HAMLIN (ROBERT), ET AL. VS. DANVILLE-BOYLE COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT , ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000603-MR
ROBERT HAMLIN and
MARY HAMLIN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00526
DANVILLE-BOYLE COUNTY
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT;
DANVILLE-BOYLE COUNTY
PLANNING AND ZONING
COMMISSION;
MARION “PETE” COYLE;
PAULA BARY;
VIRGIE JOHNSON; VICKEY GOODE;
JERRY ROGERS;
SHIRLEY ROGERS;
WOODY LEAVELL;
WINCE ROGERS; OPAL ROGERS;
DONALD GRUBBS;
JIMMY CLOYD; LINDA CLOYD;
MIKE COCANOUGHER;
STEPHANIE COCANOUGHER;
and LONNIE BARNETT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXION AND MOORE, JUDGES; KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MOORE, JUDGE: This case involves two separate orders and a convoluted
procedural history, but in essence involves the resolution of only one question: are
the appellants, Robert and Mary Hamlin, precluded from litigating the issue of
whether they have a right to maintain a junkyard on their property?2 The Boyle
Circuit Court held that they are so precluded and that an injunction forcing them to
remove over fifty vehicles from their property was proper. We affirm its decision.
The procedural history of this case and the Hamlins’ method of
litigating it3 are more confusing than the issue actually involved; as mentioned
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute(s)
(KRS) 21.580.
2
The Hamlins’ prehearing statement before this Court provides that the issue presented on
appeal is “whether the appellants are precluded from litigating their status as a non-conforming
user under the applicable statues [sic],” and that this appeal will turn on interpretation or
application of “KRS 100 et seq.”
3
In their brief before this Court, the Hamlins also offer the argument that their junkyard actually
does qualify as a nonconforming use, pursuant to KRS 100.253(3), and contend that the circuit
court erred in failing to recognize this. Further, they allege that the circuit court could not have
reviewed the administrative record because the plastic wrapping covering the record appears to
remain intact.
We do not review either of these arguments because the Hamlins failed to include them
in their prehearing statement. See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.03(8). Even if we
were to ignore CR 76.03(8) regarding this latter argument, however, it remains meritless. The
record was never sealed in such a manner so as to make it evident that it was never reviewed.
Rather, the plastic wrapping can be removed and replaced (as this Court accomplished) without
disturbing the condition of the plastic material. The plastic material, once replaced around the
record, easily clings to it. But, more importantly is the fact that the circuit court included in its
opinion references to the evidence contained in that record to support the Board’s decision. In
short, there is no reason whatsoever to impugn the integrity of the circuit court on this issue.
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above, it involves an appeal of two orders: one rendered December 17, 2004, and
another rendered October 19, 2006. To avoid confusion, we separately analyze
these orders; the facts of this case will be developed within the contexts of these
separate analyses.
I. THE DECEMBER 17, 2004 CEASE AND DESIST ORDER
A. Relevant facts leading up to the order
Robert and Mary Hamlin own two adjoining tracts of farmland on
Stewart’s Lane in Boyle County, Kentucky, zoned as agricultural/residential.
Robert stores inoperable vehicles, junk equipment, building materials and other
items on these tracts; he claims he began this practice on one tract as early as 1987
and on the other sometime after 1995. The zoning ordinance of Boyle County
defines Robert’s use of his property as a “junkyard.” Consequently, this is not in
conformity with an agricultural/residential use.
On July 9, 2004, the Compliance Administrator for the Planning and
Zoning Commissioner sent a letter to Robert, stating
[a] recent site visit to your property has revealed well
over 50 vehicles, of varying types and uses located
throughout the property. The Zoning Ordinance allows
for up to three (3) inoperable and/or unlicensed vehicles
per location. More than three (3) inoperable and/or
unlicensed vehicles would constitute a junkyard by
definition within the Zoning Ordinance.
The letter further advised Robert that if he wished to continue using his property in
that manner, he would need to apply for a conditional use permit. Robert Hamlin
received this letter but ignored it. When the Compliance Administrator followed
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up his letter with a personal visit on July 16, 2004, Robert claims he told him that
he thought that his use of his property, as a junkyard, had been “grandfathered in.”
In a December 17, 2004 letter addressed only to Robert, the
Compliance Administrator stated in relevant part:
Consider this letter a Cease & Desist Order for the
removal of the 50+ vehicles from your property located
on Stewarts Lane. Five months has [sic] passed since our
initial meeting regarding the complaint on file in our
office regarding this issue. No action of any kind has
been taken on your part to resolve this Ordinance
violation as of this date.
You are hereby ordered to effect removal of the vehicles
no later than Jan 16, 2005. Failure to adhere to this order
may result in further action by the Danville-Boyle
County Planning Commission in the filing of a criminal
complaint in Boyle District Court. Violations of the
provisions of the ordinance or failure to comply with any
of its requirements shall constitute a misdemeanor as per
Section 3.7 of the Zoning Ordinance and shall upon
conviction thereof be fined not less than $100 but no
more than $500 for each conviction. Each day of the
violation shall constitute a separate offense.
B. Relevant facts subsequent to the order
Robert claims he never received the December 17, 2004 cease and
desist order. However, on June 25, 2005, Robert was personally served with a
criminal summons from the Boyle District Court. The summons alleged that
Robert had violated the Boyle County zoning ordinance by maintaining a junkyard
on his property without either obtaining a conditional use permit or registering his
junkyard with the planning and zoning commission as a nonconforming use. The
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summons cited the December 17, 2004 cease and desist order and its January 16,
2005 deadline.
Additionally, on September 21, 2006, in a hearing before the
Danville-Boyle County Board of Adjustment on the unrelated subject of Robert
and Mary Hamlin’s application for a conditional use permit, a copy of the
December 17, 2004 cease and desist order was entered into evidence as an exhibit.
The Hamlins and their attorney were also informed at that hearing that the
December 17, 2004 cease and desist order had never been administratively
appealed. To date, Robert and Mary have never administratively appealed this
order.
On November 17, 2006, the Hamlins petitioned the Boyle Circuit
Court for a declaration of rights regarding the December 17, 2004 cease and desist
order. They asked the circuit court to hold, as a matter of law, that their appellate
rights relating to that order never ripened because the notice they received did not
comport with the minimum requirements of due process as stated in Godman v.
City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362 (Ky. App. 2007). The circuit court dismissed
the Hamlins’ petition, holding that their window for an administrative appeal of the
December 17, 2004 order had expired and that it was final as a consequence.
C. Analysis: Whether the Hamlins have a right to appeal the December 17,
2004 order
Regarding the statutory time period for an administrative appeal in
this context, KRS 100.261 provides that, upon receipt of actual notice, “any
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person, or entity[,] claiming to be injuriously affected or aggrieved by an official
action, order, requirement, interpretation, grant, refusal, or decision of any zoning
enforcement officer” shall take an appeal to the Board within thirty days thereafter.
In Taylor v. Duke, 896 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. App. 1995), we interpreted this statute to
mean that where a party had not received written notice of an adverse decision or
the opportunity to participate in a hearing, it had thirty days after it received actual
notice of the Board’s action to appeal the decision, irrespective of the date the
order was actually entered.
Here, the latest the Hamlins could have become apprised of this order
was September 21, 2006, when it was introduced as an exhibit at the hearing
regarding the Hamlins’ application for a conditional use permit. As stated above,
the Hamlins have, to date, taken no such appeal. Nonetheless, the Hamlins
contend that this thirty-day appellate period does not apply to them even if they did
have actual notice of the Compliance Administrator’s action prior to the expiration
of any thirty-day period. In support, they cite to Godman, supra, and its holding
that appellate rights relating to this kind of action do not ripen unless the notice of
that action comports with the minimum requirements of due process. We disagree
with their interpretation of Godman.
Godman states that minimum due process requires that the notice an
appellant must receive of an administrative agency’s action must 1) set out the
reasons for the action; and 2) advise of the obligation to appeal to the
administrative agency. Id. at 369. Here, the Hamlins had actual notice of the
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reasons for the Compliance Administrator’s action. The July 9, 2004 letter advised
that over 50 vehicles were on the Hamlins’ property and, in the absence of a
conditional use permit, the law allowed only for three at most. Additionally, the
December 17, 2004 cease and desist order specified that the presence of the “50+
vehicles” violated the county zoning ordinance and ordered their removal.
Moreover, the Hamlins had actual notice of their obligation to
administratively appeal the Compliance Administrator’s action when the Hamlins
and their counsel were advised during the September 21, 2006 conditional use
permit hearing before the Board of Adjustments that the December 17, 2004 cease
and desist order had never been appealed. Following receipt of this information
the Hamlins not only failed to appeal the cease and desist order within thirty days,
they instead waited almost sixty days, and even then addressed it before the circuit
court, rather than the administrative agency.
In short, the period of time in which to appeal the Compliance
Officer’s December 17, 2004 cease and desist order has expired. Accordingly, the
issue of whether the Hamlins have any right to maintain a junkyard on their
property is settled, so long as the order is not void. The resolution of this issue
depends upon our analysis of the October 19, 2006 order.
II. THE OCTOBER 19, 2006 ORDER DENYING THE HAMLINS’
REQUEST FOR A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT
A. Relevant facts leading up to the order
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Unlike the previous order, the history of the October 19, 2006 order is
far more complicated. And, it is made more complicated by the fact that the
Hamlins’ appeal of the October 19, 2006 order does not actually represent an
appeal of that order at all. Rather, the Hamlins’ ostensible appeal of that order is,
at its heart, a collateral attack upon the validity of the December 17, 2004 cease
and desist order.
As stated above, Robert Hamlin was personally served with a criminal
summons from the Boyle District Court on June 25, 2005. The summons alleged
that Robert had violated the Boyle County zoning ordinance by maintaining a
junkyard on his property without either obtaining a conditional use permit or
registering his junkyard as a nonconforming use, and it referenced as its basis the
December 17, 2004 cease and desist order.
On March 31, 2006, as a condition of holding the criminal
proceedings in abeyance, Robert and Mary applied to the Danville-Boyle County
Board of Adjustment for a conditional use permit to allow for a junkyard on their
property. A number of adjoining property owners, who stated that they would be
seriously injured if such a permit were granted, intervened and opposed the
Hamlins’ application. The sole issue before the Board was whether to grant or
deny the Hamlins’ application for a conditional use permit.
The confusion surrounding the October 19, 2006 order resolving the
matter of their application began at a September 21, 2006 hearing before the
Board. In their brief, the Hamlins state that the question of whether they had any
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preexisting right to maintain a junkyard on their property constituted no part of the
proceedings before the Board of Adjustments relating to their application for a
conditional use permit.4 The record of those proceedings, however, contradicts this
statement. There, the Hamlins’ counsel asked the Board if it would allow the
Hamlins to register their junkyard as a nonconforming use (i.e., recognize that they
had a preexisting right to operate a junkyard) as an alternative to issuing them a
conditional use permit:
Counsel: Robert believes that this property was, quote,
grandfathered into the zoning ordinance. Your zoning
ordinance has a requirement in it that if it’s there at the
adoption of the ordinance, you have sixty days to register
it with the commission. Robert indicates to me he was
not aware of that requirement and did not register it. I
believe had he registered it, we would not even be here
today.
....
Robert was cited under a criminal statute in district court.
We raised the issue of the preexisting condition or the
grandfather clause. In pretrial talks with Mr. Campbell
and a representative of your commission, at their request
we agreed to ask for a conditional use permit to sort of
satisfy hopefully and cooperate with the commission and
everyone, as to both the existence and location of this
material.
....
So what we’re really asking, depending on how your
attorney advises you, is either to waive the 60-day
requirement, let use register, because that’s all that
4
The Hamlins clarify that any discussion of whether they had a right to maintain a junkyard on
their property would have been “illogical since a request for a conditional use permit involves
the assumption that one has no legal right to a specific use[,]” and that “a claim of right . . .
would not necessitate a conditional use.”
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technically is keeping us from operating legally under
your ordinance, and give us a conditional use permit with
reasonable and appropriate restrictions.
The Hamlins concluded their argument before the Board without
offering any evidence demonstrating that their junkyard was essential to or
promoted the public health, safety, and welfare in the area where it is located. Nor,
for that matter, did the Hamlins offer any evidence demonstrating how or why their
junkyard qualified as a nonconforming use that could be registered.
The intervening landowners then presented their case before the
Board. They urged the Board not to waive the Hamlins’ failure to register their
junkyard as a nonconforming use. They argued that, to be a nonconforming use,
the use in question had to have been legal prior to the adoption of any zoning
ordinance making it nonconforming.5 To demonstrate that the junkyard could not
have been a preexisting legal use, they introduced the Compliance Administrator’s
December 17, 2004 cease and desist order as an exhibit, as well as copies of the
zoning ordinance as it appeared at all times relevant to the Hamlins’ operation of
their junkyard, which demonstrated that the Hamlins’ use of their property as a
junkyard had never been legal at any time. They also argued that because the
Hamlins had never appealed the December 17, 2004 order’s essential
5
This theory tracks the language of KRS 100.253(1), which provides that “The lawful use of a
building or premises, existing at the time of the adoption of any zoning regulations affecting it,
may be continued, although such use does not conform to the provisions of such regulations,
except as otherwise provided herein.” However, it ignores the alternate rule for determining
nonconforming uses, which is specified in KRS 100.235(3). That rule specifies that “Any use
which has existed illegally and does not conform to the provisions of the zoning regulations, and
has been in continuous existence for a period of ten (10) years, and which has not been the
subject of any adverse order or other adverse action by the administrative official during said
period, shall be deemed a nonconforming use.”
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determination that the Hamlins had no right to use their property as a junkyard, the
issue could not be raised.
On October 19, 2006, the Board of Adjustment voted to deny the
Hamlins’ application for a conditional use permit. In its written opinion, the Board
concluded that the Hamlins produced no evidence demonstrating that their
proposed conditional use (i.e., junkyard) was essential to, or promoted, the public
health, safety, and welfare in the area where it is located. Further, the Board held
that there were no conditions that the Board could impose which would effectively
prevent the aesthetic, environmental, and economic damage which the conditional
use would cause.
Finally, the Board’s opinion also stated that its denial meant that the
junkyard was not protected as a preexisting and nonconforming, or
“grandfathered,” use “because there has not been a conditional use permit granted
for this property and the Zoning Ordinance in effect when the junkyard was created
required a conditional use permit for junkyards[.]”
B. Relevant facts subsequent to the order
As stated above, on November 17, 2006, the Hamlins petitioned the
Boyle Circuit Court for a declaration of rights. As it relates to this October 19,
2006 order, the Hamlins included with that petition an appeal, pursuant to KRS
100.347. There, the Hamlins did not contest the Board’s denial of their request for
a conditional use permit or whether its denial was supported by substantial
evidence of record. Instead, the Hamlins took umbrage with that portion of the
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Board’s order stating that its denial of the conditional use permit meant that their
junkyard was not protected as a preexisting and nonconforming use. They
contended only that the use of their property was exempt from any regulation (i.e.,
that it qualified as a preexisting nonconforming use per KRS 100.253(3)) because
they had illegally maintained a junkyard on their property and had received no
adverse order regarding that junkyard for a period exceeding ten years.
On this basis, the Hamlins asked the circuit court for the following
relief: (1) an order overturning the October 19, 2006 order of the Board and
allowing the Hamlins to continue operating the junkyard on their property as a
nonconforming use; (2) a declaration, pursuant to KRS 418.040, that the Hamlins’
junkyard qualified under KRS 100.253(3) as a valid nonconforming use; and (3) an
injunction to prevent enforcement of any order prohibiting the Hamlins from
maintaining a junkyard on their property. In sum, the Hamlins asked the circuit
court to declare that they had a right to maintain a junkyard on their property. As
such, the Hamlins’ appeal of the October 19, 2006 order necessarily attacked the
validity of the Compliance Administrator’s December 17, 2004 cease and desist
order.
Two groups opposed the Hamlins in this action: (1) the governmental
appellees, which consisted of the Danville-Boyle County Board of Adjustment, the
Danville-Boyle County Planning and Zoning Commission, and their respective
members in their official capacities; and (2) the same group of adjoining
landowners who had intervened before the Board of Adjustment. Both groups
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asked the circuit court for an injunction, based upon the December 17, 2004 cease
and desist order, to force the Hamlins to remove the vehicles from their property.
And, as stated above, both groups argued that this order was enforceable because
the Hamlins did not administratively appeal it within thirty days of its issuance and
could not contest its merits before the circuit court.
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the
governmental appellees and intervening landowners, holding that the Hamlins
could not litigate the issue of nonconforming use because they had failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies by timely appealing the December 17, 2004
cease and desist order. The circuit court also held that because the Hamlins could
not appeal the December 17, 2004 order and because substantial evidence
supported the denial of the conditional use permit, they likewise could not contest
the issuance of an injunction to enforce it. The Hamlins appealed.
C. Analysis: Whether the Hamlins may collaterally attack the validity of the
December 17, 2004 order
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the Hamlins that the October
19, 2006 opinion and order of the Board, from which this appeal ostensibly arises,
could not have disposed of whether the Hamlins had any kind of right to maintain a
junkyard on their property. It appears that the Hamlins put the subject of their
right to maintain a junkyard on their property at issue in those proceedings and the
October 19, 2006 order purports to have decided that issue. However, the question
of the Hamlins’ right to maintain a junkyard on their property had already been
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answered in the negative and disposed of, prior to October 19, 2006, in the
Compliance Administrator’s December 17, 2004 cease and desist order. As a
consequence, that part of the Board’s opinion addressing this matter was purely
advisory and could not somehow revitalize the period of time for appealing the
December 17, 2004 cease and desist order if that time had expired.
In most cases, this result would mandate dismissing the remainder of
this appeal. However, if the December 17, 2004 cease and desist order was void
for want of jurisdiction either of the person or subject matter, then it is subject to
collateral attack. Grooms v. Grooms, 225 Ky. 228, 7 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1928). A
collateral attack of a judgment differs from a direct attack of a judgment; where a
direct attack calls a judgment into question in a proceeding for a new trial, through
an appeal, or through an action to vacate, modify, or set it aside for fraud, a
collateral attack is an attack made on a judgment in any other way.6 Id. This rule
6
We treat the Hamlins’ ostensible appeal of the October 19, 2006 order as a collateral attack
upon the validity of the December 17, 2004 cease and desist order, as it does not constitute a
direct attack upon the December 17, 2004 cease and desist order and could succeed only if the
underlying action of the enforcement officer was void for want of jurisdiction. This strategy was
originally recognized in Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 11, 215 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1942):
[T]he right to an injunction or declaratory judgment in
circumvention of a hearing and determination by similar
administrative agencies has been denied because of the adequacy
of the legal remedies through use of the statutory administrative
processes, which are regarded as exclusive when the case is within
their purview. But direct judicial relief is held available without
exhaustion of administrative remedies where the statute is charged
to be void on its face, or where the complaint raises an issue of
jurisdiction as a mere legal question, not dependent upon disputed
facts, so that an administrative denial of the relief sought would be
clearly arbitrary. The concept of the term jurisdiction embraces
action, or contemplated action, by the body without power and in
the given case, it is necessary for the judiciary to restrain the
agency in order to prevent irreparable injury.
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applies with equal force to administrative decisions made by an agency acting in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. Department of Conservation v. Sowders, 244
S.W.2d 464, 467 (Ky. 1951). See also Kentucky Bd. of Hairdressers and
Cosmetologists, 393 S.W.2d at 888 (“judicial relief [as distinguished from
administrative appeal process] is always available to directly attack a void
administrative order.”) The rule, then, is that if a judgment is collaterally attacked,
the court will merely determine whether the court or agency wherein it was
rendered had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of the action.
Rollins v. Board of Drainage Com'rs. of McCracken County for Mayfield
Drainage Dist. No. 1, 281 Ky. 771, 136 S.W.2d 1094, 1097 (1939). It is well
understood, however, that “judgment may not be so impeached for mere errors or
irregularities committed in the course of the proceeding by the court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction.” City of Hickman v. First Nat. Bank in City & State of N.Y., 307
Ky. 702, 211 S.W.2d 801, 802 (1948).
The Hamlins argue that the Compliance Administrator did not have
jurisdiction to render its order and that its order was consequently void because (1)
Mary Hamlin was an indispensible party and the order does not name her; and (2)
(Internal citations omitted.) This tactic has also been utilized and discussed in other cases,
including Kentucky Board of Hairdressers and Cosmetologists v. Stevens, 393 S.W.2d 866 (Ky.
1965); Greater Cincinnati Marine Service, Inc. v. City of Ludlow, 602 S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1980);
Alcorp, Inc. v. Barton, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2003 WL 22064248 (Ky. App.); and Thomas v.
Cynthiana-Harrison County-Berry Joint Planning Com’n, Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2008 WL
4601243 (Ky. App.).
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the Hamlins did not receive the December 17, 2004 cease and desist order in the
mail. In sum, they contend that personal jurisdiction was lacking. We disagree.
The rules regarding the necessity of joining “indispensable parties” to
litigation are defined by the requirements of CR 19.01. However, the Civil Rules,
and particularly CR 19.01, do not apply in this type of proceeding until after the
appeal has been perfected to the circuit court. Board of Adjustments of City of
Richmond v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1978). See also CR 1. Accordingly, CR
19.01 cannot supply a basis to void this order.7 Moreover, regardless of any
joinder issues, the injunction against Robert applies to Mary with equal force
because Mary received actual notice of the injunction as a result of the circuit
court’s order and has been a co-owner of the property with Robert at all relevant
times. See CR 65.02(2) (“Every restraining order or injunction shall be binding
upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, and attorneys; and upon other
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of
the restraining order or injunction by personal service or otherwise.”) As such, we
cannot find that the order is void on this basis.
Also, while the Hamlins argue they did not receive a copy of the cease
and desist order in the mail, the order is not void as a result. In Godman, supra, a
landowner similarly did not receive notice of an adverse action taken by an
enforcement officer via certified mail. However, we emphasized that the
7
Although tangential to this issue, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has also held that a nonparty
cannot collaterally attack a judgment on the ground that CR 19.01 had not been complied with.
Murphy v. Lexington-Fayette County Airport Bd., 472 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Ky. 1971).
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determination was not void for lack of notice because the landowner had actual
notice of the enforcement officer’s determination (i.e., he acknowledged receipt of
the letter). Id. at 369. In the case at bar, the Hamlins likewise had actual notice of
the enforcement officer’s determination; even assuming that Robert Hamlin never
received it in the mail, he certainly was made aware of it as a result of the June 27,
2005 criminal summons, and it was introduced as an exhibit at the September 21,
2006 conditional use permit hearing. Robert Hamlin and his attorney (who
represented both Robert and Mary) attended that hearing. As such, Robert and
Mary Hamlin had actual notice of this order and its contents, at the latest, on
September 21, 2006. In light of the above, we cannot consider this order void or
subject to collateral attack.
CONCLUSION
Considering these facts, as well as the total circumstances of this case,
we agree with the circuit court and find that the Hamlins’ appellate rights have
expired. And when the Hamlins failed to avail themselves of an appeal within
thirty days, as mandated by KRS 100.261, the cease and desist order became final
and not subject to appellate review. As such, the injunction must stand, and we
affirm the decision of the Boyle Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
JOINT BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
David A. Franklin
Charles W. Curry
Lexington, Kentucky
Bruce E. Smith
Nicholasville, Kentucky
Merle C. Clark
Danville, Kentucky
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