HUGHES (GERALD) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001419-MR
GERALD HUGHES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN L. WILSON, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 03-CR-00245, 05-CR-00054, & 07-CR-00097
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Gerald Hughes (Hughes) appeals pro se from an order of the
Henderson Circuit Court denying his post-conviction Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial
court’s order.
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
FACTS
Hughes filed his RCr 11.42 motion in connection with three criminal
cases. The last case, 07-CR-00097,2 was based on a controlled buy using a
confidential informant (C.I.). The buy took place on December 11, 2006, in
Henderson, Kentucky. Detective Preston Herndon (Detective Herndon) met a C.I.,
searched him, equipped him with a video recording device, and provided him with
$40.00. The C.I. subsequently went to Hughes’s apartment to purchase crack
cocaine. Shortly thereafter, the C.I. returned and provided Detective Herndon with
a quantity of suspected crack cocaine, which field-tested positive for cocaine. The
C.I. also returned the video equipment. Detective Herndon reviewed the recording
and identified Hughes as the man selling the cocaine.
Hughes was indicted for trafficking in a controlled substance and for
being a first-degree persistent felony offender. In exchange for his plea of guilty,
the Commonwealth agreed to reduce the persistent felon enhancement to second
degree. Hughes pled guilty to the amended charge. Hughes signed the
Commonwealth’s formal plea offer and filed a standard motion to enter a guilty
plea.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court conducted an extensive plea
colloquy in which it questioned Hughes as to the voluntariness of his plea. The
trial court found that Hughes affirmatively answered all of its questions; that
Hughes knowingly, freely, and voluntarily pled guilty, and that he knowingly and
2
Because Hughes did not cite any error in his 2003 and 2005 convictions (03-CR-00245; 05CR-00054), the trial court was correct in concluding that it was not in a position to vacate them.
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intelligently waived his rights. Thus, in accordance with the Commonwealth’s
recommendation, the Henderson Circuit Court sentenced Hughes to ten years in
prison. This sentence led to the revocation of his parole in his two previous cases,
03-CR-00245 and 05-CR-00054.
On June 5, 2008, Hughes filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to RCr 11.42 arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in
his 2007 case. The Henderson Circuit Court denied Hughes’s motion on July 15,
2008, and this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard
governing review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under this
standard, a party asserting such a claim is required to show: (1) that the trial
counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell outside the range of
professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial
because there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different but for counsel’s performance. Id. at 687. This standard was adopted by
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky.
1985). This test is modified in cases involving a defendant who enters a guilty
plea. In such instances, the second prong of the Strickland test includes the
requirement that a defendant demonstrate that, but for the alleged errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a guilty plea, but
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rather would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.E.2d 203 (1985); Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721
S.W.2d 726 (Ky. App. 1986).
A reviewing court must entertain a strong presumption that counsel’s
challenged conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66. The defendant bears the
burden of overcoming this strong presumption by identifying specific acts or
omissions that he alleges constitute a constitutionally deficient performance. Id.
The relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
ANALYSIS
Although it is unclear from Hughes’s brief what he is arguing on
appeal, it appears that Hughes is contending that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because: (1) his counsel failed to investigate the reliability of the C.I.
and failed to suppress the evidence obtained by the C.I., and (2) his counsel failed
to challenge the excessiveness of his sentencing. Hughes also argues that the
cumulative effect of these errors resulted in the denial of effective assistance of
counsel.
First, we note that Hughes has failed to assert that absent the alleged
errors of his counsel, he would not have pled guilty. As concluded by this Court in
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Sparks, 721 S.W.2d 726, a defendant must demonstrate that, but for the alleged
errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a
guilty plea, but rather would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Because Hughes
fails to argue in his 11.42 motion that there is a reasonable probability that he
would not have entered a guilty plea, his claims for ineffective assistance of
counsel must fail.
Further, we are of the opinion that Hughes’s responses during the plea
colloquy conclusively refute any assertion that he would not have pled guilty but
for the supposed failures of his counsel. A review of the plea proceeding reveals
that Hughes’s plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. Moreover, it is clear that
Hughes was satisfied with his attorney’s services and that he agreed that his
attorney did everything he asked him to do in representing him. Additionally, the
certificate of counsel on the written motion to enter the guilty plea confirmed that
Hughes’s counsel discussed the charges and all possible defenses with him.
However, even if Hughes did claim that he would not have pled guilty
absent his counsel’s alleged errors, we conclude that his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel would still fail. Hughes’s first argument is that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to investigate the
reliability of the C.I. and failed to move to suppress the evidence obtained from the
C.I. We disagree.
In order to support probable cause, the allegations of an informant
must either be supported by indicia of that informant’s reliability or corroborated
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by independent police investigation. Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 199 S.W.3d 765,
769 (Ky. App. 2006). Hughes’s counsel was not unreasonably ineffective in
failing to move to suppress the evidence obtained by the C.I. due to the
unreliability of the C.I. because the information was otherwise corroborated.
Specifically, the police had a video recording of the controlled buy which
identified Hughes as the man selling the cocaine. Thus, it was not necessary to
verify the C.I.’s reliability because the police independently confirmed the
information they received from the C.I. by watching the video recording.
Therefore, Hughes’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to file an unnecessary
and futile motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the C.I. based on the
C.I.’s alleged unreliability.
Hughes’s second argument is that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue that his sentence was excessive under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, a drug trafficker dealing in crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as
one dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine. In Kimbrough v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court held that federal sentencing judges are not bound by
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio. 552 U.S. 85, 128
S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007).
However, Hughes’s argument is flawed in that the trial court did not
sentence Hughes under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Instead, Hughes was
sentenced under Kentucky’s penal code, which does not recommend different
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sentences for crack and powder offenses. Therefore, Hughes’s counsel was not
ineffective for failing to argue that Hughes’s sentence was excessive under the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Finally, as we can find no error in the trial court’s decision to deny the
motion for post-judgment relief pursuant to RCr 11.42, there is no basis for
Hughes’s claim that the cumulative effect of all the errors resulted in a denial of
effective assistance of counsel.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Henderson Circuit Court’s order
denying Hughes RCr 11.42 relief is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gerald Hughes, pro se
Central City, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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