TABLER (MARK G.), ET AL. VS. WOLHOY (JOHN), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 21, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001913-MR
MARK G. TABLER AND
JANICE L. TABLER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00071
JOHN WOLHOY AND
ALICE WOLHOY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; WHITE,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Mark G. Tabler and Janice L. Tabler (the Tablers) appeal from
the March 17, 2005, Order of the Greenup Circuit Court dismissing the individual
claims against John and Alice Wolhoy (John and Alice), the Order denying the
1
Senior Judge Edwin White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant
to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate entered March 31, 2005, the Trial Order and
Judgment entered May 14, 2008, and the Order and Amended Judgment entered
September 12, 2008. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
At the outset, we note that John and Alice have not filed a brief in this
matter. Therefore, pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
76.12(8)(c)(iii), we could regard their failure to file a brief “as a confession of error
and reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the case.” However,
because we believe the trial court’s order is correct, we will not do so.
The facts are essentially undisputed. On January 7, 2004, the Tablers
entered into a contract with Wolhoy Construction, LLC, (Wolhoy Construction), to
purchase a house. John and Alice were the sole members of Wolhoy Construction.
At the time the contract was entered into, approximately ninety percent of the
house had been built. Part of the contract required Wolhoy Construction to finish
construction of the house in accordance with specifications attached to the
agreement. Wolhoy construction also promised to deliver a warranty to the
Tablers. Additionally, the agreement provided a warranty that no latent defects
known to Wolhoy Construction existed.
After the closing in May 2004, the Tablers discovered that several
portions of the home were defectively constructed. Subsequent investigation
revealed that the house had numerous building code violations. Additionally, it
was later discovered that water had intruded into the house causing property
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damage and mold to grow. Due to the mold infestation, the Tablers vacated the
premises in January 2005.
As a result of these discoveries, the Tablers filed suit in the Greenup
Circuit Court against Wolhoy Construction and John and Alice, individually, on
February 1, 2005.2 The complaint alleged fraud and intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of express and implied
warranties, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligence, negligence per se,
and violation of applicable building codes. On February 23, 2005, citing CR
12.02(f), John and Alice filed a motion to dismiss arguing that they could not be
held personally liable. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss by Order dated
March 17, 2005. The Tablers filed a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, which
was denied by the trial court on March 31, 2005. The case continued against
Wolhoy Construction. At the conclusion of a seven-day trial, the jury returned a
verdict against Wolhoy Construction. Consistent with that verdict, the trial court
entered a Trial Order and Judgment on May 14, 2008. On September 12, 2008, the
trial court entered an Order and Amended Judgment making the March 17, 2005,
Order final. This appeal followed.
Our standard of review for a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint
pursuant to CR 12.02(f) is as follows:
The court should not grant the motion unless it appears
the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under
any set of facts which could be proved in support of his
2
Although other parties were named in the complaint, the claims against those parties are not
relevant to this appeal.
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claim. In making this decision, the circuit court is not
required to make any factual determination; rather, the
question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way,
the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint
can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?
James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky. App. 2002)(internal quotation and
citation omitted).
On appeal, the Tablers argue that the trial court erred when it granted
the motion to dismiss the actions against John and Alice. Specifically, the Tablers
contend that although John and Alice are the sole members of Wolhoy
Construction, they are still personally liable for any torts they committed even
when acting on behalf of Wolhoy Construction. Although we agree that members
and agents of limited liability companies may at times be held personally liable for
torts they commit, we believe that the trial court properly granted the motion to
dismiss.
As stated in Young v. Vista Homes, Inc., 243 S.W.3d 352, 363 (Ky.
App. 2007):
Generally, an agent is not liable for his own authorized
acts, or for the subsequent dealings between the third
person and the principal after the principal is disclosed.
Likewise, an officer, director, or shareholder, when
acting as an agent of the corporation, is also protected
from personal liability when acting within his authority
to bind the principal. While an agent or corporate officer
is normally not liable for the debts or contractual
obligations of the principal, an agent or corporate officer
is not immune from liability for his own intentional
misconduct or for negligence based upon a breach of his
own duty.
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(internal citations omitted). Therefore, “the agent of a corporation, albeit a
principal shareholder and officer of the corporation, ‘is personally liable for a tort
committed by him although he was acting for the corporation.’” Smith v. Isaacs,
777 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1989) (quoting Peters v. Frey, 429 S.W.2d 847 (Ky.
1968)). Kentucky courts treat limited liability companies the same as corporations
for purposes of a liability analysis. See Daniels v. CDB Bell, LLC, 300 S.W.3d 204
(Ky. App. 2009).
The Tablers contend that the complaint states causes of action for the
torts of: fraud and intentional misrepresentation; negligent misrepresentation;
negligent hiring; negligent supervision; negligence and negligence per se.3
Therefore, the Tablers argue that the trial court erred when it granted the motion to
dismiss John and Alice Wolhoy because the complaint stated viable causes of
actions against them. We disagree.
Although the fraud and intentional misrepresentation and the
negligent misrepresentation claims sound in tort, they are based on contractual
duties owed by Wolhoy Construction, and not by John and Alice. Specifically, the
portions of the complaint for these two causes of action allege that as part of the
contract, the Builders4 represented that the house would be built in accordance with
the specifications attached to the contract and applicable building codes; that they
3
Because the Tablers do not contend that the claims of breach of contract, breach of express and
implied warranties, and the violation of applicable building codes are tort claims, we will not
address them.
4
The complaint defines “Builders” as John and Alice, Wolhoy Construction, and Wolhoy
Enterprises, Inc., which is another company owned by John and Alice.
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would deliver an express warranty to the Tablers, which was not delivered; and
that the contract provided a warranty that there existed no latent defects known to
the Builders. Because these allegations all refer to representations made within the
contract, they are based on contractual duties owed by Wolhoy Construction, and
not John and Alice.
Further, we note that the complaint fails to allege that John and Alice
personally made any misrepresentations. The misrepresentations alleged in the
complaint all stem from provisions within the contract. Therefore, John and Alice
cannot be held personally liable for the fraud and intentional misrepresentation and
negligent misrepresentation claims. See Young, 243 S.W.3d at 363-64 (concluding
that a president and vice-president of a home construction company could not be
held personally liable for the contractual warranty, building code violation, or
negligence claims because they were based on contractual and statutory duties
owed by the construction company).
Similarly, although the negligent hiring, negligent supervision,
negligence, and negligence per se claims sound in tort, they are also based on
contractual and statutory duties owed solely by Wolhoy Construction. Under the
negligence, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision portions of the complaint,
the Tablers allege that Wolhoy Construction and John and Alice failed to construct
the house in a workmanlike manner; that they failed to hire subcontractors that
could construct the house in a workmanlike manner; and that they failed to
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supervise the subcontractors that constructed the house. Again, these are duties
owed by Wolhoy Construction pursuant to the contract.
Under the negligence per se claim, the Tablers allege that Wolhoy
Construction and John and Alice had a duty to construct the house in accordance
with applicable building codes and that they violated such duties. However,
complying with applicable building codes was a statutory duty owed by Wolhoy
Construction. See Young, 243 S.W.3d at 364 (finding that a president and vicepresident of a home construction company were not personally liable for a building
code violation claim because it was based on a statutory duty owed by the
company). Because all of the claims are based on contractual and statutory duties
owed by Wolhoy Construction, John and Alice cannot be personally liable for
these claims. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the individual claims
against John and Alice Wolhoy.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of Greenup Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES.
Carl E. Grayson
Edgewood, Kentucky
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