HARDIN (CHANNING) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002119-MR
CHANNING HARDIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-002003
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; TAYLOR, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: This is a pro se appeal from an order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court which denied Channing Hardin’s motion to vacate judgment
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 without conducting
an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
In 2005, a jury convicted Hardin of murder, first-degree robbery and
tampering with physical evidence. Following the guilt phase of the trial, he chose
to waive jury sentencing and entered into an agreement pursuant to which he
received a life sentence. His conviction was confirmed by the Kentucky Supreme
Court on direct appeal. See Hardin v. Commonwealth, 2006 WL 436064 (Ky.
2006) (2004-SC-0505-MR). In its opinion, the Supreme Court set forth these
underlying facts:
On June 15, 2004, Appellant shot Jeremy Gray four times
in the head. Appellant stated that he had arranged to
meet the victim that day in order to buy cocaine from
him. Before the meeting, Appellant called a friend,
Theran Harwood, and asked him if he wanted to make
some money. Appellant told Harwood that he intended
to rob someone and that he would share some of the
proceeds with Harwood if Appellant could borrow
Harwood’s vehicle and gun. Harwood agreed, and when
Appellant met the victim, he was driving Harwood’s
vehicle and carrying Harwood’s gun. Appellant later
claimed that the story about robbing someone was a
pretext for obtaining the vehicle and the gun from
Harwood. He explained that he needed the vehicle for
transportation and the gun for protection during his
transaction with the victim.
Upon meeting, Appellant and the victim drove to
McNeely Lake Park in Southern Jefferson County to
conduct their business. Upon reaching a secluded spot,
Appellant claimed that the victim suddenly yelled, “Give
me all the s-t.” Then, the victim allegedly pulled out his
gun and fired a shot at Appellant. Appellant explained
that once the victim fired a shot at him, he pulled out the
gun that he borrowed from Harwood and shot the victim
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four times in self defense. Appellant told police that both
he and the victim fired an entire clip of ammunition at
each other during their altercation. Appellant then
emptied the victim’s pockets, took some cocaine, and
dragged the body off the trail. Appellant also said that he
threw the victim’s gun off a dock into McNeely Lake.
The Commonwealth presented evidence which
contradicted Appellant’s claim of self defense. Harwood
testified that he received $60 for his part in the robbery
and that this was not the first time Appellant had talked
about robbing someone. Also, an unrelated witness, who
was flying a model airplane in the area at the time the
victim was shot, testified that he heard a gunshot,
followed by a long pause, and then three or four
additional shots evenly spaced. The witness said that at
least three shots were fired, but not as many as six or
seven shots. The medical examiner testified that any one
of the bullets found in the victim’s head would have been
immediately incapacitating and fatal, thus casting more
doubt on the “shootout” scenario. Further, after
exhaustive searching, authorities could not find any spent
shell casings which indicated that the victim shot at
Appellant, nor could they find the victim’s gun in
McNeely Lake. The jury rejected Appellant’s self
defense claim and convicted him of all charges.
Id. at *1.
Hardin argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief on the
grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for: 1) failing to submit evidence that
he was acting under extreme emotional disturbance (EED) which would have
entitled him to a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in
the first degree; 2) failing to interview and call mitigation and expert witnesses;
and 3) knowingly allowing Hardin to sign the sentencing agreement under extreme
duress. Hardin also asks that we consider the cumulative effect of these alleged
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errors even if none is sufficient in itself to warrant reversal of his conviction. See
Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1992). Finally, he argues that
the trial court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on his claims.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-part analysis
to be used in determining whether the performance of a convicted defendant’s trial
counsel was so deficient as to merit relief from that conviction:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
Hardin argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to secure a
jury instruction on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED). EED is
defined as:
[A] temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or
disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause
one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the
extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or
malicious purposes. It is not a mental disease in itself,
and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed emotional state
does not constitute an extreme emotional disturbance
unless there is a reasonable explanation or excuse
therefor, the reasonableness of which is to be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s
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situation under circumstances as defendant believed them
to be.
McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986).
According to his own version of the events which led up to the
shooting, Hardin lied to his friend Harwood in order to borrow his gun and his car
before meeting with the victim, Jeremy Gray. In his brief, he explains that
“[d]espite the fact that he and Jeremy were old friends, the Movant felt the need to
arm himself because he was afraid Jeremy might try to rob him. He was aware that
Jeremy had purchased a gun on the previous Monday from another friend named
Phillip Lichsteiner and was worried that Jeremy would be armed.”
By his own admission, therefore, Hardin arrived at the meeting armed
and fully anticipating Jeremy also to be armed and likely to rob him. Under these
circumstances, it seems highly improbable that a jury would believe that the
shooting was motivated by EED since Jeremy allegedly behaved just as Hardin had
foreseen he would.
Furthermore, even if such an instruction was warranted and Hardin’s
counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to request it, the second prong of
Strickland is not met because there is not a “reasonable likelihood” that the
outcome of the trial would have been different had the EED instruction been given.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006). The facts that would have
supported a finding of self-defense, that Jeremy was also armed and fired first,
were the same facts that would have supported a finding of EED. But the jury did
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not believe Hardin’s self-protection theory of the case, which hinged on the claim
that Jeremy was armed, and that he fired first. Because the jury did not believe
that Jeremy was armed, or that he fired first, they would not have believed that
Hardin suffered EED as a result of Jeremy firing an unprovoked shot at him.
Hardin’s second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that his
attorney failed to interview and call mitigation and expert witnesses. He argues
that his attorney failed to secure the services of a forensic pathologist to interpret
evidence such as the autopsy report and to assist in the rebuttal of the
Commonwealth’s case. But Hardin does not explain with any specificity how the
forensic pathologist could have assisted in his defense. It is well settled that a
movant seeking relief under RCr 11.42 “must aver facts with sufficient specificity
to generate a basis for relief.” Lucas v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky.
1971). Where the allegations are “vague and general,” there is no basis to provide
relief pursuant to RCr 11.42. Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 390 (Ky.
2002) (overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151
(Ky. 2009)). Hardin simply does not explain how the failure to secure the services
of a forensic pathologist deprived him of a fair and reliable trial.
Hardin also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
secure the testimony of Josh Woods, a friend of Hardin and of Jeremy, who he
claims could have testified that Jeremy had recently acquired a gun. Hardin argues
that Woods’s testimony would have supported an EED instruction. Our Supreme
Court has recognized that a failure to present mitigating witnesses is not indicative
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of deficient performance if that decision is the result of reasonable trial strategy.
Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Ky. 2000) (overruled on other
grounds by Stopher v. Conliffe, 170 S.W.3d 307 (Ky. 2005)). Hardin admits that
Woods’s mother, Sharon, threatened to testify on behalf of the Commonwealth if
Woods testified on Hardin’s behalf. He nonetheless argues that Sharon had no
knowledge or information that could have been unfavorable to Hardin and that her
threat was not a valid reason not to contact the witness.
But Woods’s testimony that Jeremy owned a gun would have been of
limited value in proving the key point of Hardin’s defense - that Jeremy had a gun
with him at the time of the shooting. The police were unable to locate this gun or
any evidence of it at the scene of the shooting. As the federal district court noted
in its opinion and order denying Hardin’s petition for writ of habeas corpus:
[N]o gun or any shell casings were ever recovered by the
police to support Hardin’s claim that the victim fired first
at him and then continued firing his semi-automatic
pistol until it was empty. If that situation had occurred,
the bridle path where the shooting took place should have
been littered with empty shell casings ejected from the
semi-automatic pistol. No such shell casings were ever
found. Likewise, despite Hardin showing police exactly
where he supposedly threw the victim’s handgun,
repeated underwater searches by hand failed to find any
semi-automatic pistol, despite finding an unrelated air
pistol.
Hardin v. Haney, 2007 WL 2023575 *16 (W.D.Ky. 2007) (3:07CV-79-H).
In light of the limited utility of Woods’s testimony to Hardin’s defense theory and
the possibly negative impact of Sharon’s testimony, Hardin’s attorney was not
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ineffective for deciding as a matter of trial strategy not to call him as a witness.
“Decisions relating to witness selection are normally left to counsel’s judgment
and this judgment will not be second-guessed by hindsight.” Foley, 17 S.W.3d at
885.
Hardin also argues that his counsel was ineffective for allowing him
to enter into the sentencing agreement under extreme duress. After the jury
returned with its verdict, his trial counsel asked him “if he understood,” to which
Hardin replied, “I don’t even know what that was!” He then fainted and had to be
attended to by emergency personnel. After he was revived, he claims that his
attorney insisted that he hurry up and decide whether to accept the sentencing
agreement. After signing, his attorney told him to answer “Yes sir” to anything the
judge asked. He also told Hardin to “shut up” when he wanted to speak prior to
the victim’s impact statement. He argues that his attorney should have called a
recess in order for him to regain his faculties and that he was pressured to accept
the sentencing agreement. He argues that had he proceeded to the penalty phase,
he could have received a shorter sentence and that he was also denied the
opportunity of presenting mitigating factors although he does not specify what
these might have been.
The record shows that Hardin was given ample opportunity to
consider the sentencing agreement. The trial court took a recess of nearly three
hours after the delivery of the verdict before reconvening. The trial court then
engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Hardin to determine if his waiver of jury
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sentencing and acceptance of the sentencing agreement were made knowingly and
voluntarily. The trial court also explained to Hardin that the jury could consider a
penalty range on the murder conviction of life, life without parole, life without
parole for 25 years, death, or a term of years from 20 to 50 years.
When there is strong evidence of a charged crime, . . .
and when the defendant’s motives do not readily incite
sympathy . . . it is entirely rational to plead guilty to a
judge in the hope of a receiving a more lenient sentence
than from a jury. Indeed, it is not an uncommon trial
strategy to avoid facing a jury in such circumstances.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 687, 694-695 (Ky. 2003).
Hardin had been convicted of murder and was facing the possibility of
the death penalty. The jury had not accepted his self-protection defense, and it is
unlikely that his motives in committing the crime would elicit the jury’s sympathy.
Under these circumstances, trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for
urging Hardin to accept the sentencing agreement.
Finally, because the record refutes the allegations raised in Hardin’s
motion, the trial court correctly decided that no evidentiary hearing was required.
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 341-42 (Ky. 2001).
The Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Channing Hardin, pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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