MAPLES (JOHN FRANKLIN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001405-MR
JOHN FRANKLIN MAPLES, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 08-CR-00024
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001406-MR
JOHN FRANKLIN MAPLES, JR.
v.
APPELLEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00010
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, TAYLOR, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: John Maples, Jr. appeals from his conviction in the Bell Circuit
Court for two counts of receiving stolen property, being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree.
On appeal he argues (1) that he was denied a fair trial when the firearm charge was
joined with the receiving stolen property charges; (2) that the Commonwealth
failed to prove he was in possession of a firearm; and (3) that penalty phase errors
occurred when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury and improperly
allowed enhancement of the sentence for the firearm charge. However, for the
reasons stated herein, we affirm.
History
In October of 2006, two burglaries occurred in a neighborhood in Bell
County. On October 19, 2006, Mona Milwee returned home to find her door had
been pried open and that several pieces of her jewelry were missing. On October
22, 2006, another Bell County resident, Jody Cosby, discovered that his home had
been burglarized and that, among other things, his .454 Ruger Casull was missing.
Both burglaries were reported to the police.
Cosby, however, was not content to have local police handle the
matter, and instead, launched an all-out campaign to recover his .454 Ruger Casull
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on his own. Cosby began telling anyone he could about his missing Ruger. One
such person was Charlie Smith, a friend with whom Cosby often hunted. On
October 26, 2006, Smith reported to Cosby that his nephew, John Goode, had
heard that “John Boy” Maples was looking to sell a Ruger handgun for $175.00.
The men decided to set up a sting to catch Maples. Cosby gave
$180.00 to Smith and Goode to purchase the gun from Maples. Smith and Goode
proceeded to Maples’s home to purchase the gun. Cosby and his friend, Todd
Bayliss, followed behind Smith and Goode to lay in wait while the pair purchased
the gun.
Goode and Smith testified that they arrived at Maples’ residence and
parked outside. Cosby and Bayliss parked down the street, positioned so that they
could still see Maples’s home. Maples went back into his home and then returned
to the car where Goode and Smith were waiting. Maples got into the car with
Goode and Smith, retrieved the gun from a red duffle bag, and sold it to them for
$175.00. According to Goode and Smith’s testimony, Maples did not have $5.00
to make change for them, so he gave them a bag of jewelry instead. The jewelry
was later recovered by police and determined to be that of Mona Milwee (and,
ironically, to have an estimated value of $2,000.00).
Goode and Smith then drove down the street to show Cosby the gun.
After determining that it was, in fact, his gun, Cosby called the police.
Unfortunately for Maples, the police did not arrive promptly and Cosby was
anxious to recover his $180.00. Cosby and Bayliss approached Maples outside his
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home where they were joined by the other men. Maples fled into the woods to
escape the men and hid on a creek bank.
Maples later telephoned his friends to come and pick him up.
However, and again most unfortunate for Mr. Maples, the friends he called were
working in cooperation with the Bell County Police. Officer Charles Bruce and
Detective Mike Hensley of the Bell County Police Department were there to
intercept Maples when his friends picked him up.
Maples was arrested and charged with receiving stolen property and
being a persistent felony offender in the first degree for the theft of Milwee’s
jewelry. He was also charged with receiving stolen property, being a felon in
possession of a firearm, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree
for the theft of Cosby’s Ruger. At the suggestion of trial counsel, the trial court
consolidated the indictments for trial.
Maples was convicted on both counts of receiving stolen property,
receiving two years for each count. He was also convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, for which he received a five year sentence. The jury
enhanced this five year sentence to twelve years after finding him a persistent
felony offender in the second degree. However, the charge for persistent felony
offender in the first degree was dismissed with prejudice. The sentences were set
to run consecutively for a total of sixteen years.
Analysis
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On appeal, Maples argues (1) that the firearm charge was improperly
joined with the receiving stolen property charges; (2) that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that he was in possession of a firearm; and (3) that his sentence
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was impermissibly enhanced to a
Class C felony.
A. Failure to Sever Charges
We first address Maples’s argument that the possession of a firearm
charge and receiving stolen property charges were improperly joined. Maples
contends that the trial court erred by joining these charges because the charge
necessarily informed the jury that he had previously been convicted of a felony.
Although this error is not preserved for review, Maples has briefed and requested
palpable error review under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 10.26.
RCr 10.26 provides that an alleged error which has been improperly preserved for
appellate review may be revisited upon a demonstration that the error is palpable.
See Butcher v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 3, 11 (Ky. 2002). A palpable error is
one which affects the substantial rights of a party. Id. Relief will only be granted
where there is a substantial possibility that the outcome would have been different
but for the error. Id.
It should first be noted that Maples’s counsel did not merely fail to
preserve the issue for review. Rather, defense counsel was the one who suggested
that the two cases (08-CR-0010 and 08-CR-0024) be consolidated. Indeed, when
the trial court was setting trial dates during pre-trial, the defense attorney called to
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the judge’s attention that both of Maples’s cases had receiving stolen property
charges and had “the same fact pattern,” suggesting that they be consolidated. The
court responded, “You think there’s a couple of these that are subject to
consolidation?” Defense counsel responded, “Yes, sir.” The court noted that both
indictments contained receiving stolen property and persistent felony offender
charges. The Commonwealth then moved to consolidate the indictments and the
trial court granted the motion to consolidate. Defense counsel remained silent.
Although it is ordinarily improper for the jury to be informed of prior
convictions during the guilt phase of trial (which is why many trials are
bifurcated), we find that under the circumstances of this case Maples has waived
joinder on appeal. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 67 (Ky.
1982) (holding that possession of a handgun by a convicted felon should be tried
separately due to prejudice). Here, defense counsel not only raised the issue
before the judge, he effectively told the judge that the cases should be joined rather
than moving to sever the charges. Our courts have made clear that palpable error,
and even constitutional error, may be affirmatively waived by counsel at trial. See,
e.g., Violett v. Commonwealth, 907 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Ky. 1995), citing West v.
Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989). See also, Allen v.
Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 327, 146 S.W. 762 (Ky. 1912); and United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S.725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Unlike
the case cited by Maples, Phillips v. Commonwealth, 2003 WL 1193071 (Ky.
2003), trial counsel did not merely fail to object to joinder, he actively requested it.
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Further, we note that Phillips is merely persuasive, and as an unpublished opinion,
is not binding precedent. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 76.12(4)(c).
Regardless, we find that any error would have been harmless as
Maples took the stand at trial to testify on his own behalf and admitted that he was
a convicted felon. RCr 9.24. Thus, his status as a convicted felon was introduced
into evidence. Accordingly, there is no substantial possibility under RCr 10.26 that
the outcome would have been any different.
Hence, we affirm on this ground.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We now address Maples’s next contention that the Commonwealth
failed to prove by sufficient evidence that he was in possession of a firearm which
was capable of firing a shot. Maples concedes that this claim was not preserved
for review, but has briefed and requested palpable error review under RCr 10.26.
Thus, we will apply the palpable error standard of review rather than the standard
for sufficiency of the evidence set forth in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d
186 (Ky. 1991). See, e.g. Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Ky.
2005).
Maples argues that, because the Commonwealth failed to prove that
the Ruger was a fully-functioning firearm capable of expelling a projectile under
Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 527.010 and 527.040, there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. However,
Maples misunderstands the Commonwealth’s burden. The Commonwealth does
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not have the burden of proving that a firearm is operable, rather, a defendant may
show that a weapon is inoperable as an affirmative defense. Commonwealth v.
Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665 (Ky. 2009). See also, Mosely v. Commonwealth, 374
S.W.2d 492, 493 (Ky. 1964); and Arnold v. Commonwealth, 109 S.W.3d 161, 163
(Ky. App. 2003) (holding that inoperability of a gun is an affirmative defense).
Indeed, there is a presumption that a weapon is operable unless evidence is
introduced at trial to call operability into question. Commonwealth v. Jones, 283
S.W.3d at 671. Accordingly, we affirm on this ground.
C. Felony Class Enhancement
We now reach Maples’s penalty phase argument, namely that the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury on possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon as a “Class C” rather than a “Class D” felony, allowing for enhancement of
his sentence. Specifically, Maples contends that no testimony was offered by the
Commonwealth that the gun in question was a handgun. Again, this error is not
preserved for review, however, we will undertake palpable error review at
Maples’s request.
KRS 527.040(2) states that “[p]ossession of a firearm by a convicted
felon is a Class D felony unless the firearm possessed is a handgun in which case it
is a Class C felony.” (Emphasis added). A “handgun” is defined by KRS
527.010(5) as “any pistol or revolver originally designed to be fired by the use of a
single hand, or any other firearm originally designed to be fired by the use of a
single hand.” (Emphasis added.)
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Maples argues that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120
S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the jury should have been left to determine
whether he was in possession of a handgun or another type of firearm, as the fact
of whether the firearm was a handgun was a fact that increased the penalty for the
offense.
In Apprendi, supra, the United States Supreme Court established the
following rule:
Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 490. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d
403 (2004), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi,
and further explained that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in
the jury verdict without making any additional findings. Id. at 304-305.
In the present case, the classification of the possession of a firearm
charge as a “Class C” felony for the use of a handgun increased the penalty range
from a period of one to five years to a period of five to ten years. Thus, under
Apprendi, supra, a jury was required to determine whether the firearm in question
was a handgun. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165
L.Ed.2d 466 (2006).
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However, it is not clear that there is a Blakely violation as the jury
instruction required the jury to find that Maples was in possession of a “.454 Ruger
Cassull pistol.” (Emphasis added.) “Handgun is defined by KRS 527.010(5) as
“any pistol or revolver...” Further, “pistol” is defined by Webster’s Dictionary as
“a small firearm made to be held and fired with one hand.” Webster’s New World
Dictionary of the American Language, Second College Edition. As the trial court
could impose the sentence on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict
without making any additional findings, it does not appear Blakely has been
violated.
Nonetheless, even if a Blakely violation had occurred, any such
violation would be harmless. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that Blakely
errors are not structural errors and, thus, are subject to harmless error analysis.
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222. The United States Supreme Court set
forth the standard for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The
test enunciated in Chapman is whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 24.
Here, we cannot say that, if the jury had been required to find that the
firearm in question was a handgun, the result would have been any different.
Handguns are ubiquitous in our society and are easily recognized by jurors and lay
people as such. As the jury saw pictures of the weapon, which appears quite
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obviously to be a handgun, and as the jury found in its verdict that Maples wielded
a “pistol”, which is the definitional equivalent of a handgun, any error is harmless.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the Bell Circuit Court is
hereby affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David B. Abner
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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