CALDWELL (ROBERT) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MARCH 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002009-MR
ROBERT CALDWELL, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-002275
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Robert Caldwell, Jr. (Caldwell) appeals from the judgment of
the Jefferson Circuit Court sentencing him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm.
On March 12, 2007, Caldwell, a convicted felon, was arrested for
firing shots in the air from a handgun while in close proximity to four individuals.
As a result, Caldwell was indicted on July 10, 2007, for one count of possession of
a handgun by a convicted felon and four counts of first-degree wanton
endangerment. Caldwell negotiated a plea agreement with the Commonwealth in
which he agreed to plead guilty to all five charges. In exchange, the
Commonwealth agreed that it would recommend a sentence of five years on one
count of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, four years each on two
counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and one year each on the remaining
two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment. All sentences were to run
consecutively for a total of 15 years. Further, the Commonwealth agreed that it
would not object to Caldwell’s release on his own recognizance pending
sentencing. Additionally, the Commonwealth agreed that it would not object to
probation. However, if Caldwell picked up any new charges, failed to appear for
sentencing, or failed to cooperate with his pre-sentence investigation, then his
sentence would be 15 years with no motions for early release of any type.
In accordance with the agreement, Caldwell pled guilty in open court
on June 9, 2008. At the hearing, the trial court explained to Caldwell that if he
violated any of the release conditions, then the Commonwealth would object to
probation. Caldwell acknowledged that he understood the condition. After
conducting a guilty plea colloquy, the trial court accepted Caldwell’s guilty plea
and granted Caldwell’s motion for release pending his sentencing scheduled for
August 18, 2008.
-2-
On the day after entering his guilty plea, Caldwell was charged with
theft by unlawful taking under $300 for failing to scan a hair coloring product
valued at $4.99 while using the U-Scan self-service checkout lane at a Kroger
store. On August 18, 2008, Caldwell appeared for sentencing but his attorney was
not present. After learning that Caldwell picked up new charges between the date
he entered his guilty plea and the sentencing date, the trial court revoked
Caldwell’s bond and he was taken into custody. The trial court then rescheduled
the sentencing for September 25, 2008.
On September 25, 2008, the Commonwealth asked that Caldwell be
sentenced to 15 years with no probation because he picked up new charges while
he was out of custody on his own recognizance. Caldwell argued that he should be
given a continuance until after his trial on his new charges. The trial court denied
Caldwell’s motion for a continuance and sentenced Caldwell to a total of fifteen
years on the five charges. This appeal followed.
The first argument that Caldwell makes is that the plea agreement was
not valid. Specifically, Caldwell contends that the condition in the plea agreement
stating that the Commonwealth will not object to any motions for probation unless
Caldwell “picks up any new charges” is contractually void because it attempts to
contract away Caldwell’s “presumption of innocence as guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States of America.” It appears that Caldwell is arguing
that the sentencing recommendation in his plea agreement should have been
-3-
conditioned on him not receiving an actual criminal conviction rather than on
unproven criminal charges. We disagree.
A plea agreement is a binding contract between the Commonwealth
and a defendant once it is accepted by a trial court. Hensley v. Commonwealth,
217 S.W.3d 885, 887 (Ky. App. 2007). When courts interpret and enforce plea
agreements, they must use traditional principles of contract law in determining the
obligations of the contracting parties. Elmore v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W.3d 623,
626 (Ky. App. 2007). Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has
acknowledged that sentencing recommendations conditioned on a defendant’s
promise to adhere to good conduct are valid. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 995
S.W.2d 363, 366 (Ky. 1999).
In Jones, the defendant entered a plea agreement reducing a potential
twenty-year sentence to six years for various charges related to fraudulent activity.
Id. at 365. The six-year sentence was conditioned upon defendant’s appearance at
the sentencing hearing. Additionally, the agreement provided that the defendant’s
failure to meet that condition would result in a recommendation of a twenty-year
sentence. The defendant failed to appear at the sentencing hearing and was
subsequently sentenced to twenty years in accordance with the plea agreement.
The Supreme Court held that the provision offering a reduced sentence was a
lawful plea bargain condition that was legitimately withdrawn when defendant
failed to appear for sentencing. Id. at 365-66.
-4-
Therefore, based on Jones, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s
sentencing recommendation that was conditioned on Caldwell’s promise to adhere
to good conduct was valid. Thus, once Caldwell breached the plea agreement, the
Commonwealth was relieved of its obligation to recommend a favorable sentence.
O’Neil v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Ky. App. 2003). Accordingly,
after Caldwell was charged with theft by unlawful taking under $300, the
Commonwealth was permitted to object to probation pursuant to the terms of the
plea agreement.
The second argument that Caldwell makes is that the trial court did
not exercise independent discretion when it imposed the fifteen-year sentence with
no probation as provided in the plea agreement. We disagree.
Generally, trial courts have the discretion to either accept or reject
plea agreements. Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 20-24 (Ky. 2004). As noted
in Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 177 (Ky. 2007):
Before accepting any plea agreement, a trial court must
assure itself that the agreement is legally permissible and
represents an appropriate resolution and punishment for
the crime(s) to which the defendant seeks to plead guilty.
Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion by automatically
accepting or rejecting a guilty plea without first making
the particularized and case-specific determinations that
the plea is legally permissible and, considering all the
underlying facts and circumstances, appropriate for the
offense(s) in question.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court did not
exercise independent discretion in accepting the terms of the plea agreement. To
-5-
the contrary, the trial court pointed out at the plea hearing that the final decision on
whether Caldwell would receive probation was within the discretion of the trial
court and that the plea agreement was only a recommendation. The trial court
further noted that it would only make its final decision on Caldwell’s sentence after
considering the Commonwealth’s recommendation and the information contained
in Caldwell’s pre-sentence investigation report. After reviewing the sentencing
hearing, it appears that the trial court did consider the Commonwealth’s
recommendation as well as Caldwell’s pre-sentence investigation report.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court exercised independent discretion in
accepting the terms of the plea agreement. Therefore, Caldwell was correctly
convicted and sentenced pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jan R. Waddell, Sr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.