WILLHITE (JOHNNY) VS. SWEATT (PATRICIA)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 15, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: MAY 21, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001305-MR
JOHNNY WILLHITE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00436
THE CHARLES SWEATT ESTATE,
PATRICIA SWEATT, EXECUTRIX
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
KELLER, JUDGE: Johnny Willhite appeals from the trial court’s judgment that
the Estate of Charles Sweatt (the Estate) retained a quasi-easement of necessity via
a passway known as Sweatt Lane and the court’s determination that Sweatt Lane is
a public passway. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in
part.
FACTS
At the outset, we note that the Estate has not filed a brief in this
matter. Therefore, pursuant to Kentucky Rule[s] of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(8),
we could regard the Estate’s failure to file a brief “as a confession of error and
reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the case.” CR
76.12(8)(c)(iii). However, because we believe the trial court’s judgment is in large
part correct, we will not do so. The facts are essentially undisputed. Charles
Sweatt (Sweatt) owned five contiguous tracts of land (the Sweatt property). The
Sweatt property abutted railroad tracks and property belonging to Southern States
to the south; abutted property owned by Willhite to the west; and abutted property
owned by various others to the north and east. The Sweatt property did not abut
any roadway and, but for easements, was landlocked. Primary access to the Sweatt
property, dating from sometime in the late 1940s or early 1950s, began on Bowling
Green Road, and ran across Southern States’ property and onto the Sweatt
property. The access road, now known as Sweatt Lane, continued over the
southern-most tract (tract one)2 to the northern-most tract (tract two), where
2
We are using the tract numbering system on Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1. We note that there was some
testimony that the tract numbering system was incorrect; however, any discrepancy is not
2
Sweatt’s residence is located. Sweatt Lane, from Bowling Green Road to the
residence, is approximately 7,500 feet long.
In 1988, Sweatt approached Willhite and asked him if he wanted to
purchase tract one and the western-most tract (tract three). We note that both tracts
abutted land already owned by Willhite and that tract one contained approximately
2,200 feet of Sweatt Lane running from the edge of the Southern States property to
the edge of tract two.
Willhite, who operates a junkyard on his property, testified that he
told Sweatt that he was interested in making the purchase, but only if he could
obtain control of and access to Sweatt Lane. According to Willhite, people had
used Sweatt Lane to gain access to his property and to the Southern States
property, stealing from both. Furthermore, Willhite stated that, since the late
1980s, if not earlier, people had used Sweatt Lane to steal anhydrous ammonia
from Southern States and manufactured methamphetamine on or near Sweatt Lane.
Willhite testified that, because he believed that Sweatt had agreed to
sell him control over Sweatt Lane, he purchased the two tracts in September 1988.
The deed from Sweatt to Willhite states that it conveys Sweatt Lane and gives
Willhite an easement across other property out to Stevenson Mill Road. From the
date of sale until his death in 2006, Sweatt continued to use Sweatt Lane to access
his property and assumed sole responsibility for maintenance of most of Sweatt
Lane. Willhite testified that he did some maintenance on approximately 300 feet
relevant to this appeal.
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of Sweatt Lane but admitted that Sweatt performed whatever other maintenance
was required.
Following Sweatt’s death, his heirs decided to sell the property by
auction. Several days before the auction, Willhite placed two disabled vehicles
from his junkyard across Sweatt Lane, blocking access to the Sweatt property. The
Estate was forced to cancel the auction. It then filed suit against Willhite asking
the court to order removal of the vehicles blocking Sweatt Lane and for a judgment
that Sweatt Lane is a passway open to the public.
After conducting limited discovery, the parties tried the matter to the
court. At trial, a surveyor testified that there was evidence that access to the
Sweatt property was available through two old passways. One of the passways ran
from Stevenson Mill Road (the Stevenson Mill passway) to the Sweatt property
and the other ran from Mudd River Church (the Mudd River passway). However,
the surveyor testified that neither of those two had been in use for an extended
period of time, and the only viable access to the Sweatt property was via Sweatt
Lane.
Several of Sweatt’s relatives and one neighbor testified that Sweatt
Lane had been the primary, if not sole access to the property, since the early 1940s.
Furthermore, they testified that Sweatt maintained Sweatt Lane, including a bridge
that crossed Mudd River where it runs between tracts two and one. When asked
about alternative access to the Sweatt property, none of these witnesses knew of
any that did not involve going across neighbors’ fields. On the other hand,
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Willhite testified that he knew of two passways, one of which consisted of a dirt
road and that Sweatt would, on occasion, enter and leave his property by going
across fields or through Willhite’s property rather than using Sweatt Lane.
During a recess, the court, with permission of counsel and the parties,
viewed the property. Following the completion of evidence and a review of
proposed judgments from the parties, the court entered judgment in favor of the
Estate. In its judgment, the court noted that it had
traveled down two different passways to reach the Sweatt
property. One passway was Sweatt Lane, which is
graveled all the way to the Sweatt residence. It may be
traveled by ordinary automobile and has obviously been
used as access within the past few years.
The Mud [sic] River Church passway was gravel most of
the way to a field in sight of the Sweatt residence. It was
very rough and had obviously not been regularly
maintained or used for access on a regular basis for many
years. This judge accessed the Sweat property via this
road only on foot because it was blocked at one point by
an electric wire and a barbed wire gate. There are no
obstructions between the end of this road and the Sweatt
residence, albeit, the pathway is across a field which is
part of the Sweatt estate.
The Court does not find that there was a specific oral
agreement or understanding between Sweatt and Willhite
concerning Willhites [sic] sole control of access of others
to the road. This assertion by Mr. Willhite came into
evidence without objection and was considered without
evaluation under the parol evidence rule.
Willhite’s testimony was confusing and convoluted on
this point. He said that one reason he insisted on
controlling access to the road in 1988 was the rash of
thefts of anhydrous amonia [sic] from Southern States for
use in the manufacture of methamphetamine. He said
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people were utilizing his property to access the Southern
States property. This seems unlikely since the
manufacture of methamphetamine and the accompanying
rash of anhydrous amonia [sic] thefts related to the
manufacture of methamphetamine did not come to
Western Kentucky – and specifically not to this area until
the latter [sic] 1990’s. The circumstantial evidence is
also against this assertion in that the use of the road by
Sweatt did not change after 1988 and he continued to use
it and to maintain it.
As to the Mudd River and Stevenson Road passways, the court stated
that
neither could be used by passenger automobiles without
substantial improvement and it is likely that the legal
right of access over adjoining lands utilizing these
passways no longer exist [sic]. The use of both passways
as access to the Sweatt property likely ended more than
sixty years ago.
Based on the preceding, the court found that the Estate had a quasieasement and
that the roadway known as Sweatt Lane is a legal public
passway from the Sweatt residence to Highway 68/80.
This right of access shall run with the land in perpetuity.
The roadway shall remain open and unobstructed from
the public highway to the Sweatt farm.
It is from this judgment that Willhite appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal presents mixed issues of fact and law. The findings of
fact by the trial court following a bench trial “shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)
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52.01; see also Patmon v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. App. 2009). On the
other hand, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Carroll v.
Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky. App. 2001).
ANALYSIS
Initially, Willhite questions the trial court’s finding that Sweatt Lane
is a “public passway” arguing that the Lane has only been used for private
purposes. We note that Willhite has not cited to any legal authority to support this
argument; therefore, we are not required to address it. See CR 76.12 and Cherry v.
Augustus, 245 S.W.3d 766, 781 (Ky. App. 2006). Nevertheless, we will do so.
In Cole v. Gilvin, 59 S.W.3d 468 (Ky. App. 2001), this Court
addressed whether an adjacent property owner had an easement across a neighbor’s
property. One argument put forth by the party claiming an easement was that the
“passway” was public. In making a determination that the passway was not public,
the Court noted that “[a] roadway may become a public road upon general public
use and control and maintenance by the government for 15 years” or by general
and long continued use by the public. Applying this standard, the Court held that
the fact that some people used the road to access a creek for fishing and
surrounding land for hunting did not constitute sufficient public use to deem the
passway public.
In the case at hand, Sweatt Lane was used as a means of access to the
Sweatt land and residence. There is no evidence that anyone but Sweatt and his
relatives and/or friends used Sweatt Lane for any other purpose. Based on this
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evidence, we hold that the trial court erred when it found that Sweatt Lane was a
“public passway.”
We next address whether the court erred in determining that Sweatt
and the Estate have an easement across tract one via Sweatt Lane.
Willhite argues that the deed is clear and unambiguous in its
conveyance of Sweatt Lane to him and in its absence of language specifically
creating an easement across tract one via Sweatt Lane. The trial court did not find
to the contrary, rather the trial court determined that, despite the language in the
deed, an easement by implication exists. Therefore, the language in the deed is
essentially irrelevant to our analysis.
What is relevant to our analysis is whether the trial court correctly
determined that the Estate has a quasi-easement by implication. As noted by the
trial court, “[g]enerally, an easement may be created by express written grant,
implication, prescription or estoppel.” Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Ky.
App. 2005). In order to prove an easement by implication of law, a party must
show:
(1) that there was a separation of title from common
ownership; (2) that before the separation occurred the use
which gave rise to the easement was so long continued,
obvious, and manifest that it must have been intended to
be permanent; and, (3) that the use of the claimed
easement was highly convenient and beneficial to the
land conveyed.
Cole at 476.
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Factors relevant to establishing a quasi-easement include:
“(1) whether the claimant is the grantor or the grantee of
the dominant tract; (2) the extent of necessity of the
easement to the claimant; (3) whether reciprocal benefits
accrue to both the grantor and grantee; (4) the manner in
which the land was used prior to conveyance; and (5)
whether the prior use was or might have been known to
the parties to the present litigation.”
Id. at 477, quoting Bob’s Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, 569 S.W.2d 715, 719
(Ky. App. 1978).
It is undisputed that the portion of Sweatt Lane running through tract
one was separated from common ownership when Sweatt deeded tracts one and
three to Willhite. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Sweatt and others used Sweatt
Lane for ingress and egress to the Sweatt property from at least the late 1940s and
that Sweatt and/or his relatives maintained Sweatt Lane from sometime in the
1940s until Sweatt’s death. It is also undisputed that Sweatt and/or his relatives
built, replaced, and maintained a bridge where Sweatt Lane crossed the Mudd
River. The trial court visited the Sweatt property and traversed Sweatt Lane and
the Mudd River and Stevenson Mill passways. After doing so, the court found that
[t]he evidence supports the notion that Sweatt Lane is
highly convenient and beneficial to the tract upon which
the Sweatt residence sits. First, Sweatt Lane connects
with Highway 68/80, which is a four-lane highway
allowing travelers passage to destinations such as
Bowling Green, Russellville, and Hopkinsville. Second,
the alternate routes proposed by the Defendant are less
convenient than Sweatt Lane. The Stevenson Mill
passway is a dirt road along side [sic] a field and the
Mudd River Church passway ends before reaching the
Sweatt Residence. Neither could be used by passenger
automobiles without substantial improvement and it is
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likely that the legal right of access over adjoining lands
utilizing these passways no longer exist [sic]. The use of
both passways as access to the Sweatt property likely
ended more than sixty years ago. The Court concludes
that ‘the use of the claimed easement was [and continues
to be] highly convenient and beneficial to the land
conveyed.’
Based on the preceding, and the uncontested facts, it is clear that the trial court
correctly concluded that the Estate met the three criteria necessary to establish an
easement by implication.
As to the factors necessary to establish a quasi-easement, the trial
court determined that the Estate, through Sweatt, was (1) the grantor and could
have specifically reserved an easement in the deed; (2) the only other two access
routes were not practical alternatives to Sweatt Lane, making Sweatt Lane
“reasonably necessary for the use and enjoyment of the Sweatt property and
residence;” (3) there is no reciprocal benefit to Willhite; (4) Sweatt Lane was used
as the primary means of ingress and egress for more than fifty years; and (5)
“Willhite had actual knowledge of the continued use of Sweatt Lane and of the
purpose it served.” Although the Cole Court stated that necessity is the most
important of the above factors, the trial court determined that “[t]he best evidence
of the intent of the parties was their conduct in the years between the conveyance
and Sweatt’s death. Little or nothing changed about the parties [sic] conduct or
about Sweatt Lane after the conveyance to Willhite.” Although not strictly in
keeping with Cole, based on the facts in this case, we cannot disagree with the trial
court that the parties’ conduct following the sale and preceding Sweatt’s death is
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the primary evidence of their intent to create a quasi-easement by implication. We
cannot say that the trial court “was clearly erroneous or abused its discretion,” and,
absent clear error, we may “not substitute [our] opinion for that of the trial court.”
Cole, 59 S.W.3d at 473. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the
Estate has a quasi-easement by implication and that said easement runs with the
land.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment that Sweatt Lane
is a public passway is reversed. However, the court’s judgment that the Estate has
a quasi-easement by implication is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth W. Humphries
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Fred G. Greene
Russellville, Kentucky
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