i) designated as “unpublished” . . . and (ii) issued . . . after January
1, 1997.” While Kentucky courts are not bound by FRAP 32.1 or federal cases interpreting
Kentucky law, the federal judiciary has determined that all of its opinions rendered after January
1, 1997, have equally persuasive import without regard to their designation as unpublished. We
should take no less a view of post-1996 unpublished federal opinions than we do of published
federal opinions. However, Morlan was designated as “unpublished” and rendered prior to
January 1, 1997. Consequently, its persuasiveness is more suspect than other federal case law.
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determine whether M.J. Daly was an employer would have been unnecessary.
Because the correct determination in this case is that Carmeuse is a contractor,
there is no need to engage in an examination of the motor-carrier agreement.
Therefore, because Carmeuse is a “contractor” under KRS
342.610(2), it is entitled to “exclusive remedy” immunity under KRS 342.690 and
the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
David E. Davidson
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES
CAREUSE LIME SALES
CORPORATION AND CARMEUSE
LIME AND STONE, INC:
R. David Clark
John L. Tackett
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BULK
TRANSIT CORPORATION:
Charles H. Cassis
Aaron J. Silletto
Jennifer Kaelin Luhrs
Louisville, Kentucky
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