BRYANT (JUSTIN) VS. PRATHER (CLAUDE R.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001096-MR
JUSTIN BRYANT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-012434
HON. CLAUDE R. PRATHER AND
GUARDIACARE SERVICES, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, STUMBO AND WINE, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Justin Bryant appeals an order and opinion of the Jefferson
Circuit Court denying a writ of prohibition against Judge Claude R. Prather of the
Jefferson District Court. Justin sought the writ to prohibit Judge Prather’s
enforcement of two orders requiring him to pay restitution to his mother’s
guardianship account.
Bruce and Paula Bryant were in a motorcycle accident on November
21, 2004. Bruce was killed, and Paula suffered a brain injury which rendered her
unable to manage her own affairs. Justin, Bruce’s and Paula’s son, was named
administrator of Bruce’s estate and Paula’s guardian. In these capacities Justin
recovered insurance proceeds of more than $400,000; however, he deposited the
funds – which he had accumulated on behalf of both his parents separately – into
one account in the name of the Estate of Paula J. Bryant. Justin used the money for
a variety of purposes, all of which he claims were to his mother’s benefit. One
such expenditure was a payment for the legal fees of Charles Friedman. Justin and
Friedman have asserted that Friedman performed services entirely for Paula’s
benefit, but this is disputed.
The district court ordered Justin to provide a full accounting of the
expenditures he made from his mother’s account. The Jefferson County Attorney
and Paula’s Guardian ad litem objected to several of these expenditures, and Justin
was removed as his mother’s guardian and as administrator of his father’s estate.
The district court also ordered Justin to provide a final accounting and appointed
GuardiaCare to serve as Paula’s guardian.
Justin filed a final accounting on May 31, 2006, but the County
Attorney and GuardiaCare objected that there were several expenditures which
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Justin did not adequately demonstrate to be for Paula’s benefit. The expenditure
for Friedman’s legal services was among those contested.
On December 15, 2006, after a series of hearings, orders for a more
complete accounting, and motions to hold Justin in contempt, the district court
ordered Justin to repay $58,152.19 to Paula’s guardianship account. The court
later held Justin in contempt for failure to comply with this order and for failure to
comply with an order that he provide a complete accounting. On March 5, 2007,
the court ordered Friedman to return $25,750 in legal fees to Paula’s account.
Following a contempt hearing, the district court issued another order on June 11,
2007. This order required Justin to repay $8,191.74 in restitution to Paula’s
account and ruled Justin and Friedman jointly and severally liable to repay the
$25,750 in restitution to Paula’s account previously ordered.
Justin and Friedman appealed the district court’s orders to the circuit
court, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing. Justin then petitioned the
Jefferson Circuit Court for a writ prohibiting District Judge Prather from enforcing
his orders of December 15, 2006, and June 11, 2007. Friedman petitioned the
circuit court to prohibit the district judge from enforcing the orders of March 5,
2007, and June 11, 2007. On appeal, the petitioners argued Judge Prather
exceeded the jurisdiction of the district court in ordering them to pay restitution.
The circuit court denied the petition because “Judge Prather’s orders of December
15, 2006 and March 5, 2007, were valid exercises of both his contempt powers and
powers under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 387.520.” The opinion does not
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address the propriety of the June 11, 2007 order. Justin’s appeal to this Court
followed.
At the outset, we are compelled to note that Appellant’s brief does not
direct the Court’s attention to the portions of the record which support his version
of the events he deems significant to this case; nor does his brief cite to portions of
the record which indicate he preserved his arguments before the circuit court. Both
are violations of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12 (4)(c) and subject
him to the sanction of striking the brief. However, in accordance with Elwell v.
Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46 (Ky.App. 1990) this Court routinely declines to impose such
a severe sanction and, instead, reviews under such circumstances for manifest
injustice only. Id. at 47. Because we find manifest injustice here, we reverse.
“A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy.” Ally Cat, LLC v.
Chauvin, 274 S.W.3d 451, 456 (Ky. 2009). It may be granted in two instances:
when a court is acting beyond its jurisdiction and the party has no adequate remedy
via appeal or when “the lower court is about to act incorrectly, although within its
jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise, and great
injustice or irreparable injury will result.” Id. at 457, quoting Hoskins v. Maricle,
150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky.2004). Judge Prather asserts the circuit court was correct in
ruling the district court acted within the jurisdiction conferred by KRS 387.520 and
pursuant to its powers of contempt. Justin argues on appeal that the district court
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering him to pay restitution to his mother’s
guardianship account. We agree with Justin.
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KRS 387.520(1) provides, “[t]he District Courts shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all proceedings involving a determination of partial disability or
disability, the modification of orders, the appointment and removal of guardians
and conservators, and the management and settlement of their accounts.”
However, Lee v. Porter, 598 S.W.2d 465 (Ky.App. 1980) clarifies that KRS
24A.120(1) vests jurisdiction over guardianship matters in the circuit court “in
those situations where mismanagement, fraud, deception or other causes which
required proceedings adversary in nature[.]” Id. at 467.
Judge Prather argues the district court had jurisdiction to order Justin
to return certain funds to the guardianship account, because KRS 387.520(1) grants
district courts exclusive jurisdiction over “the management and settlement” of a
ward’s accounts, and because KRS 387.670(2) enables a district judge to “take
whatever action it considers necessary to enhance the well-being of the ward” upon
review of the guardian’s annual report. According to this analysis, the district
judge’s power to protect the ward gave him the ability to order a former guardian
to pay restitution. While ordering restitution may have resulted from Judge
Prather’s attempt to account for everything in Paula’s estate and manage it
properly, the statutes do not authorize the judge the broad scope of discretion
assumed here under the statute for the protection of the ward. The decision in Lee
makes it clear that a district court’s “exclusive jurisdiction” ends when issues of
mismanagement arise, meaning a district court may not conduct proceedings or
award remedies against a guardian for mismanagement. Lee, 598 S.W.2d at 467.
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We read the charge of KRS 387.679 to “take whatever action (the court) considers
necessary” to authorize a fair amount of discretion, but certainly not exceeding the
district court’s jurisdictional confines as established in Lee.
Judge Prather next argues that, because there was no official charge of
mismanagement of Paula’s funds, the rule articulated in Lee does not apply, and
jurisdiction remained with the district court. Justin asserts the proceedings before
the district court were, in fact, charges of mismanagement of funds, and that
jurisdiction therefore lay with the circuit court.
Again, we agree with Justin. First, the equitable remedy of restitution,
which Justin was ordered to pay, is one typical remedy for the mismanagement of
funds, especially applicable, as here, when the guardian is alleged to have used
funds of the ward to satisfy his own financial obligations.1 However, “district
courts are prohibited from entertaining ‘matters of equity.’” Kelley v. Nationwide
Auto Restoration, LLC, 246 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Ky.App. 2007); KRS 24A.120
(“District Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in . . . Civil cases in which the
amount in controversy does not exceed four thousand dollars ($4,000), exclusive of
interest and costs, except . . . matters of equity”; emphasis supplied). So, in
1
See Kentucky Hosp. Ass’n Trust v. Chicago Ins. Co., 978 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky.App. 1998) in
which this Court said:
In equity, a court may give restitution to a plaintiff to prevent the
unjust enrichment of the defendant where the plaintiff has used its
property in discharging an obligation. The doctrine of subrogation
includes every instance in which one person not acting voluntarily,
has paid a debt for which another was primarily liable and which in
equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the
latter. [citations omitted].
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ordering Justin to pay restitution without the formal commencement of
mismanagement proceedings, Judge Prather effected an equitable remedy for
mismanagement without giving Justin the procedural and jurisdictional protections
of a trial before the circuit court. Judge Prather acted outside the district court’s
jurisdiction in doing so.
Furthermore, the proceedings were clearly adversarial in nature. The
orders now at issue represent the culmination of several months of the Jefferson
County Attorney and GuardiaCare’s pursuit of Justin – via evidentiary hearings,
motions for contempt, and oral arguments at which both parties were present and
advocating opposing positions – to recover funds for Paula’s guardianship account.
This is precisely the type of controversy intended by the legislature to be resolved
in the circuit court pursuant to its jurisdiction.
The circuit court’s order and the Commonwealth’s brief also assert
that the district court’s orders were permissible because they were issued pursuant
the district court’s powers of contempt. However, this position mischaracterizes
the judge’s orders.2 From what we can ascertain from the record, it appears the
2
The record before us consists almost entirely of the record before the Jefferson Circuit Court.
The only orders from the district court are the order of December 15, 2006, and June 11, 2007,
ordering Justin to repay certain amounts to Paula’s guardianship account. There is no order
holding Justin in contempt, and only a brief reference to a finding of contempt in the Circuit
Court’s order denying the writ of prohibition. If the district court issued a contempt order, it is
not now before us.
While the brief submitted by the Attorney General on behalf of Judge Prather does refer
to a series of audio discs from the district court proceedings, these references, with one
exception, do not direct us to a specific time stamp on those discs. This makes it difficult to
locate the portion of the proceedings which he alleges support the judge’s version of the course
of events before the district court. We are not compelled to listen to any disc in its entirety to
locate proceedings which may support the appellee’s position. At any rate, none of these
references appear to direct our attention to any orders of contempt, written or verbal, issued by
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district judge held Justin in contempt for violating an order that he provide a
complete final accounting; any accompanying sanctions or terms of Justin’s
contempt are unclear from the record. However, the orders Justin requests the
district court be prohibited from enforcing are apparently not contempt sanctions –
they simply order restitution without explaining why. There is no indication from
the language of the orders that they have anything to do with contempt. Violating
those orders may lead to a charge of contempt, but the orders in themselves do not
place Justin in contempt, nor were they issued as the result of contempt
proceedings. It appears the orders at issue were not the result of the district court’s
exercise of its contempt powers.
The first element for granting a writ of prohibition has been
demonstrated. By ordering Justin to pay restitution, the district court was acting
outside its jurisdiction. This constitutes manifest injustice.
The second element for granting a writ of prohibition is a
demonstration that the petitioner has no available remedy through an application to
an intermediate court. Ally Cat, LLC, 274 S.W.3d at 457. Justin has already been
denied review of the district court order by the circuit court. The circuit court
denied his appeal because he lacked standing. This leaves Justin without any
means to contest the district court’s orders affecting him. The second requirement
has therefore been met. The circuit court should have issued a writ of prohibition
under these circumstances.
Judge Prather.
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Because the district court exceeded its jurisdiction and because Justin
has no recourse on direct appeal, we reverse the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order
denying Justin’s petition for writ of prohibition and remand for entry of an order
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul Hibberd
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Tad Thomas
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
John Morgan McGarvey
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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