BOYD (LAMAR LEE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 5, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001654-MR
LAMAR LEE BOYD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-01287
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: LaMar Boyd appeals from an order of the
Fayette Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 without an evidentiary
hearing. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion because: (1)
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
neither his claim that trial counsel coerced him into testifying untruthfully nor his
claim that counsel failed to properly investigate can be completely refuted by the
record alone and thus he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing; and (2) his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to seek the suppression of certain
witness statements that were introduced by the Commonwealth at trial. After
reviewing the record and briefs, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Without recounting the entire factual scenario, we first note that Boyd
was charged with shooting and killing the victim, who was unarmed. Boyd
admitted in his testimony at trial that he had shot and killed the victim, but he
claimed that he had pointed his weapon at the victim to scare him but that he
panicked and fired when he thought he saw the victim reaching for his own
weapon.
Boyd was convicted in 2005 of wanton murder and wanton
endangerment following a jury trial in the Fayette Circuit Court. He received
concurrent sentences of twenty years’ imprisonment for wanton murder and five
years’ imprisonment for wanton endangerment. On direct appeal, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed the wanton murder conviction and reversed the wanton
endangerment conviction in an unpublished opinion. Boyd v. Commonwealth,
2006 WL 3386581 (Ky. 2006)(2005-SC-0512-MR).2
2
The court set forth a more complete statement of facts in that opinion than the few facts we
have set forth herein.
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Subsequently, Boyd filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant
to RCr 11.42 alleging several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. His
appointed counsel filed a supplemental motion, and the Commonwealth filed a
response. In an opinion and order entered on August 21, 2008, the trial court
denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal by Boyd followed.
Boyd first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion
without an evidentiary hearing because his claim that trial counsel coerced him
into testifying untruthfully cannot be refuted by the record alone. In this regard,
Boyd asserts that he was not supposed to testify at his trial but that his counsel
changed trial strategy and forced him to take the witness stand and admit that he
shot the victim but that he did so in self-defense. Boyd claims that this change in
strategy surprised him and that his counsel told him that if he didn’t testify he
would be convicted and would spend the rest of his life in prison.3 Also, Boyd
claims that his counsel gave him scripted notes that he was to follow in his
testimony.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person “shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” Boyd cites Jones v.
Commonwealth, 389 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1965), to support his argument. In that case
the court vacated and remanded an order denying an RCr 11.42 motion without an
evidentiary hearing where the movant alleged that his attorney coerced him into
3
In Boyd’s RCr 11.42 motion, he asserted that his counsel’s exact words were: “You’re going to
spend the rest of your life in prison if you don’t do exactly what I say.”
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pleading guilty by threatening not to defend him. Id. at 927. The court held that
the defendant “was entitled to a hearing on the foregoing allegations.” Id.
In Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565
(2004), the U.S. Supreme Court stated as follows:
An attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the
client regarding “important decisions,” including
questions of overarching defense strategy. That
obligation, however, does not require counsel to obtain
the defendant’s consent to “every tactical decision.” But
certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of
basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be
made for the defendant by a surrogate. A defendant, this
Court affirmed, has “the ultimate authority” to determine
“whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or
her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Concerning those
decisions, an attorney must both consult with the
defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course
of action.
543 U.S. at 187, 125 S.Ct. at 560 (citations omitted).
In evaluating counsel’s conduct, a court “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
In rejecting Boyd’s request for an evidentiary hearing on this issue,
the trial court stated, “The fact that Boyd now disagrees with the trial strategy and
tactical decisions by counsel is not a sufficient basis for relief pursuant to RCr
-4-
11.42.”4 The court also emphasized that Boyd was, in fact, facing life in prison,
that Boyd had not produced the scripted notes for the record, and that Boyd failed
to show how the outcome of the trial might have been different had he not testified
and instead relied on a defense that he did not commit the shooting.
We conclude that Boyd was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this
issue. Boyd indicates in his motion that he not only questioned his counsel’s trial
strategy but that he was coerced to go along with it. As we have noted, the
Fifth Amendment prohibits a defendant from being compelled to testify. In
addition, the fact that Boyd may have been subject to a life sentence on conviction
does not satisfactorily answer his allegation that his attorney told him that he
would spend the rest of his life in prison if he were convicted.
Further, we disagree with the trial court’s statement that Boyd’s
allegation was conclusory without the notes. It was not imperative that Boyd
produce the scripted notes for the record prior to the hearing. The allegation in this
regard was sufficient to warrant a hearing without the notes being supplied to the
record.5
Finally, we cannot say that the outcome of the trial would not have
been different had Boyd proved his allegations to be true. Without Boyd’s
4
At this point, we note that Boyd’s trial counsel apparently was a methamphetamine user who
went to prison within months following Boyd’s trial for the crime of attempting to manufacture
methamphetamine. Also, Boyd’s counsel apparently did not have a file from which it might be
revealed what occurred during Boyd’s representation.
5
Boyd had stated in his motion that he wished to reserve entering the notes into the record until
his appointed counsel had an opportunity to review them. Boyd stated that the notes “are of a
sensitive nature.”
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testimony that he fired the shot, the Commonwealth’s case rested on the testimony
of witnesses who had earlier stated that Boyd had fired the shot. These witnesses
hedged their testimony at trial, stating that they were intoxicated or passed out.
This forced the Commonwealth to use the witnesses’ statements to impeach the
witnesses’ trial testimony.
An evidentiary hearing is warranted only “if there is an issue of fact
which cannot be determined from the face of the record.” Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993). The issues of whether or not
Boyd’s counsel coerced him to testify and, if so, whether such testimony would
likely changed the outcome of the trial cannot be determined from the face of the
record. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in not granting an evidentiary
hearing on this issue.
Boyd also contends that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
his allegation that his counsel failed to properly investigate the facts of the case.
His pro se motion and his counsel’s supplemental motion are insufficient in this
regard. As the trial court noted, Boyd failed to make any argument to support his
allegation.
Next, Boyd argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the
suppression of certain taped witness statements. Specifically, Boyd challenges his
trial counsel’s failure to seek the suppression of statements by Jerome Jointer,
Mario Walls, and David Jones, Jr., which were used by the Commonwealth at trial
to impeach their trial testimony. Boyd argues that these witness statements were
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derived from a statement made by Demarkus Hill, which was suppressed by the
trial court. Boyd argues that the witness statements were the “fruits” of Hill’s
suppressed statement.
The trial court rejected Boyd’s argument by relying on U.S. v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 234, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2168, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), which states in
part that “the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
being personal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of
third parties called as witnesses at trial.”
We believe this resolution of the issue misses the point. Boyd is not
arguing that the witnesses’ statements are inadmissible on grounds of selfincrimination. Rather, he contends that the statements are inadmissible as “fruits
of the poisonous tree,” with the poisonous tree being Hill’s inadmissible statement.
Regardless, we reject Boyd’s argument on a different basis.
In Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2001), the
Kentucky Supreme Court held as follows:
The exclusionary rule . . . extends to direct as well as to
the indirect products of official misconduct. Thus,
evidence cannot be admitted against an accused if the
evidence is derivative of the original illegality, i.e., is
“tainted” or is the proverbial “fruit of the poisonous
tree.” However, a major exception to the exclusionary
rule exists for information obtained from independent or
causally remote sources.
Id. at 748 (citations omitted). The Wilson court further stated
Evidence need not be excluded if the connection between
the illegal conduct and the discovery and seizure of
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evidence is highly attenuated, or when evidence has been
obtained by means “sufficiently distinguishable” from
the initial illegality so that the evidence is “purged of the
privacy taint.”
Id. (citations omitted).
The concept of derivative evidence is explained in U.S. v. Kandik, 633
F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1980). The court in that case stated: “The Government must
prove that particular evidence or testimony is not fruit of the poisonous tree, but a
defendant has the initial burden of establishing a factual nexus between the
illegality and the challenged evidence.” Id. at 1335 (citations omitted). The facts
in Kandik are somewhat similar to those in this case.
In Kandik the fruits of a search of a cabin were held by the trial court
to be inadmissible. At trial, four witnesses testified against the defendant, after he
unsuccessfully moved the court for a hearing to determine whether the testimony
of the witnesses was tainted by the illegal search. On appeal, the 9th Circuit
rejected the argument and stated as follows:
More important, even assuming the search may have
been a factor in the investigation, and subsequent
location of the witnesses, the challenged testimony was
so attenuated as to dissipate any taint. . . . We find no
close link between the illegal search and the testimony of
Lopez, Mabarek and McCrone. They testified without
coercion, and the fruits of the search did not induce their
testimony.
Id. at 1336.
We conclude that the connection between Hill’s statement and the
procuring of the witnesses’ statements were also highly attenuated and that the
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statements were thereby admissible and were not “fruits of the poisonous tree.”
The court did not err in allowing the introduction of the witnesses’ statements, and
Boyd’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to their
admissibility.
Accordingly, the opinion and order of the Fayette Circuit Court is
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
first issue.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robin R. Slater
Lexington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
REPLY BRIEF FOR
APPELLANT:
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
LaMar Boyd, pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
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