AULL (DANIEL L.), ET AL. VS. HOUSTON (JOHN T.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 7, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001238-MR
DANIEL L. AULL AND
FRANCES S. AULL, BOTH
INDIVIDUALLY AS THE SURVIVING
PARENTS OF, AND AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES FOR, WILLIAM
DANIEL BLAKE AULL, DECEASED
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-01055
JOHN T. HOUSTON, M.D.; ROBERT
HUXOL, D.O.; AND EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS GROUP, P.S.C.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND CLAYTON, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.580.
ACREE, JUDGE: Appellants seek reversal of the Daviess Circuit Court’s grant of
partial summary judgment relating to certain elements of Appellants’ damages
claim. For the following reasons, we affirm.
This case began as an action both for personal injury and for the
wrongful death of William Blake Aull (Blake) that allegedly resulted from
treatment rendered by Appellees. Blake was born on October 13, 1994. In early
infancy he was alert, responsive, had good head control, vocalized frequently, and
smiled responsively. At around five months Blake’s pediatrician noted twitching
movements on Blake’s left side. Blake was soon referred to a pediatrician and
neurologist at the University of Louisville.
An extensive examination revealed a seizure disorder, significant
muscular hypotonia, regression of his development status and decreased visual
responsiveness. The neurologist concluded that his findings were consistent with
Leigh’s disease and informed Blake’s family that the prognosis was extremely
poor; early onset of the disease is generally associated with death in early
childhood and Blake’s long term survival was unlikely. Worst of all, a definitive
treatment for Leigh’s disease is unavailable. In the following years Blake received
treatment from physicians in multiple states.
On September 8, 2000, Blake began to experience complications after
receiving certain immunizations. A series of emergency room and doctor’s office
visits occurred over the next four days. On September 12, 2000, Blake passed
away at the age of five. The ultimate cause of death was pneumonia and diffuse
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encephalopathy. Appellants brought suit in Daviess Circuit Court to determine
whether Appellees were liable for Blake’s death.
However, liability is not the subject of our review as that issue has not
been determined yet at the trial court. Our only focus is the availability of certain
categories of damages.
Appellants sought recovery of damages for Blake’s pain and suffering
prior to his death, his medical expenses prior to death, his funeral expenses, and his
parents’ loss of Blake’s affection. Appellees did not challenge the legal
availability of these categories of damage. However, they succeeded in obtaining a
partial summary judgment prohibiting Appellants’ recovery of damages for
Blake’s death itself, for Blake’s loss of earnings prior to his death, and for Blake’s
loss of future earning capacity. This appeal followed.2
Our role in reviewing a grant of summary judgment or partial
summary judgment is to determine whether the circuit court correctly found that no
genuine issue exists as to any material facts and whether based on such facts
appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d
779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996). A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
Pinkston v. Audubon Area Cmty. Services, Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky.App.
2006).
2
By order entered June 5, 2008, the Daviess Circuit Court certified for purposes of appeal its
April 23, 2008 order granting the partial summary judgment in favor of Appellees regarding the
legal availability of these categories of damages.
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Dismissing the claim for damages for “Blake’s death,” separate and
apart from the statutory claim for wrongful death pursuant to KRS 411.130, was
proper. Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Ky. 1997)(“Damages in the
wrongful death statute compensate for loss of the deceased’s earning power and do
not include the affliction to the family as a result of the wrongful death.”).
Appellants do not challenge that part of the partial summary judgment.
In fact, Appellants do not challenge the partial summary judgment
even to the extent it relates to their claim for income Blake may have lost prior to
his death. The reason is obvious. Blake was five years old when he died and was
earning no income.
Appellants concentrate their challenge of the partial summary
judgment on its elimination of their claim for the destruction of Blake’s future
earning capacity. Appellants claim the trial court erred by finding that, even when
the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to them, they could not prove
Blake suffered any destruction of earning capacity. The two arguments they
present are: (1) Kentucky law presumes Blake, like every child, possesses the
capacity to earn a living in the future, and (2) the destruction of the power to earn
money should include loss of the decedent’s entitlement to receive state and
federal disability benefits. The first of these arguments is, in essence, an argument
that there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact regarding
Blake’s ability to earn wages. The second presents a legal argument that, for
purposes of determining damages for wrongful death, the receipt of benefits from a
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government entitlement program is the equivalent of earning a wage. For the
following reasons, we do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive.
Citing Turfway Park Racing Ass'n v. Griffin, 834 S.W.2d 667 (Ky.
1992), Appellants first argue that “[t]here is an inference that the child [who dies in
infancy] would have had some earning power[.]” Id. at 671; see also Rice v. Rizk,
453 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Ky. 1970)(“inference that the child would have had some
earning power”). However, this inference was justified in Turfway because
there was no evidence that the decedent was other than a
normal four-year-old boy and certainly no evidence of a
disability so profound as to render him incapable of
earning money upon reaching adulthood.
Id.; see also, George v. Evans, 405 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Ky. 1966)(8-year-old
“deceased was well and healthy and that was sufficient to support the $8,000
verdict”), and Phillips’ Committee v. Ward’s Adm'r, 241 Ky. 25, 43 S.W.2d 331,
335 (1931)(decedent minor was “in good health, and possessed of a substantial
earning power”). In the case before us, Appellants admitted that Blake’s disability
was so profound as to render him incapable of ever earning money by his labor.3
Under such circumstances, the inference that Blake, someday, would have the
ability to “earn” money is simply, and sadly, unreasonable. It was not error for the
trial court to conclude that Blake was unable to earn money “‘by labor, service, or
performance’ or ‘to gain or get [money] in return for one’s labor or service.’”
3
“Blake was unable to walk, talk, feed himself, dress himself, write, bathe himself, brush his
teeth, or tie his shoes. He was not diaper trained, he could not breathe without the assistance of a
trach[eostomy tube], and he was fed through a stomach tube.” Partial Summary Judgment, April
23, 2008, p.3.
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(Order, entered April 23, 2008, page 3, quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 547
(2004)). Therefore, Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the issue,
unless the receipt of the benefits of a government entitlement is the legal
equivalent of earning a wage. This brings us to Appellants’ second argument.
We note first that “[t]he measure of damages in a wrongful death
action in this state is the damage to the estate by the destruction of the decedent’s
power to labor and earn money.” W.L. Harper Company v. Slusher, 469 S.W.2d
955, 959 (Ky. 1971)(emphasis supplied). Appellants admit Blake never possessed
the “power to labor and earn money.” Logically, there can be no recovery for the
destruction of that which never existed. Notwithstanding these facts, Appellants
urge us to find that an entitlement received because of one’s disability is the
equivalent of income earned as a result of one’s labor.
Appellants refer us to Heskamp v. Bradshaw’s Adm'r, 294 Ky. 618,
172 S.W.2d 447 (1943), and Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Young’s Adm'x, 253 S.W.2d
585 (Ky. 1952), to support their position that a jury may consider damages for
wrongful death as including the decedent’s loss of income other than that acquired
by labor, service, or performance. However, these cases predate the clear
articulation of the measure of damages for a wrongful death claim stated in Slusher
that focuses on the destruction of the decedent’s “power to labor.” Additionally, a
closer reading demonstrates that the award of damages in both Heskamp and
Young’s Adm'x replaced income that was earned or would have been earned
through the decedent’s power to labor.
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It is a fact that in Heskamp the jury was allowed to consider as
damages the loss of the decedent’s pension, but the reason given for allowing it
was that “[t]he decedent had earned the pension by his services in the past[.]”
Heskamp, 172 S.W.2d at 451 (emphasis supplied). The pension was not merely a
replacement of income; it was deferred income, previously earned when the
decedent did have the power to labor. Holman v. Holman, 84 S.W.3d 903, 907
(Ky. 2002)(“Pension and retirement benefits . . . constitute deferred compensation
for services rendered”). Blake did not “earn” disability benefits. Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610, 80 S.Ct. 1367 (1960)(Congress did not “engraft upon
the Social Security system a concept of ‘accrued property rights[,]’” nor are these
benefits “earned” in any way.).
Appellants also cite Young’s Adm'x for the proposition that, under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act “the dependents of the deceased are entitled to
recover for the loss of pecuniary benefits which they had a reasonable expectation
of receiving from him had he not been killed.” Young’s Adm'x, 253 S.W.2d at 58889; but see, Roland v. Beckham, 408 S.W.2d 628, 635 (Ky. 1966)(“quantum of
damages recoverable under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act . . . is
substantially different from the measure of damages for wrongful death under KRS
411.130.”). But the “pecuniary benefits” involved in that case were not social
security benefits or even a pension or retirement; they were, instead, the salary the
decedent had earned from his employment “as a laborer in” the railroad’s yards.
Young’s Adm'x at 588. The decedent in Young’s Adm'x was neither disabled nor
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retired but 32 years old and working at the time of his death. Appellants thus read
both Young’s Adm'x and Heskamp too broadly.
Appellants acknowledge that Kentucky case law has yet to directly
address whether a jury should be allowed to consider the potential availability of
social security disability benefits for the purposes of determining lost earning
capacity in a wrongful death action. Indeed, the only guidance in Kentucky
jurisprudence is the absence of the argument in wrongful death cases in which one
would expect to see it asserted and addressed by the court. One such case is Smith
v. McCurdy, 269 S.W.3d 876 (Ky.App. 2008), disc. rev. denied Dec. 10, 2008.
The case involved an elderly woman who, at the time of her death, possessed no
power to earn money because of physical disabilities. Id. The court determined
that the value of that wrongful death claim would be zero because she had no
capacity to earn a wage; i.e., she had no power to labor. Id. at 882. The court did
not mention or consider the decedent’s actual or potential receipt of social security
benefits in making its determination. Id. The Court did, however, reiterate the rule
originally stated in Slusher.
While it appears overly harsh and more than a bit
cold in the case at hand, and for that matter any case
dealing with the death of an individual who no longer has
[or in the case now before the Court, never did have] the
capacity to earn income, under existing Kentucky law
damages for a wrongful death claim are based on the
destruction to the decedent's power to labor and earn
money.
Smith, 269 S.W.3d at 882 (emphasis supplied).
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We are aware that one federal court, applying Kentucky law, recently
addressed “the proper interpretation of the ‘the power to earn money’ standard.”
Meinhart v. Campbell, 2009 WL 4508579 *2, No. Civ.A. 307CV465-H (W.D.Ky.
Dec 01, 2009).4 After considering Kentucky’s wrongful death statute and the
Kentucky cases of Heskamp and Turfway, and certain case law from other
jurisdictions, the federal court “predict[ed] that Kentucky would not exclude Social
Security disability benefits in determining the damages to [the decedent’s] estate.”
Id. at *3 (footnote omitted). We are not bound, however, by the federal court’s
prediction. LKS Pizza, Inc. v. Com. ex rel. Rudolph, 169 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky.App.
2005)(“we are not bound by a federal court’s interpretation of state law”), citing
Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1975). Moreover, we
are persuaded by the sound analysis in the partial summary judgment;
consequently, we hold that the trial court was correct in declining to consider
Blake’s speculative receipt of disability benefits as proof of the destruction of his
power to labor and earn money.
With all due respect to the federal court, Meinhart appears not to have
considered the clear language of Slusher, supra, that juxtaposes the decedent’s
“power to labor” on the one hand and the “earn[ing of] money” on the other in a
4
Meinhart was designated as “unpublished.” However, in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 32.1, “A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated
as “unpublished” ... and (ii) issued . . . after January 1, 1997.” While Kentucky courts are not
bound by FRAP 32.1, the federal judiciary has determined that all of its opinions rendered after
January 1, 1997, have equally persuasive import without regard to their designation as
unpublished. We should take no less a view of those unpublished opinions.
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cause-and-effect relationship. Conversely, the trial court in the case before us did
consider Slusher, albeit indirectly. Relying on Birkenshaw v. Union Light, Heat
and Power Co., 889 S.W.2d 804 (Ky. 1994),5 the trial court concluded that the
measure of damages in this case is “the value of the destruction of the power of the
decedent to earn money.” Birkenshaw, 889 S.W.2d at 806 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The court continued, “One does not earn disability
benefits. Indeed, [the] Court of Appeals stated that the standard is ‘the destruction
of the decedent’s power to labor and earn money.’ Green River Elec. Corp. v.
Nantz, 894 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Ky.App. 1995)(emphasis added).” (Order, entered
April 23, 2008, page 3). Though the trial court quoted only Nantz, the Court of
Appeals was, in fact, quoting Slusher. Nantz, 894 S.W.2d at 646.
The trial court further referenced the dicta first expressed by the
Supreme Court in Turfway, and later repeated in Reffitt v. Hajjar, 892 S.W.2d 599
(Ky.App. 1994), that a claim to recover damages for destruction of the power to
labor and earn money would be defeated by evidence “of a disability so profound
as to render him [the decedent] incapable of earning money upon reaching
adulthood.” Reffitt, 892 S.W.2d at 603 (emphasis in original), quoting Turfway at
671. The case before us is just such a case as was foreshadowed by the dicta of
Turfway and Reffitt. When presented with the precise issue, the trial court here
correctly applied the principle just as the appellate courts had anticipated.
5
The trial court miscites this case as Bradshaw v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., 899 S.W.2d
804 (Ky. 1994).
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Because damages under KRS 411.130 are measured by the loss
resulting from the destruction of the decedent’s power to labor, and because Blake
experienced no destruction of his power to labor at the hands of the Appellees,
Appellants cannot recover damages for the destruction of his power to labor and
earn money under KRS 411.130.
Finally, we address Appellants’ concern that the trial court’s order
appears to “extinguish [all claims] for personal injuries Blake suffered prior to his
death (medical bills, pain and suffering)”. We believe this concern to be
unjustified.
Appellees acknowledge that “no dispositive motions were filed
relating to damages for personal injury.” Furthermore, the trial court granted and
this Court now affirms the “dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for damages arising
from (1) Blake’s death, (2) Blake’s loss of earnings, and (3) the destruction of
Blake’s earning capacity.” (Partial Summary Judgment, April 23, 2008, p.2).
There is nothing in the partial summary judgment that should reasonably lead one
to conclude that Appellants were precluded from pursuing all other claims.
Nevertheless, to eliminate any controversy, we hold that nothing in the record to
date prohibits the Appellants’ continued pursuit of all categories of damages
available pursuant to KRS 411.133 and KRS 411.135, except those damages
specifically addressed in this opinion; i.e., damages for “the affliction to the family
as a result of the wrongful death[,]” Giuliani, supra, Blake’s loss of earnings, and
the destruction of Blake’s power to labor and earn money.
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For the foregoing reasons, the partial summary judgment of the
Daviess Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
David L. Yewell
Owensboro, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, JOHN T.
HOUSTON, M.D.:
Richard P. Schiller
Kimberley S. Naber
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, ROBERT
HUXOL, D.O.:
Craig L. Johnson
Louisville, Kentucky
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