WAGNER (JOHN G.) VS. WILSON (EDWARD A.), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: DECEMBER 17, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000955-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001033-MR
JOHN G. WAGNER, REVOCABLE
LIVING TRUST
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
ON REMAND FROM THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT
2009-SC-000529-D
v.
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00070
EDWARD A. WILSON; THERESA T.
WILSON; STEVEN J. BROWNING;
NANCY L. BROWNING; AND
SPRINGFIELD STATE BANK
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: This Court had previously rendered an
Opinion affirming in this case. See Wagner v. Wilson, 2009 WL 2192673 (Ky.
App.)(rendered July 24, 2009). The case is now before us after the Kentucky
Supreme Court granted discretionary review and remanded it to us for our
reconsideration in light of Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2010). Having
reconsidered our first opinion, we again affirm.
The case involves a boundary dispute over a 22.3-acre tract of land in
Marion County that is within the boundary of property described in each deed to
adjacent farms. One of the farms is referred to as the “Jacobs farm,” owned by the
John G. Wagner Revocable Living Trust (Wagner), and the other farm is referred
to as the “Wilson/Browning farm,” owned by Edward A. Wilson, Theresa T.
Wilson, Steven J. Browning, and Nancy L. Browning (Wilson/Browning).
The Jacobs farm and the Wilson/Browning farm were originally part
of a larger tract. When the two farms were separated many years ago, the 22.3acre tract in dispute became part of the Jacobs farm. Alfred and Pearl Jacobs
acquired that farm in 1970, and the Wilson/Browning owners acquired their farm
in 1988. When the Wilson/Browning owners acquired their farm, a registered
surveyor surveyed the property prior to the closing of the sale. The survey and
recorded plat incorrectly showed the 22.3-acre tract as a part of that farm. Thus,
the Wilson/Browning owners’ deed also included the disputed property.
Jacobs had his farm surveyed in 2000 and sold it in three tracts.
Although the 22.3-acre tract was part of the Jacobs farm, it was not included as
-2-
such in the survey. Rather, that survey also showed the tract as part of the
Wilson/Browning farm. Thus, although Jacobs thought he had sold the entire
farm, he had not sold the 22.3-acre tract.
Wagner bought one of the tracts sold by Jacobs and soon thereafter
suspected that the 22.3-acre tract was within the property deeded to Jacobs in 1970.
After purchasing one of the tracts, Wagner states that he obtained an option to
purchase the 22.3-acre tract from Jacobs. He further states that he exercised the
option in 2003 and purchased the tract from Jacobs at that time. There is also
evidence that in January 2005 Wagner purchased an assignment of interest to
prosecute a claim to quiet title to the tract from Jacobs.
In February 2005, Wagner filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
in the Marion Circuit Court. Therein, he asserted ownership to the property and
sought to quiet title. Wilson/Browning filed an answer denying that Wagner
owned the property, asserting their ownership under their deed, and raising the
defenses of adverse possession and champerty.
A jury trial was held in February 2008, and the jury returned a verdict
determining that the 22.3-acre tract was within the boundary of the property
described in the deed to the Jacobs farm but also determining that
Wilson/Browning owned the tract by adverse possession. Wagner appealed, and
Wilson/Browning cross-appealed. We affirmed, but as noted above, the Kentucky
Supreme Court granted discretionary review and remanded the case for our
-3-
reconsideration in light of the Moore case, which was decided subsequent to the
rendering of our opinion.
In our opinion we noted the conflicting evidence presented at the trial,
some of which related to a fence. Alfred Jacobs testified that he had built a fence
shortly after purchasing his farm for the purpose of containing his cattle. Jacobs
stated that the fence was not intended to represent a boundary fence. On the other
hand, Lloyd “Butch” Hiestand, who along with his brother had been a tenant
farmer for prior owners of the Wilson/Browning farm, testified that he and others
had built the fence in 1955 or 1956 for the purpose of marking the boundary
between the two farms. Hiestand also testified that when Jacobs purchased the
farm in 1970, he (Hiestand) had taken Jacobs to the fence and told him that the
fence represented the boundary between the farms. He stated that he told Jacobs
this pursuant to instructions from the owner of the Wilson/Browning farm.
While Wagner and Jacobs testified that they never saw anyone use the
property, David and Jerry Jacobs, sons of Alfred Jacobs, testified that they had
hunted on the disputed property while it was owned by their father. Edward
Wilson, his two sons, and Steven Browning testified that they had used the
property for hunting, four-wheeling, horseback riding, and logging multiple times
from 1988 until the present time. They also stated that they had placed a tree stand
on the property for hunting purposes. Additionally, their testimony indicated that
the fence in question was connected to other fences bordering the
Wilson/Browning property. Furthermore, Wilson/Browning paid property taxes on
-4-
property that included the tract and posted a no trespassing sign on the property,
and their cattle occasionally wandered onto the tract.
In his appeal to this Court, Wagner asserted that the trial court erred
by not granting him a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the
verdict was palpably against the evidence. Wagner argued that there was
insufficient evidence that Wilson/Browning’s possession of the disputed property
was continuous, open, notorious, and exclusive for the required 15-year period
prior to the filing of the declaratory judgment action.
In our opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment, we noted that a
question of fact is to be considered by the jury where there is conflicting evidence.
See Dunn v. Jones, 330 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Ky. 1960). We also cited Lewis v,
Bledsoe Min. Co., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Ky. 1990), wherein the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that a reviewing court is not “at liberty to determine credibility
or the weight which should be given to the evidence, these functions being
reserved to the jury.”
In Radioshack Corp. v. ComSmart, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 256 (Ky. App.
2007), we set forth the standard of review of the denial of a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict:
When this Court reviews a trial court’s decision to deny a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we
apply the same standard of review that we use when
reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny a motion for a
directed verdict. Prichard v. Bank Josephine, 723
S.W.2d 883, 885 (Ky.App. 1987). When a trial court
considers a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
-5-
verdict, it must view the evidence in a light that is most
favorable to the opposing party and give every fair and
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the
evidence. Taylor v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415, 416
(Ky.App. 1985). Furthermore, the trial court may only
grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict where “there
is a complete absence of proof on a material issue in the
action, or if no disputed issue of fact exists upon which
reasonable men could differ.” Id.
Radioshack Corp. at 261.
Ultimately, we concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that the property was adversely possessed by Wilson/Browning
for the requisite 15-year period and that the trial court properly denied Wagner’s
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We now review our opinion in
light of the Moore case.
In the Moore case the petitioners filed a petition to quiet title based on
their alleged adverse possession of a tract of wild, unimproved land. The
petitioners presented evidence that they had used the property for the requisite 15year period by hunting, fishing, biking, and riding four-wheelers on the property,
as well as by building deer and turkey blinds, occasionally clearing undergrowth
that obstructed shooting, and expelling uninvited hunters from the property. Id. at
76. The petitioners also testified that they had marked the eastern boundary line of
the property by tying engineering tape to trees that grew along it and had posted
“no trespassing” signs on some of those trees. Id. at 75.
The jury in the Moore case found that the petitioners had adversely
possessed the property for the required period of time and awarded it to them. The
-6-
trial court, however, overturned the verdict by granting the respondents a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court reasoned that the petitioners had failed
to prove that they had marked any boundary lines except the eastern one and also
noted that there was no adverse possession by the mere marking of a boundary line
without actual possession of the land in question. The Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court and held that the petitioners had sufficiently proved that they had
well-defined boundary lines and had also proved that they had reduced the
disputed property to actual possession. In connection with its ruling that the
petitioners had proved actual possession, the Court of Appeals also held that the
Recreational Use Statute (KRS 410.190) did not operate retroactively and,
therefore, was not applicable to the facts of the case.
On discretionary review to the Kentucky Supreme Court, however,
the Court in Moore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s
award of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 83. The Court began by
describing the elements of adverse possession through the language of the Court in
Young v. Pace, 145 Ky. 405, 140 S.W. 555 (1911). In the Young case the Court
held
In order to support a title by adverse holding, three facts
must be established: First, the possession must have
been continuous, actual, open, notorious and peaceable
for at least fifteen years; second, the exterior boundary
lines of the land must be well defined, i.e., either actually
enclosed or so marked that the land is susceptible of
being identified by its description; and third, the
possession must have been of such a character and extent
-7-
as to exclude the idea that the right to possession was in
anyone else.
Id.
In regard to the use of the land, the Court in Moore began its analysis
as follows:
The Virginia courts, whose early exposition of the
common law provided the starting point for our own
common law tradition, Ky. Const. § 233, have long held
that “wild and uncultivated land cannot be made the
subject of adverse possession while it remains completely
in a state of nature; a change in its condition to some
extent is essential.” Calhoun v. Woods, 246 Va. 41, 431
S.E.2d 285, 287 (1993) (citing Craig-Giles Iron Co. v.
Wickline, 126 Va. 223, 101 S.E. 225, 229 (1919). This
rule is consistent with our own requirement that adverse
possession be evidenced by substantial activity on the
land; sporadic uses, such as those indicated above, do not
suffice. Kentucky Women’s Christian Temperance
Union v. Thomas, supra; Phillips v. Akers, 103 S.W.3d
705 (Ky.App. 2002). The rule is also consistent with the
presumption that the sporadic use of wild lands is
permissive. Bradley v. City of Harrodsburg, 277 Ky.
254, 126 S.W.2d 141 (1939).
Id. at 79.
The Court further stated
Petitioner’s use of the disputed property for hunting,
fishing, and other recreation and their one-time removal
of timber are indistinguishable from those other uses
which have been held not to establish “actual”
possession. Their use has in no way altered the condition
of the property. It remains today the wild, unimproved
land it has long been. Indeed, with the possible
exception of unusual circumstances not present here, the
mere recreational use of property has as its aim the
enjoyment of the land as it naturally is, and thus by its
nature, recreational use will be sporadic and
-8-
insubstantial. Under our law, such use has never sufficed
to establish an adverse possession.
Id.
Additionally, the Court stated
Recreational uses, which do not alter the character of the
land and so leave the owner’s potential uses undisturbed,
do not suffice. Otherwise, if merely posting the land and
hiking or hunting on it were enough to establish adverse
possession, the law would in effect be putting the
trespasser on the same footing with the rightful owner of
record.
Id. (citation omitted).
The Moore Court summarized its holding by stating that “[m]ere
recreational use in sum, does not amount to ‘actual’ possession for adverse
possession purposes, and therefore such use does not set running the KRS 413.010
limitations period.” Id. at 80.
The Court also addressed the Recreational Use Statute. Id. at 80-81.
That statute states in part that “[n]o action for the recovery of real property,
including establishment of prescriptive easement, right-of-way, or adverse
possession, may be brought by any person whose claim is based on use solely for
recreational purposes.” KRS 411.190(8). The statute further states that
“Recreational purpose”
includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or
any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming,
boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, bicycling,
horseback riding, pleasure driving, nature study, waterskiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical,
archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites[.]
-9-
KRS 411.190(1)(c). The Court held that although there was no case law
specifically addressing the type of use the petitioners made of the disputed
property, such use “is an incidental use of land and it is indistinguishable from
other specific uses we have held to be incidental.” Id. at 81. Further, the Court
stated that the petitioners’ use of the property was within the Recreational Use
Statute, which merely codified common law and did not alter common law in any
way. Id. The Court also held, contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, that
the Recreational Use Statute “does not implicate the rule against retroactive
legislation[.]” Id.
Having decided the issue of “actual” possession against the
petitioners, the Moore Court determined that it would only briefly mention the
marked boundary line issue. Id. at 76. In doing so, the Court noted that it had
already decided the case on other grounds. Id. at 81. In addressing whether the
petitioners had sufficiently proved a well-defined and marked boundary line, the
Court held that proof that the northern and southern boundary lines had been
clearly marked for the entire limitations period was lacking. Id. at 82.
Applying the principles set forth in the Moore case to the facts in this
case is not an easy task. Wilson/Browning have testified that they used the
property for purposes of hunting, four-wheeling, horseback riding, and logging
multiple times from 1988 until the present. Under Moore and the Recreational Use
Statue, these are mere recreational uses of the property that do not establish the
-10-
element of “actual” possession of the property. Id. at 79. Also, the ranging of
cattle on the disputed property does not constitute actual possession of it. Id. at 78.
In addition, “[t]he surveying and marking of a boundary, the payment of taxes, and
occasional entries for the purpose of cutting timber are not sufficient to constitute
adverse possession.” Flinn v. Blakeman, 254 Ky. 416, 71 S.W.2d 961, 974 (1934)
(quoting from Griffith Lumber Company v. Kirk, 228 Ky. 310, 14 S.W.2d 1075
(1929) (overruled on other grounds by Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Ward, 286 Ky.
73, 149 S.W.2d 705 (1940)).
While such use of the property by Wilson/Browning does not
constitute sufficient evidence to prove the element of actual possession, they
maintain that the fact that the property was enclosed by a fence is sufficient
evidence and that such fact distinguishes this case from the Moore case.
Wagner has questioned Wilson/Browning’s assertion that the fence
enclosed the disputed property. We have reviewed the trial record, particularly the
portions cited to us in Wilson/Browning’s reply brief that it filed prior to our initial
opinion.
The trial testimony indicated that the fence was a barbed-wire fence
consisting of two strands of barbed wire. The fence went through a wooded area
the length of the disputed property. Further, the testimony of Butch Heistand was
that the fence started at the end of an older woven-wire fence and went “almost all
the way around the property.” Thomas Heistand, Butch Heistand’s brother who
was also present when the fence was built in the mid-1950s, testified that the fence
-11-
was a mile to a mile and a half in length and that it had no breaks in it. Butch
Heistand also testified that some of the property had already been fenced by other
adjoining owners and that those portions were not again fenced. We conclude,
based on the trial record, that the fence enclosed the property.
In City of Hartford v. Nall, 144 Ky. 259, 137 S.W. 1090, 1091 (1911),
Kentucky’s highest court held that
While it is true that the character of a person’s holding of
land may be shown to be amicable, we conclude that,
where the person holding has actually inclosed the land,
and is using and occupying it as his own, these facts in
and of themselves are sufficient, in the absence of
evidence tending to show the contrary, to establish an
adverse holding on his part.
Wilson/Browning cite Johnson v. Kirk, 648 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. App.
1983), and Newman v. Sharp, 248 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1952), in support of their
argument. In the Johnson case the court held that the party who had enclosed the
disputed property by a fence and had used it as its own for the requisite period of
time owned the disputed property by adverse possession even though it had no
intention of claiming anyone else’s property. Id. at 880. The court stated:
Although the Kirks did not intend to put their fence on
someone else’s property, they, in fact, did. They put the
fence on a line formed by some stakes and held out to all
the world that the property so enclosed was theirs. It
should have been apparent to the most casual observer,
and particularly to the Johnsons and their predecessor in
title, that the Kirks were claiming the fenced-in property
as their own.
Id. at 879.
-12-
In the Newman case the court stated:
Land claimed to a well-defined boundary such as a fence,
as in this case, if the possession thereof is open,
notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of 15
years or more, such possession is sufficient to sustain the
claim of title by adverse possession.
Id. at 415 (quoting Lewallen v. Mays, 265 Ky. 1, 95 S.W.2d 1125, 1129 (1936)).
The Newman court held that the trial court erred by not ruling as a matter of law
that the property enclosed was owned by the appellant by adverse possession up to
the fence. Id.
Years ago, in the case of Richie v. Owsley, 137 Ky. 63, 121 S.W. 1015
(1909), Kentucky’s highest court held:
An actual possession of land in this state may be
acquired, either by a physical inclosure of the whole
boundary, or by an inclosure of a part of the boundary
under a claim of title to the whole, if no one else is
asserting title to any part of the boundary upon which he
has so entered. If he enters under a paper title, the paper
may be looked to as showing the extent of his claim and
possession; or, if he enter without a paper, but claiming
to a marked boundary, that fact may be shown as
indicating the extent of his possession. But there are
certain limitations upon the rule just announced. If the
entrant goes upon a boundary under a junior patent,
which latter is entirely or partly within a senior grant or
survey, he will be deemed to be in actual possession of
only so much of the land as he actually incloses, if the
owner of the senior grant is then in the actual possession
of his boundary; or, if the owner of the senior grant be
not in actual possession of the boundary in his grant, but
enters thereon before the patentee of the junior grant has
ripened a title by adverse possession, the latter will ipso
facto be restricted to his actual close. Rulings of this
court to the above effect are so numerous and consistent
that it is not thought necessary to cite the cases here.
-13-
Id. at 1016-17.
More recently, in Phillips v. Akers, 103 S.W.3d 705 (Ky. App. 2002),
this Court held that “(a)bsent proof that the possessor made physical improvements
to the property, such as fences or buildings, there must be proof of substantial, and
not sporadic, activity by the possessor.” Id. at 708. And, in Kentucky Women’s
Christian Temperance Union v. Thomas, 412 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1967), Kentucky’s
highest court held:
Notoriety, exclusiveness and continuity of possession are
often evidenced by the erection of physical
improvements on the property, such as fences, houses or
other structures. We have none of those here. In their
absence, substantial activity on the land is required.
Id. at 870.
Based on the above authorities, we conclude that the evidence
supported the jury verdict and that the facts in this case are distinguishable from
those in the Moore case. While there was no evidence of a fence enclosure in
Moore, there was such evidence here.
The above authorities lead us to conclude that although the activities
of the Wilson/Browning owners were insufficient by themselves to support a
finding of adverse possession, the fence enclosure was sufficient to satisfy the
element of “actual” possession in the adverse possession claim
Therefore, having considered our original opinion in light of Moore v.
Stills, we again affirm the judgment of the Marion Circuit Court.
-14-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
Bryan E. Bennett
David A. Nunery
Campbellsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLANTS EDWARD A.
WILSON; THERESA T. WILSON;
STEVEN J. BROWNING; AND
NANCY L. BROWNING:
John F. Carroll
Louisville, Kentucky
-15-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.