RAY (TRAVIS) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 12, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001885-MR
TRAVIS RAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-001470
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, STUMBO, AND WINE, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Travis Ray appeals a conviction for violation of a protective
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Ray and Veronica Fields lived together with their son for
approximately two months in 2005 until Fields requested and was granted a
domestic violence order (DVO) restraining Ray from committing or threatening
further abuse, from contacting Fields, from coming within 600 feet of Fields or her
family, and from damaging or disposing of the parties’ property.
Fields accused Ray of raping and sodomizing her after breaking into
her home on March 3, 2007. Ray was charged with two counts of first degree rape,
first degree sodomy, first degree burglary, first degree wanton endangerment,
violation of a protective order, and being a persistent felony offender in the first
degree. A jury convicted Ray only of violating the protective order. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Ray argues that the trial court committed reversible error
by: (1) improperly permitting evidence of his past bad acts; (2) refusing to grant a
mistrial following the Commonwealth’s introduction of evidence which did not
comply with the notice requirement of Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 404(c);
(3) failing to sever the trial on his violation of a protection order count from his
trial on the other charges; and (4) improperly allowing the Commonwealth to use
three peremptory challenges to exclude African-American members of the jury
pool.
Ray’s first argument is that evidence of his past bad acts should have
been excluded.1 At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of the protective
order Ray was accused of violating, the assault that served as grounds for the
protective order, and past incidents in which Ray allegedly harassed Fields. Ray
1
Ray asserted in his brief that he made a motion in limine to exclude this evidence but he failed
to comply with Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv-v) by citing where in the
record the motion could be found. Although the Court has found the motion on its own and will
now address the merits of Ray’s argument, this Court is not required to find where error was
preserved or the support in the record for any argument; no one should expect the Court to do so
in the future. CR 76.12(8)(a); and see Vandertoll v. Commonwealth,110 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Ky.
2003).
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argues this violated KRE 404(b), which precludes the admission of “other crimes,
wrongs, or acts” as evidence of the defendant’s character or predisposition, but
permits them,
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on
the offering party.
KRE 404(b). The Commonwealth claims to have presented the evidence at issue
to show Ray’s state of mind, absence of mistake or accident, and lack of the
victim’s consent, and also claimed the prior bad acts were inextricably intertwined
with the alleged crimes of March 3, 2007.
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d
882 (Ky. 1994), articulated a three-part test for determining whether the admission
of such evidence was proper: “Is the other crimes evidence relevant for some
purpose other than to prove the criminal disposition of the accused? . . . Is evidence
of the uncharged crime sufficiently probative of its commission by the accused to
warrant its introduction into evidence? . . . Does the potential for prejudice from
the use of other crimes evidence substantially outweigh its probative value?” Bell
at 889-91.
The standard of review for the admission of prior bad acts is whether
the trial court abused its discretion, and “[t]he test for abuse of discretion is
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whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (internal citations omitted). We will address the admission of
evidence of the assault and the DVO separately from the admission of evidence of
the alleged harassment.
The existence of the DVO and the underlying assault which formed its
basis were clearly probative of whether Ray violated a DVO; in fact, they were
necessary to the Commonwealth’s case because Ray was charged with violating a
protective order. It is logically impossible to prove violation of a protective order
without first establishing that a protective order existed with respect to the alleged
victim.
Next, the DVO and assault conviction are sufficiently probative to
warrant their inclusion at trial. A court found, after a hearing in which both parties
were allowed to participate, that there was enough evidence of domestic violence
to issue an order preventing Ray from coming in contact with Fields. There is no
reason to believe the assault did not occur or the DVO did not exist.
Finally, we examine the likelihood that admission of this evidence
caused Ray prejudice, in comparison to its probative value. The court in Bell noted
“evidence of this sort is inherently and highly prejudicial to a defendant.” Id. at
890. Here, however, any potential for prejudice was outweighed by the probative
value of the evidence. Again, evidence of the DVO was necessary to prove it had
been violated, rendering it “inextricably intertwined” with the offense of which
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Ray was convicted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
evidence.
Ray also argues that admission of evidence of his past alleged
harassment of Fields was improper. At trial, Fields testified about one instance in
which Ray pushed and hit her in public. She also testified about another instance
in which an unknown person knocked on her door, and she initially accused Ray of
violating the DVO, but later recanted the accusation. Fields further testified about
unwanted contact initiated by Ray prior to the alleged sexual assault and burglary,
and particularly about her interactions with Ray in the days leading to the alleged
rape. As we will discuss, while most of this evidence should not have been
admitted, admitting it was harmless error.
The Commonwealth argued the evidence of past harassment was
relevant to show Ray’s state of mind, the absence of mistake or accident, and lack
of the victim’s consent. The Commonwealth also argued Ray’s pattern of behavior
was inextricably intertwined with the events of March 3, 2007. The trial court
ruled the challenged evidence was admissible because the parties’ course of
conduct was so intertwined with the alleged events of March 3, 2007, they should
have been admitted.
The trial court’s analysis was incomplete. The trial court was correct
in undertaking the first step in the Bell inquiry to determine whether the prior bad
acts evidence was “relevant for some purpose other than to prove the criminal
disposition of the accused[.]” Id. at 889-91. However, that is not the end of the
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matter. Even if the nature of the allegations of past harassment did render them
relevant to the question before the jury, the trial court was still required to analyze
the probative value of the evidence and the potential for prejudice. The court did
not do so in this case. In Bell, the Supreme Court made clear that it is the
responsibility of the trial court to determine this issue “before evidence of
uncharged crimes is admitted.” Id. at 890 (emphasis in original).
The reason the trial court did not complete the analysis is likely that
the motion was presented in a confusing manner. Counsel for Ray argued the
motion to sever the charge for violation of the DVO at the same time she moved to
exclude evidence of prior bad acts. The court’s ruling seems to confuse the two
issues and explains why the court did not conduct separate analyses.
Despite admission of evidence of past harassment without a proper
analysis, the error was harmless. “A non-constitutional evidentiary error may be
deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Winstead v. Commonwealth,
283 S.W.3d 678, 688-689 (Ky. 2009), citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750 (1946). The Commonwealth presented sufficient additional evidence of Ray’s
violation of the DVO on which a jury could base its verdict; indeed, testimony
regarding any past harassment constituted a relatively small portion of the evidence
presented at trial. Fields testified that Ray was in her home on March 3, 2007,
without her permission. The prosecutor entered records of phone calls made and
received by Ray around the time of the alleged DVO violation, which corroborated
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Fields’ testimony. The jury heard evidence from a forensic biologist that Ray’s
DNA was found on the victim, and that the DNA had likely been there no more
than twelve to eighteen hours preceding its recovery as evidence. Given such
evidence indicating Ray had been in Fields’ presence in violation of the DVO, it is
unlikely the exclusion of evidence of prior alleged harassment would have resulted
in a different outcome.
Ray’s next argument is that certain portions of Fields’ testimony was
improperly admitted in violation of KRE 404(c) and therefore warranted a mistrial.
Specifically, Ray objects to Fields’ testimony that Ray had previously examined
the caller identification feature on her phone, called the phone numbers listed, and
threatened men who answered at those numbers.
KRE 404(c) requires the Commonwealth to provide defendants notice
of evidence of prior “crimes, wrongs, or acts” intended for presentation at trial
pursuant to KRE 404(b). It is undisputed that evidence of the incident was not
listed in the Commonwealth’s notice. Ray argues the introduction of such
evidence warranted a mistrial, which the trial court did not grant. The
Commonwealth responds by insisting Ray had actual notice because a transcript of
Fields’ interview with a detective, produced pursuant to a discovery order,
included her complete description of the caller identification incident.
However, we need not address the parties’ arguments about whether
admission of the evidence violated KRE 404(c) because Ray did not request the
appropriate remedy for such a violation. At trial, the prosecutor asked Fields, “Did
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he [Ray] see his son?” Fields responded directly, stating, “One day he did come
over.” She then elaborated, explaining the course of events leading to the caller
identification incident. That subsequent portion of her testimony was clearly not
responsive to the Commonwealth’s question. After Ray’s objection to the
testimony on the caller identification incident, the prosecutor offered to redirect
Fields away from the topic. The prosecutor did so, but Fields made an indirect
reference to her previous testimony about Ray’s threatening behavior. Ray
objected and asked for a mistrial. The judge instructed the parties to move away
from the issue, and ruled that the testimony did not “rise to the level of mistrial.”
We believe the trial court ruled correctly.
In situations such as this, it is proper for a judge to admonish the jury
to disregard the testimony, and not to grant a mistrial. Matthews v.
Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 18 (Ky. 2005) (“an admonition to the jury cures
an unsolicited reference to prior criminal acts”). This is especially true when the
reference to inadmissible evidence was isolated, as it was here. Ray’s attorney did
not request an admonition; she requested a mistrial. Had Ray requested an
admonition, the trial court could have easily cured any issue of improper
presentation of evidence to the jury. Id.
Ray next argues the trial court should have severed the trial for
violation of the DVO from the trial on the other charges. The standard of review
on this matter is abuse of discretion. Debruler v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 752,
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760 (Ky. 2007). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to sever the charges.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.16 requires a court to
separate charges when it appears joinder of offenses would be prejudicial. In
particular, Ray argues the jury would not have convicted him of violating the DVO
had they not heard evidence regarding the other allegations. To be entitled to a
severance of charges, a defendant must show “joinder would be so prejudicial as to
be ‘unfair’ or ‘unnecessarily or unreasonably hurtful.’” Commonwealth v. Rogers,
689 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Ky. 1985). A significant factor in determining whether
charges may be joined is “the extent to which evidence of one offense would be
admissible in a trial of the other offense.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 933 S.W.2d
811, 816 (Ky. 1996). Here, for Ray to have raped or sodomized Fields or entered
her house illegally, he would necessarily have had to violate the DVO by coming
within 600 feet of her or having contact with her. Evidence regarding the alleged
rape and burglary would have been relevant to whether Ray violated the DVO.
Furthermore, joinder of offenses is also appropriate when “the crimes
are closely related in character, circumstances, and time.” Ratliff v.
Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Ky. 2006), citing Seay v. Commonwealth,
609 S.W.2d 128, 130-31 (Ky. 1980). Again, there is significant overlap in the
crimes alleged. The behavior alleged to form the basis of the charges is virtually
identical for the DVO and the other charges. It would have been unduly
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burdensome for the trial court to order the charges to be severed. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion here.
Finally, Ray challenges the prosecutor’s peremptory exclusion of
three African-American members of the jury pool. The Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution prohibits a prosecutor from excluding jurors because
of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986). To
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selecting the jury, a
defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant’s race, and “that the totality of the relevant facts gives
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 96. After
a defendant has made his prima facie case, the court must assess “the facial
validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent
in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.”
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court “emphasize[d] that the prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to
the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. As
an issue of fact, a trial court’s ruling on a Batson challenge is afforded great
deference, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Henderson, 500
U.S. at 364.
Here, whether Ray made a prima facie showing of prosecutorial
discrimination is moot because the prosecutor articulated legitimate reasons for
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excluding the potential jurors. Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, 831 S.W.2d 176,
179 (Ky. 1992). Those reasons related to the potential jurors’ ability to fairly
render a verdict based on their individual circumstances, and not their racial
identities. The prosecutor dismissed one African-American woman from the jury
pool because she had a sister she believed had been treated unfairly by the police
and a brother in prison for robbery. The second potential juror’s cousin had
recently been released from prison for rape; the prosecutor was unsure the juror
could put her personal experiences aside for this case. The prosecutor noticed the
last juror sleeping through the entire voir dire, and found him unresponsive.
Ray now argues those reasons were pretextual because the jurors
indicated they would not be prejudiced by their experiences; however, a trial court
– and not a reviewing court – is in the best position to evaluate prosecutors and the
validity of their stated reasons for excusing the jurors. Thomas v. Commonwealth,
153 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Ky.App. 2004). Because the prosecutor did give legitimate
reasons for her peremptory challenges, we will not second-guess the trial court to
overrule them. There was nothing inherently discriminatory in the prosecutor’s
stated reasons for excusing the three African-American jurors; there was, therefore,
substantial evidence for the trial court to rule the prosecutor’s justification
acceptable and overrule Ray’s Batson challenge.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s
conviction of Travis Ray of violating a protective order.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Annie O’Connell
Assistant Public Defender
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael J. Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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