RICHARDSON (DON) VS. GREGORY (GARY)
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RENDERED: MAY 21, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000066-MR
DON RICHARDSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00176
GARY GREGORY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Don Richardson has appealed from the Wayne Circuit
Court’s judgment denying him recovery in a collection action against Gary
Gregory and Opal Sexton. For the following reasons, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
Richardson is a businessman in Wayne County, Kentucky, where he
owns and operates several businesses. Gary and his brother Richard Gregory were
employees of one of Richardson’s businesses, Pisgah Lumber Company. Richard
also worked for and lived in a house on the premises of Donald Richardson Farms.
In December of 2004, Richard was indicted on a charge of attempted arson in
connection with a suspicious fire at another of Richardson’s businesses, Monticello
Wood Products. Subsequent to the fire, Richard continued to reside at the farm
and meet with Richardson in connection with his employment.
Richardson testified at the trial of the matter that Gary approached
him in December of 2004 inquiring about borrowing money to post Richard’s bond
in the criminal case. Richardson ultimately issued a check drawn on the Pisgah
Lumber Company account and a check drawn on his farm account in the amount of
$5,000.00 each. Both checks were made payable to Gary. Richardson also gave
Gary $5,000.00 cash for Richard’s benefit. At the time of the money transfers,
Richard’s bond had already been posted by his mother, Opal. Richard passed away
before he was tried on the criminal charges and the bond money was returned to
Gary.
Richardson filed the instant civil action seeking repayment of the
$15,000.00 from Gary and Opal. Richardson also alleged Gary was indebted to
him for the purchase price of a truck Richardson had obtained for Gary’s use as a
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logging crew supervisor.2 Gary counter-claimed for amounts allegedly due him in
connection with his employment.3
At the trial of the matter, Richardson contended he had loaned the
money to Gary and Opal for Richard’s benefit and he was to be repaid when
Richard’s bond was released. He conceded the terms of the loan and provisions for
its repayment were not reduced to writing. However, it is undisputed that one of
the non-financial conditions of Richard’s bond prohibited him from contacting
Richardson in any way, and that Richard and Richardson had no discussions
regarding the loan. At the close of Richardson’s case, the trial court granted
Opal’s motion for a directed verdict as no evidence had been adduced indicating
she was in any way connected to the transfer of the funds. 4
Gary argued the debt was Richard’s and that he, Gary, was not
responsible for its payment. Gary testified it was common practice for him to act
as a conduit for transferring money to Richard and other members of the work
crew of which Gary was the supervisor. Gary stated Richardson wrote checks
directly to him which Gary cashed and paid the men with that cash. Gary argued
2
Although the trial court denied Richardson’s claim for sums allegedly owed in relation to the
truck, no appeal has been taken from the denial. Therefore, no further discussion on the matter is
warranted.
3
The trial court rejected Gary’s counter-claim. No appeal has been taken from that portion of
the trial court’s ruling.
4
No appeal has been taken from the entry of the directed verdict and no arguments are advanced
in the instant appeal regarding Opal’s liability for the amounts at issue herein.
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he had never agreed to repay any sums to Richardson that had been given to him
for Richard’s benefit.
At the end of the trial, the court found the funds advanced by
Richardson had been used to pay Richard’s criminal defense attorney, not to post
his bond as Richardson alleged he had been led to believe. The court further found
the debt belonged solely to Richard. Finally, the court concluded Richardson had
failed to carry his burden of proof as to Gary’s responsibility for the debt and
dismissed the action. This appeal followed.
Before this Court, Richardson contends the trial court’s determination
that Gary owed nothing on the debt was erroneous as it was unsupported by
substantial evidence. Alternatively, Richardson contends the court abused its
discretion in dismissing the matter when it relied on erroneous findings of fact. As
this appeal centers solely on a factual matter, the proper scope of our review is the
clearly erroneous standard. On appellate review, we will not disturb a trial court’s
determination of factual disputes unless it is clearly erroneous, meaning it is
unsupported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.
2003). Regardless of the weight of the evidence, the presence of conflicting
evidence, or the fact that we as a reviewing court might have reached a contrary
conclusion, we must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to assess the
credibility of the witnesses. CR5 52.01. Based upon a careful review of the record
5
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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we conclude the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and
its choice of which evidence was most credible was not clearly erroneous.
The only witnesses testifying during the forty-minute trial were
Richardson, Gary, and a bank representative who introduced copies of the two
checks at issue. As the bank records regarding the checks were undisputed, the
trial court was left only to determine the weight and credibility of the conflicting
testimony given by Richardson and Gary regarding the circumstances surrounding
the loaned funds. Both men had a stake in the litigation and the trial court
obviously found Gary’s testimony was more credible as it concluded Richardson
had failed to carry his burden of proving Gary was in any way obligated to repay
the alleged debt. It is well-settled in this Commonwealth that the “trier of fact has
the right to believe the evidence presented by one litigant in preference to another.
The trier of fact may believe any witness in whole or in part.” Bissell v.
Baumgardner, 236 S.W.3d 24, 29-30 (Ky. App. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996) (internal citations omitted)). Thus, as
there was no jury impaneled, the trial court alone was vested with the discretion to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and to adjudicate the matter. There was
substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s decision, and we discern no error
in the determination.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wayne
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James M. Frazer
Monticello, Kentucky
L. Lee Tobbe
Monticello, Kentucky
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