LAYNE (LELA DANIEL) VS. DANIEL (JEFFREY SCOTT)
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RENDERED: APRIL 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002246-MR
LELA DANIEL (LAYNE)
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANIE MCKENZIE-WELLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00253
JEFFREY SCOTT DANIEL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Lela Daniel Layne (Lela) appeals from the family court’s
order allocating the parties’ debt and property and determining custody of the
parties’ minor children. On appeal, Lela argues that the court failed to make
1
Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
findings of fact, failed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children, abused its
discretion when it designated Jeffrey Scott Daniel (Scott) 2 primary residential
custodian, and should have recused, all of which constitute reversible error.
Having reviewed the court’s order and the record, we affirm.
FACTS
Lela and Scott were married on July 15, 1995. Two children were
born of the marriage, a son (Kash) on June 24, 1997, and a daughter (Julia) on June
8, 2001. During the course of the marriage, the parties separated and reconciled on
several occasions. The last reconciliation failed and, on June 20, 2006, Scott filed
a petition for dissolution of the parties’ marriage which asked the court to divide
the parties’ property and debt and to award the parties joint custody of the minor
children. By agreement, the parties attended a reconciliation conference; however,
that attempt to resolve their differences proved to be unsuccessful.
On January 30, 2007, Lela filed a motion seeking permanent custody,
child support, maintenance, and the family home. Following a hearing on that
motion, the court entered an agreed order setting forth a visitation schedule and
requiring Scott to make all mortgage and utility payments on the marital residence.
The parties’ relationship continued to deteriorate and, in June 2007, Scott filed a
motion for custody and child support.
Following a hearing on July 30, 2007, the court entered an order
awarding the parties temporary joint custody and denying Lela’s motion for
2
Throughout the proceedings, the parties have referred to Mr. Daniel as Scott; therefore, we will
do so as well.
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temporary maintenance. The court also ordered the parties, when in the presence
of the children, to refrain from drinking alcoholic beverages and speaking harshly
about each other and to limit contact with significant others. In its order, the court
found that it was in the best interest of the children to continue attending school in
Paintsville, where Scott resided, rather than transferring to Betsy Layne, where
Lela resided. Finally, the court recommended that the parties use the grandparents
to exchange the children in order to minimize any disagreement and ordered Scott
to provide Lela with a copy of the health insurance card for the children.
On September 28, 2007, Lela filed a motion to hold Scott in contempt,
arguing that he had not provided a copy of the health insurance card for the
children and that he had made degrading remarks, used foul language, and yelled at
her when they met to exchange the children. Lela also filed motions asking the
court to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children and to set a specific Thursday
for Scott’s timesharing.
On October 29, 2007, Lela filed a motion for change of venue noting
that Scott’s father is the County Judge/Executive in Johnson County, where the
case was being heard. Because of this relationship, Lela believed she might not get
a fair hearing.
On November 15, 2007, the court entered an order requiring the
parties to refrain from making disparaging remarks, appointing a guardian ad litem,
and denying the motion for change of venue. We note that Lela, on February 12,
2008, filed a motion asking the court to conduct an in camera interview of the
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children. In her motion, Lela noted that the parties “decided on [sic] seeking
someone from a care facility to” interview the children rather than using a guardian
ad litem. Lela indicated that, because of scheduling difficulties, that interview
could not take place; thus the request for the court to conduct the interview.
On March 31, 2008, the court granted the parties a dissolution of their
marriage but retained jurisdiction to decide all other issues. On April 29, 2008,
two weeks before the scheduled final hearing, Lela filed an emergency motion for
custody and contempt. In her motion Lela stated that Scott had placed a number of
her personal items in plastic bags and left the bags on her front porch without
previously notifying her. She also alleged that Scott had grabbed their daughter by
the chin and neck and “had her cornered against the kitchen table telling her not to
talk back to him.” On May 14, 2008, the court stated that it would address Lela’s
motion on the last day of the final hearing.
At the final hearing, which the court conducted for approximately five
hours on February 19, 2008, for approximately five and a half hours on March 25,
2008, and for approximately six and a half hours on May 15, 2008, the parties
testified and presented testimony from relatives, neighbors, and friends. We
summarize that testimony below; however, by way of brief summary, we note that
Lela and her witnesses testified generally that she was a good, caring mother and
that Scott was controlling and verbally abusive but also a caring father. On the
other hand, Scott and his witnesses testified that he took the primary role as
caregiver for the children and was a good, caring father while Lela was not
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involved in the children’s lives and, although she loved the children, she was more
focused on her well-being than that of the children.
1. Scott’s Testimony
Scott works as a sales representative for Glaxo Smith Kline and earns
$80,400 per year plus incentive bonuses. Lela works as a school teacher. After
they married, the couple lived in Floyd County then Pikeville, eventually moving
to Paintsville, where they built the marital residence. Scott testified that his mother
“loaned”3 the couple the money to purchase the lot for the house and his father paid
for surveying and site preparation as well as for some of the concrete work.
Scott testified that he purchased all of the furniture for the house,
made all of the mortgage payments, and paid all of the utility bills. According to
Scott, Lela kept her salary and used it to purchase clothes and some groceries.
In terms of child care, Scott testified that, after the family moved to
Paintsville, he always got the children out of bed in the morning, fixed their
breakfast, got them dressed, and took them to school. Furthermore, he generally
picked the children up from school and prepared the evening meals. Scott also
testified that he was active in the children’s extra-curricular activities, coaching
various sports which Kash plays, and attending all of his games. Scott’s parents,
who live nearby, see the children nearly every day and occasionally pick the
children up from school when Scott cannot do so. According to Scott, Lela never
3
We note that Scott characterized this as a loan; however, it does not appear that there was any
promissory note or other documentation memorializing the transaction. Furthermore, it appears
from the record that the money has not been repaid and Scott’s mother has not sought and
probably will not seek repayment.
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prepared meals, rarely attended the children’s activities, and contributed little, if
anything, to running the household. Scott asked the court to award him custody
because of his relationship with the children and their ties to the Paintsville
community.
On cross-examination, Scott denied arguing with Lela and making
disparaging comments about her in front of the children. Furthermore he denied
threatening Lela and stated that when she left him in the past, it was to be with her
family, not because of his behavior. Scott also denied telling Lela that she could
not win because the case was being heard in Johnson County, where his father is
county judge/executive.
Finally, we note that, at the end of Lela’s proof, she played an
audiotape recording of an argument that Scott denied they had. On the recording
Scott can be heard making disparaging comments to Lela, calling her psychotic
and accusing her of stealing. Although it is not clear if Kash was in the room when
those comments were made, he was in the house.
2. Bill Mike Runyon (Runyon)
Runyon is the assistant principal and athletic director at Paintsville
High School. Runyon testified that Scott is an assistant coach for the basketball
team and Kash is one of the team’s ball boys. According to Runyon, Scott is well
regarded in the community, puts his children first, and appears to be a loving
father. Furthermore, Runyon testified that the children are well-grounded in the
community and would have a difficult time if forced to move.
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3. Jimmy Daniels (Daniels)
Daniels, a teacher’s aid and coach in the Paintsville schools, testified
that he has known Scott most of his life. He has observed Scott with the children,
although he sees Scott more with Kash than Julia. According to Daniels, Kash is
well-grounded in the community.
4. Billy Phelps (Phelps)
Phelps, a funeral director, knows both Scott and Lela and his son is a
friend of Kash’s. According to Phelps, Scott attends more of Kash’s games than
Lela does. He could not testify how active either parent was with Julia, but
concluded that Scott is a good parent.
5. Jane Ann Daniels (Ms. Daniels)
Ms. Daniels is married to Jimmy Daniels and is a self-employed
cosmetic shop owner. She has known both Lela and Scott for a number of years
and has observed Scott with the children. Ms. Daniels testified that Scott is at most
of Kash’s activities, and he generally has Julia with him; however, Lela was not at
Kash’s games very often.
6. Amy Salyer (Salyer)
Salyer works in the accounting department at Mountain
Comprehensive Care and has known both Scott and Lela for four years. Kash and
Salyer’s son are friends and Salyer has observed Scott at Kash’s games. While at
the games, Scott has Julia with him and arranges for another parent to watch her
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while he coaches. As with other witnesses, Salyer testified that Lela is not present
at Kash’s games as often as Scott.
7. Paul Deaton (Deaton)
Deaton, a local attorney, knows Scott from living in the
neighborhood. He has observed Scott, but not Lela, with the children and opined
that Scott is a good father.
8. Rob Miller (Miller)
Miller, a local attorney, testified that he has known Scott and Lela for
four or five years because their sons play ball together. According to Miller, Scott
has a close bond with both children. When asked if he had anything to add to
assist the judge in making her decision, Miller testified that Lela stated, in front of
Kash, that Scott and his father bought things for Kash to “get him on their side.”
9. Kim Shomo (Shomo)
Shomo lives across the street from the marital home and was a good
friend of Lela’s when she lived there. Shomo testified that she was concerned
about Julia because Lela was often away from home on weekends and Julia
appeared “starved for attention.” Lela told Shomo that, when she went out of
town, she went to “clubs,” and Lela showed Shomo photographs of men she had
met. Shomo testified that, on at least one occasion, Lela received a phone call
from one of those men while visiting with Shomo.
10. Roger Daniel (Daniel)
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Daniel is Scott’s brother and a Deputy United States Marshall. Daniel
testified that he believes Lela is a good mother and that she has never acted
inappropriately with the children in his presence. Lela spoke with Daniel several
times about the state of her marriage to Scott, but Daniel could not remember what
advice he gave her. On one occasion, Lela came to Daniel’s house and spent the
night because she did not want to stay with Scott.
11. Paige Daniel (Paige)
Paige, who is Scott’s mother, testified that Lela was never at home
and that Scott acted as the caregiver for the children. According to Paige, Scott
always put the children first and Lela was often away from home. On crossexamination, Paige testified that Lela had complained to her about Scott’s
behavior, and Paige stated that she talked with Scott about his behavior. Paige
denied trying to physically assault Lela at a “pre-birthday party” for Kash.
12. Roger Daniel (Roger)
Roger, the county judge/executive and Scott’s father, testified that he
and Paige spend a good deal of time with the children. According to Roger, Scott
attends the majority of the children’s extra-curricular activities, but Lela rarely
does. Roger expressed concern about Lela getting custody because she seemed
more interested in her schedule and activities than in the children’s. With regard to
the marital home, Roger testified that Paige paid for the lot, and that he paid an
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additional $17,000 to $18,000 for surveying, site work, drainage, seeding, and
curbs.
13. Ann Derossett (Derossett)
Derossett, the assistant principal of Betsy Layne Elementary School,
testified that she has worked with Lela for five years and that Lela appears to be a
good mother. Additionally, Derossett testified that Lela had confided to her that
Scott had been verbally and mentally abusive and that Lela was concerned about
the impact Scott’s behavior might have on the children. On cross-examination,
Derossett testified that she had seen Scott with the children and that he seemed to
be attentive.
14. Patricia Layne (Layne)
Layne, who is Lela’s mother, testified that she had doubts about Scott
and Lela’s relationship from the beginning. According to Layne, Lela left Scott on
several occasions because of Scott’s behavior. She noted one occasion when Lela
stated that Scott had pushed her and put his hands around her neck. Because
Layne feared for Lela’s safety, she encouraged Lela to leave Scott. Layne noted
that, while living with Scott, Lela suffered from panic attacks and anxiety.
However, Lela had no such symptoms since the couple separated. As to the
children, Layne stated that she believes both need counseling and that Kash
appeared to be “full of anger.” On cross-examination, Layne testified that she did
not believe there was anything wrong with Lela spending an occasional “girls’
weekend” away from her family.
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15. Lisa Hale (Hale)
Hale, Lela’s twin sister, testified that Scott was usually not present
when she visited Lela. According to Hale, Lela is a good mother. Hale testified
that Lela reported various incidents of abuse by Scott. After one such incident,
Hale observed bruises on Lela’s arms. Hale testified that she encouraged Lela to
leave Scott because she feared for Lela’s safety.
16. Charlotte Rogers (Rogers)
Rogers, Director of the Family Resource Center at Betsy Layne
Elementary School, testified that she has known Lela most of her life. Rogers
testified that Lela is a good mother. Lela complained to Rogers about Scott’s
abusive behavior and Rogers advised Lela to leave the marriage if she felt she was
in danger. Rogers noted that Lela had been nervous and tense the last few years of
the marriage and that Kash was tense, rough with Julia, and spoke harshly to Lela.
17. Lana Ross (Ross)
Ross, who is Lela’s cousin, testified that she and Lela spoke about
Lela’s marital problems. Ross stated that she believes that Scott has “control
issues” and that he did not want to be involved with Lela’s family. Ross also
testified that Lela is a good mother.
18. Lela Layne
Lela testified that she has taught elementary school for the past
nineteen years. She agreed that Scott made the house payments and paid for
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utilities. She used her salary to pay for her expenses, for food, and for household
decorations, etc.
Lela and Scott separated three times before Scott filed for dissolution.
According to Lela, each separation flowed from Scott’s abusive behavior, behavior
that continued after he filed. The parties went to counseling and attempted to
reconcile, but were unsuccessful.
With regard to the children, Lela testified that she did participate in
their extra-curricular activities. However, she admitted that she is not as involved
with Kash’s activities as Scott. Lela testified that, when the family moved to
Paintsville, she continued to teach in Betsy Layne, which is approximately a 45minute drive from Paintsville. Because of Lela’s commute, the couple agreed that
Scott would be primarily responsible for transporting the children to and from
school. However, contrary to Scott’s testimony, Lela testified that she did prepare
meals and that she got the children’s breakfast and clothes ready for them before
she left for work.
With regard to her “girls’ weekends,” Lela testified that she and Scott
had agreed to spend time away to “ease” the children into separation. Furthermore,
Lela testified that she wanted Scott to see what it would be like to care for the
children by himself. Lela denied telling Shomo that she met men at clubs while
away and denied that she received telephone calls from any of those men.
Furthermore, Lela denied telling Miller that Scott and Roger were trying to buy
Kash’s loyalty.
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Lela testified at length to various incidents of abuse, noting in
particular that Scott had shoved her, grabbed her by the neck, and bruised her arms.
Lela noted that Scott had spoken to her harshly in front of the children and others
on a number of occasions and that Scott had also spoken harshly and abusively to
the children.
Finally, Lela testified that she is involved with another man.
However, she denied that she is “engaged” or that she has any immediate plans to
marry. In the event she would marry this man, she would likely move to Pikeville.
19. Jack Salyer (Jack)
Jack testified by way of deposition that he has known Scott most of
his life. He coaches little league with Scott and stated that Scott is attentive to his
children. Jack has seen Lela at Kash’s games.
20. Gwen Tackett (Tackett)
Tackett, a dental hygienist, testified by deposition that Lela has
brought the children to all of their dental appointments and that Scott has never
been with them.
22. Beth Phelps (Beth)
Beth, a part-time speech therapist, testified that Lela and the children
love each other and that Scott is a good caretaker. Beth noted that the couple had
argued in her presence and that, when arguing, Scott tended to make sarcastic
comments to or about Lela.
23. Testimony Regarding the Boat
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Because Lela has raised an issue with regard to a fishing boat in
Scott’s possession and Scott, Lela, and Scott’s father, Roger, testified about that
issue, we summarize that testimony separately.
Scott testified that, at about the time he and Lela got married, Roger
bought him a fishing boat. Roger testified that, after Scott graduated from college
Scott wanted Roger to co-sign a loan so that he could purchase a fishing boat.
Roger said he would not co-sign a loan but would “lend” the money to Scott to
purchase the boat. According to Roger, he told Scott that he could pay back the
“loan,” but he was not required to do so. Both Scott and Roger testified that, over
time, Scott traded that boat for a better boat and that Roger paid any difference
between the trade value and the cost of the new boat. Seven or eight of these
transactions took place during Scott and Lela’s marriage. Each time, Roger “lent”
Scott the additional money, with the understanding that Scott could pay it back but
that he was not obligated to do so. All of the boats, except the one at issue, were
titled in Scott’s name.
Near the time Scott filed for dissolution, he obtained the boat at issue.
According to Roger, the trade in value of Scott’s old boat was $26,000 and Scott
needed an additional $6,000 to purchase the newest boat. Roger agreed to lend
Scott the $6,000, with the understanding that the boat be titled in Roger’s name.
Roger testified that he wanted the boat to be in his name because he did not want it
to be considered marital property.
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Lela testified that Scott spent $36,000 for the boat, $30,000 of which
she believes came from marital funds. In support of her contention, Lela testified
that Scott had given checks to his parents in the amount of $30,000 at or near the
time the boat was purchased.
24. The Family Court’s Final Order
Because the sufficiency of the family court’s findings in its final order
is at issue, we set forth the relevant portions of that order below:
The Court held extensive hearings with regard to this
matter and with regard to all issues presented herein and
specifically heard the evidence presented on February 19,
2008, March 25, 2008, and May 15, 2008. The Court
considered the extensive testimony taken in this matter
including that of the Petitioner, JEFFREY SCOTT
DANIEL, and the Respondent, LELA LAYNE, along
with the following witnesses, BILL MIKE RUNYON,
Assistant Principal and Basketball Coach at Paintsville
High School; JIMMY DANIELS, Paintsville High
School Teachers Aide and Coach; BILLY PHELPS,
Funeral Director/Embalmer; JANE ANN DANIELS,
Self-employed Cosmetic Store Owner; AMY SALYER,
Friend; PAUL DEATON, Attorney; ROBERT MILLER,
Attorney; and KIM SHOMO, Neighbor. The Court also
considered the testimony presented herein of PAIGE
DANIEL, the Petitioner’s Mother; MARILYN BARNES,
Retired School Teacher from Betsy Lane; TOMMY
SPEARS, Retired Minister from Betsy Layne; THELMA
SPEARS, Tommy’s Wife; R.T. “TUCKER” DANIEL,
Petitioner’s Father; ANN DEROSSETT, Assistant
Principal at Betsy Layne Elementary; PATRICIA
LAYNE, Respondent’s Mother; LISA HALE,
Respondent’s Twin Sister; CHARLOTTE ROGERS,
Director of Family Resource Center at Betsy Layne
Elementary; and LANA LAYNE, Respondent’s Cousin.
The Court will not reiterate the entire testimony of all of
these parties in this matter as it was extensive but all
evidence has been considered, including the Court’s
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various interviews with the children, before making the
rulings contained therein.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties hereto have two minor children, KASH
L. DANIEL, age 11, and JULIA PAIGE DANIEL, age 7.
Both children currently attend Paintsville Elementary
School in Johnson County, Kentucky. The Petitioner,
JEFFREY SCOTT DANIEL, is a Pharmaceutical Sales
Representative employed by Glaxo Smith Kline
Beecham Corporation. The Respondent, LELA LAYNE,
is an Elementary School Teacher employed by the Floyd
County Board of Education and teaches at Betsy Layne
Elementary in Floyd County, Kentucky. The parties
were married on June 15, 1995 and separated in January
of 2007. The Court entered a Bifurcated Decree of
Dissolution of Marriage on March 27, 2008, reserving
the issue of custody of the parties’ minor children, as
well as distribution of property and allocation of debt.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
restored.
The parties have non-marital property to be
2.
The parties have marital property to be
distributed.
3.
The parties have marital debt to be allocated.
4.
The Court herein must determine the fit and
proper party to have custody of the minor children herein
and determine visitation and child support issues.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
1.
The parties hereto have a marital home at
121 Frank Street, Staffordsville, Kentucky. This home is
located in a subdivision referred to as Cross Creek II.
The parties presented appraisals with regard to this
property. Both appraisals showed a market value of
$340,000.00 with regard to this home. This home also
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has a mortgage lien in the approximate amount of
$250,000.00. The marital home is hereby awarded to the
Petitioner, JEFFREY SCOTT DANIEL, along with the
remaining mortgage thereon. The Respondent, LELA
LAYNE, is hereby entitled to 1/2 of the equity in the
home, that being approximately $45,000.00 (1/2 of
$90,000.00 equity). If the Petitioner is not able to pay to
the Respondent that amount due her for her equitable
interest in this property, then the property shall be sold by
the Master Commissioner of this Court and the proceeds
shall be divided equally between the parties hereto after
all fees and expenses of the sale have been paid. The
appliances shall remain within the marital home.
There was testimony with regard to amounts which
were loaned to the parties to purchase the lot upon which
the marital home sits and for site preparation. The Court
finds that this was a gift to both parties as there was no
documentation showing that this was a loan that required
re-payment by either party upon sale of the home or
distribution herein.
2.
There was evidence presented to the Court
with regard to Bass Boats which were purchased during
the marriage. The Court finds that the funds used to
purchase these Bass Boats can be traced to a gift from the
Petitioner’s father and therefore concludes that it is the
Petitioner’s non-marital property. As the Bass Boat the
Petitioner currently owns is in his father’s name, no
distribution is necessary.
3.
With regard to the items of personal
property which the parties during the marriage
accumulated, the parties indicated that they should be
able to agree upon a division of same. The Court does
order that the children’s bedroom furniture and all
accessories therein are to remain with the children. If the
parties are unable to agree with regard to the remaining
items of personal property, other than the appliances
which have heretofore been left in the home, they may
petition the Court for a division of those items to which
they cannot agree.
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4.
The parties have indicated that there was a
Certificate of Deposit in both parties’ names, which was
purchased during the marriage. The amount of this
Certificate shall be equally divided between the parties
hereto, as well as any non-business, joint bank accounts
that the parties had at the time of the separation. The
parties are awarded any other bank accounts in their
respective names to the owner thereof.
5.
The parties have also testified that they have
two vehicles which are marital property, that being a
1997 Tahoe and a 1999 Explorer. The 1997 Tahoe is
hereby awarded to the Petitioner along with any
remaining debt thereon. The 1999 Explorer is hereby
awarded to the Respondent along with any remaining
debt thereon.
6.
The parties herein have maintained separate
credit cards, and the Court herein allocates liability for
payment of these credit cards to the owner of same and
that party shall indemnify and hold the other party
harmless from payment thereon. If any credit cards exist
to which both the Petitioner and the Respondent’s name
are listed on the card, those credit cards shall be split
50/50 between the parties hereto with regard to all
purchases made during the marriage and prior to the
separation of the parties. Any amounts charged to a
credit card which is in both parties’ name after the
separation of the parties shall be the responsibility of the
party incurring same.
7.
The parties testified with regard to their
various retirement accounts. The Petitioner testified that
he has a GSK Retirement Savings Account and an IRA
Account. The Respondent testified that she has a
Teachers’ Retirement Account and a Deferred
Compensation Account. Under Kentucky Law, the Court
is not to consider KTRS pension plans in the division of
marital property. However, the law requires the Court to
offset the Retirement Savings Account and IRA of the
Petitioner to the extent that the Respondent’s Retirement
Accounts are not considered. Therefore, the Respondent
will receive 1/2 of any remaining amount in the
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Petitioner’s Retirement Savings Account and IRA
Account that is not directly offset by the amounts in her
own Teachers’ Retirement and Deferred Compensation
Account as of the date of Dissolution of Marriage.
8.
The Court now looks at the main issue
addressed by the parties during the extensive hearings
held in this matter, that being custody. This Court finds
that it has jurisdiction under KRS 403.822 to make a
custody determination with regard to the parties’ minor
children and the Court further finds that this Court within
the State of Kentucky has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties to this action with regard to same.
Under KRS 403.270, each case must be given individual
consideration and the best interest of the children
involved must be considered with no preference for Joint
or Sole Custody. Further, Joint Custody does not require
equal time sharing, and one of the parties may be
designated by the Court as the primary residential
custodian. The factors to be considered in determining
the best interest of the children under KRS 403.270,
include the wishes of the parents, the wishes of the
children, the interaction and inter-relationship of the
children with their parents, siblings and any other persons
who may significantly affect the children’s best interest,
the children’s adjustment to their home, school and
community, the mental and physical health of all
individuals involved, and information, records and
evidence of domestic violence if the domestic violence
affected the child and the child’s relationship to his/her
parents. The law prefers to keep siblings together.
The decision with regard to custody is a difficult
one for the Court. It is obvious to the Court that both
parties love these children very much and that both
parties wish to be the primary custodian of the children.
However, the Court must look toward the stability of
these children during this difficult time in their lives.
Applying all the factors above and interviewing the
children and taking into account their preferences, as well
as their needs, the Court herein awards Joint Custody of
the parties’ minor children to the Petitioner and the
Respondent, with the Petitioner, JEFFREY SCOTT
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DANIEL, being designated as the primary residential
custodian. This will insure that the children reside at the
marital home in Painstville, Johnson County, Kentucky
and continue to attend the Paintsville City Schools in
which they are currently enrolled. The Respondent
herein testified that if she received custody of the
children that she would be moving from her current
residence in Prestonsburg, Floyd County, Kentucky to
Pikeville, Pike County, Kentucky and that the children
would be enrolled in school there. The Court does not
find that a change in the children’s home, school and
community is in their best interest at this time.
The Court was also presented with an Emergency
Motion for Custody filed on behalf of the Respondent,
LELA LAYNE, with regard to an alleged domestic
violence incident between the Petitioner and the minor
child, Julia. After interviewing the child, the Court
determined that a domestic violence incident did not
occur. However, the parties herein are both
ADMONISHED to work with each other for the best
interest of these children and to refrain from any acts or
threats of domestic violence or abuse against each other.
The preponderance of the evidence herein showed two
very loving parents who cared for and nurtured both of
their children in a much better way after their separation
and when living in separate residences than when living
together.
9.
The Court awards the Respondent, LELA
LAYNE, a minimum of Standard Visitation under the
Guidelines of the 24th Judicial Circuit. The Court also
further awards the Respondent one extra weekend per
month visitation with the minor children. If the parties
cannot agree upon this weekend, then the Court will
herein decide which weekend this shall be. If the parties
are unable to agree upon an exchange point for this
visitation, either party may petition the Court to make a
determination with regard to same.
10. Child Support is hereby assessed in
accordance with the Child Support Guidelines. If the
parties are unable to agree on this amount, then they may
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submit separate child support worksheets to the Court for
a determination of same.
11.
herein.
Neither party has requested maintenance
12. This is a final and appealable order and there
is no just cause for delay of its entry.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are different standards of review for the issues raised by Lela.
We will set forth the appropriate standards as necessary when analyzing each issue.
ANALYSIS
The primary issues raised by Lela revolve around the sufficiency of
the family court’s findings of fact and its decision to name Scott as the primary
residential custodian of the children. Secondary issues revolve around the court’s
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem, its failure to make a record of its interview
with the children, its failure to disclose the results of its interviews with the
children, and it refusal to recuse. We address the secondary issues first.
1. Failure to Appoint a Guardian Ad Litem
Lela argues that the family court erred when it failed to appoint a
guardian ad litem. We note that Lela filed a motion seeking appointment of a
guardian ad litem, which the court granted. However, before a guardian was
appointed, Lela advised the court that the parties had agreed to have the children
interviewed by “someone from a care facility.” For reasons that are unclear from
the record, that interview could not be scheduled; therefore, Lela asked the court to
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interview the children. Because Lela asked the court to interview the children in
lieu of appointment of a guardian ad litem, she waived this issue and we will not
further address it.
2. Failure to Make a Record of or to Disclose the Results of the Interviews
KRS 403.270(2) sets forth the factors a court must consider when
making a determination regarding custody. One of those factors is the wishes of
the child as to his or her custodian. In order to determine a child’s wishes, the
court may “interview the child in chambers to ascertain the child’s wishes as to his
custodian and as to visitation. The court may permit counsel to be present at the
interview. The court shall cause a record of the interview to be made and to be
part of the record of the case.” KRS 403.290(1).
Lela correctly notes that the record is devoid of either a recording of
the interviews the court conducted with the children or any report of those
interviews. Scott argues that, because neither party specifically asked that a record
be made before the interviews, Lela waived her argument. The language in KRS
403.290(1) is mandatory and, absent a waiver by the parties, the court is required
to make such a record. However, in order to preserve this issue for our review, a
party is required to first bring it to the family court’s attention so that the family
court can remedy the error. See Kaplon v. Chase, 690 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Ky. App.
1985). Lela did not bring this to the attention of the family court at the time of the
hearing or at any point thereafter.
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Lela argues that a party should not be required to bring to the attention
of the family court its failure to follow a statutorily mandated duty. In support of
her argument, Lela cites to Couch v. Couch, 146 S.W.3d 923 (Ky. 2004).
However, Couch can be distinguished because, in Couch one of the parties asked
the court to unseal the record of interviews with the children, a request the court
refused. No such request was made in this case.
Furthermore, the family courts are not perfect and sometimes
overlook their duties. Under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.02,
52.03, and 52.04 a party, who believes that a family court has not complied with its
statutory duties, may and should ask the court to do so. The purpose of these rules
is to permit the family court to correct any errors before bringing matters to the
Court of Appeals, if for no other reason than to forward judicial economy.
In addition to bringing any alleged errors to the attention of the family
court, a party to an appeal is required to set forth those alleged errors in her
prehearing statement. CR 76.03. If a party does not set forth an issue in her
prehearing statement, that issue is not properly before this Court. Lela did not list
the family court’s failure to make a record of its interviews with the children in
either her initial prehearing statement or her amended prehearing statement.
Because Lela failed to raise the issue before the family court or to list it in her
prehearing statement, we are precluded from addressing it.
Although we cannot consider this issue, we note that Lela asks this
Court to reverse the family court’s designation of Scott as primary residential
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custodian because the family court failed to make the mandated record. Even if we
considered the issue, we could not grant the relief Lela seeks but could only
remand the matter to the family court to make the necessary record. Therefore,
while Lela might “win” the battle, she would no doubt still lose the war.
Finally on this issue, we note that Lela argued in her brief that “[t]here
is nothing in the trial court’s opinion that indicated that the children’s wishes were
considered[.]” That argument is misleading at best. The court did not set forth in
any detail what the children said during their interviews. However, the court
specifically stated that it interviewed the children and took “into account their
preferences, as well as their needs[.]”
3. Failure to Recuse
Lela argues that, based on Canon 2 of the Kentucky Code of Judicial
Conduct (KCJC), the family court judge should have sua sponte recused. Scott
argues that Lela moved for a change of venue but did not ask the judge to recuse.
Initially we note that Lela did file several motions seeking a change of venue,
which the trial court denied. During an in-chambers discussion prior to
presentation of evidence, Lela moved the judge to recuse. That motion was also
denied. Therefore, Scott’s argument is unfounded.
As to Lela’s argument, we note that paragraph A of Canon 2 of the
KCJC states that a judge “shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Rules of the Supreme
Court (SCR) 4.300. Paragraph D of the Canon states that
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[a] judge shall not allow family, social, political or other
relationships to impair the judge's objectivity. A judge
shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance
the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a
judge convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
SCR 4.300.
Lela faults the judge for not recusing because Scott’s father is the
Judge/Executive of Johnson County. However, Lela has not pointed to any
evidence this relationship had any impact on the court’s decision. In fact, Lela has
not provided any evidence that, other than the geographical relationship, the judge
has or had any social, political, or other relationship to Scott’s father. Nor has she
provided any evidence that there was any appearance of impropriety anywhere but
in her own mind.
Lela also argues that the judge should have recused because two other
witnesses were local attorneys who appeared before her, one witness was the
daughter of a former circuit court judge, and one witness was “a local basketball
hero.” There is no evidence that either attorney practiced before the judge or that
the judge had any type of social or political relationship with the attorneys or the
other witnesses. Furthermore, as with Scott’s father, there is no evidence that there
was any appearance of impropriety anywhere but in Lela’s mind.
For the foregoing reasons, we discern no error in the judge’s refusal to
recuse.
4. Sufficiency of Findings
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Lela questions the sufficiency of the court’s findings with regard to
custody of the children and allocation of property and debt. We address each
separately below.
a. Disposition of Property and Debt
Lela argues that the family court erred when it failed to grant her any
marital interest in the fishing boat, when it found her solely responsible for credit
card debt in her name, and when it failed to make findings of fact about and failed
to distribute $25,000 as reflected by a “statement sent to Scott at his parents
address.”
As to the fishing boat, Lela argues that the court should have deemed
it marital property because Scott could not produce any documentary evidence that
his father lent him the money to purchase the boat. Lela’s argument is flawed for
two reasons. First, the family court did not find that the boat transactions were
loans. It found that those transactions were gifts. A gift is “a voluntary and
gratuitous giving of something by one without compensation to another who takes
it without valuable consideration.” Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823, 825
(Ky. App. 1977). Although Scott and Roger testified that Scott borrowed the
money for the first and subsequent fishing boats, Roger testified that he had no
expectation of being repaid. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Roger
received any consideration in exchange for financing the purchase of the boats.
Therefore, the family court’s finding that the boats were gifts is supported by the
record.
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Second, although it is presumed that all property acquired during the
course of a marriage is marital, property acquired by gift or in exchange for
property acquired prior to marriage is deemed non-marital. See Terwilliger v
Terwilliger, 64 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Ky. 2002), and KRS 403.190(2)(a) and (b).
Scott obtained the original fishing boat by gift prior to the marriage, thus that boat
was non-marital property. All other boats were purchased with money from the
sale/exchange of the original and/or subsequent boats subsidized with money given
to Scott by Roger. Therefore, the evidence supports a finding that the boat is nonmarital property because it was acquired in exchange for non-marital property with
the addition of monetary gifts.
Next, Lela argues that the court erred by requiring her to pay all the
credit card debt in her name. We disagree. Initially, we note that Lela’s citation to
KRS 403.190 to support her argument that the credit card debt should have been
equitably divided is misplaced. KRS 403.190 deals with the division of marital
property, not marital debt. Unlike marital property, there is no presumption that
debt incurred during marriage is marital debt. Therefore, the party claiming that
debt is marital, has the burden of proof. See Bodie v. Bodie, 590 S.W.2d 895, 896
(Ky. App. 1979). Although Lela testified that she purchased clothing and other
items for the children with her credit card, Scott testified that he made all such
purchases. Therefore, the court was free to determine that Lela’s credit card debt
is her responsibility.
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Lela also appears to be arguing that the court misconstrued the
evidence regarding credit card debt. In support of this apparent argument, Lela
states that the court “required Lela to pay all credit cards in her name and for joint
credit cards to be paid equally. The only problem with this statement is that there
was no evidence present [sic] about any credit cards or any credit cards that were
in the parties’ joint names.” This misconstrues both the evidence and what the
family court found. There was some, albeit minimal, testimony regarding credit
card debt. However, the parties filed mandatory case disclosures which contained
credit card information. Therefore, there was evidence presented about credit card
debt. Furthermore, the parties focused their testimony and witnesses primarily on
issues related to child custody, to the exclusion of issues related to debt. Because
of the dearth of evidence related to credit card debt, we discern no error in the
court’s prophylactic finding that any joint credit card debt should be divided
between the parties.
As to the “$25,000,” Lela again misconstrues the record and the trial
court’s findings. In her brief, Lela states that “Scott had $25,187.67 in his name on
August 18, 2006, approximately four (4) months prior to separation” and that
“[t]here was no accounting for this money.” Lela then implies that Scott was
“trying to hide this money from” her. In his mandatory case disclosure, Scott
identified a certificate of deposit in the amount of $25,187.67 and conceded that it
was marital property. The court found that all non-business joint bank accounts
and a jointly held certificate of deposit were to be divided evenly between the
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parties. This finding by the court includes the $25,187.67 certificate of deposit.
Therefore, the court did account for the certificate of deposit and we discern no
error.
b. Designation of Primary Residential Custodian
Lela argues that the court did not make specific findings of fact
regarding custody thus making it impossible for us to effectively review the court’s
order. Again, we disagree. In doing so, we note that the court’s opinion is sparse,
at best, in the section designated FINDINGS OF FACT. In that section, the court
sets forth basic jurisdictional facts and a brief summary of the procedural history of
the case. The court does not summarize, in any detail, the testimony and
documentary evidence it reviewed.
However, in its CONCLUSIONS OF LAW the court makes findings
of fact that support its ultimate judgment. For example, the court states that “[i]t is
obvious . . . that both parties love these children very much and that both parties
wish to be the primary custodian of the children.” Furthermore, the court states
that designating Scott as primary residential custodian will
insure the children reside at the marital home in
Paintsville, Johnson County, Kentucky, and continue to
attend the Paintsville City Schools in which they are
currently enrolled. The Respondent herein testified that
if she received custody of the children that she would be
moving from her current residence in Prestonsburg . . . to
Pikeville . . . and that the children would be enrolled in
school there. The Court does not find that a change in
the children’s home, school and community is in their
best interest at this time.
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The court stated that it had interviewed Julia regarding alleged domestic violence
and “determined that a domestic violence incident did not occur.” Finally, the
court stated that “[t]he preponderance of the evidence herein showed two very
loving parents who cared for and nurtured both of their children in a much better
way after their separation and when living in separate residences than when living
together.” All of the preceding, although contained in the portion of the order
designated CONCLUSIONS OF LAW are findings of fact. While we might prefer
for the court to organize its final orders differently, we cannot say that the order is
so deficient as to prevent meaningful appellate review.
5. Designation of Scott as Primary Residential Custodian
The standard of review in child custody cases is whether the family
court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213 (Ky.
App. 2005). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by
substantial evidence, which is evidence sufficient to induce conviction in the mind
of a reasonable person.” Id. at 219.
Lela argues that the family court did not adequately consider the
factors set forth in KRS 403.270 when it designated Scott as primary residential
custodian. As noted above, while it might have been better if the family court had
set forth a more lengthy summary of the evidence presented, the court’s findings of
fact were sufficient. The court listed the KRS 403.270 factors and noted that it had
considered them. In designating Scott as the primary residential custodian, the
court determined that keeping the children in the marital home, their community,
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and their current school system was in their best interest. That finding by the court
is supported by ample evidence.
Lela argues that the court essentially ignored the testimony regarding
domestic violence that she put forth. Again, while the court did not summarize this
testimony or directly address it, the court did indicate that it had considered it. We
have reviewed the record and there is evidence on both sides of this issue.
Although Lela would have had the court make a different choice with regard to the
children’s living arrangement, we cannot say that the evidence in her favor was so
overwhelming as to compel it to do so. Therefore, we hold that the court did not
abuse its discretion by designating Scott as primary residential custodian.
Finally, we agree with the court’s admonishments to the parties on the
record and in it its order to put aside their differences and work for the best interest
of their children.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the family court
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Kathryn Burke
Pikeville, Kentucky
Stephen Nick Frazier
Paintsville, Kentucky
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