COUNTRYWAY INSURANCE COMPANY VS. OAKES (MARGUERITE S.)
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RENDERED: JULY 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001498-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001557-MR
COUNTRYWAY INSURANCE
COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00130
MARGUERITE S. OAKES
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
AND
NO. 2009-CA-000958-MR
COUNTRYWAY INSURANCE
COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00130
MARGUERITE S. OAKES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND CLAYTON, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Countryway Insurance Company appeals and
Marguerite S. Oakes cross-appeals from various orders of the Todd Circuit Court
relating to an automobile accident that occurred in Tennessee and a dispute over
underinsured (“UIM”) insurance coverage. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On April 15, 1999, Oakes, a Kentucky resident, sustained injuries in
Tennessee when the vehicle she was driving, which was owned by her mother,
collided with a vehicle driven by David Thrasher, who was also driving a vehicle
owned by his mother. Thrasher had a liability insurance policy with USAA with
policy limits of $100,000 per person. The vehicle owned by Oakes’s mother was
insured under a policy with Cincinnati Insurance Company that provided UIM
coverage with policy limits of $500,000. Oakes had UIM coverage with
Countryway under three policies: one providing personal vehicle coverage with a
$250,000 limit, another providing commercial vehicle coverage with a $250,000
limit, and a third providing umbrella coverage.2
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
The trial court determined that Oakes’s umbrella policy provided only excess coverage and was
not implicated in this matter. There was no appeal from this decision.
-2-
Oakes filed suit against Thrasher in Tennessee on March 31, 2000.
Pursuant to Tennessee law, Oakes had Cincinnati and Countryway served with her
complaint and notified them of her intention to seek UIM benefits.3 Both
Cincinnati and Countryway filed answers to the complaint. USAA offered its
$100,000 liability policy limits to Oakes in settlement of the claim against
Thrasher. In accordance with Tennessee law, USAA notified the UIM carriers
(Cincinnati and Countryway) of this offer. Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) §
56-7-1206. Each UIM carrier then had thirty days to give notice to its insured that
it consented to the settlement, waived its subrogation rights against Thrasher, and
agreed to submit the UIM claim to binding arbitration. Id. All parties agreed, and
on July 18, 2002, the Tennessee court entered an agreed order of dismissal of the
suit against Thrasher and his mother, with the remaining claims reserved.
Thereafter, on October 16, 2002, Oakes filed UIM claims in this state
in the Todd Circuit Court against Cincinnati and Countryway. The parties
participated in discovery, and on August 24, 2004, they submitted the matter to
mediation. Oakes accepted $250,000, or one-half of the available $500,000 UIM
limits of the Cincinnati policy, in settlement of her UIM claims against that party.
3
Under Tennessee law, “suit may not be brought directly against the uninsured motorist
insurance carrier[.]” Webster v. Harris, 727 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tenn. App. 1987). However,
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) § 56-7-1206, an insured must serve a copy of the
process upon the UIM carrier as though the company was a party defendant, and the company
thereafter has the right to file pleadings in the name of the owner and operator of the
underinsured vehicle or in its own name. Additionally, the terms “uninsured” and
“underinsured” were combined by the Tennessee legislature in the statute so as to allow
underinsured plaintiffs to recover under the uninsured motorists provision. Slutsky v. City of
Chattanooga, 34 S.W.3d 467, 470-71 (Tenn. App. 2000) (citing Dockins v. Balboa Insur. Co.,
764 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1989)).
-3-
Oakes’s claims against Cincinnati were dismissed with prejudice on December 27,
2005. Meanwhile, a show cause order had been entered on April 20, 2004,
pertaining to the Tennessee suit, and that case was ultimately dismissed without
prejudice.
In August 2006, Countryway filed a “Motion to Enforce the
Tennessee Settlement” seeking an order requiring Countryway and Oakes to
submit Oakes’s UIM claim against Countryway to arbitration. Countryway
asserted that the trial court should give full faith and credit to the Tennessee agreed
order of dismissal wherein, Countryway claimed, Oakes had agreed to binding
arbitration of the UIM claims.
The trial court denied Countryway’s motion, stating that it could find
no Tennessee judgment in the record that indicated any agreement to arbitrate.
The trial court determined that the matter was, therefore, a choice of laws issue
rather than an issue of full faith and credit. The court then held that Kentucky law
governed the dispute, as Oakes was a resident of Kentucky and the controversy
involved an insurance policy written and entered into in Kentucky. Countryway
made no further move to advance its claimed right to arbitrate, and it subsequently
moved for a jury trial.
On October 30, 2007, less than a month before trial, Oakes filed a
motion for partial summary judgment asserting that Countryway was liable for
either 100% or 77.7779% of all damages above $110,000, which was the amount
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of the underlying liability limits plus no-fault payments.4 The trial court withheld
ruling on the issue of UIM coverage until after the conclusion of the trial.
On November 19, 2007, a jury trial was held to resolve the amount of
damages Oakes had suffered as a consequence of the accident. The jury awarded
Oakes $240,000 in pain and suffering and $253,120.54 in medical expenses.
Following the trial, Countryway filed a response to Oakes’s partial
summary judgment motion. Therein, Countryway agreed that it was responsible
for damages on a pro rata basis, but asserted that its pro rata share was only 60%
of the damages, rather than 77.7779% as argued by Oakes.
On March 24, 2008, the trial court entered a post-trial order adopting
the position advanced by Countryway in its response to Oakes’s motion for partial
summary judgment that Cincinnati’s and Countryway’s policies provided for pro
rata coverage and that Countryway’s pro rata portion was 60% of the verdict in
excess of the $110,000 threshold. The court reasoned that the “Other Insurance”
clauses in the UIM policies of Cincinnati and Countryway were mutually
repugnant excess clauses and, therefore, that each policy provides pro rata
coverage. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment against Countryway for
$233,824.80.
Countryway filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial order
and judgment, claiming that the trial court erred in applying Kentucky law and in
4
The motion included language only from Oakes’s personal auto policy with Countryway and
did not contain language from the endorsements to the personal auto policy or from Oakes’s
commercial auto policy with Countryway.
-5-
refusing to order the parties to submit to arbitration and erred in ordering the pro
rata distribution of the verdict amount. Countryway asserted in that motion for the
first time that the Cincinnati UIM coverage was primary and that Countryway’s
coverage was excess. Countryway made this argument despite the fact that it had
previously agreed in its response to Oakes’s partial summary judgment motion that
its liability was pro rata with that of Cincinnati’s.
Countryway further claimed that the trial court incorrectly ordered
that interest should commence from the date of the jury’s verdict rather than the
date of the entry of judgment. The trial court granted Countryway’s motion in
part, ordering that interest would begin to accrue from the date of the judgment,
but it denied the remainder of the motion. Countryway subsequently filed a notice
of appeal with this Court, and Oakes filed a cross-appeal claiming that
prejudgment interest was appropriate.
While this appeal was pending, Countryway also filed a motion for
relief under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 and 61.02, claiming
that Oakes had not provided all of the applicable language in her policies to the
trial court in her motion for partial summary judgment. Countryway attached the
full policies, including all endorsements, to its motion.5 The trial court denied this
5
At the oral arguments of this case, Countryway acknowledged that its counsel at the trial court
level had copies of all policies and endorsements while the case was before the court on Oakes’s
partial summary judgment motion.
-6-
motion, finding that the requirements of CR 60.02 had not been met. Countryway
appealed the denial of this motion as well.6
Countryway first argues that Tennessee law required arbitration of the
UIM claims, that Oakes agreed to submit to arbitration, and that the trial court
erred in requiring the parties to proceed to trial rather than submit the matter to
arbitration. Similarly, Countryway argues that the trial court erred in failing to
apply Tennessee law in determining the priority of the UIM coverages.7 This
Court’s review of the trial court’s legal conclusions is de novo, and findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error. Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47
S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky. App. 2001).
We find no writing in the record evidencing an arbitration agreement
between Countryway and Oakes. Rather, Countryway claims a right to arbitration
pursuant to Tennessee statute. Tennessee’s uninsured motor vehicle coverage
statute states that:
. . . if a party or parties alleged to be liable for the bodily
injury or death of the insured offers the limits of all
liability insurance policies available to such party or
parties in settlement of the insured’s claim, the insured or
the insured’s personal representative may accept the
offer, execute a full release of the party or parties on
whose behalf the offer is made and preserve the right to
seek additional compensation from the insured’s
uninsured motorist insurance carrier upon agreement of
the insured or the insured’s personal representative to
6
Because these appeals arise from the same matter, we have elected to dispose of them in one
opinion.
7
Under Tennessee statutory law, Countryway’s coverage was clearly excess to the coverage of
Cincinnati. TCA § 56-7-1101(a)(1) and (2).
-7-
submit the insured’s uninsured motorist claim to binding
arbitration of all issues of tort liability and damages[.]
TCA § 56-7-1206(f).8
Countryway argues that upon settlement of her claim against the
underlying tortfeasor, Oakes expressly subjected herself to TCA § 56-7-1206,
which further provides that once the insured has provided notice to the UIM carrier
of settlement with the tortfeasor:
. . . the uninsured motorist insurance carrier shall have
thirty (30) days to give notice to its insured or the
insured’s personal representative or attorney and the
liability insurance carrier or carriers or their attorneys
that it consents to the settlement, that it will agree to
binding arbitration of the insured’s uninsured motorist
claim and will waive its subrogation rights against the
party or parties to be released in exchange for their
written agreement to cooperate in connection with the
arbitration[.]
TCA § 56-7-1206(g)(4). Countryway claims that correspondence between the
parties proves that this procedure was followed in the Tennessee action, and thus, a
valid agreement to submit the claims to arbitration was formed pursuant to
Tennessee law.
We fail to see how Tennessee’s procedural law on how to resolve
insurance disputes has any impact on a Kentucky action involving a Kentucky
resident suing on an insurance policy written and entered into in Kentucky.
Kentucky courts assign great weight to the residence of the parties to an insurance
contract. Bonnlander v. Leader Nat’l Ins. Co., 949 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. App.
8
As we noted in footnote 3, “uninsured” and “underinsured” are used interchangeably under the
Tennessee statutes. Slutsky, supra.
-8-
1996). The Kentucky Supreme Court has taken the position that Kentucky law
should apply as a matter of public policy, even where there is a conflicting final
judgment from another state. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Preston, 26
S.W.3d 145, 147-48 (Ky. 2000). As stated in Preston:
Such an interpretation would cause a Kentucky insurance
policy to yield a variety of inconsistent results depending
upon the laws of other jurisdictions. Laws unique to
other jurisdictions . . . should not bind and define the
public policy of Kentucky.
Id. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to order
arbitration.9
Countryway’s next argument is that, under Kentucky law, the trial
court erred because Countryway’s policies are excess to Cincinnati’s policy and,
therefore, could not be utilized until Cincinnati’s coverage was exhausted. We
need not reach the merits of this issue, however, as we find the doctrine of judicial
9
Additionally, a waste of judicial resources would result by requiring the parties to submit to
arbitration at this late date. While Countryway states that because the trial court’s order was
interlocutory, it “had no choice” but to continue to trial, Countryway could have moved for
interlocutory relief pursuant to CR 65.07, as the Kentucky Supreme Court has found that the
denial of a motion to compel arbitration is “akin to a denial of an injunction.” Kindred Hosp.
Ltd. Part. v. Lutrell, 190 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Ky. 2006). Moreover, although it does not appear
that Countryway is arguing that a written agreement to arbitrate existed, but rather that the right
to arbitrate existed pursuant to Tennessee statute, KRS 417.220 provides a statutory right to
interlocutory appeal of a denial of an application to compel arbitration pursuant to a written
arbitration agreement. Courts in other jurisdictions have found that the failure to take an
immediate appeal of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for arbitration could forfeit the right
to arbitration. Franceschi v. Hosp. Gen. San Carlos, Inc., 420 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2005);
Mitchell v. Owens, 185 S.W.3d 837, 840 (Tenn. App. 2005) (“the purpose behind the right to
immediately appeal a ruling to deny arbitration would be defeated ‘if a party could reserve its
right to appeal an interlocutory order denying arbitration, allow the substantive lawsuit to run its
course (which could take years), and then, if dissatisfied with the result, seek to enforce the right
to arbitration on appeal from the final judgment.’”). We find the reasoning in these cases to be
equally applicable in this situation.
-9-
estoppel to be applicable.10 See Hisle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t,
258 S.W.3d 422, 434-35 (Ky. App. 2008).
As this Court noted in Hisle,
Although there is no absolute general formula for [the
principle of judicial estoppel], several factors have been
recognized such as: (1) whether the party’s later position
is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position; (2)
whether the party succeeded in persuading a court to
accept the earlier position; and (3) whether the party
seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an
unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the
opposing party if not estopped.
Id.; see also Rowe v. Shepherd, 283 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Ky. 1955) (“The rule of law
to the effect that a party to litigation will not be permitted to assume inconsistent or
contradictory positions with respect to the same matter in the same or a successive
series of suits is well grounded upon familiar principles of estoppel.”). The
“success in persuading the court” requirement “does not mean that the party
against whom the judicial estoppel doctrine is to be invoked must have prevailed
on the merits . . . judicial acceptance means only that the first court has adopted the
position urged by the party[.]” Colston Inv. Co. v. Home Supply Co., 74 S.W.3d
759, 763 (Ky. App. 2001) (quoting Reynolds v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 469, 472-73 (6th
Cir. 1988)).
10
The issue of judicial estoppel was not raised at the trial court level. As an appellate court, we
may, however, “affirm the trial court for any reason sustainable by the record.” Kentucky Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 814 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ky. App. 1991).
-10-
From the time that Oakes filed her motion for partial summary
judgment in October 2007, Countryway consistently agreed and argued before the
court that its policy provided pro rata coverage. In Countryway’s response to
Oakes’s motion for partial summary judgment, Countryway stated that it agreed
that it was responsible for a pro rata share of the damages awarded to Oakes in
excess of $110,000. Further on in the response, Countryway stated that “it seems
clear that the Cincinnati and Countryway policies both contain ‘other insurance
clauses’ which provide for pro rata payment when there is other UIM insurance
available.” Additionally, in Countryway’s post-trial brief, Countryway continued
to agree that its policy was pro rata. It was only in Countryway’s motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the trial court’s judgment that it argued for the first time that its
policy provided only excess coverage. Therefore, its later position was clearly
inconsistent with its earlier position.
Additionally, Countryway was successful in persuading the trial court
to accept the position that Countryway’s pro rata share was 60%, the position
Countryway had consistently held since the beginning of the litigation. The trial
court agreed with the position urged by Countryway in every pleading filed with
the court up to that point - that Countryway’s pro rata share was 60% - and entered
an order to that effect.
Moreover, Oakes relied on Countryway’s position when settling with
Cincinnati. This reliance was obviously detrimental, as Countryway settled with
Cincinnati for only half of the available amount, and Cincinnati was subsequently
-11-
dismissed from the action. Countryway’s counsel had the facts upon which to base
a decision as to whether Countryway’s policy was pro rata or excess. After
Countryway made its election to argue that the policy was pro rata and presented
to the court for acceptance evidence to support its position, Countryway should not
now be permitted to change its position and insist that the coverage is excess.
Under the circumstances, Countryway is judicially estopped from asserting an
inconsistent position, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court
Countryway next argues that the trial court erred in entering a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict awarding Oakes the full amount of her
medical expenses. At trial, the jury awarded Oakes $253,120.54 in medical
expenses, $6,587.50 less that Oakes’ claimed damages. The trial court entered a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict awarding Oakes the full amount of her
medical expenses.
A reviewing court may not disturb a trial court’s decision on a
directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict unless that decision was
clearly erroneous. Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Ky. 1998). In this
case, the trial court found that the difference in the amount of Oakes’s claimed
medical expenses and the damages awarded by the jury was equal to the bill from
Pain Management Group and that no reasonable jury could have found that the
medical expenses incurred in relation to Pain Management Group were
unreasonable, unnecessary, and/or unrelated to the collision at issue.
-12-
The trial court noted that, under KRS 304.39-020(5)(a), there is a
presumption that any medical bills submitted are reasonable and found that Oakes
had submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the charges incurred at Pain
Management Group were reasonable. Further, the trial court found that
Countryway’s evidence failed to rebut this presumption, as the evidence focused
on whether there was universal acceptance of the discogram procedure
administered at Pain Management Group rather than whether the charges were
reasonable. We cannot find that the trial court was clearly erroneous in its award
of medical expenses and thus affirm.
Further, Oakes has cross-appealed from the granting of Countryway’s
motion to alter, amend, or vacate to the extent that the trial court found that
prejudgment interest should be awarded from the date of the judgment rather than
the date of the jury verdict as originally awarded. A trial court’s decision to grant
or deny a motion to alter, amend, or vacate its judgment lies within the discretion
of the trial court. Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565, 579 (Ky. 2009). As
such, we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. “The test
for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principle.” Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
Oakes has provided no evidence that the trial court abused its
discretion and even admits in her brief that prejudgment interest is a matter of
judicial discretion. Therefore, we affirm.
-13-
Also, Oakes’s cross-appeal requesting sanctions under CR 73.02(4) is
not well-taken. CR 73.02(4) states that:
If an appellate court determines that an appeal or motion
is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee or respondent. An appeal or
motion is frivolous if the court finds that it is so lacking
in merit that it appears to have been taken in bad faith.
Although we have affirmed the opinion of the trial court, we are not convinced that
Countryway’s arguments are frivolous or so lacking in merit that an appeal should
not have been taken or that the appeal was taken in bad faith.
Finally, Countryway also filed an appeal of the denial of its CR 60.02
motion. The standard of review of an appeal involving a CR 60.02 motion is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Kurtsinger v. Bd. of Trustees of
Kentucky Ret. Sys., 90 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2002). Countryway’s primary claim
in its CR 60.02 motion was that Countryway’s original counsel had committed
excusable neglect in agreeing that Countryway’s policy was pro rata.
Kentucky courts have held that attorney neglect does not qualify as
excusable neglect under CR 60.02. “Negligence of an attorney is imputable to the
client and is not a ground for relief under . . . CR 60.02(a) or (f).” Vanhook v.
Stanford-Lincoln County Rescue Squad, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Ky. App.
1984). Further, we do not find that Countryway provided evidence sufficient to
reverse the trial court under any of the other situations enumerated in either CR
60.02 or CR 61.02. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Countryway’s motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02 or CR 61.02.
-14-
Accordingly, the order of the Todd Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
David K. Barnes
Deanna M. Tucker
Kelly M. Stevens
Louisville, Kentucky
David V. Oakes
Paducah, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
David V. Oakes
Paducah, Kentucky
David K. Barnes
Louisville, Kentucky
-15-
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