ALLEN (JOHN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JANUARY 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002275-MR
JOHN ALLEN, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00283
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, MOORE, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: John Allen, Jr. appeals from a Judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court reflecting a conditional plea of guilty to one count of Possession of a
Controlled Substance, First-Degree, and one count of Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia. Allen argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to
suppress evidence obtained by police when they employed a “ruse” to gain entry
into his residence. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the Judgment on
appeal.
John Allen and the Commonwealth each direct our attention to the
Findings of Fact set out in the Fayette Circuit Court’s Opinion and Order denying
Allen’s motion to suppress, and from which Allen now appeals. The circuit court
set out the relevant facts of this action therein as follows:
Officer Patrick testified . . . that on January 31,
2008, that he was working routine patrol of Central
Sector [in Lexington, Kentucky] from 4 p.m. to midnight.
According to Officer Patrick, he had received numerous
complaints regarding narcotics use and activity in that
area. That evening, at approximately 7:45 p.m., he drove
by 460 Kenton Street, observed the door open and three
subjects on the porch who were “acting suspicious.”
Officer Patrick continued past the residence, past
Fourth Street to Transylvania University where he parked
his vehicle. He got out of his vehicle on Fourth Street
and looked up Kenton Street where he observed one of
the individuals he had seen on the porch of 460 Kenton
Street coming toward him. Officer Patrick made contact
with the gentleman who identified himself as Clem.
Officer Patrick conducted a traffic stop. He detected a
strong odor of alcohol and conducted field sobriety tests.
Clem had a crack rock in his mouth and spit it out on the
ground. Officer Patrick questioned Clem about the origin
of the crack. Clem responded, “You saw where I was
at.” Clem told Officer Patrick that the residence
belonged to “Pops” or “Poppie.” Clem was placed under
arrest. Officer Patrick called for a transport unit and
requested an additional unit to assist with a “knock and
talk” investigation.
Officer Patrick testified that he knew “Pops” is a
nickname utilized by Allen. He also knew Allen’s
residence is located at 460 Kenton Street and is a known
crack house or smoke house. After the additional officer
3
arrived, both he and Officer Patrick went to 460 Kenton
Street. Officer Patrick knocked on the door. A female
voice asked, “Who is it?” Officer Patrick responded,
“Chris.” The female occupant opened the door.
Once the door was opened, Officer Patrick
immediately shined his flashlight into the residence. He
testified that Allen was sitting on a couch approximately
five feet in front of the door with a crack pipe in his right
hand. When Allen saw the police at the door, he
immediately tried to conceal the crack pipe by moving
his hands down. Both Officer Patrick and the other
officer identified themselves as police, entered the
residence, and gave a verbal command to Allen to put his
hands up. Allen complied. Officer Patrick saw the crack
pipe, ordered Allen to put it down and placed Allen under
arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia. A search
incident to arrest revealed 3.1grams of suspected crack
cocaine, [and] a brown purse on the floor under Allen’s
leg. The purse contained a crack pipe and $250 cash.
Allen was read his Miranda rights and subsequently
arrested. Allen did not make statements to the police.
Allen was later charged with one count each of Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance, First-Degree, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. The
matter proceeded in Fayette Circuit Court, and on June 4, 2008, Allen moved to
suppress the evidence obtained by the police when they entered the residence at
460 Kenton Street. As a basis for the motion, Allen argued that the arresting
officer misrepresented himself on a “knock and talk” visit to Allen’s home by
identifying himself as “Chris” rather than a police officer. Allen maintained that
this misrepresentation resulted in a violation of his rights afforded under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky
4
Constitution sufficient to sustain his motion to suppress the evidence obtained by
the police.
A hearing on the motion was conducted in Fayette Circuit Court, and
on August 8, 2008, the court rendered an Opinion and Order denying the motion
and which forms the basis of the instant appeal. The court determined in relevant
part that the primary issue before it was whether the ruse used by Officer Patrick to
get an occupant inside the residence at 460 Kenton Street to open the door
frustrated the purpose of the “knock and announce” rule and was therefore
unconstitutional. That ruse consisted of Officer Patrick’s announcement to the
female occupant of the residence that his name was “Chris.” The court determined
that the facts of the case fell squarely within an exception to the “knock and
announce” rule as set out in Kentucky case law, which provides that there is no
constitutional impediment to the use of subterfuge or a ruse to gain entry to a
residence. According to the Fayette Circuit Court, the rationale underlying this
rule is that entry through the use of deception and accomplished without force is
not a “breaking” requiring officers to first knock and announce their authority and
purpose. The court’s resultant Order denied Allen’s motion to suppress.
Allen subsequently accepted a reduction in the charges to one count of
Possession of a Controlled Substance, First-Degree, and one count of Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia in exchange for his plea of guilty. The plea was conditioned
on the reservation of Allen’s right to appeal the adverse ruling on his motion to
suppress. A Judgment on Guilty Plea was rendered on September 17, 2008, and
5
Allen was sentenced to a term of five years in prison. Allen was placed on
probation, and this appeal followed.
Allen now argues that the Fayette Circuit Court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the police when they entered the
residence at 460 Kenton Street. He maintains that suppression of the evidence is
required because Officer Patrick used a ruse to gain entry into the residence where
the evidence was discovered. Allen directs our attention to those provisions of the
United States and Kentucky Constitutions which prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures, and maintains that the circuit court misinterpreted Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998), and Krause v. Commonwealth, 206
S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2006), in support of its conclusion that the use of the ruse by the
police was not violative of Allen’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He notes that unlike the matter at bar, the Adcock decision centered on
the execution of a search warrant. He also maintains that the facts of Krause are
distinguishable, because in Krause a police officer gained entry to a home by
falsely stating that an alleged victim maintained that she was raped in the home. In
support of his contention that he was entitled to a suppression order, Allen argues
that in the matter at bar, consent was not voluntarily given by the female occupant
because she was “effectively coerced by Officer Patrick’s identification of himself
as ‘Chris’ as opposed to rightful identification as an officer of the law.” Allen also
contends that the police could have engaged in other means of investigating their
suspicion that crack was being sold at the residence by way of monitoring the
6
residence or using a confidential informant. In sum, Allen argues that the ruse
used by Officer Patrick did not fall within the limited exception to the prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure as set out in Adcock or Krause, and that as
such he is entitled to an Order reversing the denial of his motion to suppress.
Having closely studied the written arguments, the record and the law,
we find no basis for disturbing the Order on appeal. We must first note that the
suppression hearing at issue was neither electronically nor stenographically
recorded, or was a narrative statement of the proceeding entered into the record.
See generally, CR 75.13. Where the record on appeal does not contain a transcript
of evidence or narrative statement, we must assume that the evidence supported the
factual findings of the circuit court. Porter v. Harper, 477 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1972).
The question then becomes whether the circuit court properly determined that the
constitutional safeguards, the statutory law or case law as applied to these facts
was not violated. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134
L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). We must answer that question in the affirmative.
In Adcock, a police officer disguised as a pizza delivery person
knocked on the defendant’s door and announced that he had a pizza for delivery.
When the occupant opened the door, the officer executed a valid search warrant of
the residence. On review of an Opinion of this Court affirming Adcock’s
conviction, the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that a ruse used to facilitate
the execution of a valid search warrant is constitutionally distinguishable from the
7
prohibition against “no knock entry.”1 It based this conclusion on the
determination that otherwise lawful entry (via the search warrant) obtained through
the use of a ruse and accomplished without force is not a “breaking” requiring
officers to first announce their authority and purpose. Adcock at 9.
The facts of Adcock are a reasonable analog to those preceding
Allen’s arrest. Whereas the approaching officer in Adcock pretended to be a pizza
delivery person, Officer Patrick stated that his name was “Chris.” Similarly, just
as the officer in Adcock made lawful entry based on the execution of a valid search
warrant, Officer Patrick made lawful entry into the Allen residence upon observing
through the doorway Allen’s possession of a crack pipe. In each case, the ruse did
not place the officer inside the residence, but rather caused the occupant to open
the door to the residence.
The Krause opinion, upon which the circuit court relied in part in
denying Allen’s motion to suppress, is also properly applied to the instant facts.
Krause held in relevant part that under the “plain view doctrine,” a warrantless
seizure of illegal substances or objects is constitutionally valid so long as the police
officer has not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place where the
evidence could be plainly viewed. Krause at 923. Relying on Adcock for the
determination that an officer may employ a ruse to cause an occupant to open the
door to a residence, the circuit court also properly applied Krause in support of its
1
The “knock and announce rule” set out in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914,
131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995), has three purposes: (1) to protect law enforcement officers and
household occupants from potential violence; (2) to prevent unnecessary destruction of private
property; and (3) to protect people from unnecessary intrusion into their private activities.
8
conclusion that the plain view doctrine justified Officer Patrick’s entry into the
residence. Officer Patrick stated that after the female occupant opened the door, he
shined a flashlight into the residence and observed Allen in plain view with a crack
pipe in his hand. Allen was located about five feet from the door. Allen was
subsequently arrested, and a search incident to arrest resulted in the discovery of
additional evidence. We find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s
Opinion and Order denying Allen’s motion to suppress. Because Allen’s guilty
plea was conditioned on the reservation of his right to appeal the Opinion and
Order, we affirm the Final Judgment and Sentence of Probation.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
J. Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
9
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.