CRANE (PATSY J.) VS. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2010: 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000890-MR
PATSY J. CRANE, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF BOBBY CRANE,
DECEASED
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00502
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Patsy J. Crane, Administratrix of the Estate of Bobby
Crane, appeals from an order of the McCracken Circuit Court denying her motion
to amend the complaint and dismissing with prejudice the original complaint
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
against Illinois Central Railroad (ICRR), alleging exposure to asbestos and
asbestos containing products during the course of Bobby Crane’s employment with
ICRR. Because the circuit court properly found that the motion to amend the
complaint was precluded by the three-year statute of limitations of the Federal
Employers Liability Act (FELA) and that the complaint was properly dismissed for
failure to prosecute, we affirm.
On May 25, 1999, Bobby Crane filed his complaint against ICRR
asserting his claim under the FELA, 45 U.S.C. §51 et. seq., and, in August of that
same year, amended his complaint to include a claim under the Locomotive Boiler
Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. §20701 et. seq., alleging his injury as “lung disease.”
ICRR timely filed answers to both the original and amended complaints denying
the allegations and asserting numerous affirmative defenses.
Seventeen months later, ICRR filed a motion to compel discovery.
Crane responded by requesting additional time to respond to ICRR’s discovery
requests propounded on August 4, 1999. Although the trial court ordered Crane to
respond to discovery requests by January 31, 2001, Crane delayed his response an
additional ten months after that date.
No further action was taken until May 21, 2004, when Crane filed a
“Motion to set in a Trial Group before a Jury” pursuant to the “McCracken
County’s Master Order Regarding Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation.” On June
3, 2004, an agreed order was entered setting Crane’s case and six other cases for
trial on November 7, 2005. However, the cases were to be tried separately.
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Additionally, the trial court’s order warned that “[a] failure by a party to comply
with the above deadline or in complying with the requirements of the Master Order
may subject the non-complying party to sanctions which the court may deem
appropriate under the circumstances including, but not limited to, the sanctions
outlined in CR 37.”
Following the warning, the case remained inactive until April 22,
2005, when ICRR filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The trial court
denied the motion and scheduled a status conference on June 21, 2005, for the
entire trial group, including Crane’s claim.
Approximately six years after filing his original complaint, on
October 4, 2005, Crane filed a motion to file an amended complaint alleging that
third parties caused Crane to be exposed to cylinders containing radioactive
material which resulted in lung and liver cancer. He also moved to continue the
trial. His motions were denied on October 13, 2005, and a final pretrial conference
was scheduled for November 1, 2005. Prior to the pretrial conference, Crane died
and the case was continued.
Nothing further occurred until October 5, 2006, when a motion was
filed to revive the action in favor of Patsy Crane, administratix of Crane’s estate,
which was granted on November 1, 2006. The case was again dormant until
December 10, 2007, when the estate filed a motion to file a second amended
complaint which sought to assert a new cause of action against ICRR alleging
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exposure to radiation resulting in lung cancer and to name a new party, Paducah &
Louisville Railway.
ICRR objected arguing that the amendment should be denied because
it was precluded by the three-year discovery rule applicable to a FELA claim and,
therefore, the filing was futile, untimely, and prejudicial. It also filed a motion to
dismiss the original action for lack of prosecution. The estate responded that the
proposed amendment was filed within the statute of limitations because the
radiation claim did not accrue until December 9, 2004.
At the hearing on the motions, the trial court’s attention was directed
to Crane’s deposition. Crane testified that he knew he had lung cancer in
November 2004, and that it might have been caused by his employment at ICRR.
ICRR further pointed out that in Crane’s motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint on October 4, 2005, Crane alleged that in November 2004, he learned
that he had lung cancer caused by exposure to radioactive materials while
employed by ICRR. Additionally, Crane was diagnosed with stage IV cancer in
November 2004.
Following the hearing, the circuit court concluded that because the
estate did not submit any affirmative evidence that in November 2004, Crane was
unaware of his cancer and its cause, the second amended complaint was barred by
the three-year statute of limitations. It further held that the failure to amend the
complaint in a timely manner and the delay clearly prejudiced ICRR’s ability to
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defend the claim. Finally, pursuant to CR 41.02, the circuit court dismissed the
complaint.
We first address the timeliness of the amended complaint. Under
FELA, an action must be commenced “within three years from the day the cause of
action accrued.” 45 U.S.C. §56. A cause of action accrues under the Act “when a
plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of both the
injury and its cause.” Lipsteuer v. CSX Transp. Inc., 37 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Ky.
2000). To commence the running of the statute of limitations under FELA, a
plaintiff does not need to be certain of the cause of his injury but only needs to
know or have reason to know of a potential cause. “Actual knowledge by the
plaintiff of causation is not necessary to a finding that a cause of action has
accrued.” Fries v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092,
1096 (Wis. 1990). Generally, the issue of when the cause of action accrues is a
question of fact for the jury. Lipsteuer, 37 S.W.3d at 732. However, in this case,
Crane failed to present any affirmative evidence that there was a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. Therefore, his motion to amend the complaint was properly
denied.
Crane admitted in his deposition that he was aware that he had cancer
and that the potential cause was his exposure to radioactivity at ICRR. He
testified:
Q.
Has anybody told you that you were exposed to
any radioactivity material while working at Illinois
Central?
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Well, I have got cancer of the lung and my doctor
said that caused that.
What caused that?
The radioactive.
***
What doctor told you that this was related to this
radioactive material?
Harry Carloss.
***
Was November 2004 the first time he [Dr. Carloss]
diagnosed you with this cancer?
Yeah.
Additionally, on October 4, 2005, Crane filed a motion to file a second amended
complaint and expressly alleged that in November 2004, he learned that he had
lung and liver cancer caused by radioactive materials.
Despite Crane’s admissions, the estate argued to the circuit court that
Crane knew that he had lung cancer in November 2004, and that he did not know
its cause. However, the estate offered no affirmative evidence to refute the facts in
the record.
Because there was no issue of material fact, the motion to amend the
complaint was properly denied.
Our discussion now turns to the appropriateness of the dismissal of
the action pursuant to CR 41.02(1). “The power of dismissal for want of
prosecution is an inherent power in the courts and necessary to preserve the
judicial process.” Nall v. Woolfolk, 451 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ky.App. 1970). It is a
matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and reversal of its
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determination is warranted only where that discretion has been abused. Thompson
v. Kentucky Power Co., 551 S.W.2d 815 (Ky.App. 1977).
Since its rendition, Ward v. Hausman, 809 S.W.2d at 717 (Ky.App.
1991), has been the pivotal case applicable to CR 41.02 motions for dismissal. In
Ward, the court enunciated factors to be considered when deciding the motion,
including:
1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility;
2) the history of dilatoriness;
3) whether the attorney's conduct was willful and in bad
faith;
4) meritoriousness of the claim;
5) prejudice to the other party; and
6) alternative sanctions.
Id. at 719.
Recently, in Jaroszewski v. Flege, 297 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2009), our
Supreme Court reaffirmed that dismissals cannot be based on a single dilatory act
and clarified that although the Ward factors are helpful guidelines, ultimately the
court’s decision must be based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 33.
In this case, the circuit court considered the Ward factors and made
specific findings in regard to each factor and considered the totality of the
circumstances. It recognized that although the case involved complex legal issues,
the estate or its counsel had over nine years to develop the cause of action, yet,
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failed to advance the case. The estate’s repeated delays and failure to take steps to
prepare for trial left the circuit court with no viable alternative but dismissal.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action.
The orders denying the motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint and granting ICRR’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John O. Hollon
Alva A. Hollon, Jr.
Jacksonville, Florida
L. Miller Grumley
Jonathan Freed
Paducah, Kentucky
James W. Owens
Paducah, Kentucky
Thomas R. Peters
Mark R. Kurz
David B. Schneidewind
Belleville, Illinois
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