HOBBS CORBIN (JUDITH ANN) VS. CORBIN (JERRY PLATO)
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000939-MR
&
NO. 2008-CA-001007-MR
JUDITH ANN HOBBS CORBIN
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00173
JERRY PLATO CORBIN
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant and Cross-Appellee, Judith Ann Hobbs
Corbin, appeals the findings of fact within the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage
entered by the Adair Circuit Court on April 24, 2008. The Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, Jerry Plato Corbin, also appeals. Both parties agree that the antenuptial
agreement was valid and enforceable, but dispute the court’s division of assets.
After a thorough review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the
applicable law, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further
proceedings.
The Corbins married in 1992 and separated in 2005. During the
marriage, the parties acquired various martial assets, and both had acquired
significant assets prior to the marriage. The parties entered into an antenuptial
agreement on June 24, 1992, attached to which were exhibits listing the respective
property of each. The signatures of both parties appear on the agreement.
In his arguments to the court below, Jerry asserted that the agreement
was invalid, because he was not aware that he was signing an antenuptial
agreement. Rather, Jerry asserted that at the time of signing, he believed the
document to be a will. Nevertheless, Jerry agreed that the assets disclosed were, in
fact, a true accounting of his assets prior to the marriage. The court below found
no evidence of record to indicate that Jerry did not freely and voluntarily sign the
agreement. Further, the trial court found it to be conscionable and enforceable. In
his brief to this Court, Jerry concedes that this finding was supported by substantial
evidence.
At the time the parties entered into the marriage, each had a separate
bank account. Jerry had an account with the Communicating Arts Credit Union
(CACU), and asserts that shortly after the marriage Judith set up a CACU account
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in her name and transferred into it the money from her previous non-marital
account. The parties also had various other accounts during their marriage, most of
which were held jointly, and included a third CACU account, and an account at
First National Bank in Columbia. Jerry contends that at some point in the
marriage, Judith’s name was added to his pre-marital CACU account, although his
name was not added to hers. The parties concede that in August 2004, Judith’s
name was removed from Jerry’s account. Jerry asserts that the parties primarily
lived form money in his account, although marital money was also deposited into
Judith’s account during the marriage.1
In addition to the aforementioned accounts, both parties also owned
real estate at the time they were married. Judith owned a house and three
apartments, while Jerry owned a duplex. All of these properties were sold during
the marriage. Below, Judith asserted that she deposited the money from the sale of
her apartments and one of her houses into the CACU account, although Jerry
asserts that the bank records fail to indicate this. Jerry asserts that he took
$10,000.00 from the sale of his non-marital duplex and used it for a down payment
on one of the pieces of marital real estate known as the “Knifely Farm”. Judith
apparently also inherited a piece of property from her mother, which she sold
during the marriage. Below, Judith testified that she initially put the proceeds into
a safe deposit box, later placing some in the bank, and using other portions for
various purposes.
1
Jerry asserts that specifically, the proceeds from the sale of two parcels of marital real estate
were placed in the account, as well as numerous small deposits each month.
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During the course of the marriage, the parties also purchased four
parcels of marital real estate, only one of which they still owned at the time of the
divorce. Testimony was provided below as to the amounts of the sales, and the
manner in which the monies were deposited afterwards. In addition to these
properties, the parties also held retirement accounts in their own names, as well as
various items of marital personal property. As noted, on April 24, 2008, the trial
court entered a decree dissolving the marriage, and dividing the assets of the party
accordingly. It is from that decree that both parties now appeal to this Court.
In reviewing this matter, we note that the test to determine whether an
antenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable is three-fold. First, the court must
determine whether the agreement was obtained through fraud, duress, mistake, or
through misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts. Secondly, the court
must determine whether or not the agreement was unconscionable. Finally, it must
determine whether the facts and circumstances since the time of the agreement
have changed so as to render enforcement of the agreement unfair or unreasonable.
See Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990). If the agreement is valid, our
courts certainly recognize the right of parties to enter into antenuptial agreements
which provide for a different division of property than that set forth in KRS
403.190. Id.
With respect to the disposition of marital and non-marital property,
we note that absent provisions otherwise in an agreement of the parties, our courts
are guided by KRS 403.190. This statute provides that the trial court shall divide
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the marital property without regard to marital misconduct, and in just proportions,
considering all relevant factors. As we have previously held in Wood v. Wood, 720
S.W.2d 934 (Ky.App. 1986), this does not require equal division, but instead,
division which is in “just proportions.” The manner in which marital property is
divided and valued is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be
reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See Cochran v. Cochran, 746 S.W.2d
568 (Ky.App. 1988). We review this matter with these standards in mind.
On appeal, Judith now argues to this Court that the court below was
correct in finding that the antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable.
Nevertheless, she now argues, first, that the lower court incorrectly ignored
undisputed testimony and exhibits in dividing the martial and non-marital assets of
the parties. Specifically, Judith argues that while the court correctly designated her
Communicating Arts Credit Union account as non-marital property2, it committed
error in failing to award her various items of real and personal property which were
purchased with funds from that account, including a timeshare in Pigeon Forge,
Tennessee, to which Judith Corbin holds the title, and for which she paid all
expenses, as well as a Massey-Ferguson tractor, a bushhog, a boom, a trailer, two
wave-runners, and a 1957 Studebaker.3
2
It is undisputed that prior to the marriage between the Corbins, Judith was a widow. While
Jerry states that Judith created this account shortly after their marriage, Judith states that upon the
passing of her former husband, she deposited funds in this account which were maintained
separate and apart from any funds acquired during her marriage to Jerry Corbin.
3
With respect to the timeshare, our review of the record indicates that the trial court found the
time share to be the non-marital property of Judith. Therefore, we consider the allegations
otherwise in her brief to be a factual error, and we will not address that issue further herein.
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In making this argument, Judith acknowledges that KRS 403.190 is
dispositive of the determination of marital and non-marital property. She
nevertheless states that according to subsection three of that provision, the
“presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was
acquired by subsection (2) of this section.” As Judith correctly notes, KRS
403.190(2) provides that excepted from marital property is all property acquired
after the marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, including the income derived
therefrom. Judith asserts that she met her burden in proving that the
aforementioned items were acquired solely with her non-marital funds.
In response, Jerry argues first, that the mere fact that Judith may have
purchased these items with funds from her CACU account does not automatically
make the items non-marital. Jerry asserts that the record clearly indicates that
marital funds were placed into this account and co-mingled with non-marital funds,
including, by Judith’s own concession, the proceeds from the sale of two parcels of
marital real estate. Thus, Jerry argues that as Judith has failed to trace any assets
which she had before the marriage into these items of personal property, she has
failed in her burden of proving the items to be non-marital.
Secondly, Jerry argues that the antenuptial agreement specifically
provides that:
The parties shall equitably divide all items of tangible
personal property acquired subsequent to the date of the
marriage, and in the event the parties fail to agree on any
item or items constituting tangible personal property, said
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items shall be sold and the net proceeds shall be divided
equally between the parties.
Jerry argues that as all items to which Judith claims to be entitled are personal
property, and therefore they are, marital property as set forth in the agreement and
subject to equal division.
In reviewing this matter, we find no error by the trial court. Our
review of the agreement between the parties indicates that they clearly, knowingly,
and voluntarily committed to equally divide any items of personal property which
remained in dispute. The trial court did so, and we find no error accordingly.
However, even if this were not so, our law is clear that when nonmarital property is no longer held by parties at the time of dissolution, it is the
burden of the party claiming the non-marital interest to trace the previously owned
property into an existing asset. See Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 266 (Ky.
2004). We have previously held in Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Ky.App.
2004), a claimant cannot meet the tracing requirement simply by showing that he
or she brought non-marital property into the marriage, without also showing that he
or she has spent those non-marital assets in a traceable manner during the
marriage. Our review of the record does not indicate that Judith met her burden of
tracing the purchases of these items. Accordingly, we believe the court below was
well within its discretion in its division of these assets.
As her second basis for appeal, Judith argues that the lower court
failed to properly allocate funds which she believes were due to her based on
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fraudulent activities committed by Jerry. Specifically, Judith states that in
Paragraph 26 of its findings, the lower court determined Jerry’s sale of cattle, a
marital asset of the couple, to be fraudulent, insofar as he failed to divide the
proceeds with Judith. Accordingly, the court awarded Judith the sum of $6,500,
representing her share of the asset.
Nevertheless, Judith now argues that the lower court failed to award
sums of money which she requested on account of similar activities in which Jerry
allegedly engaged. More specifically, Judith asserts that following their
separation, Jerry sold many other marital assets4, and also leased their jointly
owned farm. Judith asserts that the sale of these assets produced proceeds of
$11,650.00, of which she received only $500.00. Further, she asserts that Jerry
leased the farm in 2006, for $2,500.00. Finally, Judith asserts that Jerry
fraudulently attempted to keep Judith’s personal property from her rightful
possession. Judith values those items at $2,000.00. Accordingly, she asserts that
in addition to the $6,500.00 which the lower court previously awarded, she should
also be awarded the additional sum of $8,500.00.
In response, Jerry states that there is no evidence in the record to
enable the trial court to make a factual determination as to when the items were
sold, under what circumstances, whether or not they were marital property, or any
other pertinent fact. Jerry does concede that the $2,500.00 year lease payment was
4
These assets included a three-car carrier, a 1995 Dodge flat-bed truck, a 1994 Cougar, a 1987
Ford motor home, a 1994 Altima, a 1992 Oldsmobile, a Honda Civic, 50 rolls of hay, and a
mower.
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placed in his personal account, but notes that the court similarly allowed Judith to
keep cash placed in her account. Moreover, Jerry asserts that Judith did not raise
this issue to the court below. Accordingly, Jerry asserts that the trial court’s
refusal to award money to Judith for these items was within its discretion, and
should be affirmed.
The manner in which marital property is divided and valued is within
the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous. See Cochran v. Cochran, 746 S.W.2d 568 (Ky.App. 1988).
Certainly, in asserting entitlement to the proceeds from the sale of these various
assets, the burden lies with Judith to establish when they were sold, under what
circumstances they were sold, and where the proceeds were ultimately distributed.
The evidence presented on these issues below was for the trial court to review.
Our review of the record reveals that based upon the facts before it, the trial court
was within its discretion to rule as it did, and reveals no evidence which would
lead us to believe that the trial court acted erroneously in the manner in which it
divided this property. Accordingly, we affirm.
As her final basis of appeal, Judith argues that the lower court failed
to divide the retirement accounts of the parties in accordance with applicable law.
The court below ordered that each party keep their retirement account as separate
property.5 Judith now argues that this is contrary to both the antenuptial agreement
5
In its order, the court set forth Jerry Corbin’s retirement account as “American Funds IRA and
Cincinnati Enquirer 401K” at a total value of $8,700.00, and Judith’s account as “Square D
IRA”, valued at $3,095.73.
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and the law. Judith states that after her marriage to Jerry in 1992, she did not work
outside the home, although he continued to do so until his retirement in 2001. She
further states that during the time that Jerry continued to work, the parties
continued to fund his retirement accounts with earned marital income. Thus, she
submits that the parties should each receive the non-marital portion of their
retirement accounts, with the remaining marital portion to be divided between
them.
In support of that argument, Judith cites our decision in Vanover-May
v. Marsh, 793 S.W.2d 852 (Ky.App. 1990), in which we addressed a similar
situation, wherein a husband’s retirement account was earned in part prior to the
marriage, and in part after the marriage. Our Court determined that the wife was
entitled to a marital share of that portion which was earned during the marriage.
Judith also relies upon KRS 403.1906 in support of her arguments in this regard.
In response, Jerry asserts that in making her arguments, Judith ignores
the antenuptial agreement itself, which states:
It is expressly understood by the parties that any real
estate or intangible personal property acquired by either
party subsequent to the date of the marriage shall be the
sole property of the party who holds legal title in any
such real estate so acquired, or the party in whose name
any intangible personal property is held, free and clear of
all claims whatsoever from the opposite party.
6
This provision provides that, “All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and
before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title
is held individually or by the spouse in some form of co-ownership.”
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Jerry asserts that the retirement account is clearly intangible personal property,
which was held solely in his name, and which therefore is clearly governed by this
portion of the antenuptial agreement.
It is the law of this Commonwealth that any increase during the
marriage in the value of a retirement account is subject to division as marital
property, to the extent that such increase was from contributions made during the
marriage. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 34 S.W.3d 83 (Ky.App. 2000). However,
we are in agreement that the antenuptial agreement, into which Judith entered
voluntarily, and which she herself argues is valid and enforceable, controls. Our
review of the agreement reveals that it is clear and unequivocal with respect to the
disposition of intangible personal property. Having so found, we affirm the trial
court on this issue.
Having addressed the issues raised on appeal by Judith, we now turn
to the issues raised by Jerry on cross-appeal. As his first basis for cross-appeal,
while conceding that the antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, Jerry
nevertheless argues that the trial court erred in awarding Judith any portion of the
bank account in his name, and in awarding Judith a portion of the proceeds from
the aforementioned sale of cattle jointly owned by the parties.
With respect to his bank account, Jerry argues that the trial court
misunderstood the testimony with respect to the account, which he testified
belonged to him long before the parties were married. Jerry notes that during the
marriage, Judith’s name was placed on the account, but was later removed from the
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account in August of 2004, when, at Jerry’s request, Judith signed a document
requesting the bank to do so. Jerry acknowledges that approximately two weeks
later, a total of $13,000.00 was deposited in that account from two separate sales of
cattle.
A review of the order issued by the trial court reveals that it found that
the account was a “joint account” prior to the parties separation, and that
accordingly, it should be divided equally among the parties. Further, it found that
Jerry removed Judith from the account “without her permission,” which the court
described as “fraudulent behavior”. Accordingly, the court found that the proceeds
from the sale of the cattle, which had been deposited into the account, should be
divided equally amongst the parties, with Judith to receive $6,500.00.
Jerry now argues that the court’s order results in a double recovery for
Judith, by awarding her half of the value of the account, and then separately
awarding her half of the proceeds themselves. Upon review, we are compelled to
agree. In issuing its decision on this issue, we believe the trial court made a simple
factual error in concluding that Judith had not provided permission for her name to
be removed from the account. Indeed, our review of Judith’s deposition reveals
the following testimony:
Q: Did you subsequently learn that Mr. Corbin had
removed your name from that account?
A: He removed it in 2004.
Q: So you found out –
A: August.
Q: -- that your name was taken off of that account?
A: He requested that I sign a paper to take my name off.
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Q: And did you do that?
A: Yes, I did.
See August 16, 2007 Deposition of Judith Ann Hobbs
Corbin, p. 20.
Having reviewed Judith’s testimony in this regard, we simply cannot conclude that
Jerry removed her name without her permission, or that he did so fraudulently.
Further, our review of the agreement reveals that it clearly provides that each party
is entitled to personal, real, and “all other” forms of property which he or she
owned prior to the marriage. It is undisputed that Jerry owned this account prior to
the marriage. It is undisputed that at the time of dissolution, his was the sole name
on the account. As we have stated, it is our belief that Judith voluntarily and
willingly removed her name from the account. Accordingly, just as we have
concurred with the trial court’s determination that Judith be entitled to all monies
in the account held solely in her name, we believe Jerry to be entitled to all monies
in the account held solely in his name.
Having so found, we reverse the trial court’s award of $6,500 to
Judith for the sale of cattle owned by the parties. While it is clear that the cattle
were in fact marital property, we find this situation to be no different than other
instances during the marriage in which marital property was sold, and the proceeds
deposited into Judith’s account.7 Clearly, the sale of the cattle took place well
before the separation of the parties. Accordingly, our law is clear that a party
seeking to recover for marital assets which were sold or disposed of during the
7
See specifically, our discussion of the division of proceeds from the sale of the Harrison House
and Glens Fork properties, infra.
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marriage must prove a dissipation of those assets. As we have set forth in Brosick
v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498 (Ky.App. 1998), this would require that the money was
expended for a non-marital purpose, that it was done in anticipation of divorce, and
that it was done for the purpose of depriving the other party of his or her interest.
Our review of the record reveals that none of these facts were proven
by Judith, and further, she makes no response to Jerry’s arguments in this regard.
Having so found, we cannot find that in selling the cattle and depositing the
proceeds into his account, that Jerry intended to dissipate marital assets anymore
than Judith intended to do when she took similar actions with respect to other items
of marital property. As the account was clearly in Jerry’s name at the time of
dissolution, and as Judith willingly agreed to allow the account to be held solely in
Jerry’s name, we cannot find that she is now entitled to remove monies from that
account on the basis of the sale of the cattle. Accordingly, we hereby reverse the
trial court’s order in this regard.
As his second basis for cross-appeal, Jerry argues that the trial court
erred in failing to restore his $10,000.00 non-marital down payment toward the
Knifely Farm, which was the marital residence of the couple. Jerry testified that
the Knifely Farm has been sold and the net proceeds are in escrow. Further, he
argues that it is undisputed that he made a $10,000.00 down payment on this
property, consisting of non-marital funds coming directly from the sale of his
duplex. Below, Judith confirmed that Jerry made the $10,000.00 down payment,
and testified that she did not know where the funds came from. The trial court
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ordered the proceeds from the sale of the farm to be divided equally between the
parties. Jerry now asserts that this was error, and that he should be awarded his
$10,000.00 non-marital interest prior to the balance being divided as marital
property.
Our review of the record reveals that Jerry indeed testified that the
$10,000 deposit which he placed on the Knifely Farm property came from the sale
of his non-marital duplex. Further, the record reveals that Judith conceded that
Jerry made such a down-payment. While she was unaware as to where the funds
for that down-payment originated, Judith did not dispute, and certainly did not
rebut Jerry’s assertion that they came from the sale of his non-marital property.
Accordingly, we believe Jerry to have sufficiently traced the origin of these funds
in accordance with KRS 403.190. Therefore, we believe he should have been
awarded this sum prior to the division of the proceeds from the sale of the
property. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order in this regard, and direct
that Jerry be awarded his $10,000 non-marital interest prior to the balance being
divided as marital property.
As his final basis for cross-appeal, Jerry asserts that the trial court
erred in allowing Judith to benefit from the sale of two pieces of marital real estate,
namely, the “Harrison House”, with net proceeds of $97,000.00, and the “Glens
Fork” property for $52,500.00. Jerry asserts that the proceeds from the sale of
these two properties were placed in Judith’s personal account, without regard to the
non-marital investments of the properties. Specifically, Jerry states that Judith
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claims a $30,000 non-marital down payment on the Harrison House, and that he
made an $8,000 non-marital contribution, from the sale of his duplex, for concrete
and excavation work on the Glens Fork property. Jerry asserts that undisputed
testimony establishes that the money for the Harrison House was paid by a check
made out to both parties, which was initially deposited in a joint account, and
subsequently transferred to Judith’s account without Jerry’s knowledge.
Accordingly, Jerry now argues that the trial court’s award of these
monies solely to Judith should be reversed. Specifically, he asserts that Judith
should receive her $30,000 down payment on the Harrison House property, that he
should receive his $8,000 non-marital contribution to the Glens Fork property, and
that the remainder of $111,500 should be divided equally between the parties.
Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we simply cannot agree.
Without dispute, both the Harrison House and the Glens Fork real
estate were marital property. However, in contrast to the argument he made with
respect to the cattle, namely, that he was entitled to the proceeds as they were
placed in his account, Jerry now argues that Judith should not be entitled to
proceeds from the sale of marital property which were placed in her account.
Respectfully, this Court is of the opinion that the parties cannot have it both ways.
While Jerry asserts that Judith transferred these proceeds fraudulently,
our review of the record does not reveal any substantial evidence to establish in
support of his argument. As we have noted previously herein, the manner in which
marital property is divided and valued is within the sound discretion of the trial
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court, and will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See Cochran v.
Cochran, 746 S.W.2d 568 (Ky.App. 1988). Our review of the record indicates that
the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and division of the assets in this
instance was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm this point.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand to the court below for: (1) reversal of its previous order dividing
Jerry’s CACU jointly between the parties, and for entry of a new order awarding
the monies in that account solely to Jerry, (2) for reversal of its previous order
awarding Judith $6,500 for the sale of the aforementioned cattle (3) for entry of an
order awarding Jerry $10,000 for his non-marital share of the Knifely Farm and
dividing the remainder of the balance equally between the parties, and lastly, for
any other additional proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSS
APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS
APPELLANT:
Stephen W. Cessna
London, Kentucky
James I. Howard
Edmonton, Kentucky
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