DELOACH (EDDY D.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 25, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002202-MR
EDDY D. DELOACH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANTHONY W. FROHLICH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00449
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: DIXON AND KELLER, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Eddy Deloach appeals from the Boone Circuit
Court’s October 3, 2008, order denying his motion for relief pursuant to RCr2
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
11.42. Because we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant’s motion, we affirm.
Appellant was indicted by the Boone County grand jury on October
21, 2003. The indictment charged Appellant with one count each of first-degree
rape, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree sexual abuse. Pursuant to a plea
agreement made with the Commonwealth, Appellant was convicted of all three
crimes and sentenced to a total of thirty-five years imprisonment.3 Thereafter,
Appellant filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to RCr
11.42. An evidentiary hearing was held, and Appellant’s motion was denied in an
order entered on October 30, 2008. This appeal followed.
Post-conviction motions can be filed pursuant to RCr 11.42 by a party
who seeks to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence based on a collateral attack.
An RCr 11.42 “motion is limited to [the] issues that were not and could not be
raised on direct appeal.” Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky.
1998) (overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151
(Ky. 2009)). A party filing a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, has the burden “to
establish convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which would
justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceedings
provided in RCr 11.42.” Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky.
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Appellant was also being tried on charges in Grant County, where he had entered into a plea
agreement several weeks before. The Boone County plea agreement provided that Appellant
would serve the sentences of his Boone County charges consecutive with one another and also
consecutive with his Grant County sentence, making the total time to be served thirty-five years.
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1968). We review a trial court’s judgment on an RCr 11.42 motion for an abuse of
discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Ky. 1998).
Appellant raises thirteen issues on appeal. Included in these are the
following alleged trial court errors: 1) failure to rule that Appellant was denied
due process under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966); 2) failure to suppress Appellant’s statements to the police; 3) failure to
suppress statements made by a jailhouse informant; 4) failure to hold that a search
warrant obtained through use of an informant’s hearsay statements rendered the
warrant invalid; 5) failure to grant a continuance when new counsel was appointed
to Appellant; 6) failure to conduct a competency hearing and allowing the victim to
testify at same; 7) acceptance of guilty plea and plea agreement even though the
charges were unsupported by the elements of the crimes; 8) acceptance of
Appellant’s guilty plea although there was no factual basis to support it; and 9)
allowance of tainted evidence that was provided by the Grant County police and
prosecutor. These arguments all pertain to matters that were known to the
Appellant at the time the judgment was entered on September 17, 2004, and
therefore should have been raised on direct appeal rather than a later-filed RCr
11.42 motion. Furthermore, a valid guilty plea generally waives all nonjurisdictional claims unless they are preserved for appellate review either by
entering a conditional guilty plea or by moving to withdraw the guilty plea. See,
e.g., Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8 (Ky. 2002); Bronk v.
Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2001) (direct appeal from denial of a motion
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to withdraw guilty plea); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky.
1994) (“The general rule is that pleading guilty unconditionally waives all defenses
except that the indictment did not charge an offense[.]”); and RCr 8.09 and 8.10.
Appellant did not preserve any of the aforementioned issues for appeal. Therefore,
because they were not preserved and because they are not appropriately brought
under RCr 11.42, those arguments will not be considered by this Court.
Appellant’s remaining arguments center around a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Appellant alleges that his trial attorney, John Delaney, was
ineffective because he didn’t challenge the Commonwealth’s failure to provide
exculpatory evidence, in particular the medical records of the victim. Appellant
also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
Appellant’s psychiatric evaluation, which he claims was biased and prejudicial.
Finally, Appellant makes a general allegation of cumulative error.
Kentucky has adopted the two-prong test of establishing ineffective
assistance of counsel as outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky.
1985).
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both
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showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. It is the defendant’s burden of
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at
2066. The trial court must determine whether “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would be
different.” Id., 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “It is not
enough for the defendant to show that error by counsel had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d
380, 386 (Ky. 2002) (overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth,
279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009)). In the case sub judice, there was no trial due to the
Appellant’s guilty plea. When a defendant enters a guilty plea, that plea may be
rendered involuntarily if it is determined that counsel’s errors so seriously affected
the outcome of the plea process that absent such error there is a reasonable
probability that defendant would have instead insisted on going to trial. Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. App. 1986). The totality of the
circumstances surrounding entry of the plea must be considered upon review.
Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1978).
In support of its decision to deny the Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion,
the trial court stated, in relevant part:
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Mr. Delaney testified that he advised his client that there
were outstanding Motions but that the Defendant insisted
he wanted to enter a guilty plea. Mr. Delaney testified
that the Defendant said he wanted to plea, he wanted out
of the Grant County Jail, he said he had done it and just
wanted to get it over. Mr. Delaney testified that there
was a lot of evidence against the Defendant, three
statements to the Trooper who was investigating the
matter, the child’s statements and the Defendant’s
statements to Mr. Delaney were consistent with the
statements of the witnesses. Mr. Delaney testified that
the Defendant never expressed any indication he wanted
to go to trial or that he never committed the acts for
which he was charged. Mr. Delaney testified that the
reason he let the Defendant plea that day was because he
was going to get 35 years concurrent with Grant County
and there was a lot of evidence against the Defendant.
The Defendant insisted on pleading guilty and the
Defendant had already been found competent by this
Court. Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412
(1994), held that, assuming mental competency to make
such a decision, a defendant is “the master of his own
defense and pilot of the ship.” There was no evidence
presented to the Court contrary to the testimony of Mr.
Delaney and the Court record is consistent with the
testimony of Mr. Delaney. The Defendant’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are completely without
merit and have absolutely no basis in fact.
(Emphasis added.)
Upon thorough review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s
analysis. The record reveals that the Commonwealth’s evidence against Appellant
was considerable. Appellant has failed to show that his trial attorney erred and has
likewise failed to show, or even argue, a reasonable probability that he would have
insisted on going to trial but for his counsel’s alleged errors. Accordingly, we hold
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that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant RCr 11.42
relief.
For the foregoing reasons, the October 30, 2008, order of the Boone
Circuit Court is hereby affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Eddy Deloach, pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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