HENSLEY (LEON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000831-MR
LEON HENSLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00112
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Leon Hensley, pro se, appeals from an order of the Adair
Circuit Court entered on March 13, 2008, denying his motion to vacate, set aside or
correct his sentence pursuant to RCr2 11.42. The court’s order specified Hensley’s
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the alleged involuntariness of his
guilty plea were refuted by the record and, therefore, no evidentiary hearing was
necessary. On appeal, Hensley urges us to remand the matter to the trial court for
an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the record, the briefs and the law, we
affirm.
Hensley was charged with sixty-one sexual offenses.3 The
Commonwealth offered to dismiss one-half of the sodomy, sexual abuse and incest
charges and recommend a twenty-year sentence on the remaining charges with
parole eligibility after service of eight and one-half years. Hensley accepted the
Commonwealth’s offer and filed a motion to enter guilty plea consistent with
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
The trial court questioned Hensley orally about his desire to enter a
guilty plea. Hensley confirmed during the plea colloquy, among other things, that
he understood what he was doing; he had had all the time needed to speak with his
attorney and discuss potential defenses; he was satisfied with the legal services
provided by his attorney and had no complaints about her performance; he had no
questions about the documents he had signed because his attorney had explained
them to him; he understood the charges lodged against him as well as the
Commonwealth’s burden and the evidence needed to convict him; he understood
the rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea and understood he could still go
3
The indictment alleged twenty-four counts of both sodomy in the first degree (KRS 510.070)
and sexual abuse in the first degree (KRS 510.110), twelve counts of incest (KRS 530.020), and
a single count of criminal attempt to commit rape in the first degree (KRS 506.010 and 510.040).
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forward with trial if he so desired; and he was pleading guilty because he was
guilty and he made no claim of innocence.
After exploring the matter with Hensley, the court questioned defense
counsel, who said she had been “extremely careful” in this case and Hensley’s
guilty plea was consistent with the advice she had given to him. She also
confirmed there were no questions about any matter and no additional time was
needed to discuss the situation with her client. Thereafter, Hensley’s guilty plea
was accepted and entered by the trial court, and he was sentenced in conformity
with the Commonwealth’s recommendation.
On January 9, 2008, Hensley filed a motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to RCr 11.42 with supporting memoranda. He also requested
appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. Hensley alleged counsel was
ineffective because she did not fully inform him of the facts and elements of the
crimes, she did not investigate the case or interview any witnesses, and she did not
arrange for a defense expert at the competency hearing held March 24, 2005.
Additionally, he claimed the trial court failed to establish a factual basis for the
guilty plea prior to accepting it. The Commonwealth filed a written response
stating Hensley’s motion did not comply with RCr 11.42 because it contained only
conclusory allegations without factual support and the claims were refuted by the
record. The trial court denied the motion to vacate without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
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Hensley’s goal on appeal is to have us remand the matter to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing. Our review of the denial of an RCr 11.42 is
limited to whether the allegations contained in the motion, if true, would invalidate
his conviction and whether the grounds were conclusively refuted by the record.
Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967). If the record refutes
the allegations, no hearing is required. Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d
153, 154 (Ky. App. 1985).
RCr 11.42(2) requires that the motion “state specifically the grounds
on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies
in support of such grounds. Failure to comply with this section shall warrant a
summary dismissal of the motion.” See Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878,
889 (Ky. 2000). Hensley has offered no factual support for his claims. Therefore,
summary dismissal was warranted under the rule.4
We will comment briefly on Hensley’s allegations on appeal. First,
he claims his attorney gave him bad advice during the plea negotiations. This
allegation is advanced for the first time on appeal. We are a court of review.
Because Hensley did not raise this issue in the RCr 11.42 motion, we will not
review the claim on appeal. Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222
(Ky. 1976) (defendant not allowed to “feed one can of worms to the trial judge and
another to the appellate court.”).
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We reject Hensley’s assertion that the Commonwealth convinced the trial court to apply an
erroneous standard in denying the requested relief.
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Second, Hensley claims his attorney failed to properly advise him
concerning the law and the facts of his case. Such a claim is inconsistent with the
motion to enter guilty plea bearing his signature as well as the verbal responses he
gave to the court during the guilty plea colloquy. During his colloquy, Hensley
specified that he had no complaints about his attorney’s performance and stated
that he had no questions because his attorney had answered all his questions.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Hensley
must demonstrate two things—that counsel’s errors were so serious her
performance did not constitute professionally competent assistance; and without
counsel’s deficient performance, he probably would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); cf.,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763
(1970); Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986). Hensley has presented no facts from
which a court could deem counsel’s performance to be deficient. He has made
only blanket allegations without specifying any action that counsel failed to take or
explaining how it would have changed the outcome. Furthermore, he has not
alleged he would have gone forward with trial had his attorney given him better
advice. Based upon the record, and the lack of any factual support for Hensley’s
claims, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for RCr
11.42 relief.
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Third, Hensley alleges his attorney inadequately investigated his case.
Again, this claim contradicts his statements to the trial court, both verbally and in
writing, when he said he believed his attorney was fully informed about his case
and he had no complaints about her performance. In the RCr 11.42 motion,
Hensley claimed that had his lawyer interviewed witnesses (unnamed), she would
have learned the Commonwealth’s case was based on “allegations by teenage,
female victims with no scintilia (sic) of evidence; and discovered that one victim
(the seventeen (17) yearold (sic) at time of trial), had in fact accused others of
similar allegations, only later to recant her story.” That a witness has recanted
prior testimony is relevant to judging credibility, but it would not result in an
automatic dismissal of charges or an acquittal. Furthermore, the Commonwealth
dismissed one-half of the charges. From the appellate record, we cannot determine
whether the dismissed charges pertained to the victim who had allegedly recanted
testimony regarding a different defendant. Again, Hensley has not demonstrated
that more investigation by his attorney would have changed the result. Thus, relief
was properly denied by the trial court.
Fourth, Hensley claims his attorney failed to obtain a defense expert
and adequately prepare for his competency hearing. KRS 504.100(1) authorizes a
trial court, with reasonable grounds to believe a defendant is incompetent to stand
trial, to appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine, treat and report on the
accused’s mental condition. See also RCr 8.06. Defense counsel moved for
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Hensley to be evaluated for mental health issues as well as competency. As a
result, the court ordered Hensley to be evaluated.
Dr. Timothy S. Allen with the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric
Center was the sole witness at the competency hearing convened by the trial court.
According to his written report, in relevant part, “Hensley was a man of average
intelligence with no indications of organic brain impairment, memory problems,
thought disorder, or psychotic thinking. The M-FAST suggested he was
exaggerating his psychiatric symptomatology.” Dr. Allen concluded Hensley was
capable of appreciating the nature and consequences of the legal proceeding
against him and could participate rationally in his defense.
Dr. Allen’s evaluation resulted from a court order. He was beholden
to neither the Commonwealth nor the defense. As explained in Bishop v. Caudill,
118 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003):
A competency examiner is working for the court, not
necessarily the defense or the Commonwealth. Binion v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 383 (1995).
Thereafter, [KRS 504.100] requires an evidentiary
hearing at which all parties—the court, the defendant,
and the prosecution—are entitled to examine the
evaluator and the basis of the report. Gabbard v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 887 S.W.2d 547 (1994). However,
nothing in the language of the statute or criminal rules
authorizes an independent evaluation by the
Commonwealth.
Since the Commonwealth is not authorized to seek an independent competency
evaluation, it stands to reason the defense must operate under the same limitation.
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Furthermore, Hensley has not demonstrated errors in Dr. Allen’s conclusions, nor
has he shown a second evaluation would have provided a basis for a finding of
incompetency.
Following a thorough review of the record, we have determined that
all of Hensley’s claims are refuted by the record and therefore no evidentiary
hearing was required. Further, due to Hensley’s failure to provide any factual
support for his assertions, summary dismissal of the motion to vacate was
appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Adair Circuit Court
denying RCr 11.42 relief without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Leon Hensley, pro se
Sandy Hook, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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