CALLIHAN (WALTER) VS. GRAYSON RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE CORPORATION
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RENDERED: JANUARY 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000533-MR
WALTER CALLIHAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00757
GRAYSON RURAL ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Walter Callihan appeals from an order of the Greenup
Circuit Court dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction and imposing
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
sanctions against him for frivolous and repetitious filings. For the reasons stated
herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On November 1, 2007, Callihan filed a complaint against Grayson
Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation (Grayson) and the Public Service
Commission of Kentucky (PSC). According to the complaint, Callihan sought a
court order forcing Grayson to sell electricity to him or, in the alternative, to eject
Grayson from his residential service area and order the Kentucky Power Company
to provide electric service to the area.
After Callihan filed a successful motion to recuse, Judge C. David
Hagerman was appointed to preside over the case. Callihan then filed a motion to
recuse Judge Hagerman, which was denied. In January 2008, Grayson and PSC
filed motions for dismissal, arguing that the PSC, not the trial court, had exclusive
jurisdiction over Callihan’s claim pursuant to KRS Chapter 278. After Callihan
filed a response, the trial court issued an order granting the motions to dismiss
against Callihan.
The trial court’s order, in pertinent part, provided the following:
Pursuant to KRS 278.040(2) PSC, an agency of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, has exclusive jurisdiction
over the regulation of rates and service of utilities. KRS
278.260(1) vests original jurisdiction with the PSC over
complaints pertaining to the rates or service of any
utility. Carr vs. Cincinnati Bell Telephone. Inc., 651
S.W.2nd 126 (Ky.App. 1983). The statutory framework
also places exclusive jurisdiction with the PSC for
matters pertaining to the boundaries and territories in
which retail electric suppliers may operate. The Greenup
Circuit Court is not the proper forum in which to litigate
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the subject matter of Callihan's complaint. Moreover,
Callihan has failed to effect service of process on the
Kentucky Attorney General pursuant to CR 4.04(6).
The trial court further ruled Callihan in violation of CR2 11 and ordered him to pay
Grayson’s attorney’s fees and required him to obtain the leave of court before
filing any further pleadings. This appeal followed.
Callihan contends that the trial court erroneously found that his
complaint was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PSC. He contends that his
complaint was within the trial court’s jurisdiction, because his complaint related to
his electric service rather than the geographic boundaries of the service. We
disagree.
“Kentucky has recognized the right of a customer to sue a utility in
circuit court in certain instances but in other cases has held that jurisdiction was in
the state regulatory commission.” Carr v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 126,
127 (Ky.App. 1983). KRS 278.040(2) provides that the jurisdiction of the PSC
shall extend to all utilities and shall “have exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation
of rates and service of utilities....” Generally, the PSC has exclusive jurisdiction
regarding the quality or quantity of service but matters peculiar to an individual
complainant are within the jurisdiction of the courts. Id. at 128.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly
dismissed Callihan’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Although Callihan
disagrees, he failed to allege a personally peculiar claim permitting the trial court
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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR).
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to assert jurisdiction over the matter in dispute. While we recognize that
Callihan’s pleadings were pro se and imprecise, Callihan was required to state a
claim sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court but failed to do so.
Ultimately, Callihan’s request to require a particular utility company to service his
residence lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PSC. Cincinnati Bell, Inc.,
651 S.W.2d at 128.
Callihan next contends that the trial court erred by imposing sanctions
against him. Specifically, Callihan contends that the trial court’s sanctions denied
him due process, his rights provided under Kentucky law, and his rights provided
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We disagree.
In its order dismissing Callihan’s complaint and imposing sanctions,
the trial court wrote the following:
Also before the Court is a motion by GRECC for costs
and attorney fees against Callihan. Rule 11 of the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that
in signing a pleading a party is certifying that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry that the pleading is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law and that the pleading is not interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass or cause delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. The subject
matter of Callihan's complaint has been asserted in many
prior actions in the Greenup Circuit Court, United States
District Court and the Public Service Commission. All
of these actions have resulted in denial of relief because
they were not supported either factually or legally. It is
unclear to the undersigned why Callihan persists in filing
these silly actions. What is clear, however, is that these
frivolous lawsuits require the time and efforts of judges,
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deputy clerks, secretaries, process servers and various
other court personnel, all of whom are compensated with
public funds from the tax dollars of hard-working
Kentuckians. These actions not only waste the taxpayer's
resources but also cause parties who are wrongfully sued
to incur costs of litigation, not to mention that it diverts
the court's attention away from cases in which legitimate
claims are being litigated.
On November 14, 2001, an order was entered in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky by Hon. Joseph M. Hood addressing this very
same conduct on the part of Callihan. Said order is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Judge Hood found that
Callihan has abused his right of access to the federal and
state courts by filing frivolous lawsuits against officials,
particularly judicial officers and the instant defendants
(Commonwealth of Kentucky). The order went on to
impose sanctions against Callihan pursuant to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C.
Section 1651(a). The order also enjoined Callihan from
filing suits in federal or state court unless the suit met
various criteria to ensure that it was in compliance with
Rule 11.
On October 25, 2004, another order was entered in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky by Hon. Karl S. Forester. A copy of same is
attached as Exhibit 2. Referring to the previous order
entered by Judge Hood, Judge Forester noted that
Callihan had proceeded to file additional civil actions
without having first paid (sic) sanctions and providing
the requisite verification within the purview of Judge
Hood's prior order. Judge Forester placed additional
sanctions and conditions upon Callihan which are also
appropriate in state court.
The Court has reviewed the affidavit submitted by
counsel for GRECC and finds that the legal expenses for
GRECC which were incurred in defending against this
ridiculous action are reasonable and are in the amount of
$1,524.00. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Callihan is
sanctioned pursuant to CR 11 and is to pay the
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aforementioned amount to GRECC. In addition thereto,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Greenup Circuit
Court Clerk shall not accept any pleadings or filings from
Callihan until he can show proof that he has paid the
aforementioned sanction to GRECC. Any pleadings
received by mail from Callihan are to be returned to him
by the clerk unfiled. If the sanctions are eventually paid,
the clerk shall not accept and file any pleadings tendered
by Callihan until the Judge of the Greenup Circuit Court
has reviewed same and determined that they are not in
violation of CR 11 and can survive a motion to dismiss
brought under CR 12.
The Court also heard sworn testimony from Carol Ann
Fraley, President and Chief Executive Officer of
Defendant, GRECC. The testimony, which the Court
finds to be compelling and credible, demonstrates that
Callihan has on multiple occasions entered the business
office of GRECC and engaged in harassing behavior
toward female employees to intimidate them. This
conduct consists of standing over employees, speaking
very loud and almost shouting, making threatening
gestures and throwing papers. This Court, sua sponte,
orders that Callihan is restrained from entering onto the
business premises of Defendant GRECC and in the event
he does so any peace officer is ordered to take Callihan
into custody and lodge him in the Greenup County
Detention Center until further orders of this court.
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, “we think where sanctions are
imposed our role requires a multi-standard approach, that is, a clearly erroneous
standard to the trial court's findings in support of sanctions, a de novo review of the
legal conclusion that a violation occurred, and an abuse of discretion standard on
the type and/or amount of sanctions imposed.” Clark Equipment Co., Inc. v.
Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Ky.App. 1988). From a review of the record,
Callihan has not disputed the factual findings of the trial court and the record
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appears to support the trial court’s factual findings. Thus, we conclude that the
factual findings of the trial court were not clearly erroneous.
The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s ruling was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000). The
trial court documented Callihan’s multiple unsuccessful filings of the same action
which required Grayson to continuously expend its time and financial resources in
defending a frivolous and repetitious action. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees.
Regarding the trial court’s order prohibiting Callihan from filing all
court actions until Grayson’s attorney’s fees are paid, we conclude that this
sanction was overly broad because it unreasonably denied Callihan meaningful
access to the courts considering that many less onerous remedies were available.
In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115
L.Ed.2d 27 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that courts of justice necessarily
have certain implied powers due to the nature of the institution. Although our
courts have not explored this area to the same extent as federal courts, it is clear
that Kentucky courts have the statutory and inherent power to control the
disposition of the actions on its dockets to provide timely and effective judicial
administration. CR 11; Rehm v. Clayton, 132 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Ky. 2004).
Addressing the issue of restricting access to the courts based on
judicial sanctions, in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1,
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3, 113 S.Ct. 397, 398, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), the United States Supreme Court
explained that every paper filed to a court requires some portion of its limited
resources; and, thus, in cases where a pro se litigant files repetitious and frivolous
claims, a court can bar his prospective filings to prevent the deleterious effect of
such filings on its scarce judicial resources. When such restrictions are ordered,
the Court expressed the opinion that sanctions should be limited to addressing the
frivolous and repetitive matter necessitating the order. Id.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Feathers v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264 (6th.Cir. 1998), stated that “[t]here is nothing unusual
about imposing prefiling restrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or
vexatious litigation.” Id. at 269. While a court should “protect its ability to carry
out its constitutional functions against the threat of onerous, multiplicitous, and
baseless litigation,” a court’s restriction on prospective filings should not be overly
broad to the extent of denying a petitioner meaningful access to the courts.
Abdullah v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487, 488 (2nd.Cir. 1985).
While the trial court properly imposed limitations on Callihan’s
ability to file actions relating to his frivolous and repetitious claim, its blanket
prohibition against Callihan filing any action impermissibly deprived Callihan of
adequate access to our courts. As stated by multiple federal courts, the prohibition
from filing actions must be constrained to the frivolous and repetition matter taxing
the court’s resources. Id. While we are empathetic to the onerous plight of our
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trial courts in handling vexatious litigants, litigants cannot be prevented from filing
meritorious claims involving matters unrelated to their frivolous litigation. Id.
Moreover, the sanction in this case constituted a civil judgment in
which Callihan was made personally liable for paying Grayson’s attorney’s fees.
Mays v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Ky. 1962) (a judgment rendered
during proceedings which are civil in nature constitutes a civil judgment). Thus,
the trial court, and Grayson, had multiple other methods to enforce the monetary
judgment beyond a blanket prohibition from accessing the courts. Jackson v. Law
Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne and Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th.Cir. 1989)
(“There is agreement among the circuits, with which we concur, that because
deterrence, not compensation, is the principal goal of Rule 11, courts should
impose the least severe sanction that is likely to deter.”). Finally, we note that a
trial court’s ability to issue sanctions remains as active and robust as ever. We
simply state that a court’s complete barring by sanction of a litigant’s right to file
all claims should be its last resort. Id.
Finally, the trial court’s implementation of a judicial screening
process, where it reviews Callihan’s prospective filings to ensure compliance with
CR 11, was not erroneous. To the contrary, this judicial screening system
establishes a process in which two competing aims can be reconciled: Callihan’s
future claims will receive individualized judicial review and the trial court can
prevent the squandering of its limited resources by preventing repetitious and
frivolous actions. Feathers,141 F.3d at 269-70.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Greenup Circuit Court’s order
dismissing Callihan’s complaint, awarding attorney’s fees, and establishing a
judicial screening process is affirmed, but its decision prohibiting Callihan from
filing all actions until paying Grayson’s attorney’s fees is reversed and this case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Walter Callihan, Pro Se
Argillite, Kentucky
W. Jeffrey Scott
Grayson, Kentucky
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