BROWN (MICHAEL SCOTT) VS. BROWN (ANDREA LEE)
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RENDERED: APRIL 2, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001895-MR
MICHAEL SCOTT BROWN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CASEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00005
ANDREA LEE BROWN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Michael Scott Brown appeals from the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution of marriage entered on July 11, 2008,
and amended on September 12, 2008, by the Casey Circuit Court. He contends
that the trial court erred in the division of the parties’ assets and debts. Upon
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Senior Judge Edwin White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant
to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Michael Scott Brown and Andrea Lee Brown began dating in high
school and were together for approximately sixteen years. They were married in
2002 and divorced in 2008. Prior to their marriage, they cohabitated with their
children, born in 1997 and 1999, in a mobile home located on property owned by
Andrea and her mother.
In 1999, the parties decided that they wanted to build a home. They
designated 3.02 acres of the 19.05 acres owned by Andrea and her mother to build
the family residence. After considering the evidence presented, the trial court
made the following findings regarding this residence:
A. Miles Roberts and Elsie Roberts and Evelena
Harris and Andrea Harris deeded the land on which the
residence was built to Scott Brown on July 20, 2001, for
the stated consideration of $6,000. [Andrea] and [Scott]
testified that the $6,000 was never paid for the land. At
the time the land was transferred to [Scott] the parties
were not married. The Court finds that the land was
obtained by gift. Evelena Harris testified that even
though the land was deeded to [Scott], it was a gift to her
daughter, Andrea. She stated that she had paid for the
land and was gifting it to her daughter as a site for the
family residence. Further [Andrea] and Evelena Harris
stated that the land was deeded to Scott so that he could
use it as collateral to obtain a building loan for the
residence. As such, the Court finds that the land on
which the residence is built is the non-marital property of
[Andrea].
B. There has been much testimony regarding the
residence. The Court finds that the residence was
substantially completed prior to the marriage. Based on
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the invoices submitted, the Court finds that the cost to
build the residence is $162,865. Both of the parties are
listed on the various invoices. The invoices do not show
what funds are used to pay for the goods and services.
[Scott] alleges he paid for the majority of the
construction of the home with nonmarital funds. Prior to
the marriage, [Andrea] and [Scott] co-habitated for many
years. [Andrea] testified that she knew nothing of the
savings. [Scott] is uncertain as to how much money he
had actually saved but estimates it around $125,000.
[Andrea] maintains that the home was built from
funds from three different sources, Scott’s savings,
money gifted to her by her mother, and the bank loan.
Evelena Harris testified that she gifted her daughter the
total sum of $45,000. The evidence contains a carbon
copy of three money orders made payable to Andrea
Harris from Evelena Harris. The money orders are dated
September and October of 1999. The sum of the three is
$10,000. Both parties agree that Mrs. Harris gave
Andrea a money order in the amount of $15,000.
Additionally, Mrs. Harris testified that she gave Andrea
cash in the amount of $10,000 on one occasion and Scott
$10,000 in cash on another. She stated that it was her
intent to make a gift of the cash to [Andrea]. Mrs. Harris
also stated that the money was for the new home. The
Court is persuaded by the record and finds that [Andrea]
used these funds for the improvement of the residence.
The Court finds [Andrea] made nonmarital contributions
to the residence in the amount of $45,000.
A bank loan resulting in a mortgage was secured
against the property on February 12, 2002 for the sum of
$49,914.79. This loan was made subsequent to the
marriage and paid back during the marriage. [Scott]
argues that a portion of said loan was used to purchase a
truck and furniture. The parties do not agree on this issue
and the Court is not so persuaded. The Court finds that
the monies from the bank loan were expended on the
residence and therefore a marital contribution in the
amount of $49,914.79. The loan has been reduced by
approximately $13,000. This reduction of mortgage is a
marital asset to be divided.
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The evidence shows that [Scott] did contribute
nonmarital funds to the home. The Court finds that
[Scott’s] nonmarital contribution is $67,950.21.
C. The parties have agreed that the fair market
value of the property is $200,000. . . .
D. . . . [Andrea’s] nonmarital contribution is
$51,000. [Scott’s] nonmarital contribution is $67,950.21.
The trial court then ruled that the marital residence and the 3.02 acres
shall be utilized by Andrea and the minor children until such time as “she decides
to remove herself and the children from same, she remarries, cohabitates with a
person of the opposite sex, dies or upon attainment of the youngest child of age 18,
whichever is earlier.” Once such an event occurs, the property “shall be sold and
the net proceeds divided equally.” It is from these findings and others that Scott
now appeals to this Court.
In his first assignment of error, Scott claims the trial court erred in
determining that the land on which the parties’ residence was built was the nonmarital property of Andrea. He argues that the deed in this case is incontrovertible
proof that the real property was his non-marital property, not hers. After
consideration of these unique facts, we hold that the trial court did not err in its
classification of this property.
“On appellate review of a trial court's ruling regarding the
classification of marital property, we review de novo because the trial court's
classification of property as marital or non-marital is based on its application of
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KRS 403.190; thus, it is a question of law.” Heskett v. Heskett, 245 S.W.3d 222,
226 (Ky. App. 2008).
As the land in this case was conveyed to Scott by deed prior to the
parties’ marriage, there is an automatic presumption that it is Scott’s non-marital
property. KRS 403.190(2); see also Rakhman v. Zusstone, 957 S.W.2d 241, 244
(Ky. 1997) (“it has long been the law in Kentucky that record title or legal title is
an indicia sufficient to raise a presumption of true ownership”) (internal quotation
and citation omitted). However, the presumption of true ownership may be
rebutted by “clear and convincing evidence of a specific agreement, either express
or implied, that the title is held in trust or clear and convincing evidence that the
title was obtained by the grantee by fraud or in violation of a specific agreement or
understanding.” Rakhman, 957 S.W.2d at 244.
In this case, the trial court determined that the specific agreement or
understanding of the parties in deeding the land to Scott was not to convey sole
ownership of the property to him, but rather it was to allow Scott to obtain a
construction loan to build the parties’ family residence on the land. Thus, it was
understood and agreed by all that this land was to become the home of the parties
and their family. Both parties contributed substantial amounts of time, labor,
resources, and money to the subsequent erection of a home on this land. Although
initially assigning the $6,000 interest in the land to Andrea as non-marital property,
the trial court ultimately determined that title to the real property shall be reformed
to reflect Scott and Andrea as tenants in common.
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Scott concedes that the land was conveyed to him for the purpose of
obtaining a loan to build the family home, but argues that the home and the land
were intended to be owned solely by him. He claims that any contrary intent found
by the trial court cannot overcome the plain language of the deed. We disagree.
While the presumption of gift is high in this case since Scott is most
likely a “natural object” of Andrea and her mother’s “bounty,” see Rakhman, 957
S.W.2d at 245, this gift presumption may be overcome. Id. Scott maintained a
rebuttable presumption of gift until the point that Andrea submitted evidence to
rebut this presumption. Id. Once rebutted, Scott bore the risk of non-persuasion.
Id.
In reviewing this evidence and applying the proper standard, we hold
that the trial court did not err in finding that Andrea produced clear and convincing
evidence to rebut the presumption that the family land was gifted solely to Scott.
See Mayo Arcade Corp. v. Bonded Floors Co., 240 Ky. 212, 41 S.W.2d 1104, 1108
(1931) (“It is a well-settled principle of law that courts of equity have authority to
reform contracts consistent with the intentions and understanding of the party for
fraud or mutual mistake.”); see also Bradshaw v. Kinnaird, 319 S.W.2d 475, 477
(Ky. 1958); Price v. Godby, 263 S.W.3d 598, 602 (Ky. App. 2008). As found by
the trial court, the land was one of Andrea’s many contributions in a joint effort to
create and build a family homestead.
Scott next argues the trial court erred in assigning Andrea $45,000.00
in non-marital contributions to the parties’ residence that was allegedly received as
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cash gifts from Andrea’s mother. He claims that $15,000.00 was received by the
parties, but was used to buy himself a “4-wheeler.” As for the remaining
$30,000.00, he contends that such gifts were never made or utilized to help
construct the residence. Rather, Scott alleges that the residence was constructed
almost entirely from cash savings that were accumulated and kept by him in a safe
at the parties’ trailer home.
Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 directs that a trial
court’s findings of fact shall not be set aside “unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.” See also Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986)
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they are not supported by substantial
evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
In this case, both Andrea and her mother testified as to the $45,000.00
in cash gifts that were utilized to construct the family residence. The first
$15,000.00 is acknowledged by Scott; however, he disagrees that the money was
spent to help construct the residence. Andrea submitted three carbon copy money
orders reflecting another $10,000.00 in payments made to Andrea during the
period when the home was being built. Andrea’s mother further testified that she
gave each party $10,000.00 cash on separate occasions during the construction of
the home. Scott produced nothing to support his claim that the home was built
entirely from his cash savings.
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The trial court also reviewed invoices for various construction
materials and other building costs that were in the names of both Andrea and Scott.
Ultimately, the trial court determined from the invoices submitted that the total
cost of the build was $162,865.00. From this amount, $49,914.79 was found to be
funded by the construction loan; $45,000.00 was found to be funded by cash gifts
from Andrea’s mother; and the remainder, $67,950.21, was found to be funded by
cash savings from Scott. Giving due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses and to assess the evidence before it, we hold
that the above findings are supported by substantial evidence. Scott’s arguments to
the contrary are without merit.
Scott next argues that the trial court erred in ordering that Andrea may
utilize the marital residence for a period of time before it is sold and divided
between the parties. He claims the ruling is unreasonable. We disagree.
A trial court’s determination as to the division and assignment of
marital assets is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52
S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
KRS 403.190(1)(d) specifically authorizes trial courts to award
spouses having custody of children the right to live in the marital home for
reasonable periods of time prior to any division of that property. See Spratling v.
Spratling, 720 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Ky. App. 1986). Scott complains that utilizing
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KRS 403.190(1)(d) is unreasonable in this case because he might have to wait as
long as ten years from the issuance of the divorce decree to receive proceeds from
the sale of the home. He claims inequity is further demonstrated by the fact that
the home was the parties’ only substantial asset and because it has a “non-marital
component.”
Andrea counters that the ruling is equitable since she makes
substantially less per month than Scott ($1,000 per month versus $2,600 per
month) and because it is in the best interest of the children to remain in the home.
She maintains that the children have developed a strong bond with the homestead
because they were involved with the planning of the home, have lived there since
its construction, and are near their grandmother. She further argues that it is
unlikely that Scott would have to wait as long as ten years to receive proceeds from
the sale of the home due to the other conditions imposed by the trial court.
In making its findings, the trial court found that the children expressed
a strong affection for their maternal grandmother, Evelena Harris, who lives on the
adjoining property. The trial court further found that Scott is often out of town and
thus, the children have spent most of their time with their mother and grandmother
at the family residence.
Upon review of the totality of these circumstances, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion in utilizing KRS 403.190(1)(d) to permit
Andrea to continue to live in the marital home with the children until such time as
“she decides to remove herself and the children from same, she remarries,
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cohabitates with a person of the opposite sex, dies or upon attainment of the
youngest child of age 18, whichever is earlier.” We agree with Andrea that these
conditions make it unlikely that Scott would have to wait as long as ten years to
receive proceeds from the sale of the home. The best interests of these children in
addition to the disparity of income between these parties provided sufficient
statutory justification to support the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this
instance.
Scott next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling
that the furniture in the home was also to remain “for the use and benefit of the
children” until such time as the home is sold. Once the home is sold, the trial court
ordered that the parties shall divide the furniture among themselves. In the event
the parties cannot come to agreement as to its division, the trial court ordered the
furniture to be sold at auction with the proceeds to be divided equally.
In this case, the furniture at issue consisted of three beds, four night
stands, two television stands, a couch, a recliner, a love seat, a dresser, an armoire,
lamps, and a table and chair set. The trial court determined that living in the home
without furniture would not be in the best interests of the children, especially in
light of the fact that Scott presented absolutely no showing to the trial court of an
immediate need for this furniture. In light of the above discussion, we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.
Scott next maintains that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in not
assigning 29% of the proceeds of his father’s life insurance policy to him as his
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non-marital property. Both parties concede that a life insurance policy was taken
on Scott’s father in 2000. Premiums were paid on this policy through 2007, at
which time Scott’s father died. After his death, the parties received $45,000.00 in
proceeds. Scott argues that since 29% of the premiums were paid prior to the
parties’ marriage, 29% of the proceeds should have been classified as Scott’s nonmarital property. After careful review, we find no error in the trial court’s
classification of this marital asset.
Term life insurance policies with no cash value are not considered
property. Davis v. Davis, 775 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Ky. App. 1989). Rather, they
become property only upon payout. Id. In this case, the insurance policy proceeds
were paid to Scott during the party’s marriage; and, thus, these proceeds are
presumed to be marital property. Rearden v. Rearden, 296 S.W.3d 438, 441 (Ky.
App. 2009). “To rebut this presumption, KRS 403.190(3) specifies [that] the party
claiming the asset acquired during the marriage is non-marital must show the
property satisfies an exception described in KRS 403.190(2)(a)-(e) . . . .” Id.
Here, Scott failed to make a showing that the life insurance proceeds
satisfied any of the exceptions described in KRS 403.190(2)(a)-(e), especially in
light of the fact that a majority of the premiums were paid with marital funds. See
Davis, 775 S.W.2d at 944 (wife had no interest in the proceeds of term life
insurance policies obtained with marital funds since the policies did not payout
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during the marriage). Accordingly, we discern no error in the trial court’s
classification of the policy’s proceeds as 100% marital.2
Scott next argues the trial court erred in classifying two all-terrain
vehicles purchased during the marriage as Andrea’s non-marital property. Andrea
claimed they were gifts to her from her mother. Since this property was acquired
during the marriage, Andrea bore the burden of proof on this issue. Hunter v.
Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Ky. App. 2003); KRS 403.190(2).
Both Scott and Andrea’s mother testified that these vehicles were gifts
from her. Scott maintained that they were gifts to him since the vehicles were
purchased in his name. Andrea’s mother testified that they were actually gifts for
Andrea and the children and that Scott simply purchased the vehicles for her.
“[T]he intent of the purported donor is considered the primary factor in
determining whether a transfer of property is a gift.” Hunter, 127 S.W.3d at 660.
In this case, we agree with the trial court that Andrea met her burden of proving
that she acquired the vehicles during the marriage by gift and, thus, they were her
non-marital property. Scott’s argument to the contrary is without merit.
In his final assignment of error, Scott claims the trial court abused its
discretion in the division of the parties’ debt. The following sets forth the trial
court’s standard for making such a determination:
2
Of course, the trial court may consider the percentage of premiums paid with non-marital funds
in its division of such marital property. See KRS 403.190(1) (in division of marital property,
trial court may consider contributions of each spouse to acquisition of property). Scott only
challenged the classification of the life insurance proceeds in his brief. He did not challenge its
division.
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In dividing marital property, including debts, appurtenant
to a divorce, the trial court is guided by Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 403.190(1), which requires that
division be accomplished in “just proportions.” This does
not mean, however, that property must be divided
equally. It means only that division should be
accomplished without regard to marital misconduct and
in “just proportions” considering all relevant factors.
Lawson v. Lawson, 228 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Ky. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
The trial court identified $26,700.00 in marital debt. It consisted of
Andrea’s student loan debt of $4,000.00, which was assigned to her. It also
included a cattle line of credit in the amount of $6,000.00 used for Scott’s business
and a $12,000.00 debt incurred to purchase a tractor used for Scott’s business.
Since Scott was assigned the business and its assets, he was also assigned its debt.
We find no abuse of discretion in the above assignments of debt.
The remaining $4,700.00 was credit card debt which was assigned to
Scott without explanation. In Scott’s July 24, 2008, motion to alter, amend, or
vacate, Scott alleged that the trial court erred in assigning this debt to him since
Andrea testified that it was incurred by her “solely for her benefit.” Andrea does
not dispute Scott’s allegation in her brief to this Court. In light of Scott’s post-trial
motion, we agree that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to assign this
$4,700.00 in credit card debt solely to Scott without any explanation as to whether
this assignment was in “just proportions.” Accordingly, we must remand this issue
to the trial court for additional consideration.
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For the reasons set forth herein, the Casey Circuit Court’s findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution of marriage entered on July 11,
2008, and amended on September 12, 2008, are affirmed in all respects except for
that portion of the orders which assign $4,700.00 in credit card debt incurred
during the marriage solely to Scott. This assignment of $4,700.00 in credit card
debt is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court for an assignment of
this $4,700.00 debt between the parties in “just proportions” that is supported by
sufficient findings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William R. Erwin
Danville, Kentucky
Theodore H. Lavit
Lebanon, Kentucky
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