WEBB (HENRY), ET AL. VS. MEYER (PAMELA)
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002274-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-002312-MR
HENRY WEBB, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT
OF FLOYD COUNTY SCHOOLS AND
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FLOYD
COUNTY, KENTUCKY
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
v.
APPEAL & CROSS-APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANNY P. CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-01038
PAMELA MEYER
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Henry Webb, in his official capacity as superintendent of
Floyd County Schools, and the Floyd County Board of Education (collectively
referred to as the “Board”) appeal two orders of the Floyd Circuit Court finding
that the Board violated the statutory rights of Pamela Meyer and awarding her
damages for lost wages. Meyer filed a cross-appeal regarding the amount of lost
wages that she was awarded by the Floyd Circuit Court. For the reasons stated
herein, we affirm.
By letter dated June 21, 2007, the Board notified Pamela Meyer, the
Coordinator of the Family Resource Youth Service Center (FRYSC) at Clark
Elementary, that she would not be hired for the same position at the new
Prestonsburg Elementary. Meyer had applied for the job after the loss of her
position following the consolidation of Prestonsburg Elementary and another
school at the end of the 2006-07 school year.
Despite having less seniority than Meyer, Reibal Reynolds, who was
the FRYSC Coordinator at the old Prestonsburg Elementary, was assigned the
same position at the newly consolidated school. Further, there were other district
FRYSC coordinators who had less than four years of continuous active service and
maintained their positions. Meyer became a FRYSC Project Clerk, which carried a
salary and responsibility reduction compared to her former position.
On September 17, 2007, Meyer filed a civil action against the Board,
alleging violations of her classified employee and constitutional due process rights.
She alleged that the Board violated her classified employee rights by terminating
her employment contract without a reason as required by KRS 161.011(7). She
further alleged that her seniority rights were violated when the Board placed an
employee with less seniority in the FRYSC Coordinator position at the new school.
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The Board answered by asserting that there was no reduction in force
as defined by applicable statute and its policies. Thus, it contended that Meyer’s
classified employee rights were not violated and that seniority played no role in
Meyer’s employment placement. Additionally, the Board contended that its
decision was in compliance with the terms of Meyer’s employment contract.
Subsequently, Meyer filed a motion for a declaratory judgment
seeking a ruling that the Board had violated state law. On April 24, 2008, the trial
court ruled that the Board violated KRS 161.011(8)(a). The trial court then issued
an order awarding Meyer $11,299.92 in damages, the difference between her fiscal
year 2008 salary and what she would have received as FRYSC Coordinator for the
same period. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
The Board argues that the trial court erred by finding that its selection
of the Prestonsburg Elementary School FRYSC Coordinator was in contravention
of KRS 161.011(8)(a). The Board argues that it could not be in violation of KRS
161.011(8)(a) because it did not reduce its workforce. Thus, it contends that the
statute was inapplicable to Meyer’s case. We disagree.
A trial court’s findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous when the court sits without a jury. Sebastian-Voor Properties, LLC v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 265 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Ky. 2008).
When factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, they will not be
found to be clearly erroneous. Eagle Cliff Resort, LLC v. KHBBJB, LLC, 295
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S.W.3d 850, 853 (Ky.App. 2009). We then review the trial court’s application of
law de novo. Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky. 2007).
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention
and effectuate the intent of the legislature. MPM Financial Group, Inc. v. Morton,
289 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Ky. 2009). We must apply the literal meaning of a statute's
terms unless such an approach leads to absurd or wholly unreasonable results.
Richardson v. Rees, 283 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Ky.App. 2009). The interpretation and
application of statutes are matters of law and reviewed de novo. Hill v. Thompson,
297 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Ky.App. 2009).
KRS 161.011(8), in pertinent part, provides the following:
The superintendent shall have full authority to make a
reduction in force due to reductions in funding,
enrollment, or changes in the district or school
boundaries, or other compelling reasons as determined by
the superintendent.
(a) When a reduction of force is necessary, the
superintendent shall, within each job classification
affected, reduce classified employees on the basis of
seniority and qualifications with those employees who
have less than four (4) years of continuous active service
being reduced first.
From a plain reading of the statute, the legislature has expressed a retention
preference for employees with greater seniority and qualifications. Id. Further,
reduction in force applies to the “job classification affected,” not all classifications.
In this case, two elementary schools, each having a family resource
coordinator, were consolidated, which left only one position. Although the Board
argues that there was no reduction in force because its total number of employees
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in the district was not reduced, the statutory language provides that a reduction in
force occurs when the total number of employees in a particular job classification
is reduced (affected). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by applying KRS
161.011(8)(a) in Meyer’s case and ruling in her favor regarding her job placement.
The Board next argues that Meyer’s claim that she was demoted was
without any basis in law or fact. The Board argues that Meyer’s claim must fail
because no such statute exists with respect to the demotion of classified employees.
Despite the Board’s contention, its argument must fail because it was not ruled on
by the trial court and was not further preserved by citation in the Board’s brief.
When a party believes that the trial court has erred, it must insist on a
ruling from the trial court in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.
Oldham Farms Development, LLC v. Oldham County Planning and Zoning Com'n,
233 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Ky.App. 2007). Moreover, a party’s brief must contain
citations to the record where it requested a ruling on the issue or the issue is
unpreserved. Craig & Bishop, Inc. v. Piles, 247 S.W.3d 897, 905 (Ky. 2008).
Accordingly, because the Board has not preserved this issue for appellate review,
we will not address its claim on the merits.
The Board next argues that the trial court erred by issuing a
declaratory judgment in favor of Meyer. The Board argues that a declaratory
action claim cannot be used to secure a determination of substantive rights during
the pendency of a civil action. According to the Board, the issues relating to
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Meyer’s termination and the district’s reduction of force remained disputed and
could not be resolved against it without further proceedings. We disagree.
The Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Act, codified in KRS 418.040,
provides that “in any action in a court of record wherein it is made to appear that
an actual controversy exists, the plaintiff may ask for a declaration of rights, either
alone or with other relief, and the court may make a binding judgment.” Mammoth
Medical, Inc. v. Bunnell, 265 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Ky. 2008). While the Act must be
liberally applied to effectuate its purpose, it cannot replace our existing system for
resolving disputes between parties. Id. at 210. Further, the trial court’s granting of
a declaratory judgment is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Bradley, 244 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Ky.App. 2007).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err
by issuing a declaratory judgment in favor of Meyer. While the Board correctly
contends that a declaratory action cannot be instituted to secure a determination of
substantive rights involved in a pending suit, Meyer’s motion was filed against the
Board in their pending lawsuit. Unlike the plaintiff in Gibbs v. Tyree, 287 Ky.
656, 154 S.W.2d 732, 733 (1941), Meyer was not instituting an action to determine
legal questions relevant to an already pending action. Meyer merely requested that
the trial court construe and apply the statute applicable to the parties’ case where
there was no factual dispute.
Having addressed the issues raised in the Board’s appeal, we now
turn to the issue presented by Meyer’s cross-appeal.
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Meyer contends that the trial court erred by not awarding her the
difference between the salary she received during the 2007-08 school year and the
salary paid to Reibal Reynolds, the FRYSC Coordinator at Prestonsburg
Elementary during the 2007-08 school year. We disagree.
The trial court found that Meyer earned $19,207.02 and that she
would have earned $30,506.94 had she been hired as the FRYSC Coordinator at
Prestonsburg Elementary, according to the Board’s adopted pay schedule. The
trial court awarded Meyer the difference between these amounts in damages for
her lost wages, which was $11,299.92. However, Meyer contends that she should
have been awarded $18,131.99, the difference between her salary and Reynolds’s
salary of $37,339.01. According to Meyer, because the person hired as the
Prestonsburg Elementary School FRYSC Coordinator received $37,339.01, she
contends that her damages should be based on this amount. Additionally, she
contends that the Board did not consistently follow its adopted pay schedule and,
thus, she should not be limited by the schedule.
Notwithstanding Meyer’s argument, we conclude that the trial court’s
findings were not clearly erroneous. The trial court found that the Board adopted a
uniform pay schedule for its employees but that some employees were
“grandfathered” in, permitting them to earn a higher salary, including Reynolds.
While Meyer argues for a higher award of damages, the trial court was permitted to
use the Board’s adopted pay schedule in determining her award for lost wages.
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For the foregoing reasons, the two orders of the Floyd Circuit Court
are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS/
CROSS-APPELLEES:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Jonathan C. Shaw
Michael J. Schmitt
Paintsville, Kentucky
Carrie C. Mullins
J. Follace Fields
Lexington, Kentucky
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