CLARK (RANDALL BENNETT), ET AL. VS. WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 12, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000599-MR
RANDALL BENNETT CLARK;
SALLY C. TAPSCOTT; JOHN
TAPSCOTT; KEITH BRANSON
CLARK; KRISTIA CLARK; SUSAN
DOBRUSIN; ROB DOBRUSIN;
JEAN CLARK HOUGHTON; DAN
HOUGHTON; HOWARD BROWN
CLARK, JR.; AND TAMI CLARK
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-01827
BOARD OF REGENTS OF WESTERN
KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Appellants (“the Clarks”) appeal from a judgment entered
by the Warren Circuit Court upholding the power of the Board of Regents of
Western Kentucky University (“WKU”) to condemn certain property of the Clarks
for the purpose of constructing an educational facility thereon to house WKU’s
College of Education and Behavioral Sciences (“CEBS”).2 For the following
reasons, we affirm.
Prior to entering its judgment, the trial court conducted a hearing to
determine whether WKU had the right to take the Clarks’ property by eminent
domain. The record reflects that WKU planned to construct a new CEBS building
on the Clarks’ property, and the other seven parcels of property WKU acquired in
the same vicinity. According to WKU, the construction of a new building was
necessary because Tate Hall, which currently houses the CEBS, had deteriorated
beyond the point of repair. However, WKU could not simply raze Tate Hall and
construct a new building on the same site because no space was available on
campus to temporarily relocate the more than 200 faculty and staff who occupy
Tate Hall, and the thousands of students who attend classes in the building, while
construction was ongoing.
After relocating faculty, staff and students to the new CEBS building,
WKU planned to use Tate Hall as “swing space” during the construction of a
replacement building for Grise Hall, which currently houses WKU’s College of
2
The Kentucky Supreme Court has previously upheld Clark’s ability to challenge the
interlocutory judgment by means of an appeal under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 73.02.
Board of Regents v. Clark, 276 S.W.3d 819 (Ky. 2009).
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Business. WKU then planned to raze Tate Hall so that the site could become part
of the adjoining South Lawn, on which numerous campus activities take place.
WKU articulated tentative future plans to expand surrounding campus buildings
onto South Lawn.
With the assistance of an architectural firm, WKU researched and
considered numerous sites adjacent to campus where the new CEBS building could
be built. Based on factors such as location, accessibility, convenience, and
construction logistics, the eastern edge of campus, where the Clarks’ property was
located, was found to provide the best opportunity for future campus growth.
WKU successfully negotiated the purchase of seven other properties located near
the Clarks, but after eleven months of negotiation, was unable to reach an
agreement with the Clarks.
The Clarks’ property was owned by eight members of the Clark
family. During negotiations with WKU, the Clarks were represented, albeit
informally, by Howard Brown (H.B.) Clark, who evidently had the power to
accept, reject, and propose purchase sale agreements for the property. The first
appraisal obtained by WKU assessed the fair market value of the Clarks’ property
at $140,000 and WKU offered to pay $150,000. This offer was rejected. The
second appraisal valued the property at $152,000 and WKU offered to pay
approximately $167,000. This offer was also rejected. As a final alternative,
WKU offered to pay the Clarks in the form of a unitrust, whereby the Clarks would
receive approximately $250,000 over fourteen and a half years. The Clarks
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refused this offer, and instead expressed a desire to receive either $250,000 in cash
or $315,000 in the form of a unitrust, based on an appraisal they received which
valued the property at approximately $300,000. In adhering to its common
practice of only paying a maximum of ten percent above the appraised value of any
property it attempts to acquire, WKU maintained its offer of approximately
$167,000.
Since the parties could not reach an agreement, WKU filed a petition
for condemnation pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, KRS 416.540
et seq. KRS 416.550 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever any condemnor cannot, by agreement
with the owner thereof, acquire the property right,
privileges or easements needed for any of the uses or
purposes for which the condemnor is authorized by law,
to exercise its right of eminent domain, the condemnor
may condemn such property, property rights, privileges
or easements pursuant to the provisions of KRS 416.550
to 416.670.
WKU’s petition alleged, in part, that “condemnation is necessary to fulfill
construction of a replacement building for the WKU’s College of Education and
Behavioral Sciences, in accordance with authorization of the Kentucky General
Assembly and the WKU’s Facilities Master Plan.” Following the hearing on the
petition, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
interlocutory judgment granting WKU’s petition to acquire the Clarks’ property
through eminent domain. This appeal followed.
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We review the trial court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard and the legal issues de novo. See God’s Ctr. Found. Inc. v. LexingtonFayette Urban County Gov’t, 125 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Ky.App. 2002) (applying the
clearly erroneous and de novo standards of review to a condemnation case in
which the trial court conducted a bench trial).
Factual findings are not clearly erroneous if they are
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence
has been conclusively defined by Kentucky courts as that
which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence,
has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the
mind of a reasonable person. It is within the province of
the trial court as the fact-finder to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to the
evidence. Although the factors of necessity and public
use associated with condemnation are ultimately legal
issues, resolution of those issues encompasses factual
matters subject to deferential review on appeal.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
On appeal, the Clarks argue that the court’s judgment was erroneous,
as WKU acted in bad faith during negotiations and, as a matter of law, WKU’s
taking by eminent domain was unjustifiable. With respect to their bad faith claim,
the Clarks stress that WKU’s campus expansion onto their property was not part of
its “Master Plan” so as to provide notice of future growth to property owners, that
WKU’s offer to purchase their property preceded the General Assembly’s approval
for funding of the construction project, and that WKU failed to communicate with
all Clark property owners during negotiations. The Clarks further argue that the
taking was unjustifiable, as the purported need for the condemned land bore an
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unreasonable relation to the public interest, emphasizing that future use of the
former Tate Hall site as “green space” on the South Lawn was not a reasonable
public necessity so as to justify the taking.
WKU maintains that it, in good faith, negotiated extensively with the
Clarks during the eleven months preceding the filing of its petition for
condemnation, and provides a “negotiation timeline” documenting the parties’
communications in support of its assertion. Moreover, WKU points out that H.B.
Clark was the designated representative of the Clark family and that
communications with him were presumably conveyed to other family members
who owned the property. WKU further asserts that selection of the Clarks’
property as the optimal site for the new CEBS building was not arbitrary and
details the site selection process in support of its contention. While WKU
concedes that authorization of the condemnation by its Board of Regents occurred
subsequent to its negotiations with the Clarks, and that the expansion was not part
of WKU’s “Master Plan,” it disputes the materiality of these issues with respect to
whether the taking was an abuse of its discretion, unjustifiable, or an exercise in
bad faith.
Finally, with regard to the future use of the former Tate Hall site,
WKU reaffirms its plan to use the site as “swing space” during ongoing
construction and to eventually integrate the site into South Lawn, onto which
campus buildings may be expanded in the future. WKU avers that the taking is not
for the purpose of creating “green space;” rather, the taking is necessary for the
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construction of a new CEBS building, although the former Tate Hall site may
eventually become part of the South Lawn. WKU asserts that any uncertainty as to
the future use of the former Tate Hall site beyond what is currently planned is not
dispositive of the issue of whether a public necessity presently exists.
The trial court found that WKU’s selection of the site for the new
CEBS building was made in the best interest of WKU and its educational mission
and that no evidence of bad faith or fraud in the process utilized by WKU to
identify and select the site for the project was presented. The court further found
that WKU made reasonable efforts to negotiate with the Clarks for the purchase of
their property prior to filing its petition for condemnation. While the court did not
address the materiality of the issues concerning the timing of Board approval for
funding of the project, and the project’s absence in WKU’s “Master Plan,”
nonetheless, the Clarks fail to provide any authority, as required by CR3 76.12, to
support its contention that this action, or inaction, on behalf of WKU evinces bad
faith so as to disturb the deference we afford to the court’s findings on appeal. As
a result, we decline to address the merits of this claim.
As a matter of law, the court held that WKU did not act arbitrarily or
in excess of its authority and that the taking was a reasonable public necessity so as
to justify WKU’s exercise of its eminent domain power. No dispute exists that
WKU, as a public university, has the authority to condemn property through the
sovereign power of eminent domain of the Commonwealth. KRS 164.410(1). The
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-7-
limitations on this power are the constitutionally imposed restrictions “that the
taking be for ‘public use’ and the condemnee receive ‘just compensation.’” God’s
Center, 125 S.W.3d at 299 (citing, in n.9, Ky. Const. §§ 13, 242; The Eminent
Domain Act, KRS 416.540-680; V.T.C. Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d
573 (Ky. 1957); Barker v. Lannert, 310 Ky. 843, 222 S.W.2d 659, 663 (1949)).
Furthermore:
The taking of private property for a non-public use may
also offend due process and the prohibition on the
arbitrary exercise of power in Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution. Generally, the condemning body has broad
discretion in exercising its eminent domain authority
including the amount of land to be taken. A
determination by the condemnor that the taking is a
necessity is ordinarily conclusive, but the courts will
review the condemning body’s exercise of discretion for
arbitrariness or action in excess of its authority. The
condemnor’s decision on the amount of land to be
condemned will be disturbed only if it is unreasonable in
relation to the public interest or welfare involved and the
condemnor may consider the future, as well as the
present, needs for the taking. Kentucky courts have also
imposed a duty on the condemnor to negotiate in good
faith the acquisition of the property prior to seeking
condemnation.
God’s Center, 125 S.W.3d at 299-300 (citations omitted).
Finally, “[t]he party challenging the condemnation . . . bears the
burden of establishing the lack of necessity or public use and abuse of discretion.”
Id. at 300. In the present case, the Clarks have failed to meet their burden. Thus,
we conclude that the factual findings made by the court in support of its rulings
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were supported by substantial evidence and the court did not err in concluding that
WKU did not act arbitrarily or in excess of its authority in seeking condemnation.
The judgment of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David F. Broderick
Christopher T. Davenport
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Greg N. Stivers
Scott D. Laufenberg
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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