HUNTER (DONNA) F/K/A ADKINS VS. STEFANIC (DAVID), ET AL.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000047-MR
DONNA HUNTER, F/K/A ADKINS
v.
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT G. JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00574
DAVID STEFANIC AND
SUZANNE STEFANIC
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 2009-CA-001511-MR
NEIL E. DUNCLIFFE
v.
APPELLANT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT G. JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00574
DONNA ADKINS AND WILLIAM S. WATTS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: This case arises out of a lawsuit brought in the Scott Circuit
Court by Donna Hunter (fka Adkins) against David and Suzanne Stefanic. The
Stefanics subsequently brought a counterclaim against Hunter. In April 2008, the
Scott Circuit Court granted the Stefanics’ summary judgment on their counterclaim
against Hunter, and they subsequently have attempted to execute on that judgment.
In September 2008, the court dismissed Hunter’s claims and denied her motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the dismissal. Hunter now appeals the dismissal of her
claims against the Stefanics in appeal number 2009-CA-000047-MR. Attorney
Neil Duncliffe separately appeals the Scott Circuit Court’s imposition of sanctions
in appeal number 2009-CA-001511-MR. The court imposed sanctions against the
Stefanics and Duncliffe for attempting to intervene in the pending divorce action
between Hunter and her husband. After careful review, we affirm the Scott Circuit
Court’s rulings in both cases.
Hunter filed the complaint in appeal number 2009-CA-000047-MR on
August 3, 2007, and an answer and counterclaim was filed on September 17, 2007.
On November 8, 2007, Hunter’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel,
which was granted on December 6, 2007. The Scott Circuit Court’s order provided
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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that Hunter should retain new counsel within thirty days. After allowing the
allotted time to elapse, the Stefanics served a notice of deposition setting the
deposition of Hunter’s husband, Glenn Adkins, whose deposition was taken on
February 25, 2008. Mrs. Hunter did not appear personally or through counsel, and
no substitution of counsel was ever noticed upon the Scott Circuit Court.
On March 11, 2008, the Stefanics filed a motion for summary
judgment on their counterclaim, which was sustained on April 16, 2008. The order
recited that it was final and appealable, and it was served on Hunter by the clerk of
the Scott Circuit Court. On May 12, 2008, the Stefanics noticed Hunter’s
deposition and served a subpoena upon her. Hunter did not appear for the
deposition.
In August, the Stefanics took several steps to collect the judgment
entered on their counterclaim, and all notices were served upon Hunter. On
August 22, 2008, the Stefanics filed a motion to dismiss, and a copy was again
served upon Hunter. The Stefanics argued that Hunter had abandoned her case and
had failed to respond to any of the steps they had taken. Hunter did not file any
response or objection, and she failed to appear at the hearing on the motion to
dismiss. On September 4, 2008, the Scott Circuit Court granted the motion and
entered an order dismissing Hunter’s remaining claims.
On September 15, 2008, Attorney Watts entered an appearance on
Hunter’s behalf and filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 motion
to alter or vacate the dismissal of the claims. After a hearing on November 6,
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2008, the Scott Circuit Court denied the motion to vacate. An order adopting the
oral findings made at that hearing was entered on November 10, 2008. On
November 20, 2008, the Stefanics filed a motion to amend the November 10, 2008,
order to set out in more detail the findings which had been made. Hunter then filed
a motion for an evidentiary hearing.
The Scott Circuit Court entered a more detailed order on December
11, 2008, finding that based on the factors set forth in Stapleton v. Shower, 251
S.W.3d 341 (Ky. App. 2008), Hunter had failed to prosecute her case and had an
extensive history of dilatoriness. The court noted that Hunter had not offered any
justification for her failure to appear at motions and depositions in 2008 and
concluded that her actions were willful and in bad faith. The court held that the
Stefanics had been clearly prejudiced by having to defend the action, and in light
of these facts, dismissal was appropriate under CR 41.02. Hunter now appeals
from this order.
As Kentucky case law has long held, we review a trial court’s
dismissal under CR 41.02 for lack of prosecution by an abuse of discretion
standard. Jaroszewski v. Flege, 297 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Ky. 2009). “There is no
absolute right to dismissal for a plaintiff's failure to prosecute and no exact rule can
be laid down as to when a court is justified in dismissing a case for the plaintiff's
failure to prosecute or for delay in prosecuting his or her action; each case must be
looked at with regard to its own peculiar procedural history and the situation at the
time of dismissal.” Id. (Internal citations and footnotes omitted).
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The Court in Jaroszewski went on to clarify the role of appellate
courts in evaluating a trial court’s dismissal under CR 41.02 and ultimately
concluded that a trial court must not detail every factor listed in Ward v.
Houseman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. App. 1991). However, the Court held that
“[t]rial courts must make explicit findings on the record so that the parties and
appellate courts will be properly apprised of the basis for the trial court's rulings;
and the appellate courts can assess whether the trial court properly considered the
totality of the circumstances in dismissing the case.” Id. at 36.
In the instant case, the trial court detailed its written findings in its
order entered December 11, 2008. Those findings are supported by the record, and
thus we find no abuse of discretion by the court in dismissing Hunter’s claims
against the Stefanics. In particular, the Scott Circuit Court found that in all
pleadings and documents before the court Hunter’s address remained the same, and
Hunter was still the record owner of that property. Thus, there was proof in the
record that Hunter was receiving court documents, motions, pleadings, and notices
to appear before the court from August 2007 through dismissal in September 2008
and ignored such pleadings.
In her motion to vacate, Hunter argued that she had sought out new
counsel in her separate divorce proceedings and that her understanding was that
such counsel had agreed to represent her in the current civil proceedings.
However, we note that Hunter did not argue this before the court at the hearing on
the original motion to dismiss but instead failed to appear at that hearing. The trial
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court found that Hunter failed to obtain new counsel and that even if she had relied
on counsel to represent her in the instant action, the continued receipt of pleadings,
motions, and notices put Hunter on notice that counsel had not filed an appearance
in this matter and that her interests were not being represented.
The court determined that Hunter had not offered any reasonable
justifications for her failure to appear at motions and depositions and that her
conduct was willful and was evidence of bad faith. The court concluded that it
could not determine the merit of Hunter’s claim because she had failed to
prosecute her claim. Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Jaroszewski stated
“So, in a typical case, the meritorious nature of a plaintiff’s case may be difficult to
assess and of minimal value because even a meritorious case may be dismissed
under CR 41.02 if the totality of the circumstances shows that the plaintiff is not
actively prosecuting the case.” Jaroszewski at page 39. Finally, the trial court
found that the Stefanics had been prejudiced by having to continue to defend the
lawsuit.
Based on the trial court’s explicit written findings detailing the basis
for its dismissal under CR 41.02, it is clear the trial court considered the totality of
the circumstances in this case. The trial court considered the fact that Hunter was
receiving mail at her registered address and had not adequately hired another
attorney to represent her interests. The court made the factual determination that
Hunter was in fact receiving numerous pleadings and was ignoring them in bad
faith. Furthermore, the trial court determined that the Stefanics were prejudiced by
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the delay in action. Accordingly, the trial court’s reasons for dismissing were
supported by the evidence and as such, there was no abuse of discretion. Absent
such an abuse, we will not overturn the trial court’s ruling on appeal.
Attorney Neil Duncliffe appeals separately, arguing that the Scott
Circuit Court erred in imposing CR 11 sanctions against him for attempting to
collect a judgment on behalf of David and Suzanne Stefanic. Because we find no
error by the Scott Circuit Court in imposing CR 11 sanctions, we affirm the trial
court’s May 15, 2009, order.
As stated above, Hunter’s complaint was dismissed for lack of
prosecution on September 4, 2008. Meanwhile, on April 16, 2008, the Stefanics
obtained a judgment in the amount of $19,641.00 plus interest against Hunter on
their counterclaims. Hunter did not post a supersedeas bond, leaving the Stefanics
free to collect their judgment.
Upon obtaining the judgment against Hunter, Duncliffe issued a
garnishment upon marital funds held by attorney John Dutra in Hunter’s collateral
dissolution of marriage action which is still pending in Scott Circuit Court/Family
Division (Civil Action No. 06-CI-254 styled In the Marriage of Donna Adkins
(now Hunter) and Glenn Adkins). Dutra held $132,662.78 in marital funds
remaining from the sale of the Adkins/Hunter marital residence. Dutra executed an
affidavit indicating that Donna Hunter’s portion of the escrow account exceeded
the Stefanics’ judgment amount of $19,641.00 plus interest.
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Accordingly, on August 18, 2008, Duncliffe served a garnishment on
Dutra, seeking payment of $19,641.00 plus interest to satisfy the Stefanics’
judgment. When Dutra did not respond, the Stefanics moved to collect their
judgment via enforcement of the garnishment served upon Dutra. On December 4,
2008, the Scott Circuit Court, Civil Division I ordered the Stefanics to obtain a
ruling on whether they were permitted to garnish the marital funds from the Family
Division of the Scott Circuit Court, where the divorce petition was pending.
On January 7, 2009, the Stefanic’s motion to intervene into the
dissolution action was heard, but the Family Division deferred ruling on the
motion. On February 5, 2009, with no ruling from the Family Division on their
motion to intervene and with Hunter posting no supersedes bond, the Stefanics
again moved again to enforce their judgment in the Civil Division. The Civil
Division of the Scott Circuit Court again declined to rule, awaiting an order from
the Family Division.
On March 13, 2009, the Family Division of the Scott Circuit Court
entered an order denying the Stefanic’s motion to intervene. That order stated that
the Stefanics had no standing to intervene and found that the Stefanics had no
interest that would be affected because they already had a judgment against
Hunter, which they could execute upon immediately or after the disbursement of
the marital assets.
On March 17, 2009, Duncliffe initiated a conference call between
himself and attorneys Dutra and Prewitt, the attorneys for Donna and Glenn Hunter
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in their divorce petition, to sort out the meaning of the Family Division’s order.
According to Duncliffe, Dutra believed the Family Court order allowed him to
release the funds held in escrow immediately. However, Prewitt believed that the
Family Court order did not permit Dutra to honor the garnishment.
On April 2, 2009, after no resolution from the conference call,
Duncliffe moved the Scott Circuit Court Civil Division to resolve the conflicting
interpretations of the Family Court order and to enforce the garnishment originally
served eight months earlier. At this time, the Civil Division denied enforcement of
the garnishment and imposed CR 11 sanctions in the amount of $1,225.00 in fees
and costs in an order entered May 15, 2009. From this order, Duncliffe now
appeals. The Stefanics do not separately appeal the imposition of sanctions and
attorney’s fees.
“When reviewing a trial court's issuance of CR 11 sanctions, we
review the trial court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, the
ultimate determination that a violation occurred under a de novo standard, and the
‘type and/or amount of sanctions’ under an abuse of discretion standard.”
Lattanzio v. Joyce, 308 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Clark Equip. Co.,
Inc. v. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Ky. App. 1988)).
Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by
substantial evidence. Hallum v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Ky. App.
2007). Substantial evidence constitutes facts that a reasonable mind would accept
as sufficient to support a conclusion. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.
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2003). In its May 15, 2009, order the Scott Circuit Court’s factual findings mirror
the facts as presented in Duncliffe’s brief. Given that Duncliffe and the Scott
Circuit Court’s versions of the facts are the same, the facts in the instant case are
clearly supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
CR 11 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion
or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
A trial court is authorized to impose sanctions against any party or attorney who
violates this rule. CR 11 (“If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction . . . .”).
In Clark Equip. Co., Inc. v. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. App.
1988), this Court explained that the imposition of CR 11 sanctions should be
reserved for “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 420. “The test to be used by the
trial court in considering a motion for sanctions is whether the attorney's conduct,
at the time he or she signed the allegedly offending pleading or motion, was
reasonable under the circumstances.” Id.
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In the instant case, the Scott Circuit Court ruled that the Stefanics and
Duncliffe had “continually failed out of haste to recognize what this Court has
instructed them on two prior occasions. The family court’s Order unmistakably
states that the Defendants already have a judgment against the Plaintiff in this case,
and therefore, there is no need for them to intervene in that case.” The court went
on to note that the Family Court’s order was clear that based upon the Stefanics’
judgment against Hunter, they had the legal means to execute upon any property to
collect their debt but could not obtain any interest in Hunter’s marital funds until
they were disbursed. Given Duncliffe’s repeated pursuit of the matter in light of
the clear language in the Family Court’s order, his actions were not “reasonable
under the circumstances,” and the Civil Division was justified in imposing
sanctions under CR 11. Accordingly, even under a de novo standard of review,
sanctions were appropriate as a matter of law.
Finally, we review the type and/or amount of sanctions for an abuse of
discretion. Lattanzio, supra at 726. In the instant case, the Civil Division of the
Scott Circuit Court imposed attorney’s fees and costs for the second and third
motions filed by the Stefanics in their “ill-fated and ill-conceived attempt to get a
disbursement from the Dutra Escrow Account.” Those fees totaled $1,225.00 and
were tailored specifically to the costs incurred in the unnecessary attempts by
Duncliffe and the Stefanics to intervene and seek out marital funds. Thus, they
were reasonable in light of the court’s finding that sanctions were proper in this
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case. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the Civil Division in the
amount and/or type of sanctions imposed.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the December 11, 2008, order of
the Scott Circuit Court dismissing Hunter’s claims. Further, we affirm the May 15,
2009, order imposing CR 11 sanctions.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
APPELLEE DONNA HUNTER
(f/k/a ADKINS):
William S. Watts
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES DAVID
AND SUZANNE STEFANIC:
Ronald L. Green
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT NEIL E.
DUNCLIFFE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES DONNA
HUNTER (f/k/a ADKINS) AND
WILLIAM WATTS:
Neil E. Duncliffe
Georgetown, Kentucky
William S. Watts
Lexington, Kentucky
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