LAW (ANDRE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001288-MR
ANDRE LAW
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT
2009-SC-000682-DG
v.
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00199
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: This appeal is before us on remand from the Kentucky
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its decision in Jones v.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 295 (Ky. 2010). Upon reconsideration, we reverse
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts underlying this case were stated in our previous opinion as
follows:
On July 26, 2006, Law was indicted in Pulaski Circuit
Court for one count of rape in the third degree and one
count of sodomy in the third degree, both Class D
felonies. These crimes allegedly occurred on May 31,
2006. On March 15, 2007, Law pleaded guilty to both
counts with the Commonwealth’s recommendation for a
total of one year to serve for these crimes. Law was also
subject to a five-year conditional discharge as a sex
offender. Final judgment was entered on May 3, 2007,
and Law was sentenced to one year total to serve with a
conditional discharge of five years. Both Law and the
Commonwealth state that Law was sentenced as a nonviolent offender, however the May 3, 2007, judgment
reflects that he was sentenced as a violent offender.
Law’s conditional discharge period was later amended to
three years pursuant to KRS 532.043.
On May 17, 2007, Law was credited with 323 days
custody as of April 19, 2007, and was released from
custody by way of a serve out on May 26, 2007.
However, the probation department filed an affidavit on
July 23, 2007, indicating that Law had been arrested on
July 11, 2007, on a warrant from Wayne County on two
felony charges (burglary and robbery in the second
degree). Law pleaded guilty to the new charges and
received a five-year sentence. The Pulaski Circuit Court
revoked Law’s conditional discharge on May 15, 2008,
due to his new convictions in Wayne County. The Court
ordered that his sentence for the Wayne County
convictions run consecutively with the remaining time on
his conditional discharge.
In our opinion rendered on September 18, 2009, this Court affirmed the trial
court’s order revoking Law’s conditional discharge pursuant to KRS 532.043(5)
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and KRS 533.040(3) as complying with the requisite ninety-day revocation period.
We reversed the portions of the Pulaski Circuit Court’s order that improperly
reflected time served and listed Law as a violent offender and remanded to the trial
court with instructions to make the changes to its orders in conjunction with our
opinion. Subsequently, on September 23, 2010, our Supreme Court rendered
Jones v. Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 295 (Ky. 2010) and then remanded the
instant case to us for reconsideration in light of its decision in Jones.
In Jones, the Supreme Court held that KRS 532.043(5) violates the
separation of powers doctrine of Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution
by giving the judicial branch, rather than the executive branch, the power to revoke
conditional discharge imposed after a period of incarceration.2 The Court reasoned
that the statute violates the separation of powers doctrine by impermissibly
conferring an executive power to the judiciary. The Court explained that
conditional discharge is similar to parole, where:
[T]he Parole Board (executive branch) sets the conditions
of release, as well as the terms of supervision, after a
prisoner has been sentenced by the court and has begun
servicing his or her sentence. See KRS 439.340. “Parole
recognizes those justifications [for incarceration] existed
at sentencing and there now exists a change of
circumstances or a rehabilitation of a prisoner.” “[T]he
power to grant parole is a purely executive function.”
Upon breach of a condition of parole, the parole officer
seeks revocation, and an administrative hearing is held
before the Parole Board. Appeals are then made to the
2
“Conditional discharge” under KRS 532.043 is a special form of post-sentence conditional
release, which applies only to those convicted of certain sex offenses. It is not to be confused
with conditional discharge under KRS Chapter 533, which is imposed in lieu of incarceration.
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Circuit court, as with other executive, administrative
appeals.
Jones, 319 S.W.3d at 298 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). The Court
reasoned that in the case of conditional discharge, unlike with parole, the Parole
Board or another executive branch is not making the initial decision to revoke the
conditional discharge, but rather the judicial branch is making that decision.
The statute in question in this case, KRS 532.043, also
mixes the roles of the judicial and executive branches of
government. Under KRS 532.043, the General Assembly
added a period of conditional discharge to the sentence of
incarceration of persons convicted of certain offenses.
The three-year (now five-year) period of conditional
discharge is to be served beginning upon the person’s
final release from incarceration or parole. The conditions
and supervision of the felony conditional discharge are
set by the executive branch. Violations, however, are
reported to the judicial branch (the court in the county of
conviction) by the Commonwealth Attorney, for
revocation (as opposed to an appeal of a decision by the
Parole Board). Thus, the statute imposes upon the
judiciary the duty to enforce conditions set by the
executive branch.
Id. at 298-299. (Internal citations and footnotes omitted). Thus, the mixture of the
role of the judiciary and the executive branch is fatal to the statute.
In the instant case, the trial court revoked Law’s conditional discharge
pursuant to KRS 532.043(5), and based on Jones, impermissibly invaded the
province of the executive branch. Accordingly, the trial court’s May 28, 2008,
order revoking conditional release and imposition of sentence is reversed, and this
case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the revocation proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen K. Schmidt
V. Gene Lewter
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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