JONES (CASEY) VS. ERNSPIKER (CHERI), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: APRIL 9, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001316-MR
CASEY JONES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-010351
CHERI ERNSPIKER AND
CHAD ERNSPIKER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Casey Jones appeals from a directed verdict entered in favor
of Cheri Ernspiker and Chad Ernspiker on a claim of malicious prosecution. Jones
argues: (1) the issue of lack of probable cause was an issue of fact for the jury; (2)
the trial court admitted improper hearsay testimony; and (3) the trial court erred by
permitting evidence demonstrating the existence of probable cause which was
acquired after the commencement of the criminal proceeding. We affirm.
Chad Ernspiker was attacked at a Catholic school party. He was
approached from behind and struck in the head with brass knuckles. While Chad
was on the ground, two other individuals punched and kicked him. When Chad
returned to school, another student approached Chad and told him the names of his
attackers. The student wrote three names on a piece of paper: Casey Jones,
Spindle Johnson, and Keith Gutterman. This information was corroborated by Ms.
Ernspiker’s nephew, who told her the same three names after speaking to a
coworker while working at a pizza parlor.
Ms. Ernspiker filed a complaint against Jones in the juvenile court.
Complaints were also filed against Johnson and Gutterman. The charges against
Jones were dismissed without prejudice. Gutterman admitted he had attacked
Chad and stated that Jones was not involved. Subsequently, Jones filed an action
for malicious prosecution against Ms. Ernspiker and Chad. At the close of the
evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Ms. Ernspiker and
Chad finding that Jones had failed to establish a lack of probable cause and malice.
Jones filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal
followed.
Jones first argues that the issue of probable cause should have been
determined by the jury. In analyzing the probable cause element of a malicious
prosecution claim, it has long been the rule in Kentucky that whether certain facts
-2-
constitute probable cause is a question of law for the court to decide. Hendrie v.
Perkins, 240 Ky. 366, 42 S.W.2d 502 (1931). Where the trial court concludes the
facts do not establish probable cause and the underlying facts are in dispute, there
is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Prewitt v. Sexton, 777 S.W.2d 891, 894
(Ky. 1989).
In the case at bar, Jones does not allege a factual dispute concerning
the existence of probable cause. Rather, he questions the credibility and weight of
the evidence. Jones points out that the jury could have disbelieved the evidence
and the existence of the sources that provided the information to Ms. Ernspiker and
Chad. However, this is not a factual dispute as Jones has presented no affirmative
evidence contradicting the evidence establishing probable cause. Again, this is a
question of credibility and weight. As the facts were not in dispute, the trial court
properly analyzed the probable cause issue as a matter of law. We next turn to
whether the trial court correctly determined that probable cause existed.
In Goode v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 755, 252 S.W. 105, 106 (1923),
the former Court of Appeals stated:
Probable cause, in cases of malicious prosecution, has
been frequently defined by the courts as that which
affords a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong within themselves to
warrant a cautious person in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense of which he is charged.
And it has been held that while mere conjectures and
suspicions will not warrant a prosecution, credible
information received from others might well be enough
to induce such action, although proof that the information
came from an unreliable source would be important in
-3-
showing that the information was such that a reasonable
man would not act on it.
The evidence demonstrated that Chad was told that Jones, Johnson,
and Gutterman attacked him. Ms. Ernspiker was informed from a second source
that Jones, Johnson, and Gutterman attacked Chad. Jones was at the party when
the attack occurred. Jones was friends with Johnson and Gutterman and attended
the party with them. Jones admitted discussing the attack with Gutterman later that
same night where Gutterman admitted attacking Chad with brass knuckles. The
facts are undisputed. We conclude this evidence was sufficient to establish
probable cause.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that there was no probable cause,
the trial court also found that there was no evidence of malice. “[L]ack of probable
cause and improper purpose are separate and distinct elements, separate both as to
their meaning and as to their function; i.e., the role they play in the decisionmaking process.” Prewitt, 777 S.W.2d at 894. While Jones notes that the jury
may infer malice from a lack of probable cause, he points to no affirmative
evidence whatsoever on the element of malice. Rather, the evidence demonstrated
that Ms. Ernspiker and Chad did not know Jones or his family. Ms. Ernspiker
testified that she filed a complaint simply to initiate a police investigation after she
learned from two sources that Jones was involved in the attack on Chad. The lack
of any malicious intent is an independent basis for affirming the directed verdict.
-4-
Next, Jones argues that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay
testimony by allowing testimony regarding anonymous communications. KRE1
801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” The substance of the anonymous communications received by Ms.
Ernspiker and Chad was not introduced to prove that Jones was actually involved
in the attack on Chad. Rather, they were offered to demonstrate the basis upon
which Ms. Ernspiker filed her complaint and the circumstances surrounding her
motive for doing so. The statements were not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted and were, therefore, not impermissible hearsay.
Next, Jones argues that the prejudicial effect of the anonymous
statements outweighs its probative value under KRE 403. Jones has not
demonstrated where this alleged error was preserved in the record. The KRE 403
issue was not raised in his motions in limine to restrict hearsay testimony nor did
the trial court address this issue in its order denying Jones’ motion in limine.
Issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Lawrence v. Risen, 598
S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1980). Therefore, we decline to address this argument.
Finally, Jones argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence
of probable cause which was acquired after Ms. Ernspiker filed her complaint.
Jones cites both the general rule of relevancy and foreign authority in support of
his argument. We disagree.
1
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
-5-
In Mosier v. McFarland, 269 Ky. 214, 106 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1937),
the former Court of Appeals stated that the issue in malicious prosecution cases is
whether probable cause actually existed. (emphasis added). The Court stated that
“it would not make any difference” if evidence regarding probable cause was
obtained after the issuance of the warrant. Id. Thus, the evidence acquired after
the complaint was issued was properly admitted. There was no error.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce A. Brightwell
New Albany, Indiana
Charles H. Cassis
Hans M. Pfaffenberger
Prospect, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.