FREITAG (CHRISTINA M.), ET AL. VS. BLACK DIAMOND TERMITE & PEST CONTROL
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RENDERED: JANUARY 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001695-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001770-MR
CHRISTINA M. FREITAG
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.
HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-007615
BLACK DIAMOND TERMITE
& PEST CONTROL, INC.
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: FORMTEXT FORMTEXT COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; TAYLOR,
JUDGE; HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Christina M. Freitag brings Appeal No. 2008-CA-001695MR and Black Diamond Termite & Pest Control, Inc., (Black Diamond) brings
Cross-Appeal No. 2008-CA-001770-MR from a March 23, 2007, summary
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing Freitag’s complaint against
Black Diamond. We affirm both Appeal No. 2008-CA-001695-MR and CrossAppeal No. 2008-CA-001770-MR.
Black Diamond is an Indiana corporation that is engaged in the
termite and pest control business and promotes those services in Kentucky. This
action arises from pest control services provided by Black Diamond to Freitag. In
1995, Freitag contracted with Black Diamond to treat her home for termite
infestation. After Black Diamond initially treated the home, Freitag alleged that
termites reinfested the home. Black Diamond then retreated the home for termites
at various times during the period of 1995 through 2004. Despite Black
Diamond’s repeated efforts, the termite infestation persisted, and Freitag became
dissatisfied with Black Diamond’s services.
Consequently, in September 2004, Freitag filed a complaint against
Black Diamond. Therein, she claimed breach of contract, violation of the
consumer protection act, breach of warranty, and negligence. Black Diamond filed
an answer and, thereafter, filed a motion for summary judgment. Eventually, the
circuit court rendered a summary judgment in favor of Black Diamond and
dismissed Freitag’s complaint in its entirety. These appeals follow.
Freitag contends that the circuit court erred by rendering summary
judgment. Specifically, Freitag argues that the circuit court erroneously dismissed
her breach of contract claim. We disagree.
Summary judgment is proper where there exist no material issues of
fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kentucky Rules of
-2-
Civil Procedure (CR) 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). In reviewing a summary judgment on appeal, all facts and
inferences therefrom are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id.
In rendering summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that the
relevant terms of the contract between Freitag and Black Diamond were
unambiguous and that the facts were undisputed that Black Diamond complied
with such terms. In particular, the circuit court reasoned:
During the years that Black Diamond provide[d]
termite treatment for Ms. Freitag, they returned
repeatedly to her home to re-treat. Ms. Freitag has
brought this action contending that Black Diamond did
not fulfill its contractual obligation in that her home was
not cleared of termite infestation. She asserts that she
relied on the business name and the contract in her belief
that Black Diamond would rid her home of termites.
The contract between the parties provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
WARRANTY: If a live reinfestation is
found while this Agreement is in force,
BLACK DIAMOND will re-treat the
described property without additional costs.
....
In the present action, the contract between the
parties is not ambiguous. The plain meaning of the terms
of the contract is that Black Diamond will continue to
treat re-infestation during the contract period without Ms.
Freitag incurring additional costs. There is no dispute
that it did so. Consequently, Black Diamond is entitled
to summary judgment.
-3-
Freitag counters that the circuit court’s interpretation of the
contractual provisions was “too narrow.” In particular, she argues:
The purpose(s) of having “Black Diamond Termite
& Pest Control, Inc.” provide “pest control” services, for
her house, as their business name implies, was to
“control” the termites, so as to prevent termite damage to
her house. The primary aim of having Black Diamond
provide “pest control” was to protect her house from
termite damage, not just to have them come out and retreat every time there was a new termite infestation.
....
If Black Diamond’s only responsibility was to retreat time and time again, then they had no . . .
responsibility to kill existing termites or prevent future
termites on Ms. Freitag’s property, and the contract as a
whole would have no real meaning. Under Black
Diamond’s interpretation of the contract and the warranty
provisions, they . . . have no duty to kill existing termites,
no duty to prevent future termites, all they have to do is
come out and re-treat every time a re-infestation occurs,
without regard to whether the treatment kills the termites
or prevents future termites. Such an interpretation would
be absurd; clearly anyone entering into this contract
would expect the purpose of the contract was that the
treatments provided would kill the existing termites and
help to prevent a re-occurrence of termites, thus
providing “pest control” so there would be no damage to
their house.
Freitag’s Brief at 6-7. Freitag argues that Black Diamond undertook a duty to
exterminate existing termites and to prevent future termite infestation of her home.
Unfortunately, Freitag fails to cite this Court to any terms in the contract that
impose such a duty upon Black Diamond.
-4-
The law is well-established that terms of a written contract control in
determining the parties’ respective duties thereunder. Geary-Gay Motor Co. v.
Chasteen, 248 Ky. 282, 58 S.W.2d 393 (1933). Moreover, a court may not read
words into or add conditions to a contract but is bound to consider the contract as
written. Alexander v. Theatre Realty Corp., 253 Ky. 674, 70 S.W.2d 380 (1934).
Here, Freitag does not cite this Court to explicit contractual terms that impose a
duty upon Black Diamond to eliminate existing termites or to prevent future
termite infestation of Freitag’s home. Rather, the written terms of the contract
merely provide that Black Diamond would treat Freitag’s home for termite
infestation and would retreat as necessary. We have no doubt that it was the goal
of the parties to eliminate termites from Freitag’s home. However, it is entirely
plausible that some homes cannot be successfully treated for termite infestation. In
any event, the written terms of the contract must prevail. See Chasteen, 58 S.W.2d
393; Alexander, 70 S.W.2d 380. Thus, we do not believe the circuit court erred in
this respect.
Alternatively, Freitag asserts that Black Diamond breached the terms
of the contract by inadequately performing its duty under the contract to treat her
home for termite infestation. Even if Black Diamond did not contract to
completely eliminate the termites, she alleges that Black Diamond clearly
contracted to treat the home for termites. Freitag believes that a material issue of
fact exists as to whether Black Diamond’s treatment for termites was substandard,
thus breaching its contractual duty to treat her home.
-5-
A review of the record reveals that Freitag failed to present any expert
opinion upon whether Black Diamond’s treatment was substandard. The record
does contain Freitag’s deposition. Therein, Freitag stated that she was told by a
representative from another pest control company that Black Diamond
inadequately treated her home for termites. However, we do not think that
Freitag’s testimony alone is sufficient to create a material issue of fact. To defeat
summary judgment, it was incumbent upon Freitag to have filed an affidavit or the
deposition of a representative of the pest control company or other qualified expert.
Indeed, Freitag is not qualified to express an opinion upon Black Diamond’s
performance and her recitation of another’s opinion in her deposition most likely
constituted inadmissible hearsay. Upon the whole, we conclude that no material
issue of fact exists and that Black Diamond was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. In sum, we hold that the circuit court properly rendered summary judgment in
favor of Black Diamond.
As to Black Diamond’s cross-appeal, we assigned no merit to the
argument raised therein and view Freitag’s direct appeal as timely filed under CR
73.02(1)(d).
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-6-
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
Wallace N. Rogers
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
A. Andrew Draut
Louisville, Kentucky
Mark E. Hammond
Melissa F. Calabrese
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
A. Andrew Draut
Louisville, Kentucky
Mark E. Hammond
Louisville, Kentucky
-7-
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