LAYMON (TODD) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001626-DG
TODD LAYMON
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
v.
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-XX-00007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: KELLER AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: This Court granted discretionary review of
Appellant’s misdemeanor conviction for second-degree sexual abuse for which he
was sentenced to six months confinement in the county jail and a fine of $500.
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
KRS 510.120. The sole issue presented is whether Appellant was denied his
Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States by virtue of the admission of the hearsay testimony of the victim’s
mother, the mother’s boyfriend William DeRose, and Deputy Sheriff Vallelunga.
At or about 8:00 a.m. on July 8, 2006, officers of the McCracken
County Sheriff’s Department, responding to a call, discovered 13-year-old J.A.
sleeping in her mother’s car. Upon questioning, J.A. stated that Appellant had
entered her bed and touched her inappropriately. According to J.A., as repeated by
witnesses at trial, Appellant had “felt her arms, down the side of her legs, and over
her butt” several hours earlier. There was no physical evidence, and J.A. was not
taken to the hospital or given any medical or forensic examination.
Although J.A. was present in the courthouse on the day of trial, she
was not called as a witness. Over objection, the three persons who heard her
account of the incident were permitted to repeat her out-of-court statements as to
what she claimed had occurred. According to the child’s mother, the act would
have occurred some two and a half to three and a half hours prior to the discovery
of J.A. sleeping in the car.
On appeal the circuit court affirmed. The court relied on McClure v.
Commonwealth, 686 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. App. 1985), a case dealing with the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and discussed the decision of the Supreme
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Court of the United States in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct.
1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The circuit court, sitting as a court of review,
concluded that “the statements made by the victim in the case below were made as
she was suffering under the stress of the nervous excitement and shock produced
by the act at issue. Accordingly, such statements were properly admitted under
KRE 803(2).” The court held that J.A.’s statements were not testimonial and were
not, therefore, barred by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
We will not unduly lengthen this opinion as we are firmly persuaded
that the lower courts erred. There appears to have been insufficient consideration
of Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006),
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2006, or of Heard v.
Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 240 (Ky. 2007), and Rankins v. Commonwealth, 237
S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2007), decisions of the Supreme Court of Kentucky that bear
directly on this issue. Davis v. Washington clearly distinguished between
statements that are nontestimonial and those that are testimonial. Statements in the
former category do not violate the Confrontation Clause while statements in the
latter are violative of it. Davis explains the distinction as follows:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
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Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74. We have no doubt in the conclusion
that J.A.’s statements made to members of her family and police officers two or
more hours after the alleged abuse were testimonial. There was no ongoing
emergency. She was questioned in an effort to facilitate criminal prosecution.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Rankins v.
Commonwealth is dispositive of this case. Under facts far more compelling and
urgent than those presented here, the Court nevertheless enforced the
Confrontation Clause decisions in Crawford v. Washington and Davis v.
Washington. It concluded as follows:
Here, the police officer responded to a call, and
discovered Nicole Weaver. She proceeded to tell the
officer “what happened,” recounting the assault by
Rankin. Under Davis and Crawford, Weaver’s
statements are testimonial. The Sixth Amendment
prescribes that the only method for testing their reliability
is through cross-examination. We cannot consider
whether they fit into the excited utterance, or any other
hearsay exception. To do so “would perpetuate . . . what
the Sixth Amendment condemns.” Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 67, 124 S.Ct. at 1373, 158 L.Ed.2d at 202.
Rankins, 237 S.W.3d at 131-32 (footnotes omitted).
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the courts below, vacate
Appellant’s conviction, and remand to the McCracken District Court for further
proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeremy Ian Smith
Paducah, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Samuel G-R Clymer
Special Assistant Attorney General
Paducah, Kentucky
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