GIBSON (ROY), ET AL. VS. KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: DECEMBER 3, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000048-MR
ROY GIBSON AND
CLINTON BOWMAN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE OSCAR G. HOUSE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-003251
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY; GARY SPETH, SR.;
AND FABIAN GOMEZ SANCHEZ
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS AND WINE, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Appellants Roy Gibson and Clinton Bowman appeal the
October 3, 2008 judgment of the Clay Circuit Court entered upon a jury’s verdict
finding them liable for fraud and ordering them to pay $43,778.53 to Appellee
Kentucky Farm Bureau (KFB) and $14,000 to Appellee Gary Speth. For the
following reasons we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for additional
findings.
On June 24, 2005, Gibson and Bowman reported to KFB their 2000 Ford
F150 had been stolen approximately three weeks earlier; KFB established the date
of the loss as June 1, 2005. At the request of KFB, Gibson and Bowman filed a
police report. Because they no longer possessed the vehicle’s certificate of title,
they also obtained a duplicate title. In accordance with the terms of their KFB
insurance policy covering theft of the insured vehicle, Gibson and Bowman soon
received a check in the amount of $17,291.50.
In late 2005, an individual named Rogelio Mendez attempted to register the
vehicle. He presented the original certificate of title to the clerk; the back of the
certificate showed that on March 22, 2005, Gibson and Bowman had executed an
assignment of the title to Mendez and their signatures were notarized.1 However,
because the vehicle had been reported stolen, the clerk refused to permit Mendez to
register the vehicle in his name. Police seized the truck and returned it to KFB.
The insurer sold the truck for approximately $7,200.
Although KFB had recovered the vehicle Gibson and Bowman alleged was
stolen, Mendez’s title document cast doubt on the story Gibson and Bowman had
told. KFB initiated an investigation to verify the representations its insureds had
made that resulted in KFB’s payment for the truck.
1
While the back of the Certificate of Title is denominated “Assignment of Title”, the signature
line is captioned “Signature(s) of Seller(s) To Be Notarized.”
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KFB’s investigation yielded information that contradicted the
representations made by Gibson and Bowman. Investigators learned that Mendez
had actually obtained the vehicle from an individual named Gary Speth. Speth
believed he had legally acquired the truck from a man named Fabian Sanchez, a
friend of Mendez. Sanchez had approached Speth seeking a loan on March 23,
2005, three months earlier than the date Gibson and Bowman had reported the
truck stolen. At that time, Sanchez had possession of the truck and the original
title that had been signed by Gibson and Bowman and their signatures notarized,
but the transferee information was left blank. Believing Sanchez was in lawful
possession of the truck, Speth agreed to loan Sanchez $7,000, keeping the truck as
collateral. Speth did not attempt to register the title because he expected Sanchez
to return and repay the loan with interest.
After Sanchez failed to repay the loan, Mendez expressed interest in
purchasing the truck. Speth agreed to sell the truck to Mendez on or about
September 23, 2005, and Mendez signed the Assignment of Title as the “Buyer.”
By the terms of the agreement between Speth and Mendez, payment was due after
Mendez registered the truck in his name. As noted, however, Mendez was unable
to register the vehicle despite making the attempt in both Kentucky and Indiana.
The deal between Speth and Mendez was then off and Speth was never paid.
KFB investigator Daniel Keller was able to reach and interview Sanchez.
Sanchez informed Keller that Gibson had sold him the truck in March 2005 and
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otherwise confirmed the information Speth provided regarding when and why
Speth had come into possession of the truck.
Gibson and Bowman maintained that the truck was in their possession until
it was stolen on or about June 1, 2005. Gibson claims that on or about that date he
was traveling in the truck from Manchester, Kentucky, to Louisville and stopped
for gas in Richmond when the truck’s starter failed. He stated he left the truck at
the home of a friend who promised to have a local shop repair it. He then arranged
for other transportation and continued his trip to Louisville. Both Gibson and
Bowman deny having signed the title document before a notary or delivering title
or possession of the truck to a third person. Gibson explained that he did sign the
title document, but that he did so several years before the alleged theft in
anticipation of using the truck as collateral on a loan. He never went through with
that loan, however.2
Believing it had been defrauded, KFB filed a complaint seeking a
declaration of rights to the truck as against Sanchez and Speth and asserting a fraud
claim against Gibson and Bowman. Gibson and Bowman were represented in the
action by counsel and defended against the fraud claim. Speth appeared pro se
with the benefit of some assistance from KFB’s counsel. Sanchez was never
served and did not appear in the action.
2
During trial, numerous discrepancies were revealed between the story Appellants told to KFB
and the police in 2005 and their deposition testimony approximately a year later. This description
is consistent with their earlier statements.
-4-
Following trial, a jury determined Gibson and Bowman had defrauded KFB
and awarded KFB $43,778.53. The jury also awarded Speth $14,000.3 This appeal
followed.
Gibson and Bowman claim the circuit court erred as follows: (1) by failing
to strike for cause jurors who were policyholders of insurance issued by KFB; (2)
by admitting hearsay testimony of out-of-court statements made by Sanchez; (3) by
awarding KFB costs of investigating and prosecuting the claim; and (4) by
awarding damages to Speth in absence of a finding he was defrauded and without
proof of his loss. We address those assignments of error in that order.
Jury Selection
“It is elementary that the determination of whether to excuse a prospective
juror rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and ought not to be set
aside by a reviewing court unless the error is manifest.” Peters v. Commonwealth,
505 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Ky. 1974). We review the circuit court’s determination with
that standard in mind.
Gibson and Bowman claim the circuit court erred by overruling their motion
to strike for cause prospective jurors who were also holders of KFB policies. They
have also identified statements made by counsel for KFB and a witness, Keller,
which they believe served to further bias the KFB policyholders on the jury. KFB
does not directly respond to allegations that these statements biased the jury,
presumably because Gibson and Bowman made no objection to these statements
3
The jury was not instructed to determine whether Speth had been defrauded or to resolve the
declaration of rights action.
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during trial. We separately address that issue, and the issue of preservation of
error, infra. However, KFB does argue that the trial court’s refusal to disqualify
any of the policyholders was proper absent a showing of any individual juror’s
actual bias. We agree with KFB.
Kentucky courts have acknowledged juror-policyholders may become biased
when those jurors are aware their insurer has an interest in the outcome of a case.
Planters Bank & Trust Company of Hopkinsville v. Deason, 532 S.W.2d 16, 18
(Ky. 1975). However, in Planters Bank, the Court did not indicate the juror would
automatically be disqualified “[e]ven if the possibility of higher rates or lower
dividends determined by the loss ratio of the company be considered a sufficient
interest upon which to infer bias on the part of a policy holder who serves as a
juror[.]” Id.; David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Prospective Juror's Connection
With Insurance Company As Ground For Challenge For Cause, 9 A.L.R.5th 102,
§6[e] (2010)(“The court [in Planters Bank] reserved the question of whether a
juror’s assessability or participation in dividends would amount to an interest
sufficient to warrant a challenge for cause”). The burden of demonstrating bias
remains “upon the party claiming bias or partiality[.]” Polk v. Commonwealth, 574
S.W.2d 335, 337 (Ky.App. 1978), citing Watson v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d
884 (Ky. 1968). That burden is borne by questioning the suspect juror to reveal
whether the juror’s interest in the insurance company gives rise to an inference of
bias sufficient to justify disqualification for cause.
-6-
The argument Gibson and Bowman present is that no KFB policyholder was
capable of sitting as an unbiased juror in this case. That is, they argue the
policyholders’ status alone required striking them for cause. True, by statute,
certain persons are subject to challenge for cause merely because of their status.
Howell v. Commonwealth, 489 S.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Ky. 1972)(Former Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 29.025, now KRS 29A.080(2)(b), disqualifies felons from
jury service; “a juror in such status is subject to challenge for cause”). However,
this panel may not, by creating the bright line test suggested by this argument, take
from the province of the trial court the discretion to determine the qualifications of
any jurors in the venire not otherwise disqualified by KRS 29A.080(2).
We do not exclude the possibility that one or more jurors in this case may
have had such a concern about their relationship with KFB that they might be
deemed biased. However, we can only speculate as to the existence of actual bias
because Gibson and Bowman simply did not inquire further into the matter during
voir dire either with any individual juror or with the venire.4 Relevant inquiries
could have determined whether any particular juror had a concern that a judgment
in the case would affect them personally. In this case, the only information about
the juror-policyholders available to the trial court was that the potential for bias
existed. Absent further indication from the voir dire that any juror, because of his
or her relationship with KFB, was actually biased or would have difficulty fairly
4
The attorney who pursued this appeal on behalf of Gibson and Bowman is not the same
attorney who represented them before the circuit court.
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deciding the case, we cannot label the trial court’s refusal to strike any jurors for
cause an abuse of discretion.
Gibson and Bowman also maintain that, in light of certain jurors’ status as
policyholders, statements made by KFB’s counsel and KFB’s witness, investigator
Keller, served to bias the juror-policyholders. No argument regarding those
statements, however, was preserved for review. Gibson and Bowman did not
object to any of the statements they have identified as problematic on this score.
Our review is therefore for palpable error only. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
(CR) 61.02.
The statements at issue included assertions that “everybody” is affected by
fraud and that KFB had an obligation to report suspicious claims to a state agency,
to protect its policyholders, and to protect the public in general. References to
KFB policyholders in particular were brief at most; the majority of the statements
addressed the effects of fraud on the people of Kentucky. Permitting these
statements did not constitute palpable error, even in light of some of the jurors’
status as policyholders.
Hearsay evidence
At trial KFB introduced certain of Sanchez’s statements through its
investigator, Keller, because Sanchez was unavailable to testify. The relevant
portion of Keller’s testimony was as follows:
Mr. Sanchez told me that he had purchased the vehicle
from Mr. Gibson during about the first week of March.
He explained to me that he knew Mr. Gibson; they were
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both in the same profession, that is roofing, and that they
were acquainted with one another, and Mr. Gibson had
offered to sell him the vehicle on several occasions. On
this particular occasion he took him up on it and he gave
him $7,000 for the vehicle. Mr. Gibson gave him the
original title, registration, as well as the vehicle. He also
indicated to me at one point that Mr. Gibson had
expressed an interest in maybe buying the vehicle back;
he said he needed the money right away, but he may be
interested in buying it back. Mr. Sanchez said to me that
he tried to locate Mr. Gibson a couple of times to see if
he wanted to buy it back, but he was unsuccessful. And
then he himself needed money, so he sought out Mr.
Speth through a friend and put up the vehicle as collateral
for a loan.
Gibson and Bowman contend these statements should have been excluded
because they do not qualify as hearsay exceptions. KFB argues they do so qualify,
either as admissions of a party or as statements against the declarant’s interest.
“A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness, if the statement is offered against a party and is . . . [t]he
party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity[.]”
Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 801A(b)(1). Sanchez, however, was not a party
to the case before the jury, and his statements therefore do not qualify as
admissions by a party. While Sanchez was named as a defendant in the complaint,
he was named only in the context of the declaration of rights to the truck. At trial,
the jury was not instructed to determine who the rightful owner of the truck was;
the only instructions regarded the fraud claim.5
5
Counsel for KFB, in his opening statement to the jury, said one of the issues in the case was
determining who owns the truck; however, there was no instruction on that matter. It was not an
issue before the jury. The only options the jury was given were to find either for KFB and Speth
and therefore against Gibson and Bowman, or for Gibson and Bowman and against KFB and
-9-
Additionally, the statements made by Sanchez to the investigator were not
used against Sanchez. Rather, they were used against Gibson and Bowman in
prosecution of the fraud claim. KFB never claimed that Sanchez had defrauded
anyone. Therefore, Sanchez’s out-of-court statements could not be permissibly
introduced pursuant to this rule.
KFB also asserts the statements were admissible as statements against
Sanchez’s interest. KRE 804(b) permits the inclusion of certain out-of-court
statements made by non-parties, including,
[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far
contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil
or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
KRE 804(b)(3). KFB contends Sanchez’s statement that he purchased the car from
Gibson on March 22, 2005, is a statement against Sanchez’s interest because it
could subject him to civil or criminal liability for fraud; KFB also asserts it was a
statement against his proprietary interest because it could be used to rule against
him in the declaration of rights action.
Had Sanchez’s statement been that he accepted the car for the purpose of
defrauding Speth or KFB, it would clearly be admissible as a statement against his
Speth. It is unclear from the record why the issue of the truck’s ownership was not presented to
the jury.
-10-
interest because it would potentially render him criminally or civilly liable for
fraud. As it stands, however, Sanchez’s statement was more a defense to fraud
charges than an admission – that is, it is a statement that he received the truck
legally in exchange for money and that he transferred it to Speth legally. It was
error to admit the statement under this theory.
As a statement against Sanchez’s proprietary interest, the testimony appears
at first blush to be admissible. Sanchez’s statement that he had used the truck as
collateral on a loan he never repaid was effectively a disavowal of any ownership
interest he may have had in the vehicle. However, courts are wise to be wary of
such statements: “Statements may appear from their content to be against the
interest of the declarant but when examined in light of context have self-serving
characteristics.” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook
§8.45[3] (4th ed. 2003). Those self-serving characteristics vitiate the rationale that
the hearsay evidence is reliable.6 Id.
In the context of Keller’s interview with Sanchez, it becomes clear the
statements at issue were actually self-serving. Keller was conducting the interview
to determine which scenario was accurate: (1) that Sanchez stole the truck and
then used it as collateral on a $7,000 loan, or (2) that Gibson had legally conveyed
the truck to Sanchez and then fraudulently reported it stolen. Given those options,
it was decidedly in Sanchez’s interest to state he acquired the truck from Gibson in
6
The rationale is “that when one makes a declaration in disparagement of his own rights or
interests it is generally true, and because it is so the law has deemed it safe to admit evidence of
such declarations[.]” Lawson §8.45[2], citing Mercer’s Adm’r v. Mackin, 77 Ky. 434, 441-42
(1879).
-11-
a legal manner and then left it with Speth. The conversation with Keller was
therefore inadmissible as statements against the declarant’s interest.
In light of the other evidence of fraud, however, any error in admitting
Sanchez’s statements to KFB’s investigator was harmless. Sanchez’s statements
were discussed only briefly at trial, and the other evidence against Gibson and
Bowman was strong. Speth testified he received the truck from Sanchez in March
2005, well before Gibson and Bowman reported it missing, and KFB introduced
the notarized title which supported that testimony. As an official act, a notarized
document cannot be attacked absent direct proceedings against the notary or “the
allegation of fraud in the party benefitted thereby or mistake on the part of the
[notary].” KRS 61.060. While Gibson and Bowman both testified they never
signed the title before a notary, they also did not assert the signed, notarized title
was the result of fraud on the part of either Sanchez or Speth. In the absence of
such an allegation, the notarized document cannot be challenged. The document is
therefore conclusive on the issue; paired with the testimony of Speth and Keller, it
renders harmless any error in admitting the hearsay evidence.
Award of costs
Gibson and Bowman next assert the award of $33,700 for the cost of
investigating the claim, including attorney fees, had insufficient legal and factual
basis to survive its motion for a directed verdict. KFB contends costs of
investigation were properly awarded as compensatory damages.
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In ruling on . . . a motion for a directed verdict. . . , a trial
court is under a duty to consider the evidence in the
strongest possible light in favor of the party opposing the
motion. Furthermore, it is required to give the opposing
party the advantage of every fair and reasonable
inference which can be drawn from the evidence.
Taylor v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky.App. 1985). In reviewing the denial
of a directed verdict, this Court must “consider the evidence in the strongest light
possible in favor of the opposing party.” Allen v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.3d
649, 656 (Ky.App. 2009).
The jury was instructed to award damages as follows:
If you find for the Plaintiff, Kentucky Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company and Gary Speth . . . , you
will determine from the evidence and award a sum of
money that will fairly and reasonably compensate
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company for
such of the following damages as you believe from the
evidence that it has sustained:
a. The amount paid by Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company for the truck (not to exceed
$10,078.53) . . .
b. Reasonable costs and expenses related to the
investigation of this claim (not to exceed $33,700.00) . . .
c. Reasonable damages for Gary Speth[.]
Keller testified that total “investigative costs” for this matter included attorney fees
and legal expenses greater than $16,000, expenses for transcriptionists and court
reporters of about $1,200, and the cost of his investigation of about $16,500, for a
total of $33,700.
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We first address the recoverability of attorney fees, which were included in
the total award for the cost of investigation. The “American rule” is that attorney’s
fees are not recoverable in the absence of a statutory or contractual provision to the
contrary, or with certain equitable exceptions. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967).
Kentucky follows the American rule. See Kentucky State Bank v. AG Services,
Inc., 663 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky.App. 1984). Compensatory damages are “designed
to equal the wrong done by the defendant.” Jackson v. Tullar, 285 S.W.3d 290,
297-98 (Ky.App. 2007). Attorney fees, however, do not compensate the plaintiff
for any wrong done by the defendant. Id.
It is the responsibility of the trial court, and not the jury, to determine the
availability and amount of attorney fees. See Inn-Group Management Services,
Inc. v. Greer, 71 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Ky.App. 2002) (“What constitutes a reasonable
attorney fee . . . is an issue of law when the attorney and/or client seeks to recover
a reasonable attorney fee from an opposing or third party.”); see also Kentucky
State Bank, 663 S.W.2d at 755 (citing the “equitable rule that an award of counsel
fees is within the discretion of the court depending on the circumstances of each
particular case.”). It was improper in this case to instruct the jury on the issue of
attorney fees or to enter judgment for such an award based on the jury’s verdict.
This was a determination the trial court, in its discretion, should have made. We
therefore remand this matter to the circuit court for a determination of whether
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attorney fees were warranted in light of a statute, contractual provision, or
equitable consideration, and, if so, what amount is reasonable.
Our attention turns now to the other costs of investigation awarded by
the jury. Gibson and Bowman acknowledged at oral argument that Kentucky law
does not prohibit the recovery of investigative expenses as a matter of law.7 We
agree. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 Measure Of Damages For
Fraudulent Misrepresentation (1977 & 2010 supp.)(a party deceived by “a
fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to recover as damages in an action of deceit
against the maker the pecuniary loss to him of which the misrepresentation is a
legal cause, including . . . (b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence
of the recipient’s reliance upon the misrepresentation.”); see also KRS 304.47020(3)(allowing all persons, including insurers, who are victims of fraud “to
recover compensatory damages, plus all reasonable investigation and litigation
expenses, including attorneys’ fees” where appropriate).
We find unavailing their argument that there was no competent evidence to
support the award of investigation expenses. This argument focuses on the lack of
specificity of the evidence KFB presented in support of the claim for consequential
damages. Specifically, their objection is that “[t]here was no itemization, no
definitive numbers, just a series of . . . estimates” offered by KFB’s investigator.
However, while Kentucky law does not tolerate uncertainty as to the fact of
damage (i.e., recovery will not be had where there is uncertainty as to whether the
7
Their brief implied the opposite argument. Counsel, however, affirmatively waived its
assertion during oral argument.
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damage has in fact occurred), once the existence of some damage is certain,
uncertainty as to the amount of that damage will not defeat recovery. As this Court
held in Johnson v. Cormney, 596 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. App. 1979), overruled on other
grounds by Marshall v. City of Paducah, 618 S.W.2d 433 (Ky.App. 1981),
[a]ll recoverable damages are subject to some
uncertainties and contingencies, but it is generally held
that the uncertainty which prevents a recovery is
uncertainty as to the fact of damage and not as to its
amount. Where it is reasonably certain that damage has
resulted, mere uncertainty as to the amount does not
preclude one’s right of recovery or prevent a jury
decision awarding damages.
Johnson at 27; see also Hanson v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 865
S.W.2d 302, 309 (Ky. 1993)(to the same effect), overruled on other grounds by
Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483, 495 (Ky. 2002).
Thus, Kentucky law does not require KFB to provide exact calculations of its
damage – an estimation may suffice if it proves damages with “reasonable
certainty.”
In this case, there was no challenge, either by objection or crossexamination, that the misrepresentation was not the legal cause of any particular
expense or that any expense was unreasonable as to the amount. In the absence of
that challenge, and in light of the cited authority, KFB has met its burden in this
matter. We see no reason to affect the jury’s award.
Award to defendant Gary Speth
-16-
Gibson’s and Bowman’s final ground for appeal is that the award of $14,000
to Speth was improper. More specifically, they argue their motion for a directed
verdict should have been granted because the evidence did not support the
conclusion Gibson and Bowman defrauded Speth. We agree.
The six elements of common-law fraud are: “(a) a material representation,
(b) which is false, (c) known to be false or made recklessly, (d) made with
inducement to be acted upon, (e) acted in reliance thereon, and (f) causing injury.”
Wahba v. Don Corlett Motors, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Ky.App. 1978), citing
Cresent Grocery Co. v. Vick, 240 S.W. 388 (Ky. 1922). Speth could not prove all
of these elements because he did not “act in reliance” upon any representation
Gibson and Bowman made. All witnesses were in agreement that Speth never met
or communicated with either Gibson or Bowman prior to trial. The critical
misrepresentation alleged at trial was the insureds’ claim that the truck had been
stolen, and the jury instructions reflected this.8 There was no evidence Gibson or
Bowman made this representation to Speth or that he relied upon it. This
constitutes a complete absence of proof on an essential element of fraud. The
circuit court should properly have granted Gibson’s and Bowman’s motion for a
directed verdict on this matter, and we therefore reverse the circuit court’s denial
of that motion.
8
The relevant portion of the Instruction 1 read, “You will find for the Plaintiff Kentucky Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company and for Gary Speth if you are satisfied by clear and
convincing evidence as follows: a. That the Defendant Roy Gibson made representations to
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company that his truck was stolen on or around June
1, 2005[.]” (emphasis added) Instruction 1A was identical, but substituted Clinton Bowman for
Roy Gibson.
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Conclusions
The circuit court’s refusal to strike for cause prospective jurors who were
Kentucky Farm Bureau policyholders was not erroneous, and the judgment will not
be reversed on that ground. While we find that the admission of the out-of-court
statements of Fabian Sanchez was error, we will not reverse the judgment on that
ground as the error was harmless. We hold that the award of KFB’s investigative
costs were recoverable consequential damages the amount of which was proven
with reasonable certainty and we will not reverse on that ground. However, we
reverse the judgment to the extent of the jury’s award to KFB of attorney fees and
remand the case for a judicial determination as to the propriety and amount of an
award of attorney’s fees. Finally, we reverse the judgment to the extent of the
award of $14,000 to Gary Speth because such judgment is not supported by
substantial evidence.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANTS:
Robert W. Dyche, III
London, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE KENTUCKY
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY:
Perry Adanick
Louisville, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FOR GARY SPETH, SR.
AND FABIAN GOMEZ SANCHEZ
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