JONES (RYAN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 5, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001517-MR
RYAN JONES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00208
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Ryan Jones appeals from an order of the Hardin Circuit
Court revoking his probation. The issue presented is whether the circuit court’s
failure to continue the probation revocation hearing or, alternatively, grant Jones
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
“use” immunity unconstitutionally forced him to choose between asserting his
right against self-incrimination and his right to present a meaningful and complete
defense. Because we conclude that Jones should have been informed that his
testimony at his probation revocation hearing could not be used against him at his
subsequent criminal trial, we reverse and remand.
On February 27, 2007, Jones entered a plea of guilty to trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree; tampering with physical evidence;
possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia, first offense. His
sentences were ordered to run concurrently for a total of seven-years’
imprisonment, probated for five years.
The events leading to the probation revocation occurred on March 20,
2008, when Hardin County Probation and Parole Officer Steven Whitley, Jones’s
probation supervisor, received information from the Radcliff Police Department
that witnesses reported seeing Jones shoot a gun near his residence. Officer
Whitley, Officer Sullivan McCurdy, and other officers arrived at the residence
where they found a male, Justin Valentine, and two females on the front porch.
Jones was not at the residence. After Officer McCurdy smelled marijuana, the
three were arrested and taken into custody.
Vicki Spencer, appellant’s aunt, spoke with the officers and escorted
them to the basement of the residence where Jones and Valentine lived. According
to Officer Whitley, he observed in plain view marijuana residue on a dresser. A
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search of the area produced digital scales, fifty dollars in cash, marijuana in plastic
bags, a white powdery residue in a gray tray and marijuana in the pockets of
clothing.
Upon Jones’s arrival at the residence, he was arrested and taken into
custody. Although Jones denied any knowledge of the drugs, when asked if he
could pass a drug test, Jones responded, “No,” and admitted that he had smoked
marijuana the previous day.2
Jones was indicted for possession of a controlled substance. At his
probation revocation hearing, Jones sought a continuance on the grounds that the
underlying facts that supported the probation revocation were the same used to
support the felony indictment. As a consequence, he argued that he could not
present a complete defense to the revocation because his testimony could be used
against him at his criminal trial. The continuance was denied. Fearing that his
testimony would be used against him at his subsequent criminal trial, Jones elected
to remain silent. Following the hearing, Jones’s probation was revoked.
A probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding; thus,
the probationer is not entitled to the full panoply of rights afforded a criminal
defendant. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484
(1972). “Indeed, if an individual released on probation has failed to abide by the
conditions of his release, the State has an overwhelming interest in being able to
2
Jones represents to this Court that if he had been allowed to testify under a grant of immunity,
he would have denied making these statements.
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return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary
criminal trial.” Robinson v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Ky.App. 2002)
(internal quotations omitted).
Although a probationer’s rights are limited at a revocation hearing, it
is constitutionally required that the probationer be given the opportunity to testify.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Murphy
v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Ky.App. 1977). The right to testify is
significant to the probationer and the Commonwealth because it ensures that the
proceeding leads to an accurate and informed result so that the probationer’s
liberty is not unjustifiably taken and the Commonwealth does not unnecessarily
interrupt the rehabilitative process or prejudice the safety of the community. It
derives from the succinct proposition that the probationer is entitled to be treated
with “basic fairness.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484, 92 S.Ct. at 2602.
Basic fairness requires that a probationer not be forced to sacrifice one
constitutional right for another. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct.
967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). See also, Shull v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 469
(Ky.App. 1971)(holding that Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution and the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibit the Commonwealth
from using a defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing as substantive
evidence at the criminal trial). The rights afforded through due process cannot be
exercised at the expense of an equally important right, the right to be free from
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self-incrimination. Jones contends that the exercise of his right to testify exposed
him to self-incrimination unless his testimony was excluded from use at his
criminal trial or his revocation hearing postponed until the criminal charges were
resolved. Thus, the question presented is whether he was entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no person in a criminal case shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Section Eleven of the Constitution of Kentucky provides identical protections
against self-incrimination. Commonwealth v. Buford, 197 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Ky.
2006).
The right against self-incrimination “not only permits a person to
refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but
also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
368, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 2991, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986) (internal quotes and citations
omitted). “As a general proposition, the privilege against self-incrimination may
be invoked whenever a witness has a real and appreciable apprehension that the
information requested could be used against him in a future criminal proceeding.”
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824, 841 n.2 (Ky. 2000).
We have had occasion to address self-incrimination in the context of
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probation revocation hearings and have held that because a revocation proceeding
is not a criminal proceeding, the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution do not apply. Citing
federal authority, in Childers v. Commonwealth, 593 S.W.2d 80 (Ky.App. 1979),
the Court held that the “privilege against self-incrimination is fundamentally
inconsistent with the acquisition and maintenance of probationary status.” As a
consequence, there is no right to assert the Fifth Amendment at a probation
revocation hearing. Id. at 81. Recently, in Gamble v. Commonwealth, 293 S.W.3d
406 (Ky.App. 2009), this Court reaffirmed Childers and rejected the probationer’s
assertion that his Fifth Amendment rights were implicated when he refused to
answer questions at his probation hearing regarding his failure to pay child support.
We do not deviate from the precedent cited and reaffirm that the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section Eleven of the Kentucky
Constitution are not applicable to testimony used solely to establish grounds for
probation revocation. However, a different conclusion is required when revocation
is sought prior to a criminal trial arising from the same facts as the revocation. Our
reasoning is premised on two constitutional principles: the concept that due
process requires basic fairness in all judicial proceedings; and the concept that the
state cannot compel incriminating testimony.
The tension between the probationer’s right to be heard and the
possible use of that same testimony against the probationer at his subsequent
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criminal trial has been the subject of a plethora of legal opinions. The probationer
must choose between remaining silent or presenting a defense to probation
revocation, which divulges his defense to the criminal charge and risks selfincrimination at his criminal trial. The probationer’s precarious position was
artfully summarized in a concurring opinion by the then-Chief Justice of the
Alaska Supreme Court in McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 999 (Alaska 1980),
as follows:
The probationer or parolee when confronted with a
revocation hearing prior to a criminal trial still must
weigh several factors in deciding whether to testify. Not
to testify may mean that parole or probation will be
revoked because no response had been made to the state's
evidence. The commentary to the ABA standards on
probation point out the greater difficulty in defending
such an action:
The relative informality of a probation
revocation proceeding, as compared to the
trial of an original criminal charge,
underlines the danger. Relaxation of rules
of admissibility of evidence, the absence of
a jury, a lesser burden of proof factors such
as these can lead to an abuse of the
proceedings by basing revocation upon a
new criminal charge when the offense could
not be proved in an ordinary criminal trial.
ABA Standards relating to Probation, s 5.3, at 63
(Approved draft 1970). To testify and put forth a full
defense, if successful, may still be a hollow victory. For
while the parolee or probationer may be successful in
persuading the parole board or the court that parole or
probation should not be revoked, the prosecution has
most likely been given a fairly comprehensive
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presentation of the parolee or probationer's defense. At
the criminal trial, the prosecution will thus be better
prepared because the revocation proceeding was held
prior to the trial on the underlying criminal conduct.
In 9 Ky. Prac. Crim. Prac. & Proc. § 31:156 (2009-2010), similar
concerns are expressed by Professor Leslie W. Abramson, a recognized authority
on Kentucky Criminal Procedures, who advises that the court afford the defendant
insulation from the possible incriminating use of his or her testimony in other
proceedings. Absent some assurance that a probationer’s statement will not
diminish his chances of acquittal at a subsequent criminal trial, “his opportunity to
be heard is more illusory than real . . . .” People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 874,
120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 392, 533 P.2d 1024, 1031 (1975).
Despite criticism of pretrial revocation hearings, courts have been
reluctant to mandate that a hearing be postponed until the concurrent criminal
charge is resolved. Because the state has an interest in expeditiously removing
recalcitrant criminals from society and the probationer has an interest in a speedy
resolution of his probationary status, there is no constitutional requirement that the
revocation hearing be postponed until resolution of any criminal charges based on
identical facts. See Lynott v. Story, 929 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1991); Tiryung v.
Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503 (Ky.App. 1986).
Jurisdictions that have sought to ease the probationer’s dilemma and
diminish the possible tactical advantage gained by the prosecution presented by a
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pretrial revocation hearing have declined to interfere with the Commonwealth’s
swift pursuit of revocation but, instead, have adopted the position that the
probationer’s testimony at the hearing cannot be used against him at a criminal
trial. See Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d 653, 655 (D.C.Cir. 1968); Tinch v. Henderson,
430 F.Supp. 964, 969 (M.D.Tenn.1977); People v. Rocha, 86 Mich.App. 497, 512,
272 N.W.2d 699, 706 (1978); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629, 653-57
(1975) (requiring use immunity in the context of a prison disciplinary hearing);
State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673, 679, 370 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1977); State v. Evans,
77 Wis.2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664, 668-69 (1977). By application of use immunity,
the tension between the probationer’s constitutional rights is eased without
sacrificing the purported benefits of a pretrial revocation.3
The Commonwealth recognizes the authority cited but points out that
other federal and state courts have held there is no constitutional mandate that the
probationer’s testimony be immunized from use at a subsequent criminal trial and
those courts granting immunity have done so on state grounds. See Lynott, 929
F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1990); Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1978)
(finding that immunity was not constitutionally required and that the courts had no
supervisory power to grant immunity under Montana law); Roberts v. Taylor, 540
3
Use immunity is defined as the prohibition against the use of the testimony, or any evidence
derived directly or indirectly from that testimony, against the witness in a criminal prosecution.
See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212
(1972)(defining use immunity).
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F.2d 540, 542-43 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50
L.Ed.2d 796 (1977); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1974) (concluding
that there was no “compulsion” involved and thus the prosecution did not need to
hold the criminal trial first or grant use immunity for testimony given at the
revocation hearing); People v. Carr, 185 Colo. 293, 524 P.2d 301 (1974); State v.
Randall, 27 Or.App. 869, 557 P.2d 1386 (1976).
As evidenced by the divergence of judicial opinion, the United States
Supreme Court has not given definitive guidance on the use of testimony given at a
probation revocation hearing and, as a consequence, federal and state courts
struggle to interpret the various Supreme Court decisions relating to the right
against self-incrimination. However, we believe the confusion was clarified in
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984), and
conclude that the probationer’s testimony at a probation revocation hearing cannot
be used against him at a subsequent criminal trial.
In Murphy, the United States Supreme Court discussed the right
against self-incrimination in the context of a requirement that a probationer be
truthful with his probation officer. Although the Court held that the state may
insist on answers to incriminating questions, it added the caveat that the answers
cannot be used in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 465 U.S. at 435, 104 S.Ct. at 1146,
n.7. Addressing the situation when a probationer’s responses to the state’s
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questions might later incriminate him in a pending or subsequent criminal
proceeding, the Court stated:
A state may require a probationer to appear and discuss
matters that affect his probationary status; such a
requirement, without more, does not give rise to a selfexecuting privilege. The result may be different if the
questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his
probationary status, call for answers that would
incriminate him in a pending or later criminal
prosecution. There is thus a substantial basis in our cases
for concluding that if the state, either expressly or by
implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would
lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the
classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege
would be excused, and the probationer's answers would
be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution.
Id. at 465 U.S. 420, 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1146 (footnote omitted). On two
occasions since Murphy, this Court has echoed the Supreme Court’s statement.
In Razor v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 472 (Ky.App. 1997), we held
the probationer’s constitutional rights were not implicated. However, we did so
because the probationer’s non-compliance with his sex offender treatment could
not serve as the basis for a criminal charge. We stated:
On the contrary, even though the requirement was
accompanied by a threat of possible probation
revocation, any incriminating admissions made by
appellant could not have been used as a basis for
criminal charges against him.
Id. at 474 (emphasis ours).
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Recently, in Gamble, this Court again made the identical distinction
when it held that there was no Fifth Amendment protection when a probationer
was questioned for the purpose of probation revocation based on his failure to pay
child support. However, we explicitly stated that his testimony could not be used
at a subsequent criminal proceeding. Quoting State v. Cass, 635 N.E.2d 225
(Ind.App. 1994), we stated:
We agree with the State and conclude that a
probationer is not entitled to the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination as afforded to a defendant in a
criminal trial. However, a probationer is protected by
the fifth amendment from answering any questions where
those answers could be used against him or her in any
subsequent criminal proceedings.
Id. at 410 (emphasis ours).
Based on this Court’s interpretation of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Murphy and Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution, we
join those jurisdictions that hold the probationer’s testimony at a probation
revocation hearing cannot be used substantively against him at a subsequent
criminal proceeding arising from the same facts. We further hold that the trial
court must inform the probationer that, if he chooses to testify, his testimony at the
probation revocation hearing cannot be used against him in a subsequent criminal
trial on the underlying offense. However, consistent with our rules of evidence,
the testimony might be admissible for the purpose of impeachment or rebuttal in an
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appropriate instance. See Rocha, 86 Mich.App. at 512-513, 272 N.W.2d at 706,
quoting Coleman, 13 Cal.3d at 889, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402, 533 P.2d at 1042.
Our decision resolves a constitutional dilemma faced by the
probationer without mandating that the state seek revocation only after the
probationer’s criminal trial and is a concession to the interest of the state in
promptly resolving probation revocation proceedings. The application of use
immunity will protect the probationer’s right to testify in his defense and deter any
abuse of the revocation hearing process that would provide an unfair advantage to
the Commonwealth at a subsequent criminal trial. It remains within the trial
court’s discretion whether to grant or deny a probationer’s request for a
continuance of the probation revocation hearing.
Because Jones requested and was denied use immunity for his
testimony as directed by this opinion, and thus did not testify, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND
DISSENTING IN PART: While I concur with the majority of the reasoning in this
well crafted opinion, I would refrain from speculating upon what use such
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testimony could have for collateral matters such as impeachment or rebuttal. For
the sake of consistency and in harmony with the constitutional principle against
self-incrimination that is at the heart of this case, I would respectfully suggest that
use of such testimony for any incriminating purposes would be barred. Therefore,
I dissent as to this issue.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
Shelly R. Fears
Asst. Public Advocate
Dept. of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
J. Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
J. Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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